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Despite the pretensions to antiquity in the Modus Tenendi Parliamenta ... in Hibernia (1692), and 
the claims to sovereignty in Molyneux’s Case of Ireland (1698) the Irish House of Commons from 
1692 looked to Westminster and the parliamentary transformation that followed the 1688 
Revolution not only for constitutional parity of status but also for procedural and operational 
efficiency. The Irish parliaments of the 1690s saw innovation, compromise and improvisation in 
procedures, and after 1703 distinctive historic Irish practices were eclipsed. The main differences 
with Westminster that emerged were adjustments, to operate within Poynings' Law and divergent 
Irish political and constitutional arrangements. The stimulus and conduit for change were a 
growing print culture, the shared political alignment of politics in Westminster and Dublin and 
contacts between politicians and parliamentary officials. Westminster practices were adopted in 
the Commons silently, as standing orders or under the cloak of 'the constitution of parliament', to 
protect emerging patriotic sensibilities.  
The procedural similarities between the two Houses of Commons have been noted in the 
historiography but not examined in detail. While the historiography has moved on from the view 
of the eighteenth century as a crescendo to 1782, 1798 and union, some parts of the legacy still 
colour the approach to the Irish Parliament. First, there is a lingering teleological waiting for the 
removal of the distortions caused by Poynings' Law. Second, there has been a focus on a top-
down management of the Commons, to secure the Government's priorities, which, although 
providing structure to each session, did not take up the bulk of the time that the Commons was in 











Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 2 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 6 
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 7 
Note on spelling, nomenclature, references, dates and figures ........................................ 8 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 Comparison with other legislatures........................................................................... 9 
1.2 Historiographical review .......................................................................................... 13 
1.3 This thesis ............................................................................................................... 20 
2 The administrative organisation of the House of Commons......................................... 25 
2.1 Chichester House ................................................................................................... 25 
2.2 Replacement of Chichester House ......................................................................... 31 
2.3 Conclusions on buildings ........................................................................................ 35 
2.4 Staff of the House of Commons.............................................................................. 36 
2.5 Remuneration of staff of the House of Commons .................................................. 45 
2.6 Journals of the House of Commons ....................................................................... 54 
2.7 Conclusions on staff and clerical organisation ....................................................... 71 
3 The corporate identity and functions of the House of Commons ................................ 73 
3.1 Membership of the House of Commons ................................................................. 74 
3.2 Members’ privilege ................................................................................................ 105 
3.3 Corporate privileges of House of Commons ......................................................... 116 
3.4 Procedural rules and orders made by House of Commons ................................. 121 
3.5 Use of precedents ................................................................................................. 127 
3.6 Position and role of monarch and lord lieutenant ................................................. 139 
3.7 Relations with House of Lords .............................................................................. 149 
3.8 Impeachment ........................................................................................................ 155 
3.9 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 156 
4 The operation of the House of Commons ..................................................................... 159 
4.1 Decision and debate ............................................................................................. 159 
4.2 The parliamentary session .................................................................................... 166 
4.3 Divisions ................................................................................................................ 171 
4.4 The Speaker ......................................................................................................... 174 
4.5 Management of business ...................................................................................... 178 
4.6 The day in the House of Commons ...................................................................... 182 
4.7 Undertaking the management of business ........................................................... 187 
4.8 Legislative procedures .......................................................................................... 195 




4.9 Drafting legislation ................................................................................................ 214 
4.10 Financial powers and procedures ....................................................................... 225 
4.11 Committees ......................................................................................................... 232 
4.12 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 239 
5 Conclusions on the operation, practices and procedures of the Irish House of 
Commons from 1692 to 1730 ................................................................................... 247 
6 Appendices ....................................................................................................................... 254 
6.1 Parliaments and parliamentary sessions from 1692 to 1730 ............................... 254 
6.2 Speakers of the House of Commons (1613 to 1730) ........................................... 258 
6.3 Chairmen and activities of principal committees .................................................. 259 
6.4 Clerks and officers of the House of Commons (1613 to 1730) ............................ 269 
6.5 House of Commons officers' fees (3 Mar 1640/1) ................................................ 277 
6.6 Comparison of selected fees of officers ............................................................... 279 
6.7 Costs incurred in enacting a bill at Westminster ................................................... 281 
6.8 Success rates of legislation .................................................................................. 282 
6.9 Outcome of possible bills on list prepared for 1703–04 session .......................... 284 
6.10 Comparison of private legislation enacted at Dublin and Westminster .............. 286 
6.11 Members who sat in House of Commons before 1692 ...................................... 287 
6.12 Operation of Committee of Privileges and Elections .......................................... 289 
6.13 Procedural orders, rules and precedents of House of Commons ...................... 293 
6.14 Procedures of the House of Commons .............................................................. 313 
6.15 Provisions in the 1707 Act limiting parliamentary privilege ................................ 329 
6.16 Publications aimed as affecting passage of legislation ...................................... 330 
6.17 Matters examined by Committee on the State of the Nation .............................. 331 
6.18 Holidays and fast days ........................................................................................ 332 
6.19 Divisions    . .................................................................................................. 333 
6.20 Comparison of Perceval diaries and Journal entries on timing of sittings .......... 340 
6.21 30 July 1711, items considered 'according to Order' and 'orders of the day' ..... 342 
6.22 Petition requirements .......................................................................................... 348 
6.23 Statistics on petitions .......................................................................................... 349 
6.24 Petitions: content of selected petitions     . ...................................................... 350 
7 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 357 
7.1 Primary Material .................................................................................................... 357 
7.2 Later works  . .................................................................................................... 367 
7.3 Unpublished works ............................................................................................... 383 









Figure 1  Sketch plan of Chichester House ........................................................................ 28 
Figure 2  Parliament House, Dublin, with plan of Chichester House superimposed ........ 34 
Figure 3  Parliament House, Dublin, engraved ground-floor plan, 1767 .......................... 35 
Figure 4  First Printed Votes of Irish House of Commons (10 October 1692) ................... 58 
Figure 5  Example of Irish House of Commons Votes (13 July 1719) ................................ 62 
Figure 6  Example of Westminster House of Commons Votes (11 April 1728) ................. 64 




Table 1 Expenditure on repairs to Chichester House 1700 to 1708 ............................... 31 
Table 2  Appropriations to officers .................................................................................. 53 
Table 3  Remuneration for officers in Irish House of Commons in 1711 compared with 
claims made by officers in Westminster House of Commons in 1713 ............... 54 
Table 4 Members returned at general elections who had sat in a previous parliament74 
Table 5  Members returned at general elections whose fathers had sat or were sitting in 
House of Commons ............................................................................................ 75 
Table 6 Members returned at by-elections between 1715 and 1730 ............................ 76 
Table 7  Election disputes brought to House of Commons.............................................. 79 
Table 8  Double elections after general elections............................................................ 94 
Table 9 Totals voting in divisions from 1695 to 1730 ..................................................... 95 
Table 10  Totals voting in divisions by session in the 1720s .............................................. 96 
Table 11 Average number of Members voting in a parliament ........................................ 97 
Table 12 Requests for leave of absence .......................................................................... 102 
Table 13 Breach of privilege allegations ......................................................................... 110 
Table 14 Addresses presented by House of Commons ................................................... 146 
Table 15 Recipients of addresses (by content) ............................................................... 146 
Table 16 1695–97 session: comparison of heads and bills introduced in House of 
Commons.......................................................................................................... 166 
Table 17 1729–30 session: comparison of heads and bills introduced in House of 
Commons.......................................................................................................... 167 
Table 18 Outcome of petitions seeking private legislation ............................................. 207 
Table 19  Stages reached by failed public legislation in 1720s ........................................ 214 
  





I wish to thank my supervisor, Professor Ian McBride, formerly of King's College London, for his 
advice and support over seven years and Mr Paul Evans, formerly Clerk of the Journals of the 
House of Commons, who read the thesis in draft and made many useful suggestions. Emeritus 
Professor David Hayton of Queen's University Belfast kindly allowed me to read his work on the 
Brodrick correspondence in proof ahead of its publication. Finally, I must thank the librarians in 
London, including the British Library and the Institute of Historical Research, who made 
arrangements for me as a wheelchair-user to have access to hard copies. I would also like to 
thank King's College library which made special arrangements for electronic access to digitised 
material.  
The operation, practices and procedures of the Irish House of Commons from 1692 to 1730 
7 
 
List of Abbreviations 
BL British Library manuscript collections 
c. chapter 
co. county 
CJE and CJGB Journals of the House of Commons of England (to 1707) and of Great 
Britain (from 1707); see bibliography. Roman number indicates volume. 
CJI Journals of the House of Commons of the Kingdom of Ireland, 4
th
 edition; 
see bibliography. Roman number indicates volume. 
CJI (1
st




CSPD Calendar of State Papers Domestic; see bibliography. Where CSPD has 
been used rather than the original source the reference includes CSPD. 
CTB/CTBP Calendar of Treasury Books Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers; see 
bibliography. 
d denarius/ denarii for penny or pence 
DIB  Dictionary of Irish Biography; see bibliography. 
ed.(eds.) editor(s) 
ff and following pages (or entries) 
f./ff. [with number] folio(s) 
fn footnote 
HIP Edith Mary Johnston-Liik, History of the Irish Parliament 1692–1800; see 
bibliography. 
HoP History of Parliament publications, in particular the volumes covering the 
House of Commons at Westminster from 1690 to 1820―for example, 
History of Parliament, Commons 1715–1754, vol. II as HoP(1715)(II); see 
bibliography. 
ILD Irish Legislative Database; see Databases in Bibliography. 
Jr. Junior 
lord lieutenant unless otherwise stated or explicit, lord lieutenant is used generically for 
the chief governors of Ireland and includes lord deputies and lords justices 
l/£ libra/ librae for pound/ pounds 
LJI  Journals of the House of Lords of Ireland; see bibliography. Roman 
number in brackets indicates volume. 
LJE/ LJGB Journals of the House of the Commons of England (to 1707) or of Great 
Britain (from 1707); see bibliography. Roman number indicates volume. 
NS New Style calendar i.e. the Gregorian calendar 
OS Old Style calendar i.e. the Julian calendar 
s solidus/solidi for shilling/ shillings 
SP State Papers series of The National Archives of the United Kingdom 
Sr. Senior 
Votes The daily printed sheets setting out the decisions and orders of the House 
of Commons  
 




Note on spelling, nomenclature, references, dates and figures 
The spelling, punctuation, capitalisation, some archaisms and italicisation of eighteenth-century 
publications and manuscripts have been modernised and contractions expanded.  
Unless indicated otherwise 'administration' is used to refer to the Irish executive in Dublin Castle 
and 'government' to the English or British executive in Whitehall. 
Dates before 1752 are given in Old Style (OS), that is according to the Julian calendar. For the 
avoidance of confusion, where a date falls between 1 January and 24 March the New Style (NS, 
the Gregorian calendar) year is added after a forward slash—for example, 1 February 1703/4 (or 
1729/30). The one exception to this approach is the treatment of parliamentary sessions where 
Gregorian years have been used—thus the session that ran from 10 February 1704/5 to 16 June 
1705 is referred to as the 1705 session and where a session straddles two Gregorian years as, 
for example, 1729–30. 
Financial amounts have usually been rounded to the nearest pound. 
 




 1  Introduction  
The genesis of this thesis was a comment by Edith Johnson-Liik in the introduction to History of 
the Irish Parliament 1692–1800 that the 'Irish parliament modelled itself as closely as possible' on 
the Westminster House of Commons.
1
 While the statement was made in the context of a 
discussion about the printing of the proceedings of the Irish House of Commons, it conveyed a 
broader view―established and elaborated in 1903 by Edward and Annie Porritt in The 
Unreformed House of Commons―that the Dublin legislature from the sixteenth century was on a 
journey to replicate the Westminster Commons. They concluded that, once the complicating 
processes required by Poynings' Law had been removed in 1782, 'it would be difficult for an expert 
in parliamentary procedure to detect any material differences' between the two legislatures.
2
 While 
from the 1970s historians of Ireland have transformed the understanding of many aspects of 
eighteenth-century Ireland and of aspects of the Irish Parliament such as supply procedures and 
the operation of Poynings' Law,
3
 the broad picture of the procedural operation of the Irish 
Commons has not moved much beyond the work of the Porritts. This thesis sets out to examine 
and test the 'close as possible modelling' assumption and how the Commons developed and 
operated in the forty years from 1692.  
1.1  Comparison with other legislatures 
A review of the literature on some comparable legislatures was undertaken. Julian Goodare has 
commented that the Scottish parliament from the Restoration 'began to look and behave more like 
the parliament of England' than a medieval estates.
4
 Alastair Mann in 2003 reviewing the Scottish 
parliament of the 1690s considers that the pre-1707 Scottish parliament had not 'enjoyed a 
particularly high reputation with English and Scottish constitutional writers but that 'the reputation of 
and interest in the Scottish parliament is now the subject of much historiographical revision and 
effort'. Drawing on the work of Kathryn Ellis on the English parliament, Mann juxtaposed changes 
at Westminster with developments in the Edinburgh legislature, in particular: 
                                                        
 
1
  Edith Mary Johnston-Liik, History of the Irish Parliament 1692–1800, 6 vols. (Belfast, 2002), vol. 1, p.14  
2
  Edward [and Annie] Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons: Parliamentary Representation Before 1832, 2 
vols. (Cambridge, 1903), (II), p.187; see also pp.404ff.  
3
  See C.I. McGrath, The Making of the Eighteenth Century Irish Constitution: Government, Parliament and the 
Revenue 1692–1714 (Dublin, 2000) and James Kelly, Poynings' Law and the Making of Law in Ireland 1660–
1800: Monitoring the Constitution (Dublin, 2007). 




a) the regular meeting of parliament instead of sporadic sessions; 
b) the increase in the volume of legislation which resulted in an 'unprecedented number 
of standing orders to fine-tune the procedures of the House in order to cope with the 
greater level of activity' and 'committees became more structured and specialized in 
response to the new level of business, although mostly based on existing models'; 
and  
c) the extension of parliamentary control of the crown's finances.
5
  
All three changes―taking their lead from Westminster―can be seen emerging in Ireland after 
1692. A central point Mann makes is that constitutional change in Scotland―the Claim of Right of 
1689―took longer to be translated into procedural changes in the Scottish parliament than at 
Westminster.
6
 In Ireland in the 1690s attempts were initiated to secure a Bill of Rights but they 
failed in part because the Irish Parliament achieved a productive legislative breakthrough as a 
result of the compromise with Lord Deputy CapeI and it became clear that the government would 
not go further to agree to what Lord Chancellor Methuen called an "impertinent" claim for a Bill of 
Rights.
7
 Molyneux cited Scotland as a model for the relationship between Ireland and England: 'the 
Kingdoms of England and Scotland at this day, [are] without any subordination of the one to the 
other'. But he makes neither an examination of the Scottish parliament nor an explicit claim that 
Ireland should replicate the constitutional changes of the 1688 Revolutions in Scotland and 
England.
8
 Although Ireland had neither a Bill of Rights nor a Claim of Right, the Irish Commons 
copied and adapted some of the procedural changes that flowed from the operational changes that 
emerged at Westminster.  
The work of Pasi Ihalainen and Kari Palonen draws a distinction between the surviving medieval 
estates and diets of Europe and the British Parliament. Some of the Irish Parliament's features can 
be found in ancien-régime estates across Europe. William Doyle has pointed to, for example, the 
'intense confusion of powers and perpetual overlaps of unequal jurisdiction' and the challenging 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
4
  Julian Goodare, 'The Estates in the Scottish Parliament, 1286–1707 ', Parliamentary History, vol. 26, part 1 
(2007), p.32  
5
  Alastair J. Mann, 'Inglorious Revolution: Administrative Muddle and Constitutional Change in the Scottish 
Parliament of William and Mary', 1600–1800, Parliamentary History, vol. 22, part 2 (2003), pp.121-22  
6
  Mann, 'Inglorious Revolution', pp.143  
7
  SP, 63–359 f.123(stamped 264) (To James Vernon, 16 Sep 1697); see also Kelly, Poynings' Law, pp.79-96.  
8
  William Molyneux, The Case of Ireland Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England, Stated (Dublin, 1698), p.55  




and bargaining between estates and central authority' found elsewhere across Europe.
9
 
Particularism was often validated by claims of antiquity. Doyle notes that by the 1690s 'there was 
an extensive mythology', upon which Molyneux liberally drew, about the Irish Parliament's 'origins 
and early powers and development'.
10
 But inherent in the term ancien-régime is a history of 
continuity. Doyle states that 'when territories changed rulers, they seldom changed institutions' and 
implies continuity of institution, people and practices.
11
 The convulsions of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries meant that Ireland could not be a composite state similar to those found 
elsewhere in Europe, where the acquiring ruler depended on a deal with an old elite and undertook 
to preserve pre-merger customs with an estates focussed on defending these 'liberties'.
12
 The 
modern (British) features suggested by Julian Hoppit can be detected―albeit in diluted form―in 
the operation of the Irish Parliament: more frequent and regular sittings; government prepared to 
work through, rather than around, parliament; the normalisation of controversy and discord within a 
resilient legislative process; and the use of the legislature by a propertied elite to protect and 
further their own interests as the state grew.
13
 These tests when applied to the Irish Parliament put 
it in the modern rather than ancien category,
14
 although, in contrast to Britain, there was confusion 
about where the focal point of power lay―Irish Parliament, Whitehall or Westminster. But other 
English/British (and emerging Scottish) characteristics can be detected: the free mandate of 
Members; and its operation as a deliberative decision-making assembly providing an 'agency for 
publicly representing' and changing political views.
15
 The legislative output of the Irish Parliament, 
like that of the Westminster parliament, increased from the 1690s.
16
 The pattern which Hoppit, 
Innes and Styles have identified at Westminster of a legislature receptive to sub-sectional interests 
                                                        
 
9
  William Doyle, 'The British-Irish Union of 1801', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 10 (Dec 2000), 
p.168; for example, he draws attention to features such as the far from open elections in Poland or Sweden that 
were dominated by magnate influence (p.171).  
10
  Doyle, 'Union', p.170  
11
  Doyle, 'Union', p.168  
12
  H.G. Koenigsberger, 'Composite States, Representative Institutions and the American Revolution', Historical 
Research, vol. 62, issue 148 (1989), p.135  
13
  Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? England 1689-1727 (Oxford, 2002), pp.26-27, 135, 311, 493 
14
  Julian Hoppit, 'Reformed and Unreformed Britain, 1689-1701' in William Doyle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Ancien Régime (Oxford, 2012), pp.507-12 
15
  Pasi Ihalainen and Kari Palonen, 'Parliamentary Sources in the Comparative Study of Conceptual History: 
Methodological Aspects and Illustrations of a Research Proposal', Parliaments, Estates and Representation, vol. 
29, issue 1 (2009), pp.17, 20-23, cites the quote from Jeremy Black. 
16
  See section 4.8 and Appendix 6.8. 




that preferred to grant particular rights rather than blank cheques,
17
 is less pronounced in Ireland 
with a higher proportion of public legislation and is constrained by the elite's confessional 
boundaries. That said, the Irish Commons falls on the 'British' side of the line. 
A limited comparison of the literature on legislatures in America provides further background. The 
historiography has shown some similarity with that of Ireland: the concentration on constitutional 
arrangements and disputes; a focus on the end of the eighteenth century colouring earlier 
developments; and what J.P. Greene calls the powerful "mimetic impulses" within colonial 
society,
18
 which chime with developments identified by Hoppit that appeared in Ireland and 
Scotland. Greene sees one of the most significant results of the 1688 Revolution as the 
localisation of power under growing parliamentary institutions, not just within Britain but also in 
Ireland and the American colonies. He points out that it was therefore entirely reasonable for the 
political nation in both Ireland and the colonies to assume that their "mimic parliaments" rested 
upon the same "foundations" and had the same rights and powers within their political jurisdictions 
as did the Parliament at Westminster.
19
 Greene points to parallels with the American colonies, 
where British parliamentary suzerainty was being established from 1688 combined with greater 
economic control through Navigation Acts.
20
 He suggests how these impulses were 
transmitted―for example, through published parliamentary manuals―and affected the lower 
houses of the colonial legislatures which were striving to emulate the Westminster House of 
Commons and so bolster their importance and authority.
21
 Greene maps out the differences under 
which these legislatures and Westminster operated but does not measure the operational effect 
                                                        
 
17
  Julian Hoppit, Joanna Innes and John Styles, 'Towards a History of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660–1800', 
Parliamentary History, vol. 13, issue 1 (Jan 1994), pp.319-20 
18
  Jack P. Greene, 'A Consideration of the Historical and Cultural Roots of Legislative Behavior in the British 
Colonies in the Eighteenth Century', American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 2 (Dec 1969), p.343; see also J.P. 
Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the 
United States 1607–1788 (Georgia, 1986).  
19
  Greene, Peripheries, pp.63-64 
20
  Greene, Peripheries, pp.13, 16 
21
  For the operation of Irish Commons from 1692 Scobell's Memorials (H. S. E. C. P [Henry Scobell], Memorials of 
the Method and Manner of Proceedings in Parliament in Passing Bills Together with several Rules & Customs, 
which by long and constant practice have obtained the Name of Orders of the House Gathered by Observation, 
and out of the Journal Books, from the time of Edward 6. (London, 1656; reprinted 1658, 1670, 1685 and 1689) 
provided guidance, and, where it is in-step with the Irish Commons, it has been noted or footnoted. Scobell was 
working in the early seventeenth century and, while a good guide on the rituals and rules within the chamber and 
on bill procedure, he pre-dates the procedures on supply that emerged in the 1690s. Similarly, Elsynge's Ancient 
Method, taking its cue from the English version of the Modus, covers the calling and opening of a parliament to a 
much greater extent than day-to-day operations. 




within the legislatures of the mimetic impulse.
22
 In America there was no equivalent of Molyneux 
and no one seriously questioned the right of parliament at Westminster to legislate.
23
  
1.2  Historiographical review 
Until comparatively recently, historical research on the eighteenth-century Irish Parliament 
concentrated on the closing decades of the century, the so-called ‘age of reform’, and was heavily 
political in emphasis.
24
 One of the characteristics of Irish historiography has been its intertwining 
with contemporary politics and, as David Hayton has noted, the study of the eighteenth-century 
parliament has been no exception.
25
 The union of Great Britain and Ireland enacted in 1800, which 
terminated the parliament sitting in Dublin, was—and even today is—a live political issue in Ireland 
where the actuality and perceptions of history can be used, to justify current political attitudes and 
attack opponents. The interpretation of politics, and the operation of institutions, at the end of the 
eighteenth century had a direct bearing on politics for more than the following century;
26
 and in 
return those political attitudes coloured examination of the Irish Parliament .
27
 As a result 
historians, many of whom were also politicians, focussed on why the Irish Parliament failed—or 
whether it was bound or deserved to fail—which inevitably drew attention to its constitutional 
position, its sectarian composition and legislation, its levels of 'corruption' and its failure to reform.  
One of the first examinations of the operation of the Irish parliament was Thomas Davis' The Irish 
Parliament of James II, first published in 1843. It set out a model of a 'great Senate',
28
 against 
                                                        
 
22
  Greene, 'Consideration', pp.344-53 
23
  Greene, Peripheries, p.59 
24
  The same can be said for the study of the Irish Parliament in the seventeenth century, Coleman Dennehy notes 
parliamentary processes and institutional history were subordinated to a dominant political narrative until the late 
twentieth century, which sought to account for contemporary arrangements and point the way forward. Coleman A. 
Dennehy, An Administrative and Legal History, 1613–1689, Ph.D. thesis (2011), p.6  
25
  D.W. Hayton (ed.), The Irish Parliament in the Eighteenth Century: The Long Apprenticeship (Edinburgh, 2002), 
p.2  
26
  A pattern of approach also seen in England where the Whig view of history―sharing its name with a political 
party―argued that England was on a trajectory of improvement and this approach dominated academic history 
into the twentieth century. Michael Bentley in his review of historiography―Modernizing England's Past English 
Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870–1970 (Cambridge, 2006)―is unclear when it ended: 1890s, 1914-
18 or 1931. 
27
  See W.E. Hume-Williams, A Short History of the Irish Parliament from 1782/1800 (London, 1879), preface; it also 
led to anachronisms—for example, to J. Roderick O'Flanagan in, Annals, Anecdotes, Traits, and Traditions of the 
Irish Parliaments, 1172 to 1800 (Dublin, 1895), p.41, supporters of Sir John Everard for the Speakership in 1613 
are 'the Nationalists'. 
28
  Thomas Davis, The Patriot Parliament of 1689, [1
st
 edition: Dublin, 1843] (3
rd
 edition, with introduction by Charles 
Gavan Duffy: London, 1893), p.xciii  




which subsequent Irish parliaments could be measured and found wanting.
29
 Using the surviving 
(and hostile) contemporary evidence he produced a positive account of what had been dismissed 
from the 1690s as a 'pretended parliament'.
30
 Davis attached particular importance to the act 
declaring that the English parliament could not legislate for Ireland. By Davis' tests it was not until 
the constitutional changes of 1782―with the virtual removal of Poynings' Law
31
―that Ireland had 
'another Parliament to be proud of'.
32
 He saw the 1689 parliament as pointing the direction and 
providing the programme for the following century. For him Molyneux’s Case of Ireland was 
published within ten years of it and had been influenced by the 1689 parliament’s declaration of 
legislative independence.
33
 (There is no direct evidence to support him in this contention.) Davis’ 
approach marked out the pitch on which two teams―unionists and home 
rulers/nationalists―carried out the academic engagement with the Irish parliament for the next 
century with its emphasis on 1782 and the following 18 years, given life by better accounts of 
debates in the final quarter of the century. Protestant nationalists found it easy to follow Davis. J.G. 
Swift MacNeill, MP and Professor of Constitutional Law at King's Inns, Dublin, writing in the 1880s, 
viewed the 'Irish Revolution of 1782' as Ireland’s 1688 and the period from 1690 to 1782 as a 
struggle to overcome the principles of the Stuarts, now championed by the English ministry.
34
 
MacNeill’s The Irish Parliament concentrated on constitutional issues and the oratory of the great 
men in parliament. Detailed administrative arrangements and the everyday business of the House 
were below his sight-line. The point of his work was that the Irish parliament was capable of 
evolving into a body that not only could produce a national administration but also deliver Catholic 
emancipation.
35
 A restored legislature would pick up the baton dropped in 1800. 
From the unionist perspective, James Whiteside, MP for Dublin University and a former attorney 
general, in The Life and Death of the Irish Parliament argued that the turning point came with the 
                                                        
 
29
  Davis, Patriot Parliament, p.40; for a more critical account see, Eoin Kinsella, '"Dividing the bear's skin": Irish 
Catholics and Land in the Late Stuart Monarchy', 1683-9, in Dennehy, Restoration Ireland, pp.164ff; the 
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30
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1705', Ph.D. thesis (University College Dublin, 2005), p.5 
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33
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  J.G. Swift MacNeill, The Irish Parliament: What it Was, and What it Did (London, 1885), pp.vii-ix  
35
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1788–89 Regency Crisis when the parliament attempted to act constitutionally in a separate 
manner from Great Britain.
36
 He painted a parliament out of touch in a dangerous world by the end 
of the 1790s, when the stark choice was separation from, or incorporation with, Great Britain.
37
 He 
focussed on the orators, especially the lawyers, and the arguments deployed in the Commons on 
the constitutional issues. With J.A. Froude, a less successful and perhaps more frustrated 
politician, unionism spilled over in superiority and racism. Writing a decade after Whiteside he 
viewed the eighteenth-century Irish parliament as a failure and opined: 'Parliamentary 
governments ... are suited well for people who understand their own affairs, and do not need to be 
interfered with; for others such governments are not suited at all'.
38
 Froude’s was a nightmare 
vision of a dysfunctional institution leading to separation and independence. As Bentley argues, for 
Whig historians such as Froude, if Great Britain could not hold on to its oldest colony (Ireland) their 
view of imperial progress would be undermined.
39
 
W.E.H. Lecky―another MP―responded to Froude, and his moderation and fidelity to the 
evidence had greater and longer resonance.
40
 In his view the parliament was not bound to fail but 
was, until 1782, stunted and a shadow of her English sister—with only a third of the revenue of the 
country within its control, hedged in by Poynings' Law and with 'no Act obliging Members of 
parliament who accepted places or pensions under the Crown to vacate their seats'.
41
 As L.P. 
Curtis noted in 1972, Lecky propounded a view of the institutions of the eighteenth century derived 
from Edmund Burke, which admired the English people for their ability to adapt old institutions to 
new needs, and he argued that a country’s institutions preserved 'the sense of its organic unity, its 
essential connection with the past'.
42
 But, whereas the polemical Froude's partisan perspective is 
obvious, Lecky's 'pseudo-detachment is deceptive'. For Lecky 'faith in property ownership [is] the 
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anchor of social stability and the ballast of responsible political leadership'
43
 and to him the Irish 
Commons was the 'flower of the landlord class'.
44
 The Leckyan view begs the bigger question 
whether Ireland in the eighteenth century had organic unity and, in particular, whether the Irish 
parliament was an expression of, or path to, that unity.
45
 What the 1689 parliament had attempted 




 the parliaments from the 1692 did for the New English (or Anglo-Irish).
47
  
As others have noted, Lecky’s approach to the eighteenth century was teleological
48
 allowing him 
to emphasise the prospect of greater national coherence as the penal laws began to be reversed 
and an increase in the parliament's legislative autonomy after 1782. Lecky concentrated on the last 
third of the century leaving the years from 1692 an overture to 1782 and the drama that lasted until 
the end of the century. As Hayton has noted, Froude’s and Lecky’s works together:  
produced two different kinds of parliamentary history: on the one hand a straightforward 
(and rather old-fashioned) account of constitutional development, charting the rise of the 
Irish parliament through a process of (Irish) challenge and (British) response, resulting in 
the gradual expansion of claims for autonomy; on the other, a high-political narrative, 
explaining the way in which successive parliaments were managed, concentrating on the 
policies of successive viceroys... In both cases the story was structured through a 
succession of crises in Anglo-Irish relations.
49
  
To twentieth-century historians from the nationalist and republican tradition, the Irish parliament 
was a charade. Joseph Lee writing in 1973 dismissed Grattan’s parliament (the post-1782 
parliament) as economically backward-looking and sectarian to its core, before reaching the 
hyperbolic conclusion that it was 'the bloodiest repressive institution in modern Irish history'.
50
 
Against this background, it is not surprising that there has been little appetite to examine how the 
parliament functioned, how it carried out is day-to-day business or how its procedures developed. 
Historians―both unionist and nationalist in outlook―with their focus on the constitutional position 
of Ireland have not scrutinised the Porritts' view: to the former it was self-evident that the Irish 
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institution should take Westminster as a model;
51
 and to the latter it was an import that failed to live 
up to its own principles or was an alien irrelevance. The Porritts were more detached from 
contemporary Irish politics and were familiar with Westminster and had a keen eye for highlighting 
its procedures in the Irish parliament.
52
 Their work was, however, firmly grounded in the 
nineteenth-century approach to parliamentary history. For them the contemporary House of 
Commons was the exemplar and parliamentary history was a journey culminating in the reforms 
that started in the 1820s. They restricted themselves to the study of what J.C.D. Clark has noted in 
the context of the Westminster parliament
53
 was the 'old corruption' and the justification for the 
reform that followed. For them the Irish parliament was an extreme example of what needed to be 
reformed and the calamitous consequence of the absence of reform.  
In the mid-twentieth century the work of historians investigating the operation of the Westminster 
Commons began to affect the study of the Irish parliament. It took time because, with 
acknowledgement to Burke, the Irish parliament was no longer a living institution: none of its 
distinctive procedures and practices
54
 entered the Westminster Commons in 1801. Irish 
parliamentary history has had two fissures—1800 and 1919/22—and neither of the two 
legislatures that emerged in 1922 had an umbilical or physical link to College Green. In contrast, 
the Westminster parliament was seen as a mature, thriving institution governed by procedures 
dating from the thirteenth century and bolted to its history with precedents and ritual and in the 
twentieth century included parliamentarians working in a building that displayed self-consciously its 
own history. The History of Parliament Trust set up in England in the 1930s was presided over by 
serving politicians and had, as Johnston-Liik has pointed out, an objective to educate MPs in the 
traditions of parliamentary democracy and to alert the expanded electorate to its democratic duties 
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 It also fitted within a Burkeian view as it aimed to show how the Commons 
had been able to respond to 'the needs of an ever-changing national society, and saved that 
society from the convulsions and revolutions which still disturb realms not yet inured to 
Parliamentary language'.
56
 There was no such incentive in Ireland, where the lack of continuity 
meant that views polarised around the fractures and the lessons from history were those of 
injustices, fears and warnings, not the veneration of institutions, precedents and incremental 
change. Ironically, the fissures from the seventeenth century kept Irish history relevant to 
contemporary political debate, albeit in a populist and self-serving form.  
In the early twentieth century there was a shift in the English historical approach: method and 
analysis of evidence came to matter more than concepts and style.
57
 Modern methods broke the 
Whig mythologies of parliamentary history.
58
 In 1964 the History of Parliament Trust published the 
first instalment of The History of Parliament covering the British House of Commons from 1754 to 
1790. The project had been re-started when 'both politicians and academics thought largely in 
biographical terms'
59
 and the prosopographical approach of Sir Lewis Namier was ascendant.
60
 
The publication contained 1,966 biographical articles and 314 constituency articles with an 
introductory survey.
61
 In 1963 Edith Johnston published Great Britain and Ireland, 1760–1800: a 
study in political administration, combining Namierite analysis of the Irish parliament (but at this 
stage without the biographies) with a revised Leckyan approach influenced by J.C. Beckett, a 
'revisionist' historian working at Queen's University Belfast from 1940s, who 'regarded the 
eighteenth century as a golden age, the heyday of his beloved Anglo-Irish caste'.
62
 The focus of 
Johnston's work was still the period from the 1770s and the tone is intermittently that of an irritated, 
liberal Protestant. She concludes: 
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If the 'ascendancy' had widened the franchise in 1784, and thus placed the House of 
Commons upon a more liberal basis, a national body might in course of time have been 
welded together, and an Irish nation, inclusive of all classes and creeds might gradually 
have emerged. [On the other hand it might have produced] the complete collapse of the 
system of government by further divorcing the legislature from the executive.
63
 
Four decades later Johnston produced the Irish equivalent of the biographical work of the History 
of Parliament Trust, History of the Irish Parliament 1692–1800, with its funding coming from a 
'patchwork of annual, often small grants'.
64
 The multi-volume HIP has the benefit of being 
comprehensive for the period 1692–1800; although primarily a biographical dictionary, it has useful 
sections, including one on the legislation produced by the Irish parliament . While it is invaluable to 
the study of the Irish Commons, it has limitations, errors and omissions. It was an offshoot from the 
earlier volumes of The History of Parliament, with the result that its biographies lack the depth and 
prescience of more recent volumes of the HoP and it has little to say on procedure, statistical 
analysis of business or how the institution transacted its everyday business.
65
 The Namierite 
approach had the attraction that it could easily be applied to the Members of the Irish parliament. 
From at least Tudor times men had sat in both the Dublin and Westminster parliaments and were 
related, shared a similar education and creed; many knew each other and had the same interests 
and approaches. As men of property they generated records that historians could interrogate. As 
Daunton has pointed out, with his concentration on biographies, Namier missed the way in which 
MPs were expected to work for their constituents 'by seeking improvement bills for new bridges or 
turnpikes, and by keeping a close watch on the impact of customs and excise duties on the 
economy of the area'.
66
 The interests of other historians of the Westminster parliament were not so 
applicable to Ireland—for example, Neale on the operation of the Puritan party in parliament,
67
 
Elton on the development of legislative competence
68
 and Russell’s view that parliaments reflected 
divisions among the court factions.
69
 There are several reasons. First, Irish parliaments met less 
frequently than those in England and the source material is less plentiful. Second, constitutionally 
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the Irish parliament was regulated by Poynings' Law. Third, Irish parliaments had neither the 
importance nor the same preoccupations as those sitting at Westminster. The modernist 
examination of Irish parliamentary history was left to the Leckyans using Namierite tools as 
historians opened up tracts of Irish history from the early medieval onwards left undisturbed by 
nineteenth-century historians. Like the Porritts, the benchmark for the Leckyans was Westminster.  
From the 1970s the operation of the Irish parliament started to be examined by historians working 
on eighteenth-century Ireland.
70
 From the 1980s this gathered pace with Hayton looking across the 
field;
71
 C.I. McGrath and Eoin Magennis have fully described the context and development of 
supply legislation, revenue and appropriation;
72
 James Kelly and John Bergin did the same for the 
process by which statute law was made;
73
 and S.J. Connolly and Ian McBride on political ideas 
and the place of the parliament in what would in the nineteenth century be called society.
74
 These 
works have undoubtedly taken the study of Ireland in the eighteenth century, especially the early 
part of the century, to a new level based on an examination of the evidence. Irish historiography 
has travelled a considerable distance since 1967 when Sir Herbert Butterfield described its 
unusually fragmented character.
75
 As Patrick Walsh comments: 'The products of this sustained 
research activity have allowed a more nuanced picture of eighteenth-century Ireland to appear, 
which has done much to revise earlier dominant frameworks'.
76
 As noted, there are still debates 
about whether Ireland in the eighteenth century was a composite ancien régime state or modern 
and colonial. There are also gaps and this thesis aims to start to close one.  
1.3  This thesis 
The study of the practice and procedure of the Irish House of Commons is still dominated by the 
century-old work of the Porritts. There is no Irish equivalent of P.D.G. Thomas on the eighteenth-
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century Westminster House of Commons, Orlo Cyprian Williams on clerks in parliament
 
or Julian 
Hoppit on failed legislation.
77
 This thesis aims to draw on, and apply some parts of, their work to 
the operation of the Irish Commons, to consider whether the Porritts' view of the that the only 
direction was towards Westminster is accurate in appearance and substance. The Porritts were of 
the view that the only significant exception from the procedure at Westminster was, until 1782, 
Poynings' Law and that from the Parliament of 1568-71 until the Union the Irish House of 
Commons was  
slowly but continuously adopting the orders and usages of Westminster; and, except for 
a single variation in procedure which made possible a discussion and division on the 
general principle of a bill after it had reached committee, and for a usage peculiar to 
Ireland, in accordance with which a commoner succeeding to a peerage or elevated to 
the peerage was "graced" to the bar of the Lords, it is not possible to discover in the 
Irish Journals any procedure which had not its origin at Westminster. From 1568, when 
the Speaker appealed for assistance, advice, and counsel in the ordering of procedure 
to such members of the House as were acquainted with the order of Parliament in 
England, until 1795, when even the type used in printing the Journals was ordered to 
be of the same fount as that used for the Journals of the House of Commons of Great 
Britain, the Irish House of Commons, as regards its organisation and procedure, was 
being made a replica of the House of Commons at Westminster.
78
 
Poynings' Law provided that no Irish parliament could be held without the consent of the English 
king confirmed by the king's lord lieutenant and Privy Council, who were to certify the 'causes and 
considerations' for calling a parliament and 'all such acts as to them seemeth should pass in the 
same Parliament'. Only after a licence to hold the parliament was issued by the king in Council 
under the great seal of England and bills sent from England could the Irish parliament meet.
79
 The 
effect of Poynings' Law was that, once a bill had been approved by the king and Council in 
England, the Irish parliament could not amend it. The consequence was that the Westminster bill 
procedures, which allowed bills to be amended in committee or at report and third reading, were 
rendered purposeless. Without the power to amend a bill each Irish House could only reject or 
accept it as presented.  
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The Porritts contended that but for Poynings' Law the Irish parliament would have been an exact 
copy of Westminster. However, Poynings' Law affected the development of the Irish parliament for 
nearly 300 years. In addition, there were also other influences in play. As Coleman Dennehy notes 
for the seventeenth century, there were two forces pulling on the development of the Irish 
parliament: the Westminster parliament and Irish political requirements. Taking Westminster as the 
centre of gravity these may be seen as centripetal and centrifugal forces. The latter include 
Ireland’s political and distinct confessional structure, the Irish Commons' awareness of its own 
history and precedents as well as what Robinson and Acemoglu call the process of institutional 
drift. The centripetal forces came from political control from England and political and procedural 
developments in Whitehall and Westminster. Poynings' Law sat squarely within the centripetal but 
its effects were mitigated, from the seventeenth century, when a system of draft legislation 
emerged, the heads of bill procedure, by which a House drafted a bill that it presented to the lord 
lieutenant for transmission and approval to meet the requirements of Poynings' Law. The 
consequence was significant institutional divergence from the Westminster model. Review by the 
Irish and English (and after 1707 British) Privy Councils was not a formality as legislation was 
frequently amended and rejected. The latter came to operate as a third chamber. Bills transmitted 
back from London could not be amended in the Irish parliament . The intrusion of the London Privy 
Council both symbolised and stimulated a tension at the heart of politics in Dublin: the power and 
requirements of Whitehall.  
The constitutional and parliamentary changes that occurred in England after 1688 resonated in 
Ireland as well as Scotland. While in Ireland the shock of the 1689–91 war underlined the 
dependence of the Protestants on England, this realisation sat alongside a growing patriot self-
awareness―or insecure, self-interest―and comprehension of the potential for political influence, if 
not control, that having a functioning, effective parliament operating along the Westminster model 
offered.  
As was case in Scotland, the development of the Irish House of Commons took time to absorb 
changes and settle. The years after 1692 show an institution changing, being tested―externally by 
the Government and internally with factional disputes culminating in the 1713 session―and being 
consolidated into a body that served the ends of the administration and its Members. Following the 
abortive session of 1692, a political compromise was found by which the Commons exercised 




extensive control over supply, which financed the civil and military establishments in Ireland.
80
 It is 
striking that, in comparison to the 21 years after 1692, the Commons of the 1720s was a settled 
institution. To some extent this is reflected in the coverage of this thesis with a greater focus on 
examples from 1692 to 1713 as improvisations and experimentation and the testing of the system 
during the 'rage of partly' spurred the development of parliamentary procedures and methods of 
carrying out business. The end date of 1730 was chosen as the end of the decade, the end of lord 
Carteret's lord lieutenancy and was shortly after the deaths of several key figures, who had been 
active since the 1690s: Speakers, Alan Brodrick (Earl of Midleton) and William Conolly, and 
William King, Archbishop of Dublin. 
This thesis aims to examine the daily operation and the procedures of the Commons and how and 
why they changed. The main source and starting point is the daily record of the Commons. Every 
entry in the Commons Journals from 1692 to 1730 has been examined. While these have been 
frequently and extensively used by historians, they have mostly been mined from the perspective 
of a particular subject such as supply. Entries were categorised, certain types counted, 
procedurally significant entries examined in detail and a sample compared with the Westminster 
Journals. Where data were sufficient, statistical analyses have been attempted. In addition, 
contemporary printed and manuscript records were examined both to establish the background 
and context to the entries in the Journals as well as the operation of the Commons. In contrast, 
however, to P.D.G. Thomas's work on Westminster, there is only one parliamentary diary―that of 
Sir John Perceval covering part of the 1711 and 1713 sessions.
81
 This can be supplemented with 
accounts of events in the House recorded in correspondence and other sources. Although many 
are firsthand accounts of proceedings in the chamber, they tend to focus on the dramatic event of 
interest to the government in London rather than the daily grind of business. The material 
examined was published or is in manuscripts available in London, particularly that held by the 
British Library and in the State Papers in the National Archives of the United Kingdom. While 
material is available in other repositories in Britain and Ireland that may have amplified some of his 
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analysis, the sources used provide sufficient foundation for the conclusions. Case studies have 
been used to illustrate procedures and to draw out points of broader application.  
Adding to contemporary records the Irish Legislative Database
82
 and the HIP provide much 
material. The research has been supplemented with a review of the secondary material listed in 
the bibliography. This thesis sets out to use the approaches and methodologies employed in the 
study of other eighteenth-century legislatures, especially Westminster, and by historians working 
on other aspects of eighteenth-century Irish history to examine the development and operation of 
the Irish Commons from 1692 to 1730.  
The chapters are organised around the functions and operations of a legislature. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the building the Irish parliament sat in, Chichester House, and the staff and 
administrative organisation of the Commons.  
Chapter 3 reviews the corporate identity and functions of the Commons. It examines a sample of 
Members' backgrounds and covers parliamentary elections, how the Commons managed its 
exclusive cognisance (or privileges) and how it treated precedents. The chapter reviews the 
development of procedures by the Commons from 1692 to 1730, including how Westminster's 
procedures were absorbed.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the business carried on within the House, the procedures that applied and 
how it was managed.  
Although not brought together as a free-standing chapter, at several points the confessional 
dimension of the operation of the Commons is examined. Specifically, the extent to which the 
Commons as an Anglo-Irish institution framed and operated its own procedures in a sectarian 
manner that imitated the penal laws it enacted.  
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 2  The administrative organisation of the House of Commons 
This chapter examines two areas. First, it assembles the evidence about the building, Chichester 
House in which the Irish parliament sat in from the 1660s to 1728. It examines what is known 
about the physical arrangements and how it may have been used. While it enabled the same 
parliamentary procedures and rituals as Westminster to be performed, Chichester House was no 
Palace of Westminster, beehive of multi-functions. It had a single function: the meeting place of the 
Irish parliament met. The chapter also examines the replacement of Chichester House with what 
has struck historians as a remarkably self-confident building. Second, the chapter considers the 
staff who worked in Chichester House, to meet the clerical and administrative demands of the 
Commons. It examines their backgrounds and their functions and methods of work, including the 
production of the House's records and publications. 
2.1  Chichester House 
Chichester House was used by the Irish parliament from 1661 to 1728 (excluding 1689). The 
administration had shown a commitment to the building and the institution when in April 1673 it 
entered a 99-year lease with John Parry, bishop of Ossory, 'for the use of the two Houses of 
parliament'.
1
 The earlier parliaments of James I and Charles I had met in Dublin Castle
2
 and, 
briefly, in Dublin’s municipal building, the Tholsel. The 1689 parliament had met in the King’s Inns, 
a former Dominican convent near the present Four Courts.
3
 In contrast to the English Commons, 
which met in St. Stephen’s Chapel at Westminster from about 1547,
4
 Chichester House carried 
none of the weight of tradition of continuously meeting in such a venue.
5
 Nor does it appear that 
the buildings left an imprint on operation or procedure as St. Stephen’s did on the English House 
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1986), p.69, suggests Chichester House was in a poor state of repair, presumably on the basis later reports―see 
below.  
4
  Thomas, Commons, p.1; except when it met in Oxford.  
5
  Chichester House may originally have been a hospital; subsequently it was used as offices by Sir Arthur 
Chichester, lord deputy 1604-15; in 1641 it was rented a residence and eventually passed to Parry (HIP(I), p.322; 
Walter Harris, The History and Antiquities of the City of Dublin (Dublin, 1766), p.47).  




with, for example, the Members sitting opposite each other in the stalls.
6
 Instead, the 
accommodation requirements of the Irish parliament were derived from its operating needs: as a 
minimum it required two chambers, with the Commons’ chamber having the capacity to hold a 
maximum of 250 Members,
7
 and accommodation for the Speaker. It was also desirable to have a 
room for conferences between the Houses, meeting rooms for committees and accommodation for 
staff.  
The 1673 conveyance gives a description of Chichester House as laid out for the Irish parliament 
at that time: 
a large room, wherein the Lords sat; two committee rooms for the Lords on the same floor, 
a stair-head room, a robe room, a wainscot room at this stair foot, a conference room 
below stairs, wherein the Commons sat; a passage room leading to the committee room, 
two committee rooms above stairs for the Commons; the Speaker's room; two rooms 
below stairs for the Serjeant-at-Arms, three rooms adjoining for the Clerk, two small 
cellars, a gatehouse next the street, containing five small rooms, a courtyard, with an entry 
through the House to the backyard, a stable yard, with a range of old buildings containing 




Although no depiction of Chichester House survives, against which this description can be 
checked,
9
 a plan apparently of the ground floor of the building—drawn up in 1727 shortly before 
demolition—does: it is reproduced below at Figure 1.
10
 It lacks the detail set out in the earlier 
description—for instance, it does not show committee rooms, the Speaker's accommodation or the 
location of the staircase. Moreover, the layout described in 1673 contradicts the 1727 plan (though 
the answer may be that the internal layout had been altered in the intervening half century): in 
particular, the 1673 description suggests the two chambers were on different floors whereas the 
1727 plan shows them on the same floor. If the 1673 description is accurate, the Commons had 
three committee rooms on two floors (the Lords had two on the same floor as its chamber). The 
Orders and Rules of the House of Lords dating from 1692 stated that the room, where the 
Commons and Lords met, was 'usually the conference-chamber below stairs', which corroborates 
                                                        
 
6
  Other examples are the tradition of bowing to the altar as MPs arrived and left the chamber, which evolved into 
bowing to the Speaker, and use of green furnishings, which may have grown from the preponderant liturgical 
colour in St. Stephen's. 
7
  The total number of MPs was 300 but during this period attendance rarely reached 250 and was frequently much 
lower (see Appendix 6.19).  
8
  CJI(II), Appendix, p.ccv (Commons report, 1709)  
9
  Francis Place visiting Dublin in 1698/99 preferred to draw St. Andrew’s church beside Chichester House. 
10
  HIP(I), p.324; Edward McParland, 'Edward Lovett Pearce and the Parliament House in Dublin', The Burlington 
Magazine, vol. CXXXI, no 1031 (Feb 1989), pp.91-92  




the 1673 description of activity on two floors.
11
 Irrespective of these difficulties, both the 1673 
description and the 1727 plan indicate that the two Houses were close together, possibly on top of 
each other, in contrast to Westminster where the Houses were separated by buildings used for 
other administrative and legal functions.  
The 1727 plan includes dimensions which indicate that the Commons was about 6.5 metres wide 
and 17 metres long.
12
 This compares to St. Stephen’s at Westminster which was about 10 metres 
wide and 18 metres long (excluding the lobby) giving a rough equivalence of space per MP.
13
 The 
1727 plan also shows that Chichester House was set back about 22 metres from College Green, 
from which it was approached through a courtyard (13.5 metres wide). This contrasts with the 
Palace of Westminster which was a jumble of governmental buildings, to which the public had 
access. The potential to control access was therefore much greater at Chichester House. 
                                                        
 
11
  LJI(I), p.471, no.15 No document examined provides a conclusive answer. Several sources state that Commons 
'came up' to the House of Lords―for example, SP, 63–354–167(stamped 166) (12 Oct 1692), when Lord 
Lieutenant Sydney described to Secretary of State Nottingham the opening of the 1692 Parliament but this 
probably reflects the Westminster 'hierarchical' idiom that the Lords was the upper House. Similarly, the Perceval 
Diaries, pp.125, 144, record 'the peers sent [the Commons] down a message to desire a conference immediately 
in the conference chamber'. On 20 Oct 1707 in an inquiry into the text of a bill a Commons committee reported 
that it 'went up to the Office of the Clerk of the House of Lords' (CJI(II), p.556).  
12
  The written figure for the length may be 47 feet but R Gillespie, 'Describing Dublin: Francis Place's visit, 1698–99', 
in Adele M. Dalsimer (ed.) Visualizing Ireland: National Identity and the Pictorial Tradition (Boston and London, 
1993), p.113, takes the chamber as 57 feet (17 metres) by 21 feet (6.5 metres).  
13
  Kathryn M. Ellis, The Practice and Procedure of the House of Commons 1660–1714, University of Wales 
(Aberystwyth) Ph.D. thesis (1993), p.1; the floor area of Westminster House was about 176m
2
; as the Westminster 
House had (from 1707) 558 MPs this works out at 0.32m
2
 per MP; the Dublin House's floor space was 108m
2
 and 
with 300 MPs works out at 0.36m
2
 per MP.  





Figure 1  Sketch plan of Chichester House 
The Journals and other sources provide additional details about the Commons chamber. 
a) In the 1660s there was a removable bar to which those to be admonished by the 
Speaker could be brought and the main rooms were decorated, when the House sat, 
with wall hangings supplied from the wardrobe of Dublin Castle.
14
  
b) Members sat on benches.
15
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  CJI(I), pp.669, 757  
15
  SP, 63–363(stamped 135) (Edward Southwell (Chief Secretary 1703-07 and 1710-13 and Secretary of State for 
Ireland 1702-30) to Nottingham, 4 Nov 1703) 




c) There were clocks in Chichester House, probably in the chambers as, for instance, 
the House usually had to adjourned at a set time, 4pm.
16
 
d) By the end of the century there were references to a gallery, the door to which had its 
own door-keeper
17
 and could, on instruction by the House, be locked to exclude 
'strangers'.
18 
There appears to have been committee rooms off the gallery.
19
 
e) In November 1661 the lords justices gave possession of the stables and 'necessary 
house' at the rear of Chichester House to the serjeant-at-arms 'for the use and 
service of the House of Commons'.
20
 
f) The gatehouse was used by Commons clerks until they were violently ejected by the 
serjeant-at-arms in 1666.
21
 The dimensions in the 1727 plan indicate that there were 
probably two rooms at ground level with the three rooms mentioned in the 1673 
description at first floor level over the gate; the rooms would have been about four by 
six metres. 
Sir John Perceval records that on the first day of the 1713 session, when summoned to hear the 
lord lieutenant in the House of Lords 'a great many [MPs] went up, while the greater part remained 
below for the sake of getting into convenient places, because the House was very much crowded, 
there being at this time more Members present than were ever remembered'.
22
 His comment is 
significant because, as at Westminster, seats were not reserved at this time and possession was 
occupative and when the business was controversial there was a shortage. It was an accepted 
parliamentary convention at Westminster that only those Members sitting on benches could 
participate in debate.
23
 At the start of the 1713 session there were at least 260 MPs present.
24
 The 
implication is that the seating capacity of the House was below 260. 
                                                        
 
16
  CTB, vol. 32 (1718) in an entry on 8 May 1718 records for 1717 a payment to 'Walter Bingham, clockmaker, for 
taking care of the clocks of the House of Lords and House of Commons £7:19:3½'.  
17
  CJI(II), p.104 (22 Oct 1695)  
18
  CJI(II), p.85 the House ordered keys of doors to be laid on Table; see also pp.85, 251, 602, 653, 697.  
19
  The table of fees agreed by the House in 1695 recorded fees belonging to door-keeper attending the gallery and 
referred to committee meeting in rooms 'belonging to the ... gallery' (CJI(II), p.xx). If the Commons had a gallery 
and linked committee rooms that may be a pointer to the chamber being on ground floor with accommodation on 
first floor, which chimes with the 1673 description of committee rooms upstairs.  
20
  CJI(I), pp.441, 669, 677  
21
  CJI(I), p.746  
22
  Perceval Diaries, p.125  
23
  Ellis, Practice and Procedure, pp.13-15  
24
  See Appendix 6.19.2.  




In the 1660s the Commons looked to the administration to manage the upkeep of the building and 
to pay for provisions such as coal for heating.
25
 In July 1678 the administration sub-leased the 
gardens, grounds and yards for 90 years to William Robinson, Surveyor General 1671–1700,
26
 for 
an annual rent of only £1 but with a covenant to keep Chichester House in good repair.
27
 As 
repairs were financed by the administration the arrangement may have been to establish an 
obligation on Robinson to carry out repairs. A Commons committee reporting in 1709 found that 
between 1677 and 1701 the administration had paid him £208 for 'repairs and other works at the 
Parliament House' but the arrangement failed as it could not establish what portion of the money 
was for repairs and what for other works such as fitting out Chichester House, which was outside 
obligations in the lease.
28
 Similarly, the committee found that £207 paid to Robinson’s successor, 
Thomas Burgh, from 1701 to 1708 could not be disaggregated. It asked Burgh for an estimate for 
repairs that were needed in 1709, which he costed at £598, to make the building weather proof, 
and £523, to repair floors, windows and ceilings. He painted a picture of a decrepit building with 
'bulged and rotten' walls, eight 'rotten' chimney stacks all in need of rebuilding, a roof frame that 
needed replacing and 'uneven and patched' floors. The committee considered that, if the building’s 
walls, roof and floor were not repaired, they would stand 'but few years'. It noted that Chichester 
House was so impaired by the weather that it is not safe for habitation and that the stable and a 
banqueting House had fallen to the ground.
29
 The financial abstract,
30
 appended to the 1709 
report, showed when the £207 paid to Burgh from 1700 to 1708 was defrayed (Table 1). There is a 
pattern: (i) expenditure mostly fell in the years that the parliament sat—in other words little was 
spent on Chichester House when no parliament met (or during the time that it was used by the 
forfeited estates commissioners);
31
 and (ii) that half the expenditure was incurred for the 1703 
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  CJI(I), pp.441, 465, 677  
26
  HIP(VI), pp.168-69; Robinson sat in the Commons from 1692 until he fled to England in 1707 in the face of a 
lawsuit for falsifying clothing accounts of the army.  
27
  CJI(II), p.ccv  
28
  As above  
29
  As above  
30
  CJI(II), p.ccviii  
31
  English Act (11 &12 William III, c.9) placed forfeited lands in the hands of trustees and most were sold by auction. 
As Simms notes (in T.W. Moody and W.E. Vaughan (eds.), A New History of Ireland: Eighteenth-Century Ireland 
1691–1800 (Oxford, 1986), p.11) the act of resumption 'caused much resentment in Ireland' and this was a 
'notable instance of [the English] parliament assuming both executive and legislative power over Irish affairs'. The 
trustees occupied Chichester House until they completed their work in 1703 and the Irish parliament did not sit 
again until the sales had finished. 




session, that is after the longest period—four years—without a sitting parliament between 1692 
and 1730, and presumably after the commissioners had left.  
Year 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 
Amount  £0 £3 £0 £103 £1 £17 £0 £81 £2 
Table 1 Expenditure on repairs to Chichester House 1700 to 1708 
 
2.2  Replacement of Chichester House 
After 1709 the next recorded instance of concern about the state of Chichester House was on 7 
August 1719 when the Commons addressed the lord lieutenant asking him to direct Burgh to 
inspect the state of the building. A report was presented to the House on 29 October, which was 
referred to a committee of the whole House, but no further progress was recorded.
32
 The issue re-
surfaced on 5 December 1727 when a committee, chaired by Thomas Trotter, was appointed to 
inspect the state of the building.
33
 Its report made on 10 January 1727/8 was published and was 
referred to the Committee of Supply, which reported the following day with a recommendation that 
£6,000 be 'granted towards providing materials and building a new Parliament House'. On the 
following day a committee was appointed, to consider the new Parliament House, and instructed to 
receive plans 'and to enquire what title the crown has to the ground, whereon the present 
Parliament House stands'; again chaired by Trotter.
34
 Progress was rapid. The House of Lords 
was consulted on 30 April and the Commons accepted without a division Edward Pearce's designs 
which were laid before the lord lieutenant, who was asked to direct that building work start.
35
 By 
June 1728 Pearce was in London arranging for the provision of materials for the building.
36
 
The 1727 report on the state of the building was short but dramatic. There was no examination of 
the costs of repairs or options. The committee reported that the building was rotten and dangerous 
and that the offices for staff were too small and it baldly stated that Chichester House 'cannot be 
repaired without very great expense, so as to stand longer than another session ... and that it 
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  CJI(III), pp.214, 234 and 237  
33
  CJI(III), p.477; Hayton classes Trotter as a lieutenant of Speaker Conolly (Letters of Marmaduke Coghill 1722–
1738, D.W. Hayton (ed.) (Dublin, 2005), p.xv).  
34
  CJI(III), pp.494, 496 and ccclviii  
35
  CJI(III), p.564  
36
  McParland, 'Pearce', p.92  




seems absolutely necessary to build a new House'.
37
 The report has the feel of the paperwork 
following a decision already made. How and when that decision was taken is unclear. The 
architectural historian Edward McParland observes that Speaker Conolly's involvement in the 
building project is 'obscure' and speculates that the project may have been 'reflationary' and 
designed to alleviate hardship during economic distress in the 1720s.
38
 McParland suggests that 
'the assertiveness of the new building was as obvious politically as it was architecturally'.
39
 
Whether or not the new building was a delayed rejoinder to Ireland's constitutional inferiority 
reinforced seven years before by the Declaratory Act of 1720 and a harbinger in stone of the 
constitutional aspirations that took half a century to achieve is not supported by surviving 
documentary evidence. Pearce was an MP and he was an architect and well informed about 
current fashions. Conolly had already employed him on the building of Castletown. The 
administration supported the project, which may count against the speculation that the new 
building was a patriotic statement of self-assertion. The striking feature is the absence of comment 
in the surviving records of the period. London was passive and the guardian of English interests, 
Archbishop Boulter, appears to have been quiet.  
The Commons kept a watching brief on the work via a committee which reported favourably on 22 
November 1729 and 2 December 1731. Inspecting the building, after the roof and walls had been 
constructed, it observed:  
with the greatest pleasure, an uncommon beauty, order and contrivance in the ... building; 
and that the same has been carried on with unusual expedition and diligence; that the 
money expended thereupon has been laid out with the utmost skill and frugality.
40
 
There is only point at which criticism emerged. On 11 December 1731 the Commons divided four 
times on whether payments for the building should be made. The tellers for the Ayes were 
administration supporters or 'placemen'―William Maynard and Trotter―and those for the Noes, 
opponents with Tory connections―Sir Richard Meade and Eaton Stannard.
41
 The Ayes had 
conformable majorities, though on one division the opponents managed 62.  
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40
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The new building had clear benefits, not least much more space (see Figure 2, which 
superimposes the foot-print of Chichester House on the plan of the new building). Pearce set out in 
his memorandum accompanying the plans (which have not survived) his pitch for the commission, 
which gave prominence to the position of the Speaker and convenience of Members: 
[The] House of Commons [is] an octagon.... I have endeavoured ... to give all advantages 
necessary for such an Assembly, the Chair is free at very near an equal distance from all 
parties, the Speaker can from thence with very little difficulty see everybody in their seats, 
and every person who speaks from his seat so as to be heard by the Speaker must be 
heard by everybody. The bar has also the same advantages, and an evidence in the 
centre, must be heard equally by everyone. Order and attention is with great difficulty 
preserved where gentlemen can talk to each other across the floor, or are seated in 
clusters especially behind the chair, which cannot possibly happen in this situation. The 
seats are divided into 4 rows employing six sides of the octagon. The chair and bar employ 
the other two: there are seats only for 280 persons within the body of the House. I was 
afraid of making the room too large considering how few attend at certain times of the 
sessions, but the gallery employs no part of the House and consequently does not hang 
over or cover any part of the seats so that every person in the House may be seen from 
any part of the gallery.... 
The rooms are large and of very good proportions. All corridors or passages of 
communication, free, open, well lighted and on the same floor.
42
 
The memorandum emphasises the design's advantages from the Speaker's perspective and 
further underlines Conolly's role in the project. It also throws light back on Chichester House 
indicating that the rooms, if not the chambers, were not on one level, that the gallery overhung the 
chamber and there was a shortage of space. The new chamber had about a third more floor-
space and there was more office accommodation. But some features did not change: there were 
three committee rooms (as in the 1673 description) and divisions still operated on the basis of one 
side staying in the chamber while the other went into the lobby (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3  Parliament House, Dublin, engraved ground-floor plan, 176744 
 
2.3 Conclusions on buildings 
From 1692 to 1727 the Irish House of Commons sat in Chichester House. The Commons and the 
Lords sat metaphorically, if not literally, on top of each other. This was not the only contrast with 
the Palace of Westminster. The building was physically separate from the law courts and executive 
offices, which were collocated at Westminster. Those attending Chichester House came there for 
parliamentary business, or to observe the Irish parliament in operation, and access via a single 
gate-lodge could be controlled. This may have given the Commons an ability to shut itself off and 
deny access that was not as easily achieved at Westminster. The replacement building followed 
the old in being a building used exclusively for parliamentary purposes. But, in contrast to 
Chichester House, the replacement building sat squarely on College Green with an imposing―if 
not inviting―entrance.  
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The main features required for the operation of a Westminster-model legislature were available in 
Chichester House but the evidence of the layout is contradictory. Notwithstanding the apparently 
slum conditions and the impenetrable, and probably inadequate, financial arrangements for the 
repair of the building that the 1709 report depicted, the Houses continued to use the building for 
nearly another 20 years―presumably patched and repaired ahead of each session. In the 
absence of criticism, the project for the replacement parliament building has the appearance of 
achieving what both Houses wanted. The prosaic interpretation for the project and its design is that 
it was a replacement and as there was no alternative building a functional building in the current 
style was commissioned. The absence of criticism may point to the building project being a 'top-
down' project run by Speaker Conolly, being well-managed and the final product being an obvious 
improvement that met nearly everyone's expectations and requirements. 
If broader conclusions can be drawn from the erection of the new building, two can be offered. 
First, by the 1720s the Irish legislature's permanency was assured and when a new building was 
required it was a purpose-built parliament. Second, the Commons led the project, not the Lords or 
the administration (as in the seventeenth century). This reflected the predominance of the 
Commons in parliamentary matters. The building was designed to meet its, and its Speaker's, 
needs. 
 
2.4  Staff of the House of Commons 
The clerical organisation of the Dublin House of Commons copied that of the Westminster House 
but with some noteworthy differences―it was smaller and some operational arrangements varied. 
There was a clerk of the House (or more correctly, after 1692, joint clerks), who ensured that the 
decisions of the House and its committees were recorded. In the early seventeenth century the 
clerk was responsible for 'reading, writing and engrossing the public bills'.
45
 The clerks and the 
staff who served the Commons feature periodically in the Journals and in contemporary 
records―not in the correspondence of ministers between London and Dublin but rather in land 
transactions, wills and as lawyers drawing up documents. At first sight the documentation indicates 
they were an Irish equivalent of those men in London who came from, and remained in, a class of 
administrative middling, remunerated officials. They were integrated into the administrative and 
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civic life of Dublin, with property and business interests in and outside the city. The patterns seen 
in England in the seventeenth century appeared in Ireland in that and the following century: the 
clerks purchased and traded patents for lives allowing positions to be sold for profit and to be 
passed from father to son or to become sinecures with a deputy carrying out the work.
46
 A list, with 
some biographical information, of clerks and officers who served the Dublin Commons can be 
found in Appendix 6.4. Analysis of their names indicates that they were mostly New English and on 
the evidence available conformed to the established church. There were contrasts with officials in 
London. First, given the irregularity of meetings of the Irish parliament until 1703 and that 
thereafter it met for only a few months every two years working for the Commons was not a full-
time job. Second, Irish patent holders often had extensive links to England. Third, the boundaries 
of the class were porous and overlapped with the 'gentlemen' who sat in the Commons. Fourth, 
some operated in conjunction with a patron. 
The clerk of the Irish House and an increasing cast of supporting clerks had legal or administrative 
experience and were drawn from men, many of whom trained in England and worked in the courts 
in Dublin. A father-and-son team, both called Thomas Tilson, held the patents of clerkship of the 
Commons from 1680 to 1711. Tilson Sr. was the son of a bishop of Elphin
47
 who had retreated to 
England after the 1641 war started and died there in 1655. A grandson, George Tilson, and 
therefore Tilson Sr.'s nephew, was Under-Secretary for the Northern Department from 1710 to 
1738 and another nephew, Christopher Tilson, spent 58 years at the Treasury and was an MP at 
Westminster from 1727–34. Thomas Tilson Sr. entered the Inner Temple (in May 1658) as did 
Tilson Jr. who studied at Trinity College Dublin and Oxford. Tilson Jr. married in 1708 and had at 
least six sons. Most were educated at Eton and Cambridge and several trained at Lincoln's Inn or 
the King's Inns; some settled in Ireland and others in England. This pattern, or elements of it, was 
repeated with their principal successors, another father-and-son duo called Worthington: the son, 
Burdett, attended Trinity College and entered the Inner Temple, though the family was not as 
fecund or climbed as far as the Tilsons in England. Both families operated, and owned land and 
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  Henry Elsynge, Clerk of the Westminster Commons from 1640, was the son of another Henry Elsynge, who had 
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property, in England and Ireland.
48
 In 1692 Tilson Sr. also carried out the duties of Usher of the 
Court of Chancery of Ireland, which would have included financial responsibilities as well as the 
carriage of records and enrolling of decrees.
49
 Clerks in the courts would have had the skills 
necessary to be clerks of the Commons: the ability to read and write in English and, to a lesser 
extent, Latin and French; the ability to take notes of proceedings quickly and accurately; the ability 
to copy documents accurately; and a knowledge of records, precedents and procedure combined 
with the ability to give advice.
50
  
The appointment of clerk was by letters patent issued by the monarch (as were appointments for 
the posts of serjeant-at-arms, his deputy and the keeper of the Parliament House). The use of 
letters patent was significant for Orlo Cyprian Williams who starts his work, The Clerical 
Organization of the House of Commons 1661–1850 [in England], by drawing attention to the 
reinstitution of this method of the appointment of the clerk of the House, William Goldsborough in 
1661. Unlike his predecessors since 1649 he was not appointed by the House 'but by letters 
patent under the seal of a restored king'. Williams argues that this was a turning point: from the 
medieval, part-time record-keepers to the whole-time servant, master of a 'vastly intricate corpus of 
procedure and the administrative head of an active department'.
51
 Williams’ view may be over-
reliant on hindsight seeking to cut a clear path to later proceduralists such as John Hatsell at the 
end of the eighteenth century. Greene in The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in 
the Southern Royal Colonies 1689–1776 puts forward an alternative analysis seeing royal 
appointment as a symptom of a push for greater 'imperial' control.
52
  
The first clerk of the Irish House of Commons known to be appointed by patent
53
 was William 
Bradley in 1608 and the practice was repeated for his successors. The advantage for the 
administration was that it ensured a suitably qualified person with acceptable credentials, including 
confessional, would be appointed. In addition, the sale of the patent generated income. The fact 
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  HoP(1715)(II), p.469, and see the Appendix 6.4.  
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  Harrison and Williams, The Practice of the Court of Chancery, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1807), (I), pp.63-64  
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that patent holders bought the office for life or lives provided continuity—Philip Ferneley’s tenure 
as clerk from 1628 to 1673 spanned the civil wars and upheaval in the middle of the century.
54
 
When the 1692 Commons met the House 'allowed and approved' the patent holders, the Tilsons, 
with Faustin Cuppaidge as clerk assistant and appointed a committee to examine the precedents 
for swearing them in.
55
 In 1634 the clerk of the House and his assistant were sworn in before the 
lord chancellor,
56
 in the manner of clerks in the law courts and in England, and the procedure was 
followed again in 1692.
57
 They also took the oath provided by English statute 'for abrogating the 
oath of supremacy in Ireland'.
58
 On 26 October 1713 the Tilsons sold their patent for £400 to 
Thomas Trotter (an MP from 1715) and a partner, Francis Skiddy (deputy town clerk, Dublin), 
whom Trotter bought out on 5 December 1713 for £250. In 1715 he sold the patent to Bruen and 
Burdett Worthington
59
 and Isaac Ambrose for £484.
60
 The Tilsons appear to have had no problem 
functioning during the rise of parties or change of administrations. The reason for selling up may 
have been that by 1713 Tilson Sr. would have been in his 60s, at least, and Tilson Jr. may have 
had ambitions elsewhere. The political links of their successors are clearer. Both Trotter and Bruen 
Worthington were within the orbit of William Conolly. The Irish clerkship may therefore have fitted 
neither the Williams nor Greene model being within the patronage of the predominate faction or 
parliamentarian. 
There are no Journal entries in 1713 or 1715 approving or noting the change of personnel (nor are 
there in the English Journals when Jodrell was appointed in 1683 or his successor, Edward 
Stables, in 1727), though the Irish Journal recorded that at the beginning of the 1713 parliament 
'the clerks and deputy clerks' took their oaths along with Members.
61
 When the Worthingtons and 
Ambrose sought a fresh patent in 1716, Lords Justice Galway wrote on 22 June, two days after 
the 1715–16 session ended, to Lord Lieutenant the earl of Sunderland in London with a supporting 
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report from the attorney general and a certificate from Members, and he added that Bruen 
Worthington and Ambrose had discharged their 'employment [as clerks] during this session to 
everybody's satisfaction and are very earnestly recommended by the Speaker and others'.
62
 The 
certificate, signed by Conolly and 21 MPs, stated that they 'very well qualified ... and every way 
acceptable to the House', and the signatories included Conolly associates, country gentlemen, 
Hanoverian Tories and Chief Secretary Charles Delafaye.
63




Twomey suggests that for Bruen Worthington the office was a sinecure.
65
 There is some evidence 
to support his view. The bundle of supporting documents supplied by Galway made it clear that the 
Tilsons' patent allowed them to act through deputies, though in the 1690s Tilson Sr. was active as 
he is described as serving 'with great diligence'.
66
 Moreover, at the beginning of the 1703 
parliament it appears to have still been a requirement that once appointed an officer needed the 
House’s leave to withdraw from its service.
67
 But by 1713 the Tilsons' departure was not recorded 
in the Journals. Nor were there any entries recording substitutions because of illness,
68
 though 
such notifications may have been unlikely where a patent was held by two active individuals. There 
is evidence against a sinecure. In support of their petition for a new patent in 1716 the 
Worthingtons and Ambrose stated that 'in compliance with the universal inclination of the House 
[they had] purchased the ... office and patent and quitted other business to attend the service of 
the public'.
69
 Interrogation of the Registry of Deeds database indicates that Bruen Worthington 
gave up the post of deputy registrar and his activity as a notary public from 1716 onwards was 
largely carried out, though not exclusively, when parliament was not sitting.
70
 In addition, The 
National Archives of the United Kingdom contain several manuscript copies of entries from the 
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Journals signed by Bruen Worthington and Ambrose.
71
 Worthington had been clerk assistant 
under the Tilsons but he was not listed as attending the 1713 parliament, although he was in 
Dublin,
72
 which may be an indication he kept out of sight. Trotter may have been a more Tory-
friendly stand-in; the Journals described him as a clerk, rather than the clerk of the House, though 
this may reflect the fact that the Tilsons' patent was still current.  
The appointment of the clerk assistant was not by patent. The post emerged in the early 
seventeenth century as deputy to the clerk. The Westminster House formally appointed a clerk 
assistant in 1640, though the clerk of the House may have had assistance before this date and 
have appointed, and managed, a team of supporting clerks.
73
 The title 'clerk assistant' is not used 
in the Journals until 1666.
74
 But, in contrast to Westminster, the post of 'assistant' to the clerk (as 
opposed to those who were simply his team of clerks) appears in Dublin in the 1630s.
75
 The 
Journal for 9 November 1634 recorded a petition to the House from William Sandys, 'assistant' to 
the clerk asking the House 'to dispense [his] absence here during the term; and [he] humbly prays, 
another, in his absence, may be admitted to attend this place'. On the following day Walter 
Heighter was admitted 'and this day sworn, for the better dispatch of the business of this House'.
76
 
These entries show that the House approved the appointment of the assistant as he may have 
duties that brought him within the chamber, most likely attending at the Table (though, as noted, 
this practice of seeking the House's consent later fell away). In 1661 the same title is used when 
the House ordered that Richard Warburton 'be assistant to the clerk of the House'
77
 and he is later 
called clerk-assistant.
78
 Faustin Cuppaidge held the post from 1692 to February 1704/5 when 
Bruen Worthington replaced him. 
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The serjeant-at-arms and his deputy were appointed by patent and also sworn in, though details 
are lacking.
79
 The serjeant-at-arms was a key figure of the structure of the Commons as the House 
explained to the Lords on 28 July 1666 when the Lords tried to execute a writ of habeas corpus for 
the release of a person in his custody by summoning him to the bar of the House of Lords, 
because to accede would mean that  
their Lordships may discontinue the House of Commons at their pleasure, because they 




In 1695 Joshua Carpenter, son of the serjeant-at-arms during the 1661 parliament claimed to hold 
the patent. The Commons appointed a committee stocked with lawyers which concluded that he 
did 'not appear' to have the right to the office 'but if any of right he has, that he be left to law for 
recovery thereof'. The House concurred and ordered 'That Mr Wynne, the [current] Serjeant ... 
have leave to waive his privilege in any suit to be brought against him' by Carpenter.
81
 The 
Commons considered that it was within its authority to consider the claim and that, although 
Carpenter may have had an arguable claim, they did not want to displace the incumbent, who 
remained in post until 1697.  
In contrast the office of deputy serjeant-at-arms was a sinecure. In 1725 the patent for deputy (or 
second) serjeant-at-arms was held jointly by Thomas Carter, a former MP, who was to die in 1726, 
and his son, Thomas, an MP (who was concurrently buying the patent for the deputy master of the 
rolls and was destined for a substantial legal career).
82
 Carter Sr. assigned the patent to John 
Stothard, who sought a new patent for his life and that of George Cuppaidge. George I had no 
objection to the assignees but told Lord Lieutenant Carteret he was not 'willing to countenance or 
encourage the sale of offices' and withheld consent until 'better informed'. In response Carteret 
explained that many 'patent offices have been sold without the knowledge of the government, 
neither should I have been applied to about it'. Because Stothard and Cuppaidge had obtained a 
certificate of recommendation from Chief Baron Gilbert, however, he had become aware of the 
transaction. Carteret added that 'there can be no doubt but that this assignment has been made in 
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consideration of a sum of money' and concluded ambiguously 'if this employment should be 
thought of any consequence whatsoever, I am very far from endeavouring to remove objections 
His Majesty may have to the giving his consent to such a grant'.
83
 There is no record of a new 
patent. The office-holder drew a share of fees paid to parliamentary officials and made little impact 
on the operation of the Commons. 
Further down the hierarchy, the functions the clerks who attended committees carried out are 
imprecise. Williams takes the view that at Westminster a small cadre of committee clerks—four 
'out of doors clerks'—emerged in the 1690s. He suggests that they attended committees, carrying 
out the work themselves without deputies.
84
 A similar pattern can be seen in Ireland. But instead of 
four out-of-doors clerks Dublin may have had two. In 1661 the House ordered that the clerk 'do 
from time to time appoint such clerks, as he shall consider fitting, to attend upon the several 
committees'.
85
 The names of two of these clerks are listed
86 
but it is not until 1703 that more 
names are recorded. One was Daniel Golborne, who may have developed a specialised skill, 
working for the Committee of Accounts.
87
 He was a graduate of Trinity College Dublin and had 
been admitted to the Inner Temple in 1672. Another Commons clerk, Enoch Sterne, progressed to 
become clerk of the parliaments, that is clerk of the House of Lords. Others have not proved easy 
to trace. There were, however, committee clerks in post from 1692 as the schedule of fees 
endorsed by the House in 1695 list fees to be received by the clerks of select committees dealing 
with private business.
88
 The records are too fragmentary to draw firm conclusions but the lists of 
House staff in Appendix 6.4.3 show some turnover with the retirement of the Tilsons just before the 
turbulent 1713 session.  
As with other officers, the names of the door-keepers appear to be New English. Williams states 
that at Westminster the Commons had two door-keepers and four messengers, who were 
appointed by the serjeant-at-arms and he was able to charge a heavy payment for an appointment 
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as the posts were a source of considerable income derived from the sale of papers and customary 
fees.
89
 In 1695 there was a door-keeper of the chamber and, as noted, a 'door-keeper attending 
the gallery' and adjacent committee rooms.
90
 Door-keepers and messengers were then seen as 
menial servants to be tipped via a collection from Members with the House resolving 'that every 
Member ... pay onto the doorkeeper for his care and pains in attending with their post-letters half a 
crown'.
91
 By 1713 Perceval noted that Members were becoming reluctant to pay.
92
 He suggests 
that what was at issue may have been whether the door-keeper and messengers were already 
sufficiently remunerated as well as the adequacy of their postal and messenger services.  
The 1713 session saw the public sacking of the door-keeper to the chamber, George Spike. A 
Long History of a Short Session explains that following his father's victory in the contest for the 
speakership, St. John Brodrick was so fired up by with resentment against the 'wicked Tories' that 
he could not contain himself even against the poor door-keeper, but turned him away from 
thence with the utmost fury and indignation; and with all the reproaches that could possibly 
be deserved by a loyal subject for wearing a laurel [a Tory symbol]; though it was known 
he had served in that employment since the Revolution without the least imputation either 




The account is hostile to Brodrick but shows that staff of the House could hold partisan views and 
that Spike's public demonstration of his allegiance in the strained circumstances of the 1713 
session was ill-considered. The charged political atmosphere had evidently spread to staff. Spike's 
position may have been more than a domestic servant and as he had some standing in Dublin.
94
 
Brodrick was able to secure the dismissal, presumably with the assistance of his father and the 
serjeant-at-arms' acquiescence. The political situation was such that the usual norms of long and 
steady service could be set aside. 
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2.5  Remuneration of staff of the House of Commons 
Staff emoluments posed a problem during the seventeenth century. The Goldboroughs, father-
and-son clerks at Westminster after the Restoration, had great difficulty obtaining payment.
95
 
Dublin and Westminster came up with different solutions by the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. There were two problems. First, remuneration―from private bills―was erratic. Second, 
disbursement of monies due from the Treasury was protracted. Irish officials did not have easy 
access to Treasury officers that the counterparts at Westminster enjoyed. As early as 11 May 1615 
the Journals recorded that Edmond Midhopp had taken a reduction in income by becoming clerk of 
the House. The Commons considered that his income should be made up to the same level as 
those of his former colleagues, clerks of Common Pleas, and, expressing satisfaction with his work 
and finding that 'there was not one private bill passed this session', decided to allocate him £22 out 
of a fine the House had imposed.
96
 In a good session fees from private bills could provide the 
Commons staff with a substantial part of their income and in contrast to Westminster where the 
House of Lords predominated the Irish Commons supplanted the Irish Privy Council after 1703 as 
the starting point for most private bills.
97
 A table of fees was agreed in March 1640/1 setting out the 
fees the clerk and serjeant-at-arms could charge (see Appendix 6.5). Although this Irish table 
antedates an equivalent English table by nine years,
98
 they were obviously in step―generating 
fees from similar activities such as private bills, copying documents and apprehending and 
incarcerating people. But some rates and items covered differ―for example, the Irish table has 
tiered rates for the arrest of knights (20s) and of esquires (13s), on which the English table is silent. 
The Irish table appears therefore to be grounded in practice rather than an exact copy of English. 
On obtaining payments, in 1666 the clerk assistant, Richard Warburton, petitioned for payment for 
his services since the start of the parliament and the committee which considered his petition 
concluded he should be paid £150 per annum. Disbursement was, however, by the administration. 
While the House agreed and sent the committee to the lord lieutenant to request payment, nothing 
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 Warburton was still petitioning for his money in 1695
100
 as was another clerk 
from that parliament, Laurence Steele.
101
  
The part of the serjeant-at-arms’ responsibilities which generated his income was the fees from 
those held in custody on the Commons orders. But he had upfront outgoings. When the House 
ordered the production of a witness, he could be required to send messengers to any part of 
Ireland. In a petition in December 1695 Serjeant-at-Arms Wynne explained that many of those 
summoned were placed in custody but, if 'most of whom having been acquitted of the crimes ..., 
have been discharged [by the Commons] without fees', as a result he suffered a 'great loss'. He 
met the costs of the upkeep of those in custody
102
 and when the 'loss' became serious he had to 
petition the House for a gratuity. Wynne listed some of those who were discharged without 
payment of fees and having consulted the Journals pointed out that in 1661 a gratuity of £300 had 
been given to the Serjeant.
103
 Although the House ordered his petition to lie on the Table, the 
complaint had effect as releases from with custody with waivers of fees fell off significantly.
104
 
There was, however, a greater problem with fees which Wynne pointed out in a separate petition 
in 1695: 
there are several fees which are usually paid onto the Serjeant at Arms attending the 
Commons in England, for his attendance and pains in executing the orders of the said 
House, several of which fees the petitioner not finding to be mentioned in the List of Fees 
settled upon the Serjeant at Arms attending the House and he not being willing to demand 
the same until allowed: and therefore praying the House will be pleased to give order onto 
the petitioner to receive the fees contained in our List.
105
 
A committee examined staff fees, which reported on 16 October 1695, and on 22 October agreed 
fees were entered in the Journals.
106
 This ensured that there was a definitive and comprehensive 
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list of the fees.
107
 The Table was not the end of the story. First, securing payment still presented 
difficulties. Frequently those summoned to appear before the House―for example, in response to 
an allegation of breach of privilege by an MP―settled and obviated the need to turn up but the 
House required fees to be paid. In November 1698 the House appointed a committee  
to search the Journals, and see what methods have been formally used for getting the 
fees due to the clerks and door-keepers that attend the committees, from persons that 
refuse to pay the same, and make report.
108
  
The committee reported the precedents which were that the Speaker should issue his warrant for 
the arrest of those refusing to pay and they should be held in custody until they paid.
109
 The issue 
came up again at the start of the 1703 parliament and the outcome was the same;
110
 by the end of 
the reign of Anne the procedure was renewed each session.
111
 (If issued, these warrants were not 
recorded in the Journals.) The second impediment was the volume and nature of business listed in 
the Table. Appendix 6.6 sets out sample entries comparing the Irish officers' fees in 1695 and 
those agreed by the Commons at Westminster in February 1700/1.
112
 As had been the case in the 
1640s, the Westminster list was similar to the Irish fees in the majority of cases with the same or 
lower rates for identical tasks but with some variation of details. The Irish fees, for example, make 
no provision for a Speaker's secretary and none is listed in other sources; his functions, and the 
fees due, which include drawing up warrants for witnesses to attend, were probably carried out by 
the clerk. Nor are any fees paid to the house-keeper
113
 as was the case at Westminster. If 
comprehensive, the Irish list shows that the serjeant-at-arms may not have derived the same level 
of fees from private bills as his English counterpart. Instead, he received fees for admitting 
strangers and serving summonses on behalf of Members, items not listed in the Westminster fees.  
Both Tables of Fees required those fees due for private bills to be paid before second reading. 
This rarely appears to have been a problem. On 18 August 1697 the Irish House extended this 
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rule when it demanded fees for 'personal' provisos to public bills. It did this five days after a privy 
council bill confirming several outlawries and attainders passed the Commons, on a division, on 13 
August; although a public bill, significantly it contained provisos exempting named Catholic lords 
and landowners. The Commons instructed the Speaker to demand payment within 10 days.
114
 The 
bill had, however, by then gone to the Lords (where it failed). On the day that the Commons sent a 
replacement bill
115
 to the Lords (15 November 1697)―presumably after the beneficiaries of the 
provisos had paid up―the House appointed a committee to examine the precedents for the 
charges.
116
 It reported on 18 November that there was a precedent from 1662, which envisaged 
summoning those who did not pay rather than holding up the legislation.
117
 There the matter was 
left. The episode appears to have been a belated and ineffectual attempt, with a sectarian flavour, 
to hold up controversial legislation rather than a search for new income. The rule once made was 
subsequently enforced.
118
 As Westminster did not enact public bills that applied to Ireland (other 
than in exceptional circumstances), charging for provisos provided a profitable monopoly for the 
Speaker and the House's officials. 
One feature not listed in the Irish Table of Fees was any reference to the heads of bill process or 
charges exclusive to its procedures—for example, taking the heads to the lord lieutenant. The 
omission may have had several reasons. First, the Table was anchored to practice in England. 
Second, the Table had its genesis before the heads processes solidified. Third, and probably most 
significantly, the heads process as applied to private bills could generate additional 
fees―especially for the officers in the Commons as most started in that House―with, for example, 
two committee stages (at heads and after second reading). Processes―particularly when linked to 
an order of the House recorded in the Journals―also triggered fees. In addition, as noted, fees 
due on the bill had to be paid before second reading. In Dublin there would have been a strong 
incentive to pay at that point as the sponsor having successfully negotiated the heads process was 
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within reach of securing the legislation.
119
 But given the failure rate of the heads process, fees 
incurred on a failed heads may have been difficult to collect. Hence the prominence given to the 
Speaker's warrant to collect money due to officers. 
As the Dublin and Westminster parliaments both enacted private legislation that applied in Ireland, 
they were in competition for the same business. In 1709 and 1710 both Irish Houses reviewed the 
fees they charged and compared them with Westminster's. The Commons considered that a 
significant reason for the volume of legislation originating at Westminster was 'in a great measure 
to proceed from the fees demanded for passing such bills'.
120
 The Irish House of Lords sought a 
copy of the fees charged at Westminster and suggested they were undercut by 25%
121
 and that 
where a bill 'concerns divers person concerning the same interest ... they are to pay no more than 
as for one private person'.
122
 A committee agreed the proposals on 24 June 1710
123
 but nothing 
further was heard. The episode may have been a reaction to particular circumstances: the reversal 
of the outlawry and attainder of Lord Slane in 1708 and a spike in Irish legislation enacted at 
Westminster, which after 1713 reverted to the mean―one or two acts a year (see Appendix 6.10). 
On this basis the volume of private legislation and the consequent loss of fees to Dublin was not 
significant.  
Parliamentary expenses were not the only outlay. There was the drafting and preparation of a bill 
which in England in 1700 was estimated to be around £240.
124
 In the case of bills coming before 
the Irish parliament the sponsor would pay agents in London to guide the bill through the Privy 
Council as well as officials such as the clerk of the Privy Council.
125
 Only a proportion of the 
proponent's costs would flow to the Irish Commons. The 1695 Table of Fees allows an inexact 
estimate of officers' income against entries in the Journals―orders for private business, reading 
reports and petitions―and the scale and nature of business generating fees and carried out in 
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committee or at the bar of the House itself is rarely discernible. On the basis of the former and 
taking a sample in 1703 the total fee income may have been around £10–20 per week. 
The problems of remuneration of the Commons staff seen in earlier parliaments persisted into the 
1690s: income from fees was low and unsteady
126
 and the alternative of petitioning the 
administration for remuneration was frustrating. As noted, there were claims overhanging from the 
1661 parliament―and not just from Warburton and Steele but from the descendants of Speaker 
Mervyn, who were pressing for £6,000 they claimed was due from expenses incurred in carrying 
out the office and loss of income, and they were pressing for it to be paid directly, that is 
appropriated from a supply bill.
127
 They and Warburton were successful, Steele was not. One 
reason for their success was that Mervyn's son, Henry, was a Member as was Warburton from 
1697
128
―Steele was not an MP―and both appear to have been Whigs.
129
 The heads containing 
the provision made it through the privy councils and the principle of allowing appropriation to an 
individual for a debt was therefore properly considered and accepted in London.
130
 The first 
venture into appropriation of the Irish Commons―in contrast to practice at Westminster where 
throughout the 1690s appropriation was for public, usually military purposes―was for old, private 
debts. As a result there was a risk that petitions for money would flood in and the Commons closed 
the gates shortly afterwards with a resolution:  
That this House will not enter into the consideration of giving, or raising any more money 
this session for any private use, except what relates to Sir Humphrey Jervis, Dr Walker's 




                                                        
 
126
  Aug 1641 the clerk, Philip Ferneley, petitioned the House pointing out that because of the dearth of private bills he 
had not received 'the benefit and profit of his place'. As compensation the House provided that as the Scots of 
Ulster had benefited from 1635 legislation granting them naturalisation the counties of Ulster with Carrickfergus 
and Derry should be taxed to pay him £250 by Nov 1641 (CJI(I), pp.275, 288). As Dennehy points out, the timing 
was bad (Dennehy, Administrative History, p.13). In July 1661 Ferneley reminded the House of the petition and 
that he had not been able to collect the money due. MPs in 1661 with knowledge confirmed the veracity of petition; 
the House revived the order ((I), pp.428-29).  
127
  CJI(II), p.185  
128
  HIP biography: Warburton was an MP from 1697 to 1713 as was his son, also called Richard, from 1692 to1715/6. 
One also had ties with the administration―see correspondence in BL, Add. 28,879 ff.124-26 (Richard Warburton 
to John Ellis, 19 Sep 1695). 
129
  HIP biography 
130
  CJI(II), p.158; an earlier attempt to appropriate funds for debts Sir Humphrey Jervis had incurred in bridge building 
was rejected in London because it would be levied as a duty on coal, a product of England; Whitehall had in the 
preparations for the part-session in 1697 been asked whether the Irish parliament could appropriate and had told 
the Dublin administration that, if Parliament insisted upon an appropriation, it was not to be opposed (SP, Entry 
Book 2, p.163 (CSPD: William III, 1697―23 Apl 1697 (Instruction to Lords Justice Galway)).  
131
  CJI(II), p.207  




The criteria for a select band of petitioners who might be eligible for preferential treatment was 
emerging: dependents of war 'heroes' and 'House of Commons' debts to former staff. Of more 
significance, the process worked as there were no subsequent petitions from the Mervyns or 
Warburton. 
After the prorogation of the final parliament of William III, the Tilsons petitioned the king for reward 
for their services in the parliaments of the 1690s. They asked former Speaker, Robert Rochfort, for 
advice, who certified that large rewards had been given to the clerk by the 1661 parliament and 
that the petitioners 'had discharged their duty with diligence and deserve His Majesty’s 
consideration and bounty'. This advice was sent to the Treasury in England and, despite the 
Tilsons employing an agent in London, no money was forthcoming because of William III’s 
absences abroad. When William died the Lord Treasurer concluded 'that it was for service done in 
the late reign' and decided not to pay up.
132
 Instead of seeking payment from the administration, 
the Tilsons and other officers took advantage of the developing supply process to petition the next 
parliament. A committee of the whole House considered the petition and reported back that the 
Tilsons should receive £400, the clerk assistant £200, Povey £150 and, his deputy, Cocksedge, 
£50 for their services to the previous two parliaments. The House then referred the resolutions to 
the Committee of Ways and Means.
133
 The stratagem worked and the payments appeared on the 
face of the second 1703 supply act with the instruction, omitted from the 1697 supply act, that 
payment was to be made 'without any further or other warrant to be sued for, had, and obtained in 
that behalf'.
134
 (Tilson Sr. did not push the process at this stage to include for £800 he claimed was 
owed to his father, Bishop Tilson, which proceeded by the old route of Commons petition to the 
lord lieutenant without success.)
135
 Having placed a foot in the door―and on the assumption that 
the arrangement delivered the cash―the clerks, sergeants and door-keepers petitioned separately 
at the beginning of the 1705 session for payment for the 1703–04 session. The House sent the 
petitions to a select committee, which included the attorney general. Three factors swayed the 
committee in favour: the clerk in the 1661 parliament had received 'very large and considerable 
rewards'; the difficulty of obtaining money via petition; and the current clerks had discharged their 
                                                        
 
132
  CJI(II), p.448  
133
  CJI(II), pp.357, 448; Tilson Sr. was apportioned £300, Tilson Jr. £100; Povey did not become serjeant-at-arms 
until 1697 and Cocksedge was not in post during 1692 Parliament.  
134
  2 Anne c.4, section XI  
135
  Tilson petitioned in 1707―CJI(II), p.541.  




duties with diligence. The committee reported that 'the petitioners were entitled to a reward for their 
service and attendance in such measure and in such manner as the House saw fit'. The House 
ordered that the report be referred to the Committee of Ways and Means
136
 but the upshot was 
that the House petitioned the lord lieutenant for £400 for the clerks and £100 to the serjeant-at-
arms for their services during the previous and current sessions and £50 to the doorkeeper for his 
services in the past and current parliaments. No payment was made (and provision was not 
included in the supply act enacted that session). The position was rectified at the start of the 1707 
session when the House included in the supply resolutions sums for the past and current sessions; 
these provisions appeared in the 1707 supply act.
137
 The mechanism was now established and 
the officers of the House petitioned early in the session for money, which was provided through the 
supply process and the provision was included in the main supply act.
138
 Tilson Sr. in 1709 used 
this route to obtain the £800 he claimed was owed to his father in the 1640s.
139
 The mechanism 
worked as there was no subsequent evidence of officers chasing back payments.
140
 When the 
1713 session ended prematurely, those owed money were able, on petition to the House, to obtain 
back payments in later sessions.
141
  
The 1729–30 Journals show how the process developed. The petitions from the officers became a 
routine part of the supply process and were noted perfunctorily. The amounts payable had 
increased, and additional items were added―such as the preparation of accounts. Between 1707 
and 1729/30 the total claimed increased from £700 to nearly £1,900. Although the list of officers of 
the House included in appropriations remained constant, other office-holders joined the 
list―notably, the comptroller and auditor general, but not officers of the House of Lords.
142
 Taking 
advantage of their position within the supply process in the Commons officers were able to make 
up shortfall in income.  
                                                        
 
136
  CJI(II), p.448  
137
  CJI(II), p.516; 6 Anne c.1, section VII 
138
  CJI(II), pp.587-88, 653, 709  
139
  CJI(II), p.588; 8 Anne c.2, section VII  
140
  Accounts for Lady Day 1710 to midsummer 1711 record payment of £950 to officers of the Commons, SP, 63–367 
f.71(stamped 58)  
141
  CJI(III), pp.45-46, 140-41, 205; 2 George I c.7; section II; 4 George I c.1, section II; 3 George II c.1, section IX  
142
  CJI(III), pp.594-95  




Officer in 1729–30 (1707 equivalent) 1729–30 payments 
Clerk (Bruen Worthington) 





Clerk (Isaac Ambrose) 





John Ker (clerk assistant) (£100) £200 
Committee clerks (William Bayley and Henry Buckley) - £250 (shared) 
Preparation of accounts (Buckley) 
 this session 







Door keepers (John Fieldhouse and James Savage) (£50) £80 (shared) 
Serjeant-at-arms (Richard Povey) (£150) £300 
Comptroller and auditor general - £300 
* Given jointly as £300 § Given as £200 for two sessions 
Table 2  Appropriations to officers 
The facility to use the supply process in this manner was not available at Westminster
143
 where the 
government had tighter control of appropriation, in order to prevent Member-led pork-barrel 
expenditure.
144
 In contrast in Ireland, once precedents were established and once loaded into the 
supply heads the political sensitivities surrounding supply prevented the privy councils from 
tampering with the provisions.
145
 Table 3 sets out the amounts appropriated for Irish clerks and 
officers in 1711
146
 against claims made by clerks and officers at Westminster in 1713 for payment 
for their work. (Caution must be exercised with the comparison as the Westminster figures are in 
part bids for compensation for the removal of a category of private business, naturalisation bills.) In 
1713 Westminster enacted 25 private acts (down from an average of 50 for the 1697–98 to 1708–
09 sessions),
147
 compared to an average for the Irish parliament of seven per session between 
1703 and 1711.
148
 Notwithstanding the downturn in private business, fees at Westminster provided 
clerks and officers with more lucrative remuneration that those in Dublin, whose income was 
supplemented with payments from the Exchequer. 
                                                        
 
143
  Williams, Clerical Organization, describes the often unsuccessful attempts of clerks and officers to obtain 
emoluments from Exchequer, pp.45-46, 287-94.  
144
  See p.231 below. The heads process allowed a wide ranging review of, and debate on, financial matters upstream 
of government controls developed at Westminster at the beginning of eighteenth century, especially its veto on 
appropriation. Bills returned from London implicitly had government approval equivalent to the requirements of 
Westminster's financial procedures. Other constraints on pork-barrelling in the Irish Commons overlapped with 
those in England: both were run on a 'low-tax philosophy' and MPs ' direct contact with taxpayers (Conrad Russell, 
King James VI and I and his English Parliaments (Oxford, 2011), pp.6, 20).  
145
  See p.225 below.  
146
  CJI(II), p.709  
147
  HoP(1690)(I), p.389 
148
  Kelly, Poynings' Law, p.161  




Irish House of Commons Great Britain House of Commons 
Clerks of the House: Thomas Tilson, Sr. 
Thomas Tilson, Jr. 
£200 
£150 
Clerk of the House £300–400 
Clerk assistant £200 Clerk assistant £100–120 
Serjeant-at-arms £200 Serjeant-at-arms £290 
Two committee clerks (jointly) £250 Other clerks £50 each 
Door-keeper £50 Door-keeper £30–40 
Table 3  Remuneration for officers in Irish House of Commons in 1711 compared with 
claims made by officers in Westminster House of Commons in 1713 
 
2.6  Journals of the House of Commons 
From the English records it is clear that one of the primary responsibilities of the clerk was writing 
up and holding the records and papers of the House;
149
 in Ireland the clerk had the same 
responsibilities.
150
 There was need for a mechanism to ensure accuracy. On 18 November 1695 
the Commons corrected 'a mistake committed in the Votes' of 26 October that it would examine 
certain lords 'on oath', an infringement of the privilege of the Lords. The Commons ordered that the 
offending words be struck from the Journals and the printed Votes, 'not having been the resolution 
of this House'.
151
 The following day the House sent a message to the Lords pointing out that the 
error was the clerks' and that they had been censured.
152
 No mention was made of any existing 
arrangements for checking and the House, following earlier Westminster procedure,
153
 set up a 
committee of seven experienced Members, two of whom had sat in the 1661 parliament, to meet 
in the Speaker’s chamber at 4pm each day to check that the Votes were 'agreeable to the sense of 
the House'.
154
 (This is one of the few instances where pre-1692 expertise was clearly used after 
1692.) According to the order a new committee was to be appointed for this purpose every 
                                                        
 
149
  Williams, Clerical Organization, pp.37, 42  
150
  CJI(I), p.753 (18 July 1666)  
151
  CJI(II), p.115  
152
  CJI(II), pp.116-17  
153
  On 11 Dec 1678 the Westminster Commons: 'Resolved, That a Committee be appointed to inspect and peruse the 
Journals of this House; and see that due entries be made; and make a report of the mistakes and errors therein 
every Monday Morning. ...  'Ordered, That the Orders of the House be drawn up every day, and read the next 
morning, before they be entered in the Journal' (CJE(IX), p.556).  
154
  CJI(II), p.116. Those who sat in 1661 were Henry Davis and John Weaver Sr. The others appointed were Maurice 
Annesley, Randall Brice, William Sprigge, William Molyneux and Clotworthy Upton. The same MPs were re-
appointed on Monday 25 Nov (II), p.123) and on Monday 2 Dec 1695 (II), p.129) but there were no further entries. 
The House adjourned on Saturday 14 Dec 1695 which was followed by a series of short sittings often starting on a 
Tuesday and lasting a few days with adjournments up to four months until July 1697. There is no mention of the 
'Monday' committee again. Brice was dead by 15 Sep 1697 when a writ was moved for a by-election for his seat 
but there is no entry in the CJI for a replacement on the committee.  




Monday but, if this happened, there is no trace in the Journals. Instead―as at Westminster―at the 
start of later sessions supervisory responsibilities were given to the Speaker.
155
  
There is no evidence that arrangements for the production of the Journals followed anything other 
than those for Westminster, about which more is known. A clerk took a note during business―a 
'rough copy'―and this was written up quickly as a definite version was required for the printers to 
produce the daily Votes. Although there is only one known surviving original manuscript Journal of 
the Irish Commons (from 1613–15),
156
 there are many manuscript copies of Votes in The National 
Archives at of the United Kingdom and what appears to be a copy of the entire Journal for the 
1692 parliament.
157
 Most likely it was a copy of the written up entries for the 1692 parliament, 
which was sent to London when the session was terminated abruptly, possibly as part of an 
inquest. The 1692 'Journal' differs from the surviving, contemporary printed Votes in that there is 
no abridgement―such as editing out of speeches or membership lists of committees.
158
 With the 
Journal in a different, cursive hand is a draft index, which in their final form are found in bound 
Westminster manuscript Journals.
159
 There is no evidence to show when or where the Irish index 
was produced but it does point to a standard approach and method of operation in administrative 
processes. The 1692 Journal also has comprehensive explanatory notes in the margins, which 
with some tidying up were reproduced in the eighteenth-century, printed Journal for the1692 
parliament.
160
 They include names, descriptions and processes and used with an index would 
provide a tool for searching the Journals. 
As Dennehy and Bergin have pointed out, there are errors and omissions
161
 but comparison of the 
1692 manuscript and printed copies of Votes with the printed Journals shows these to be minor, 
                                                        
 
155
  See CJI(II), p.243 (3 Oct 1698); this order copied Westminster: 'Ordered, That the Votes of the House be printed. 
Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do peruse the Votes of the House, and order the printing of them' (CJE(X), p.273).  
156
  Dennehy, 'Manuscript Alternatives', pp.139-143; all other Journals of the Commons were destroyed in the Four 
Courts in 1922.  
157
  SP, 63–354 ff,231ff(stamped 232ff)  
158
  For example, see Votes in SP, 63–359 ff.319-22(stamped 105-06) for 5 Aug 1697 and SP, 63–386(stamped 104) 
for 21 Sep 1725.  
159
  SP, 63–354 ff.272ff(stamped 273ff); as well SP, 63–354 contains manuscript copies of Votes for most days of the 
session with a few printed copies along with a copy of An Account of the Sessions of Parliament in Ireland, 1692, 
which was hostile to the government.  
160
  Some sample checking of the 1692 manuscript against the 1795 printed edition shows that the latter―with the 
exception of membership lists of committees―is an accurate and comprehensive version of the content of the 
original. Punctuation and layout in 1795 were altered to follow the model of the printed Westminster Journals. 
161
  Dennehy, Administrative History, pp.20ff; Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.267, suggests that the number of 
Irish legislators who sat in parliament and on the Irish council may account for the 'occasional disappearance of 




making the 1795 edition of the Journals a dependable transcription of the written-up Journals. This 
raises the question: which items of business were recorded by the clerks? Sir John Perceval in his 
diaries
162
―covering part of the 1711 and most of the 1713 sessions―throws doubt on the 
comprehensiveness of the records but not their accuracy or the record of decisions. From the diary 
the following items of business were not recorded in the Journals: 
a) (as can be recognised from the Journals themselves) business in committees;
163
  
b) motions debated and withdrawn;
164
  
c) motions interrupted by prorogation;
165
  
d) some items of business which resulted in no resolution or action—for example, a 
decision not to adjourn;
166
  








The 1713 session was atypical in that it saw the culmination of the 'rage of party' and, more 
prosaically, there was a new, and possibly inexperienced, team responsible for the records. In 
other cases omission was because a sponsor had not paid: private business, which included 
election disputes referred to committee, required fees for entries in the Journals and, if a sponsor 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
heads of bills from the commons’ records and their reappearance at the Irish council, without any order recorded 
in the journals'. 
162
  See Appendix 6.20. 
163
  See Scobell, Memorials, p.39, which cites a rule made in 1607 that 'Every thing directed and agreed to be 
reported, ought to be accordingly reported; but not every thing spoken or debated at a Committee'.  
 On 1 Dec 1713 there was a division in committee of the whole House on who should chair of Committee of 
Elections (Perceval Diaries, p.128) which is not recorded in the CJI. The procedure may have been irregular as 
Thomas advises that, if there was a dispute over the Chair, it went back to the House for decision (Thomas, 
Commons, p.272 and Scobell, Memorials, p.37) or it may have been an oversight.  
164
  CJI(II), p.724; the Perceval Diaries, pp.114-32; withdrawal was allowed with permission of the House. This 
instance is instructive as the entry in CJI, while strictly procedurally correct, is not a reflection of the actuality. The 
CJI stated that orders of the day were not proceeded on and that the House adjourned until the following day. Sir 
John Perceval records a decision to bring in candles, which would have been done on the basis of a motion, and 
then a substantial debate with several contributions on a motion to restrict the Privy Council's power to control the 
export of corn. The latter was withdrawn with the leave of the House.  
165
  CJI(II), p.735; Perceval Diaries, pp.119-20  
166 
 For example, the loss of a motion to adjourn or that the previous question be now put; see later entries for 1713 in 
Appendix 6.20 and Perceval Diaries, p.131.  
167
  Perceval Diaries, p.132  
168
  CJI 16 Dec 1713 records that there was a division on whether to remove the reference to the lord chancellor in a 
motion and that 'on a division it passed in the negative'; the figures are provided at the Perceval Diaries, p.133. 
For other examples see: pp.134-35. CJI entries of decisions are consistent with the results of divisions.  








As Betty Kemp points out in respect of Westminster, publication of the Votes provided both an 
authorised and an immediate printed report of the activities of the House and copies were 
distributed by the serjeant-at-arms to all Members and was sold to the public.
170
 Within a week of 
the House meeting in October 1692 it established Westminster practice with an order that its 'votes 
... already passed, or which shall hereafter pass, may be printed; Mr Speaker first perusing the 
same, and authorising the printing thereof'.
171
 (The first printed Votes are at Figure 4.) This formula 
with the subsequent addition of the warning (first used at Westminster in 1691) that 'no person do 
presume to print the same but such as Mr Speaker shall appoint' became standard at the start of 
each session.
172
 The Commons was usually content for newspapers to reproduce the Votes 
without interference. Given the extent to which the London papers, over which the House had no 
jurisdiction, reproduced material from the Irish Votes, action by the Irish House against Dublin 
papers publishing similar material would have looked anomalous, if not perverse, and contrary to 
patriotic sentiments. The Irish House only moved against Dublin printers when they produced a 
rival version of the Votes or seriously misrepresented a Vote.
173
  
                                                        
 
169
  CJI(II), pp.95, xx  
170
  Kemp, Votes, p.3 
171
  CJI(II), p.13; the English model is at CJE(X), p.273.  
172
  For example, CJI(II), pp.45 (1695–97), 243 (1698–99); (III), p. 581 (1729–30); the English model is at CJE(X), 
p.540 (27 Oct 1691).  
173
  In 1709 the House reprimanded the printers, Francis Dickson and Stephen Powell, 'relating to a printed proposal 
published by them, concerning the printing of the Votes of this House' (CJI(II), p.577). This appears to have been 
an isolated incident and may have concerned a proposal to re-print the Votes exactly. It is not until 1725 that the 
next instance is recorded when Dickson's son, Richard, and Gwyn Needham 'having taken upon them to reprint 
the Votes of this House in their newspaper ... misrepresenting the sense and proceedings of the House, are guilty 
of a breach of the privileges of this House' ((III), p.416). Four years later Dickson fell foul of the House again when 
he printed the proceedings of 29 Nov, 'in contempt of the [sessional] order, and in breach of the privilege of this 
House'. The newspaper was delivered at Table and the offending paragraph read. The House ordered Dickson 
arrested, he was incarcerated and released, subject to payment of fees on 10 Dec 1729 ((III), pp.607, 615 and 
616). The incidents appear to be commercial, rather than political, in origin―R. Munter, History of the Irish 
Newspaper 1685–1760 (Cambridge, 1967), and Mary Pollard, A Dictionary of Members of the Dublin Book Trade 
1550–1800 (Cambridge, 2000).  






Figure 4  First Printed Votes of Irish House of Commons (10 October 1692) 




The surviving copies of the Irish House's subsequent Votes are almost interchangeable with those 
produced at Westminster (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). The sequentially page numbering allowed a 
set for the session to be bound, though without an index and marginal headings they are not easy 
to search.
174
 The speed of production was comparable with Westminster and fast production 
meant that checking had to be swift and accurate.
175
 The correspondence with officials in London 
often enclosed Votes and frequently made reference to yesterday's Votes or those of the day 
before being not yet available,
176
 implying that they usually were.
177
 Sir John Perceval's and other 
accounts of the 1713 session state several times that he would not cover business because the 
Votes showed it.
178
 In compiling the diary and his autobiography he therefore had a set of the 
Votes with the notes he had taken contemporaneously. With one exception he regarded them as 
accurate. The exception was the entry in the Vote for 1 December 1713 recording a motion for a 
committee to draw up a heads of a bill to attaint the pretender. Perceval says that the decision was 
nemine contradicente but the Vote failed to record this (as does the later printed Journal).
179
 
Perceval explained that the Speaker did not express unanimity in the Votes 'as he should have 
done' and mused before erasing 'either through inadvertency or to make it believed in England that 
the pretender had friends in the Irish parliament, thereby to raise the character of the Whigs'.
180
 
For him, the Speaker alone was responsible for the content of the Votes and could edit key entries 
to convey a message to a section of readers. The Votes were one of the main conduits of the 
House's views to the administration and beyond.
181
 Officials in Dublin Castle sent material for 
inclusion in the London Gazette.
182
 Those who sent Votes to Whitehall can be split into two 
groups: officials who sent them without much comment; and those who provided commentary, 
                                                        
 
174
  There are surviving near complete sets of Votes for the 1703–04, 1717 and 1719 sessions. Southwell assembled 
complete sets which he kept with bills passed in the session (BL, Add. 34,777 ff.100ff). In contrast those surviving 
in UK National Archives tend to be individual copies or short runs sent from Dublin immediately after publication 
with a focus on business in which the government had an interest.  
175
  There is no evidence of financial support provided through voted funds and it appears that the appointed printer, 
holding a monopoly, was able to finance the production from sales of Votes. He may have spurred the House to 
action in 1709 and 1725 (noted above). 
176
  For example, correspondence between Gerard Bor (Clerk of the Parliaments) and John Ellis (15 Oct 1695) which 
indicated that Votes were included and 'if the [Commons] votes of yesterday come out this night they shall be sent' 
(BL, Add. 28,879 f.194).  
177
  One counter argument is that manuscript copies continue to be included regularly.  
178
  Perceval Diaries, pp.131-34, 136, 139-38  
179
  CJI(II), p.759  
180
  Perceval Diaries, pp.139-40  
181
  Dermot J.T. Englefield, The Printed Records of the Parliament of Ireland (London, 1978), p.5 
182
  SP, 63–363 f.68 (stamped 254) (Southwell to Richard Warr, 25 Sep 1703)  




which ranged from trivia through the self-serving to the prescient. These accounts focussed on the 
matters that interested the recipients, which was principally securing supply and key public bills as 
quickly and smoothly as possible or issues of high drama such as the impeachment of Lord 
Chancellor Porter; one aspect that generated interest was the arguments advanced on each side 
of an issue. These officials were not interested in business, as Richard Warburton noted, such as 
'Hackney coaches and paving the streets or other matters of little importance'.
183
 Communication 
did not flow in one direction and they had an appetite for news from London.
184
 Irish clerks and 
politicians were integrated into the Westminster-Whitehall framework. Carteret in Dublin observed 
to Edward Southwell on 16 March 1729/30: 'the eyes of people here are upon the Votes of the 
House of Commons of England to see if your duties upon the yarn are to be taken off'.
185
 Beyond 
news, the similarity between the Westminster and Dublin Votes in form, layout and content meant 
that they provided an easy and up-to-date guide for those running and participating in the Irish 
Commons. Barnard states that some Westminster Votes had been reprinted in Dublin during the 
agitated 1680s and were used by the Irish parliament.
186
 Print provided a more direct and accurate 
method for the transmission of parliamentary concepts, procedures and formulations than personal 
contact, visiting Westminster or even manuscript copies. Michael Harris gives more detail from the 
records kept by Delafaye (around 1710) which show how news, including the Westminster Votes, 
was distributed. He dealt with about 70 customers scattered through the British Isles, with a 









                                                        
 
183
  BL, Add. 28,879 ff.138 (Richard Warburton to John Ellis, 19 Sep 1695)  
184
  For example, BL, Add. 28,892 ff.26 (Lt.-Gen. William Steuart to [John Ellis], 23 Mar 1703/4), 101 (Joshua Dawson 
to John Ellis, 18 May 1704), 208 (William Kildare to John Ellis, 15 Aug 1704) 
185
  BL, Add. 38,016, f.27  
186
  T.C. Barnard, 'The Irish Parliament and Print, 1660–1782', Parliamentary History, vol. 33, issue 1 (Feb 2014), 
pp.98-99, fn 12  
187
  Michael Harris, 'Parliament in the Public Sphere: A View of Serial Coverage at the Turn of the Seventeenth 
Century', Parliamentary History, vol. 26, issue 1 (Feb 2007), pp.65-66; Michael Harris, 'Newspaper distribution 
during Queen Anne’s reign', in R.W. Hunt, I.G. Philip, R.J. Roberts (eds.), Studies in the Book Trade: in Honour of 
Graham Pollard (Oxford, 1975), pp.139-51  



























Figure 6  Example of Westminster House of Commons Votes (11 April 1728) 
 
Those who read the Votes knew how to interpret them: for example, a resolution agreed nemine 
contradicente followed by a series of orders was an indication that there had been little debate and 




the matter had been agreed unanimously and quickly.
188
 Similarly, as Southwell pointed out to 
Secretary of State the earl of Nottingham on 27 November 1703: 'from the printed votes [you will 
see] the great stress laid on the two bills of popery and linen manufacture. They were brought [to 
the lord lieutenant] by the whole House, and the Speaker was ordered to enlarge upon them'.
189
 A 
debate in May 1716 showed the extent to which the House was conscious of the effect of the 
published Votes. Charles Dering, a former Irish MP, kept Perceval, by then also a former MP, 
informed of developments in the Commons. Dering said that just before the House was to adjourn 
Joseph Allen had pressed for accounts to be produced to show how voted credits had been used. 
Chief Secretary Martin Bladen had replied that he was ready to do so and 
that he would engage upon their next meeting to lay all those papers before them, that he 
supposed this would be sufficient ... and he hoped that the gentleman would not insist on it 
being in the Votes because it would look like [distrust?] and some degree of reflection on 
the Government.... Allen replied that it was necessary to have it in the Votes because 
otherwise it could not be made public enough. There were several speeches of both sides 
... and to show them without doors what a concern they had that the money granted by the 
House of Commons should be applied in a proper manner as well as in a frugal one.
190
 
As already noted, the printed Votes were not exact facsimiles of the manuscript Journals: not only 
were items omitted to save space but, on the template of the Westminster Votes, some information 
was not included as a matter of course―for example, the tellers in divisions. In addition, on a few 
occasions, especially in the 1690s, where either the House had second thoughts or did not want to 
provoke the government, there were items it resolved not to print.
191
 The first ever published 
Vote―for 10 October―recorded that a debate about Members’ entitlement to free post had been 
adjourned 'to a further day'.
192
 The debate concluded on 13 October 1692 with a resolution that 
Members had 'an undoubted right and privilege ... to have their letters post free'.
193
 On 17 October 
1692 Serjeant Brodrick moved that the Vote and debate, which had taken place four days earlier 
'may not be printed amongst the Votes of this House: that the said Vote may still remain in the 
                                                        
 
188
  Southwell explained to Lord Treasurer Godolphin that: 'Mr. Tennison made the motion against Mr. Asgill's book 
which ... by the proceedings herewith sent ... was not long in debate' (SP, 63–363 f.67(stamped 262) (25 Sep 
1703)); the entry in the CJI is 'Resolved, Nemine contradicente, that the ... book contains in it several heretical and 
blasphemous doctrines and positions, contrary to the Christian religion ... and destructive of human society. 
Ordered, That the ... book be burnt by ... the common hangman ... Ordered, That Mr Asgill (being out of town) do 
attend in his place'. ((II), p.317).  
189
  SP, 63–363(stamped 49)  
190
  BL, Add. 47,027, f.149  
191
  The are no examples in CJI after the 1690s of orders not to print business in the CJI. 
192
  CJI(II), p.12; at Figure 4 
193
  CJI(II), p.15  




Journals of this House, but there is not necessity for printing the same'.
194
 No printed Vote for 13 
October has been located and given Brodrick’s intervention there appears to have been time to 
amend it before publication. Lord Lieutenant viscount Sydney explained in a letter to Nottingham 
that the government's response may have caused the re-consideration: 
I had some taste of [Members'] disposition in the business of their post letters which when I 
had ordered to be passed free; they nevertheless passed a vote declaring it to be their 
undoubted right and privilege to have their letters free, although they could have no title to 
it but by the concession of the government. I took no notice at all of this because they on 
second thoughts ordered the vote not to be printed.
195
 
Within a week there was another instruction not to print an order that the Committee of Elections 
and Privileges could sit whenever it saw fit and that it should give priority to examining new 
charters.
196
 Those contesting elections may not have been content with the increased delay. The 
next example was in August 1697 when the committee examining English legislation that could be 
replicated in Ireland reported in favour of an act for burying the dead in wool and House ordered 
that it 'be not put in the printed Votes';
197
 the reason was political sensitivity as Westminster 
prepared to restrict Irish woollen exports. It therefore appears that there was both awareness of the 
impact of publication and some caution about using it. 
Printing the Votes also added a new formal method of communication between the House and the 
administration.
198
 As noted, Sydney took the view that he could ignore resolutions agreed by the 
House but not printed and went to some effort to have unpalatable items left out of the published 
Votes. The scruples the Commons had about publicising their claims to free postage evaporated 
when it came to their 'sole right' claim in respect of supply. Publication of the claim in the Votes 
provided a platform for announcing and broadcasting the claim, which added to Sydney's 
indignation: when he saw the claim in print, he 'could do not less than show that these assertions 
in prejudice of the crown of England were not allowed by me, and therefore I sent for the House of 
Commons, and having told them of their error I caused my protest to be entered in the Journal of 
the Lords'. He then prorogued parliament. He was worried how the claim published in the Votes 
would play in the English parliament which 
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  CJI(II), p.18  
195
  SP, 63–354 ff.191-92(stamped 192-94 (6 Nov 1692))  
196
  CJI(II), p.22  
197
  CJI(II), p.163; this printed Vote is available and the item on wool is not included (SP, 63–359 ff.343-46(stamped 
117-18); similarly, the order not to print is not in printed Vote for 10 Aug (f.349(stamped 124)).  
198
  In addition to addresses and delegations. 




would think it hard to be excluded from the power of preparing money bills for this kingdom 
by a vote of the Commons here, and ... letting it pass might give them ground of 
discontent; and I think it absolutely necessary to give a check to such rash assertions.
199
  
In 1705 the Irish Commons took exception to a paper from the Lower House of Convocation on 
tithes which it took as an affront to its prerogatives on finance. After several exchanges Southwell 
explained to Nottingham: 
At last [Convocation] sent us a paper excusing and explaining their former [paper], which 
was voted satisfactory and thereupon we took off some votes from our Journals which had 
been made upon that occasion. But whereas they expected that we would also give them 
back their first paper, that so no memory might remain upon our Journals of their mistake, 
the House did divide upon the question which was very mixed ... so that it was carried to 
enter both the first and last paper upon the Journals.
200
 
The Commons had no qualms about publicly recording and broadcasting its triumph over 
Convocation. 
The move to printing the Votes was part of a shift to greater publication and the production of up-
to-date material. On 18 November 1695 the House summoned a printer 'to give account why he 
has not printed the several Acts passed this session'.
201
 At the end of the elongated 1695–97 
session the lords justices said they would 'present everyone [Member] with a book of the acts of 
this session of parliament, when ... printed', giving the appearance of a memento of a special 
occasion.
202
 Despite its length and fragmentary calendar it was one of the most productive 
legislative sessions if acts passed are measured against sitting days (see Appendix 6.8.2). When 
the 1703 parliament met, one of its early decisions was to appoint a committee to view the rolls of 
the acts of parliament to establish which needed to be printed.
203
 There were also printed lists of 
Members; those for the parliaments of 1713, 1715 and 1727 survive.
204
  
From 1703 the House ordered the printing of some reports which fell into two categories, each of 
which had a purpose. The 1713 parliament illustrates the first when it agreed to print:  
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  SP, 63–354 f.192(stamped 194)  
200
  SP, 63–365 f.60(stamped 143) (24 Sep 1692) 
201
  CJI(II), p.116  
202
  CJI(II), p.236  
203
  CJI(II), p.325  
204
  BL, Add. 34,777 ff.46, 49, 55 
205
  CJI(II), pp.762-64; the initiative for publication may have come from the participants. 




b) the committee report with papers relating to the prosecution of Edward Lloyd and 
Dudley Moore, a case used by the Commons to attack the Lord Chancellor 
Phipps;
206
 and  
c) the Speaker's report of the case of the city of Dublin.
207
  
The latter two, in particular, represented the opening of a new front by the House in its vigorous 
and highly political battle against Phipps as it actively put its case outside parliament.
208
 The 
second category had a more constructive purpose and developed in the 1720s with a focus on the 
examination of major administrative problems: 
a) a 1723 committee report on sheriffs' accounts and the fines imposed by the Court of 
the Exchequer on sheriffs;
209
  
b) a report presented in November 1729 on gaols and prisons;
210
 The report painted a 
picture of violence, extortion and squalor, which roused concern in the committee. On 
the same day the committee requested leave for a bill for the relief of imprisoned 
debtors, the better regulation of gaols and the punishment of arbitrary and illegal 
practices of gaol keepers. The publication appears to have been to assist the 




c) a report presented in December 1729 on the maladministration of justice in Dublin.
212
 
This report was focused on a group of magistrates and their clerks extorting fees. The 
subsequent legislation―for better regulating the fees of justices of the peace, and 
disabling two aldermen from acting as justices of the peace―made it on to the 
statute book. 
The first category is partisan, aimed at political opponents
213
 and follows a pattern detected in 
England,
214
 while the two 1729 reports and were aimed at achieving legislative change to address 
                                                        
 
206
  CJI(II), pp.770-71, cclxxiii-cclxxvi  
207
  CJI(II), pp.773, cclxxvi-cclxxix; the report in the CJI appears to be a summary of evidence against Tories and 
Phipps and drafted by the Speaker on behalf of the House itself; it was another plank in the House's attack on 
Phipps. It was published as The State of the Case of the City of Dublin, As it appear'd on the evidence given 
before the House of Commons, on Monday the 21st of December (Dublin, [1713?]). There was a sequel in 1715 
when the House ordered publication of a report from a select committee that examined the Dublin mayoral 
controversy producing a series of resolutions that amounted to an all-out attack on the main figures in the previous 
judiciary and executive ((III), pp.101-03, lxxviii-ciii).  
208
  There was a counter-blast in print: Helsham's Long History. 
209
  CJI(III), p.360; the report is at pp.cclxxiii-cclxxxiv; no contemporaneously printed copy has been located.  
210
  CJI(III), p.604; the report is at pp.ccclxxxvi-cccxc; no contemporaneously printed copy has been located.  
211
  Bill no.1236 (ILD) 
212
  CJI(II), p.615; the report is at pp.cccxci-cccxciv; no contemporaneously printed copy has been located.  
213
  In addition to the three 1713 printed reports, there were two earlier reports ordered to be printed. In 1707 a report 
from a committee, chaired by William Conolly, examining allegations that 60 creditors were owed substantial sums 
for providing clothing for several regiments; the committee recommended a heads for a private bill. The financial 
impropriety was part of the backwash from the fall of Sir William Robinson, an associate of Ormond (see D.W. 




an identified problem or injustice. These two later reports sit within a type of publication that, 
although they had antecedents going back to the end of the seventeenth century,
215
 became 
common in the 1720s: the report which identified, and attempted to analyse, a social or economic 
problem and offered a remedy.
216
 The solution often required legislation or a degree of self-
assertion, to take on British interests, and so the Members of the Irish parliament was firmly the 
target. The publications ensured that the political wind came from the patriotic direction
217
 and that 
there was a focus on addressing economic and social problems, both of which were given a 
stimulus by the publications which fuelled the arguments that were taking place in the Commons 
on the nation bank and Wood's halfpence.
218
 The two 1729 reports are not exceptional in that 
committees had examined 'social' issues but they show a new strategy from those pressing for 
change, that is making their case in print to those out-of-doors and to show them that the 
Commons was addressing the issue. The pattern had been set by Westminster.
219
 The gaols 
report follows closely in the footsteps of a Westminster committee report which was reprinted in 
Dublin in May 1729.
220
 Finally, it may be coincidental but the 1729 reports were authorised shortly 
after Gore took over the speakership and may indicate a new approach to put over its case in the 
print culture of Dublin that was thriving in the 1720s.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Hayton, Ruling Ireland, 1685–1742 (Woodbridge, 2004), p.90 and T.C. Barnard, A New Anatomy of Ireland. Irish 
Protestants 1649–1770 (New Haven, 2003), p.161). The heads were rejected by the Irish Privy Council (Bill 
no.2589 (ILD)). The report is in appendix to CJI(II), pp.clxxii-clxxvi; no contemporaneously printed copy has been 
located but it was printed as the CJI record that as there were several mistakes in the printed version it had to be 
reprinted―pp.537, 544, 564. The second report ordered to be printed in Aug 1711 was from a committee 
inspecting examinations given by Dominic Langton, who made allegations against Whig gentry, and this clearly fell 
into the first category―pp.712, 717, cclviii-cclix; no other copies of report appear to be available.  
214
  See HoP(1690)(I), pp.371-73; in contrast to Ireland, printing reports to attack opponents tended to be a Tory 
weapon.  
215
  For example, the works of Sir Francis Brewster such as A Discourse Concerning Ireland and the Different 
Interests thereof; in answer to the Exon and Barnstaple Petitions; shewing that if a Law were enacted to prevent 
the exportation of Woollen Manufactures from Ireland to Foreign Parts, what the consequences thereof would be 
both to England and Ireland (London, 1698)  
216
  For example, Jonathan Swift, A Proposal for the Universal Use of Irish Manufacture (Dublin, 1720); James 
Maculla, The Lamentable Cry of the People of Ireland to Parliament. A coinage, or mint, proposed. The Parliament 
of Ireland's address, and the King's ... (Dublin, 1728); The State of the Case of Great Numbers of Gentlemen, 
Merchants, Tradesmen, Widows, and Other Unfortunate Persons, Confined for Debt in the ... ([Dublin ], [1729?]); 
The Case of the Foundlings of the City of Dublin; humbly recommended to the consideration of the Parliament 
([Dublin], [1730]) 
217
  For example, Thomas Prior, A List of the Absentees of Ireland, and the Yearly Value of their Estates and Incomes 
Spent Abroad. With observations on the present state and ... (Dublin, [1729]) and Molyneux's, The Case of Ireland 
was reprinted in 1720. 
218
  See bibliography: Private correspondence, diaries and memoirs, collections of speeches, pamphlets, 
etc.―anonymous, Swift's Drapier letters.  
219
  For example, Report of the Committee Appointed to Inspect the Poors Rates and the Scavencers Rates, within the 
Cities of London and Westminster... (London, 1715), a committee chaired by Robert Molesworth. 
220
  A Report from Committee Appointed to Enquire into the State of the Goals of England: relating to the Fleet 
prison... (London, reprinted Dublin, 1729) 




The Commons controlled aspects of its own history and could order records erased. On 21 June 
1661 the House ordered a select committee to search its records for orders 'that do intrench 
[impugn] upon the honour and integrity of the late Earl of Strafford' and other leading figures of his 
regime.
221
 The committee reported a list of excisions, all bar one of which the House agreed, and 
the committee was ordered to see that the clerk carried them out.
222
 This took the form of crossing 
out entries,
223
 which left them legible and therefore they were reprinted in the Journals. The action 
in 1661 was against specific decisions, not the legitimacy of the parliament that took the decisions. 
In contrast in 1695 the Irish parliament enacted legislation ordering that the records of the 1689 
Parliament be 'publicly and openly cancelled and utterly destroyed',
224
 a procedure that was used 
to show public abhorrence of traitorous and heretical publications. The destruction of the 
parliamentary records was popular with the Protestants of Dublin who lit 'bonfires in the streets for 
joy that the act of attainder and other proceedings ... were destroyed'.
225
 The 1689 parliament had 
outlawed 2,000 people in an act of attainder and according to a note in the Southwell 
papers―possibly written in the mid 1690s―the correct course would have been for parliament to 
reverse the attainders and those Members affected to withdraw while the business was 
transacted.
226
 A retained record carried not only memory but some recognition of legitimate 
authority. Recognising any legality in the proceedings of the 1689 parliament presented 
subsequent 'Protestant' parliaments with uncomfortable problems: their positions and land titles 
rested on Irish statutes and what one parliament could grant another could take away. From their 
viewpoint therefore the best course was a direct attack on the legitimacy of the 1689 parliament 
and the complete eradication of its actions. This action underpinned by Irish statute not only 
declared its proceedings null and void but also ensured that none of the 1689 Parliament’s 
                                                        
 
221
  CJI(I), p.411; see also pp.417, 426.  
222
  CJI(I), p.426; exception was 1640 Petition of Remonstrance.  
223
  CJI(I), p.427 and see fn p.209. 
224
  7 William III, c. 3(1)  
225
  BL, Add 28,879 f.175 (Gerard Bor to John Ellis; 3 Oct 1695) Attitudes to the 1689 Parliament moved from treating 
it as a legitimate, albeit misguided, parliament to an unlawful pretence. Robert Rochfort, attorney general from 
1695, opposed 'making void the attainders and taking away the records [and had] opposed it in Parliament, it 
being his opinion they ought to remain as undeniable monuments of that Parliament's cruelty and oppression'.  
226
  The undated note cited a precedent from first year of Henry VII when the question of how to annul attainders of 
those elected to a new parliament was put to the judges in England. They had 'resolved that so many of the 
knights or citizens or burgesses as stood then attainted of treason, should depart out of the Parliament House ... 
but as soon as the act of parliament was reversed and annulled, that they ... should come into their places, and 
then may proceed upon anything there moved lawfully as lawful persons. For it is not convenient that they, who 
are attainted, should be in the places of the lawful judges' (BL, Add. 34,773 f.27).  




decisions would stand as law or precedent or even examined.
227
 In addition, the destruction of the 
records meant the Protestant elite could reassert their claims to confiscated lands on the basis of 




2.7 Conclusions on staff and clerical organisation 
The staff and clerical organisation of the Commons shows similarities, and some differences, 
between the Dublin and Westminster Houses. The Irish officials came from a narrow, educated 
Protestant group (New English and in several cases first generation or newly arrived). They knew 
each other, bought and traded offices, attended the same churches and were often related―both 
in terms of passing offices from one generation to another and by marriage with their 
contemporaries. Superficially the picture appears venal but the office-holders, for the most part, 
appear to have been educated and trained (as lawyers) to a level that fitted their responsibilities 
and to have attended to their duties in person, competently and consistently. Similarly, the 
exploitation of the appropriation process, to secure their remuneration, looks questionable but it 
represented a solution not readily available at Westminster to a pressing problem and once in 
place was used within reasonable limits. Although details are sketchy, the career of Bruen 
Worthington may show some of the operation of the Commons. He had an English (and probably 
legal) background and arrived in the Commons in 1704/5 when the procedures of the Commons 
were being brought into closer alignment with Westminster.
229
 He operated under the patronage of 
the Whigs and, in particular, William Conolly. When he was out of post during the 1713, there was 
a discernible drop in the quality of the records produced by the House of Commons. His purchase 
of the patent for the clerkship in partnership with another clerk, Isaac Ambrose, appears to have 
generated endorsement beyond the Whigs.  
In contrast to Westminster, there appear to have been no outstanding innovators but English 
procedures and changes were replicated and applied competently. Although based in Dublin and 
owning property the surrounding counties, many officials in this period had strong links with 
England in terms of relatives and land-holdings and their own education and that of their offspring. 
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 In terms of intention in 1695 it was successful as the 1689 parliament deficient in records has been left sui generis.  
228
  1 William III and Mary, c. 9 (session II) [Westminster] 
229
  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.74 and 76, points to 'inadequacies in the clerical organisation of the 
commons' in the 1695 and 1703 but there is no consistent evidence of clerical shortcomings in the 1690s.  




The easy availability of Westminster's printed Votes, facilitated the copying of procedures (and 
may have obviated the need for up-to-date manuals). The production of the Irish House's own 
Votes allowed it to communicate what it was doing to those outside the House and to put in the 
public domain what it was doing and to build its authority, status as well as broadcasting what it 
was achieving and could do.  
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 3  The corporate identity and functions of the House of 
Commons 
 




This chapter examines how the House of Commons thought of itself, its privileges as a body and 
of its Members and how it worked with the other components of the Irish constitutional and political 
structure. The chapter starts with the membership of the Commons and an examination of 
parliamentary elections, where the disenfranchisement of Catholics solidified from the 1690s 
                                                        
 
1
  Map from Moody and Vaughan, New History, p.73. 




through a mixture of law and practice. The chapter reports on a sample of Members' backgrounds, 
which demonstrates the rapid establishment of a monopoly on membership of the House by an 
oligarchy of intermarrying Protestant families. Two aspects of privilege are examined―Members' 
limited immunity from legal processes and the House's own jurisdiction―and how privilege 
developed in the forty years after 1692―often following changes made at Westminster. How the 
Commons treated precedents, and largely set aside its own precedents, is examined. The chapter 
reviews the development of procedures by the Commons from 1692 to 1730, in particular how 
Westminster's procedures were adapted and adopted. 
3.1  Membership of the House of Commons 
The map at Figure 7 sets out Irish parliamentary constituencies after 1692: boroughs and counties. 




 Members returned at general elections who had sat in a previous parliament  
 General election Total 1695 1703 1713 1715 1727 
Type of constituency
3
 MPs Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
 Counties (64) 44 69% 47 73% 49 77% 48 75% 47 73% 
 Boroughs (100+ voters) (58) 37 64% 26 45% 28 48% 38 66% 34 59% 
 Boroughs (20–100 voters) (44) 29 66% 27 61% 26 59% 29 66% 26 59% 
 Boroughs (<20 voters) (134) 75 56% 73 54% 89 66% 98 73% 82 61% 
Total  (300) 185 64% 173 59% 192 63% 213 70% 189 63% 




                                                        
 
2
  Primarily, HIP, but also biographies of parliamentarian figures such as Conolly and Coghill (see bibliography). 
3
  The data on size of electorate are approximate; the figures come from HIP(II), which often draws from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century sources. 
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Members returned at general elections whose fathers had sat or were sitting in Irish House of Commons 
General election Total 1695 1703 1713 1715 1727 
Type of constituency MPs Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
 Counties (64) 3 5% 8 13% 14 22% 15 23% 31 48% 
 Boroughs (100+ voters) (58) 4 5% 10 17% 15 26% 15 26% 23 40% 
 Boroughs (20–100 voters) (44) 3 7% 9 20% 12 27% 13 30% 17 39% 
 Boroughs (<20 voters) (134) 7 5% 17 13% 29 22% 40 30% 61 46% 
Total  (300) 17 5% 44 16% 70 24% 83 27% 132 43% 
Table 5  Members returned at general elections whose fathers had sat or were 
sitting in House of Commons 
On membership of the Commons, as Table 4 indicates, typically around two thirds of Members 
returned at a general election had sat in a previous parliament. The highest figure was 70% in 
1715, which is not unexpected given that the previous general election had been in 1713. Of the 
30% who were new party affiliation played a greater part in the turnover than age, exhaustion or 
indifference. In county seats the degree of continuity of membership across the whole period was 
higher than in boroughs: at around 75% compared to around 60%. It was not usual for county 
Members to begin in a borough seat or to have a borough seat in reserve when trying for a county 
seat so ensuring continuity of membership. Around 29 MPs (10% of the total) returned in 1692 had 
sat in the Irish parliaments in the 1660s or 1689; the number rose to 33 at the start of the 1695 
parliament.
4
 How much parliamentary experience they brought with them is difficult to measure 
and it is to be doubted that, when the Commons was operating more regularly from 1695, the 
expertise gained 30 years preciously was decisive in a parliament seeking to emulate the 
Westminster House of the 1690s. One characteristic of this group, however, was support for Lord 
Chancellor Porter, which points to this older generation having a broadly Tory outlook with an 
impact that was political rather than procedural.
5
  
Once the Protestant Anglo-Irish regime was restored Table 4 shows a high degree of continuity 
emerging from 1695 onwards (though often not continuity in the same seat). The families which 
provided the vast majority of Members from 1692 were closely related by blood and marriage. One 
proxy that can be used to measure the development of the hereditary (and oligarchic) hold on the 
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  See Appendix 6.11. 
5
  As above 




Commons is the number of MPs whose fathers were also Irish MPs, which is set out at Table 5.
6
 
The table shows a steady increase in filial hereditariness from 1692. The pattern grew especially in 
county seats when at the 1727 general election nearly half the county MPs were the sons of 
previous MPs. General elections brought all those permitted to participate in the electoral process 
into play and deals could be made and candidates unsure of success in one seat could secure a 
second reserve election. This contrasted with by-elections which presented fewer opportunities 
and less scope to manage the processes. The 160 by-elections between 1715 and 1730 throw up 
a contrasting set of figures to those in the two previous tables (see Table 6). 
 
Members returned at by-elections between 1715 and 1730  
Type of constituency
7
 Total no. Sat in previous parliament Son of Member 
By type of constituency    
 Counties (34) 32% 71% 
 Boroughs (100+ voters) (30) 13% 47% 
 Boroughs (20-100 voters) (23) 13% 30% 
 Boroughs (<20 voters) (73) 22% 41% 
By cause of vacancy
8
 
 Vacant by selection
9
 (27) 41% 9% 
 Death (115) 16% 54% 
 Ennoblement (13) 28% 67% 
All by-elections (160) 21% 47% 
Table 6 Members returned at by-elections between 1715 and 1730 
 
Those elected at by-elections caused by death or ennoblement of a sitting MP were significantly 
less likely to have sat in a previous parliament than those returned at a general election; these 
events provided an opportunity for a "new" Member. In contrast the overall pattern of filial 
hereditariness is similar with those returned for counties and, unsurprisingly, those replacing an 
MP going to the House of Lords were likely to be the son of an MP. Vacancies by selection had, 
                                                        
 
6
  The figures are provided to illustrate one aspect of a growing oligarchic rigidity in the system. Many family 
members other than sons became MPs―sons-in-law, brothers, nephews, etc.  
7
  The data on the size of electorate are approximate; the figures come from HIP(II), which often draws from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century sources. 
8
  Two categories have not been included as the numbers are too small to be statistically significant: expulsions and 
vacancies by resolutions. 
9
  Vacancies when MPs returned for more than one seat decided which seat they wanted to sit for. These vacancies 
occurred shortly after a general election. 
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however, strikingly fewer sons of MPs returned as these seats were likely to be filled by those with 
sharp elbows who failed to get in at the general election. 
Over the 40 years from 1692 a slowly growing number of Irish MPs also sat at Westminster. The 
usual direction of travel was from Dublin to Westminster for those who had the connections and 
could afford it.
10
 There were about 10 moving in the opposite direction from Westminster. Of these 
Sir Richard Levinge sat for Chester from 1690 and was an active MP.
11
 He was also a lawyer and 
so in terms of procedural knowledge was one of the most qualified for the post of Speaker in 1692.  
As well as the national picture an analysis based on the biographies in the HIP of the Members 
who sat for three contrasting counties has been carried out: Down, Kerry and Leitrim.
12
 The 
following points were noted: 
a) from 1692 the county seats were always occupied by a landowner often holding 
substantial lands in the county, worth more than £500 per year with good local 
connections, and about half of the MPs at least had been to university―nearly 
always Trinity College Dublin; 
b) many of the major 'county' landowners also held lands outside the county and, in a 
few cases, outside Ireland; 
c) the county families were frequently in competition for the county seats and often had 
a borough seat in reserve usually within the county; 
d) MPs returned for boroughs showed greater variation in the background than those for 
county seats with fewer local links and some returning people with no links―most 
often, lawyers; there was some evidence they increased between 1692 and 1730;
13
 
e) some borough MPs moving around more often than those in county seats and also 
between counties
14
 (but Down was an exception with many of the changes internal to 
the county which may have been driven by unstable alliances of leading families);
15
 
the type of borough appears to have little bearing on this pattern; 
                                                        
 
10
  The most obvious were MPs of the Brodrick family: Alan Brodrick became MP for Midhurst in 1717 and his son, St. 
John, MP for Bere Alston in 1721. The pattern can also be seen with the Hamiltons, Annesleys, Southwells, 
Percevals. 
11
  HoP(1690)(IV), biography of Levinge; he was part of a team of lawyers instructed by Whitehall to prepare bills for 
the forthcoming session (HO Letter Book (Secretary's) 2, p.388 (CSPD: William and Mary, 1691-2―9 Mar 
1691/2)).  
12
  The counties were selected to give a geographical spread and contrast 
13
  For example, Bangor and Newtownards but this was not case in Carrick or Tralee 
14
  Yasushi Aoki, 'Members of Parliament and their Connections to Constituencies in the Eighteenth Century: a study 
in quantitative political history', Parliaments, Estates and Representation, vol. 18, issue 1 (1998), pp.71-82  
15
  HIP(II), p.219  




f) those who moved seat show two types―those who went from borough to borough 
and those aiming for a country seat usually in the same or an adjoining county; 
g) those sitting for county seats tended not to take office; 
h) those elected in 1692 included two physicians―a profession not often represented in 
later parliaments―possibly indicating that the traditional pattern of landowner, lawyer 
and placeman was not in full operation;
16
 
i) there appear to be been more MPs with a military background at the start of the 
period than towards the end; 
j) three Members may have sat in the Irish parliament in the 1660s; and 
k) six Members surveyed sat at Westminster (five of these had seats in county Down) 
pointing to some parts of the country having greater links with England and Wales 
than other parts. 
3.1.1  Elections 
As in England, the Commons exercised effective oversight of its own election processes—in some 
cases determining who had the franchise
17
—and decided disputed elections. The House was alert 
to any encroachment of its prerogatives and exclusive authority over elections. On 27 June 1709 
the Commons reminded all those responsible for conducting elections that: 
It is the duty of every sheriff and magistrate or other officer having the return of Members 
to serve in parliament, to return the person elected by the majority of the votes of the 
electors, and that denying so to do, on pretence that the person elected is not qualified to 




It is not possible to say with certainty how many contested elections took place in the 150 
constituencies returning Members to the House of Commons
19
 but the Journals are a good source 
on election processes, particularly where there was a petition and the dispute came to the House 
for decision. Most disputes arose from a contested local election. (This section is built on the 
material in the Journals and does not attempt a wider review of available material, which would 
require a discrete study.) 
                                                        
 
16
  This chimes with Connolly's point that, when parliament was summoned in 1692, there had not always been time 
for dominant proprietorial interests to establish the control they were eventually to enjoy (Connolly, Religion, p.98).  
17
  CJI(II), p.766; in fiercely the contested Dublin city election of 1713 the case was heard at the bar of the House, 
which resolved that the right of election was in the freemen and freeholders of Dublin only. See also p.769.  
18
  CJI(II), p.617  
19
  J.H. Plumb, The Growth of Political Stability in England 1675–1725 (London, 1967), p.86 suggests that 75% of 
contested elections ended up before the Westminster Commons. On this speculative basis and the figures in 
Table 7 there would have been about 20 contested elections in 1695 and about 50 in 1727 (that is in a third of 
constituencies).  






















Decided in favour 
of petitioner 
1692 150 7 0 0 2 
 1692 20
23
 0 0 0 0 
1695 150 17 1 10 2 
 1695–97 26 4 0 1 2 
 1698–99 9 1 0 1 0 
1703 150 11 3 5 1 
 1703–04 12 1 0 1 0 
 1705 8 1 0 0 1 
 1707 18 6 1 2 1 
 1709 10 6 0 2 1 
 1710 7 2 0 1 1 
 1711 11 0 0 0 0 
1713 150 19 1 4 3 
 1713 8 0 0 0 0 
1715 150 19 5 14 5 
 1715–16 14 0 0 0 0 
 1717 15 3 1 1 0 
 1719 13 5 0 1 3 
 1721–22 25 2 0 1 1 
 1723–24 18 2 0 2 0 
 1725–26 29 3 1 1 1 
1727 150 37 7 18 11 
 1727–28 23 0 0 0 0 
 1729–30 20 8 6 2 0 
Total 1,186 154 26 67 35 
Table 7  Election disputes brought to House of Commons 
 
Table 7 shows that the number of contests brought to the House increased in the 40 years from 
1692: more than doubling from 15 after the 1695 general election to 37 after the general election of 
1727. Of itself this as probably a sign of more contested elections. By-elections caused by the 
death (or until 1704 resignation) of an MP (but not double elections after a general election)
24
 
produced proportionately more frequent contests and disputes than general elections (though 
                                                        
 
20
  A degree of judgment has been exercised in counting contests: obvious duplicate petitions and petitions supplying 
supplementary information have been discounted as have most counter-petitions where the parties were identical.  
21
  Only cases where leave to withdraw was clear are included; the outcome of many petitions is unclear from CJI. 
22
  Includes cases where the petition was withdrawn. 
23
  Mostly by-elections triggered by MPs returned for more than one seat deciding which seat they wanted to sit for. 
24
  See fn 116 below for the distinction between 'double election' and 'double return'. 




there is some variation). One reason for this increase after 1715 may have been the realisation 
that elections would become less frequent―general elections became a once in a generation 
opportunity. A petition provided a second chance and passed the decision to the Commons. The 
House became more efficient at processing disputes: by the 1720s, compared to the 1690s, fewer 
disputes peter out unresolved in the Journals (though this may have been a product of earlier 
inefficient record-keeping or possibly unrecorded withdrawals). It is not obvious from the data in 
Table 7 but the contests became more complex and protracted with double returns (that is 
returning more that the required two MPs),
25
 counter-petitions and repeat petitions. This trend was, 
from 1715, matched by a steep increase in the number of recorded withdrawals of 
petitions―perhaps pointing to local factors driving contests rather than the party rivalry in the 20 
years from 1692. The outcome of a petition tended to favour the incumbent but the success rate 
was far from hopeless for petitioners, at around 35%.
26
  
Electoral procedures did not start afresh in 1692 and had been developed over the previous 
century.
27
 For by-elections the process started when the Speaker issued a warrant to the clerk of 
the crown for the election. In 1665 the House tightened its control when it ordered that 'no warrants 
shall hereafter issue to prepare writs for electing and returning Members ... but what shall be 
granted by the House, upon a public motion first made'.
28
 The clerk of the crown was expected to 
send the writ immediately by a 'trusty messenger' to the sheriff of the county.
29
 (The time between 
the order to issue the warrant and the Member taking his seat could be as short as a week.)
30
 
Sheriffs executed the writ by organising the election for county seats. He, or in the case of borough 
elections the officers to whom he passed the writ, would issue a precept for the election. The 
officers executing the precept then gave public notice of the time and place of the election.
31
 
Elections took place within a few days, and at the venue the precept and writ were read.
32
 The 
                                                        
 
25
  See fn 116 below for the distinction between 'double election' and 'double return'. 
26
  Excludes counter-petitions and duplicate petitions 
27
  CJI(I), p.546  
28
  CJI(I), p.660  
29
  CJI(I), p.510  
30
  CJI(II), p.243; two MPs took their seats on 3 Oct 1698, the warrant for writs had been issued on 27 Sep. A tight 
timetable would be likely to curtail local contests, through the arrival of writ was unlikely to be the first notice of an 
election.  
31
  For examples of posting, see CJI(II), pp.381-83, 612.  
32
  For example, CJI(II), pp.47, 382. The venue could be some municipal building or communal area out of doors 
such as church-yard ((II), p.381).  
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candidates were nominated at the meeting and, if the election were contested, the presiding officer 
might first attempt election by acclamation, but candidates could demand a poll.
33
 If the electorate 
was large (more than 500) it might take more than a day to carry out the poll.
34
 At the conclusion of 
proceedings, especially following a contested election, the victor could be hoisted into a chair and 
carried in triumph.
35
 The presiding officer attended to the bureaucracy drawing up, signing and 
sealing an indenture
36
 with the name of the men (or man) elected, and this was attached to the writ 
and sent back to the clerk of the crown, who held the definitive record. A decision of the House to 
alter the outcome―on a successful petition―required the clerk to attend to alter the indenture.  
The way to challenge the result was to petition the Commons. A challenge could either be heard at 
the bar of the House or, more often, by the Committee of Privileges and Elections. From 1695 
reports from the committee appear in the Journals.
37
 The most frequent challenges
38
 were: 
a) arguments about who was entitled to vote; 
b) allegations of vote buying; 
c) bias by those carrying out the poll―such as the sheriff refusing to accept the 
completed indenture by borough officers, preferring to attach one from a rival group;
39
 
d) inadequate notice of polls;
40
 and 




                                                        
 
33
  CJI(II), pp.47, 617  
34
  CJI(II), p.382, provides an account of a contested election in Dungarvan in Sep 1703 where polling started at 9am 
and the presiding seneschal wanted to adjourn at 4pm and resume the following day but the sheriff insisted he 
complete poll. Those entitled to vote were listed in a record book and those polling would have been recorded in 
the book; objection could be made to a man claiming to be able to vote; and the process finished when the 
presiding officer closed the books. Total voter turnout in this election was over 500. See also (II), p.612.  
35
  CJI(II), p.614  
36
  CJI(II), p.311, gives wording for an indenture where there had been a dispute for second seat at the 1703 election 
for Carlow borough: 'This indenture certified Charles Howard to have forty-nine votes of the freemen, inhabiting in 
that borough; and Walter Weldon forty-six votes of the like freemen, inhabitant: But the said Walter Weldon had 
sixty-five votes of the like freemen and others, not inhabiting in the said town; and the said Charles sixty-one votes 
of the like not inhabiting; and that each of them had an equal number of votes of the burgesses'.  
37
  See CJI(II), pp.29, 47, 51-52.  
38
  A brief comparison with Westminster using secondary sources such as HoP(1690)(I) shows broadly the same 
allegations and misbehaviour, though the scale and cost were greater: Tory and Whig rivalry animated and 
intensified disputes, direct government interference appears to have been stronger, there was a more developed 
legal framework regulating elections and greater recourse to the courts and the House of Lords in its judicial 
capacity―for example, the Aylesbury case in 1704 (Tomas Erskine May, A Treatise upon the Law, Privileges, 
Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (London, 1844), pp.40-42). 
39
  CJI(II), p.47  
40
  For example, CJI(II), pp.381-83, 763  
41
  For example, CJI(II), pp.47, 381-83, 612  




After 1715 there is growing evidence that as well as candidates having agents and managers
42
 
lawyers attended and intervened on their behalf at contested elections.
43
 In the face of disputes 
about entitlement to vote, those responsible for making the return sometimes returned more than 
the required two Members and let the House adjudicate. This practice grew after 1715 and may 
have been a response to the intensity and sophistication of disputes at contested elections as well 
as a self-defence by presiding officers. In disputed and procedurally flawed elections, the 
Commons could, and did, summon officers and witnesses as well as the candidates. Dishonest, 
manipulative or incompetent officers were frequently at the sharp end of the House's authority and 
their actions corrected peremptorily with punishment.
44
 There is almost no evidence of parties 
seeking recourse to the courts or the Irish Privy Council to circumvent the House's authority. When 
the House heard disputes at the bar
45
 the timetable was shortened. In 1713, when the 
administration’s supporters and its opponents were nearly even, the Whigs used this process to 
bolster their numbers but the cost was time in the chamber and a rise in the political temperature 
(as well as the absence of detailed reports to the House summarising the evidence). In that 
session seven of the 19 disputes arising from the general election were heard at the bar (more 
than in the previous 20 years) and of these six had been determined before prorogation.
46
 In 
comparison, only one of the remaining 12 referred to the Committee of Elections and Privileges 
had had a decision at prorogation, even with the allocation of three days per week rather than the 
usual two for sittings of the committee.
47
 From 1692 (other than during the 1713 session) most 
disputes were referred to the committee to investigate and report. The House could, and did on 
occasion reject, its conclusions.
48
  
                                                        
 
42
  For example, CJI(III), p.536  
43
  For example, CJI(III), pp.47-48, 525; on the basis of the election reports in the CJI, there is no evidence of agents 
or lawyers acting during the poll before this date, although counsel frequently represented parties before the 
Committee of Privileges and Elections―for example, (II), p.382 (22 Nov 1703). 
44
  For example, in 1707, when considering the election in Callan, the committee found that the petitioner had been 
properly elected but the writ had not been duly returned as the sheriff had gone to England. The House was able 
to correct the matter by calling in clerk of the crown to affix the return of writ (CJI(II), pp.518-19).  
45
  See Appendix 6.23. 
46
  Cause célèbre heard at the bar was the Dublin city election, which took up a substantial amount of time on 11, 12, 
14 and 15 Dec 1713(CJI(II), pp.751-66).  
47
  CJI(II), p.752  
48
  For example, CJI(I), p.685, the House disagreed, on a division, with the committee's report on the Knocktopher by-
election and ordered a fresh election.  
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Petitioning the House could be costly: the petition had to be prepared in the correct form; there 
were travel expenses to Dublin for the petitioner and witnesses; costs of accommodation while 
waiting to be heard; and assembling and presenting the case (often employing counsel). Because 
the committee's report has detail,
49
 the 1727 disputed election in Swords has been used by the 
Porritts, to illustrate abuses at an election in a potwalloper borough.
50
 Here it is examined in terms 
of parliamentary process. In brief, the poll took place on 8 November 1727 and the result was:  
Bysse Molesworth  72 
William Smith  58 
Edward Bolton  58  
Plunkett Plunkett  31.  
The portreeve made a double return―one for Molesworth and Smith and the other for Molesworth 
and Bolton. Smith, Bolton and Plunkett petitioned and their petitions were referred to the 
committee.
51
 The allegations were similar: the petitioner had supporters rejected who should have 
been allowed to vote, while his opponents bought votes and had votes allowed from men who 
were disqualified. The House ordered the portreeve to produce the poll book, that the evidence be 
given 'in the most solemn manner' (i.e. on oath) and directed the committee to hear the case on 13 
January.
52
 In the event the committee was not able to complete its work on that day as the 
chairman, Thomas Trotter, had to ask for extensions.
53
 There were two procedural novelties 
before the committee reported on 15 February. First, Smith sought and was given 'liberty to give 
evidence touching bribery and corruption' on 12 January,
54
 which may have been a warning shot 
at his opponents or to ensure evidence was taken on oath.
55
 (The other petitioners made similar 
allegations but without seeking an order.) Second, when Trotter was due to report there was a 
move to put off the report to the following day. The division was tied and the Speaker gave his 
                                                        
 
49
  CJI(III), pp.325-32  
50
  Porritts, Unreformed House(II), pp.351-53  
51
  CJI(III), pp.473, 478  
52
  CJI(III), pp.486, 488, 490; see also p.129 below.  
53
  CJI(III), pp.501, 505, 507  
54
  CJI(III), p.497  
55
  When in the 1690s the House of Lords had refused to allow judges to attend the Commons to swear witnesses the 
Commons had summoned the justices of the peace for the city of Dublin to swear witnesses 'to be examined in the 
most solemn manner' (CJI(III), p.421). Coghill says evidence on oath was only taken in cases where bribery was 
alleged―Coghill Letters, no.27 (To Edward Southwell, 8 Dec 1727).  




casting vote against deferral.
56
 The House agreed with the resolutions put forward by the 
committee―that Bolton was duly elected―after a division.
57
 Molesworth and Bolton were 
returned. 
The committee took evidence from 58 witnesses, including two clergymen―one each supporting 
Smith and Bolton―and two women.
58
 Over a quarter of the witnesses were recalled―some four 
times―as the committee worked through individuals' entitlement to vote, which indicates that the 
witnesses had to at attend the entire hearing. The account shows that the election was a managed 
contest and that the electorate participated fully in the contest and was aware of the political 
process. Although some of the forms that Mark Knights has identified in England
59
 were not seen 
in the Swords election such as printed pamphlets (but were seen elsewhere in Ireland),
60
 the 
contest shows a politicised electorate as in England. 
The committee process resembled court proceedings: the report was infused with legal 
terminology such as deponent and exhibit; the parties agreed some matters among themselves; 
witnesses were led and cross-examined by counsel; and written evidence was introduced with 
leave. One witness said that he had been offered a bribe by Bolton's agent and, after discussing 
the offer with his father, while he was willing to take the money, refused to 'be book-sworn not to 
discover it ... because he did not know but he might again, before the House of Commons, be 
sworn whether he had or not [taken the money]'.
61
 Some voters were evidently aware that a 
contested election could land them before the Commons and they might have to give evidence on 
oath. At the end of oral evidence Molesworth, whose return no-one challenged, addressed the 
committee and withdrew.
62
 He was neither sworn nor cross-examined; it is not clear whether he 
spoke in favour of Smith, with whom he appeared to be working, or Bolton, his brother-in-law.
63
  
                                                        
 
56
  CJI(III), p.525  
57
  CJI(III), p.532; if the resolution had fallen the result would have been a fresh election.  
58
  Alice MacLaughlin gave evidence that Bolton offered her money for her husband's vote; Bridget Stoakes gave 
evidence that she had allowed a man to live in part of her house to meet the minimum requirements of potwalloper 
franchise. 
59
  Mark Knights, Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship and Political Culture 
(Oxford, 2005), p.3 
60
  See D.W. Hayton, 'Two ballads on the Co. Westmeath By-election of 1723', Eighteenth-Century Ireland, vol. 4 
(1989), pp.7-30, which is an even closer parallel with the election case studies Knights examines in Chester and 
Hertford. 
61
  CJI(III), p.528  
62
  In this case given his direct involvement in, and knowledge of, the case, it was not unusual that Molesworth should 
speak. The practice of MPs addressing a committee was common; for example, (CJI(II), p.383; (III), p.514). It is 
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What is missing from the committee's report is a rationale for its conclusions. Instead, as is the 
pattern with these reports, the conclusions (or resolutions) were appended at the end of the 
evidence.
64
 The process behind this approach, and shared with Westminster, was that having 
taken the evidence, weighed it up and deliberated the decision implicitly conveyed the reasoning 
as the committee agreed with the arguments of the successful party. Members could set out their 
views when the report was put to the House but these are not recorded. There was doubt about 
how objective the Committee of Privileges and Elections was. In 1703 when an aggrieved 
candidate told the sheriff of Sligo he would raise the election in parliament, the sheriff replied that: 
'the Committee of Elections was always a committee of assertions, and that he had Interest 
enough to continue sitting in the parliament any person he should return'.
65
 External factors such 
as the influence of a patron could sway the outcome in committee or the Commons but it was not 
obvious in the Swords case. Although both sides alleged that their opponents used bribery and 
ineligible voters, Smith gave more emphasis to bribery, which chimed with the leave he had sought 
on 12 January. Bolton, on the other hand, put the stress on the ineligibility of Smith's voters.
66
 The 
latter was probably easier to establish if the committee stuck to technicalities―did the voter boil a 
pot on a certain day and did his accommodation meet the criteria for being a discrete 
household―whereas bribery could, or be made to appear to, shade into legitimate transactions 
such as loans and hospitality. Finally, in contrast to many reports, there was no resolution 
criticising the sheriff or portreeve for bias or mishandling, which points to this being a case driven 
by the candidates themselves.  
When the Committee of Elections and Privileges
67
 was established at the beginning of the 1692 
parliament, the quorum was eight and it was empowered to send for persons, papers and records, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
likely that MPs who addressed a committee would participate again when the report was made to the House; they 
had local knowledge and links.  
63
  HIP biography 
64
  Not universal; the report on the disputed 1727 election in Lanesborough set out―in the form of resolutions 
interspersed in report―the steps that led to the committee's conclusions (CJI(III), pp.511-15). 
65
  CJI(II), p.323  
66
  Plunkett's case appears to have been a make-weight for Bolton bringing in some additional evidence against 
Smith.  
67
  The Committee tended to be called the Committee of Elections and Privileges in the earlier part of the period 
covered by this thesis and the Committee of Privileges and Elections in the later part; the latter has been used 
when referring to activities of the Committee across the whole period and generally. 




'as there shall be occasion'.
68
 During the period to 1730 it had a listed membership of around 50 to 
70;
69
 with so many active Members attending such a committee the House would not be able to 
function. The Swords case shows the committee presiding over a lengthy legalistic process.
70
 It 
also confirms that all Members had voices i.e. all Members could attend and speak
71
 and the 
committee could report its proceedings to the House from time to time with its opinion. As in the 
courts precedent carried considerable weight—for example, precedent guided who presided over 
or voted in previous elections.
72
 It appears the committee deliberated in private after counsel 
withdrew,
73
 though it is unclear whether Members not appointed to the committee had to withdraw. 
The committee then formed its opinion on whether a person was or was not 'duly elected' and, if 
necessary, whether he was 'duly returned'.
74
 The reports appear to have been written by, or 
perhaps on behalf of, the chairman.
75
  
It contrast to the four traditional grand committees,
76
 this committee had a clear remit and did not 
fall into abeyance. When the committee was established at the start of the 1695 session its remit 
followed the Westminster formulation (see Appendix 6.12.1). The conclusion must be that the Irish 
entry used the English as a template. The English template was updated in 1696 with the addition 
at the end of the words: 'And that all Members returned upon double returns (i.e. returned for more 
than one constituency) do withdraw till their returns are determined'.
77
 The change was not 
incorporated when the next committee was established for the 1698–99 session but was in 1703,
78
 
which is evidence that the templates used for Vote entries were checked and updated before the 
new parliament in 1703. From 1695 the committee’s work divided into: (i) the investigation of, and 
reporting on, election disputes; and (ii) privilege cases. The volume of election cases peaked after 
                                                        
 
68
  CJI(II), p.13; there had been a Committee of Privileges in the 1661 Parliament, the ambit of which included 
elections ((I), p.388, 606, 685). The committee considered written evidence―for example, (II), pp.453-56, 518-19, 
567, 612-14 
69
  The 1692 committee had 94 members (CJI(1
st
 edn)(II), pp.583-84); over the years it reduced to between 50 and 
70 (CJI(1
st
 edn)(IV), p.15, (V), pp.14, 644). 
70
  For example, see CJI(II), p.381-83, 453-56, 612, 763.  
71
  Scobell, Memorials, p.49 
72
  For example, CJI(II), p.381-83, 518  
73
  For example, CJI(II), p.383  
74
  For example, CJI(II), p.519  
75
  CJI(II), pp.453-55  
76
  See p. 232 below. 
77
  CJI(XI), p.567  
78
  CJI(II), pp.242, 317  
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general elections―see the table in Appendix 6.12.2 showing the volume of contested election 
cases dealt with by the committee.  
A feature of the period from 1692 was the steady erosion of the franchise exercised by Catholics. 
Simms states that in the 1695 general election, despite several petitions, in no proceedings was 
there a finding that challenged the voting rights of Catholics; in fact in a rare case that went to the 
Irish Privy Council it was held that freemen could vote without taking the oath of supremacy (that is 
denying the Pope's deposing power).
79
 With its predominant position in electoral matters―both in 
terms of the facility to legislate and through its determination of electoral petitions―the Commons 
provides a picture of Protestant views and their effect on elections. There were regular allegations 
by petitioners that their opponents won with the help of votes from Catholics: this is viewed 
negatively but nearly always as part of a wider picture of reprehensible behaviour.
80
 The report on 
a disputed election in Irishtown (St. Canice) in 1709 set out that the petitioner had 36 votes from 
Catholics, which, if accepted, would have given him a clear victory over the sitting Member, who 
had refused votes from Catholics, though one witness suggested that was because he could not 
get any. There was confusion as to whether Catholics could vote—one witness was of the view 
'that papists have been excluded from voting since king James' time' and the portreeve refused to 
accept their votes but his reasons were not recorded. In other reports on electoral disputes there 
were surprisingly few references to the oaths of allegiance and abjuration that voters were required 
to take by the popery act of 1704.
81
 It may have been that the oaths had been administered as a 
matter of course without comment and Catholics did not take them. Alternatively it may have been 
the oaths were not used. There are arguments in the reports about taking oaths but these are on 
whether someone met a non-religious requirement of the franchise―such as whether he was a 
freeman of a borough.
82
 Moreover, when the committee reported on Irishtown it informed the 
House that it was divided on whether Catholics had votes and it made no reference to the 
requirements of the 1704 Act. It reported in favour of the sitting Member, by implication discounting 
                                                        
 
79
  J.G. Simms, 'Irish Catholics and the Parliamentary Franchise 1692–1728', Irish Historical Studies, vol. 12, no. 45 
(Mar 1960), pp.29-30; points out that, after an attempt to assassinate William III, the Commons tried to emulate an 
English statute preventing Catholics voting but it failed in the Lords; instead, the Commons had to content itself 
with expressing its sentiments in a resolution: 'That the excluding of papists from having votes for electing any 
MPs to serve in parliament in this kingdom is necessary to be made into a law ' (CJI(II), p.230).  
80
  For example, CJI(II), pp.57, 382, 753, 762  
81
  2 Anne c.6, section XXIV  
82
  In a 1715 petition on the election in Lanesborough referred to those listed as voters in the corporation books as 
having taken oaths of allegiance and supremacy (CJI(III), p.18).  




the Catholic voters (as well as a number of Protestants on other grounds). The House, on a 
division (79 to 52) agreed with the committee but it offered no view on Catholics’ entitlement to 
vote.
83
 The case raised bitter local rivalries that were not sectarian
84
 which affected its outcome, 
but given the number of Catholic votes discounted popular sectarian sentiment was restricting the 
legal entitlement to vote.  
After 1713 allegations of Catholics voting are less frequent―one reason may have been that the 
remaining routes to the franchise (being a freeholder or a freeman) were blocked off or the 1704 
legislation, as repeated and strengthened in 1716, was being applied.
85
 By the time of the Swords 
by-election in 1727, just before legislation was enacted which unambiguously disenfranchised 
Catholics,
86
 the prevailing assumption was they could not vote. Instead, concerns focused on the 
authenticity of voters' Protestantism. One test of eligibility was whether or not a man entitled to 
vote―in all other respects―had a Catholic spouse or relatives. In the Westmeath by-election in 
1723 and in Swords in 1727 this was advanced as grounds for disqualification.
87
 And it played a 
large part in the deliberations of the committee on the county Clare election of 1727.
88
 In that 
case―reported to the House on 16 February 1727/8―the two primary issues in contention were 
the property qualification of voters and the confessional state of their spouses (as well as the 
behaviour of the sheriff). The petitioner's counsel did not cite 1704 Act with its requirements for 
oaths but cited the 1697 act to prevent Protestants intermarrying with papists, which came into 
operation on 1 January 1697.
89
 The Journal did not record which parts he read but the statute 
                                                        
 
83
  CJI(II), pp.612-14; Simms points out that Addison referred to the case and said it was treated as a party measure 
and as a victory for the Whigs (Simms, 'Irish Catholics', p.34).  
84
  The petitioner, Cuffe, had been MP for co. Kilkenny in the 1690s; he had a long-running dispute with Col Gorges 
who was one of tellers for those voting in support of the sitting MP (HIP biography); and according to the 
committee's report one of his witnesses said that the inhabitants had invited Cuffe 'to be elected'. 
85
  2 George I c.19, section VII provided that no burgess, freeman or inhabitant 'being a papist, or professing the 
popish religion, shall be admitted to give his vote ... unless such person shall have taken the oaths of allegiance 
and abjuration at least six calendar months before [the] election, and shall also take the said oaths at the day of 
election, if required so to do by the sheriff, one of the candidates, or any person having a right to vote'. The act 
also attempted to end conveyances designed to create a franchise and candidates proffering 'money, meat, drink, 
entertainment or ... present, gift, reward' (section VIII). The former provision appears to have been more effective 
than latter.  
86
  See p.90 below. 
87
  CJI(III), pp.342, 537 
 Hayton in 'Two ballads' examines the co. Westmeath by-election, where the main ammunition of attack was 
allegations of bribery supplemented with allegations of Catholic supporters. In contrast to the Swords dispute, 
there was more evidence of a Whig/Tory split with Tory allegations that their opponents were not gentlemen and 
Whig allegations that Tories were crypto-Catholics. As in the Swords case, the dispute was presented and argued 
out as in a court of law, though with behind-the-scenes busy-bodying by Speaker Conolly's wife.  
88
  CJI(III), pp.533-42  
89
  CJI(III), p.536; reference to 'Cap.28' of relevant statute in CJI appears to be an error for 'Cap.3'.  
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provided that 'protestant persons ... influenced by ... popish wives, are reconciled to popery, and 
become papists'. On this basis the legislation provided that without proof of the woman's 
conversion the husband 'be in law deemed and esteemed ... a papist or popish recusant'. The 
1697 Act then listed the civil disabilities that applied to such a man which included sitting 'in either 
House of Parliament, and [being] rendered incapable of and having, bearing or exercising, any civil 
or military office or employment whatsoever, unless such person so marrying shall, within one year 
after such marriage, procure such wife to be converted to the Protestant religion'.
90
 This argument 
found favour with the committee which passed a resolution that a Protestant, married to a Popish 
wife since 1 January 1697, who 'has not within one year after such marriage become a Protestant, 
has not a right to vote in any election for Members to serve in parliament'. On the basis of this 
opinion counsel for both sides agreed that five voters had to be disqualified.
91
 They brought 
evidence about the religious outlook and activities of the wives of several Westmeath voters. When 
the committee reported the resolution, the House agreed.
92
 The implication of this case is that the 
accepted norm was that Catholics, and those deemed to be Catholics, could not vote. The case 
highlights that since the 1690s the processes and views of the committee handling contested 
elections demonstrate that an intrusive legalism and prevalent sectarianism were in the vanguard 
of narrowing the franchise. 
The 1727 session saw a move on two fronts to reform other aspects of the handling of 
parliamentary elections and the disputes about elections. Thomas Trotter, the chairman of the 
Committee of Privileges and Elections,
93
 played a significant part in both―possibly as originator 
but certainly as the 'undertaker' or manager. The stimulus may have been the general election 
following the death of George I
94
 and the need to have processes and rules in place to handle an 
expectedly large number of petitions. On the day that it appointed the Committee of Privileges and 
Elections at the start of the 1727 parliament the Commons agreed for the first time sessional 
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  9 William III c.3, section II  
91
  CJI(III), p.537  
92
  CJI(III), p.541  
93
  Trotter was firmly in 'court' party―Coghill Letters, p.xv, no.27 (To Southwell, 8 Dec 1727).  
94
  On 21 Sep 1727, when elections were underway, Coghill wrote to Southwell that he had been told about a British 
bill 'to prevent bribery and corruptions in elections, we shall be undone unless we can get such an act here ... pray 
put me in the way to get a copy of this bill' (Coghill Letters, no.26. In Dec when it started examining disputed 
elections Coghill commenting on the House's approach to take evidence on bribery on oath: 'the House seems 
resolved to find out this practice and punish if possible, and it is hoped this method may be better security against 
this practice than any law that we that we may hope to get'―Coghill Letters, no.27 (To Southwell, 8 Dec 1727).  




resolutions on elections against peers voting and interfering in elections, frivolous or vexatious 
petitioners, bribery, tampering with witnesses to the House and submitting false evidence.
95
 They 
were not, however, the distillation of Irish experience but lifted directly from the 'normal rules' 
passed at Westminster each session since 1714.
96
 The intention seems to have been to make 
these a set of 'usual' orders repeated at the start of each session and that is what happened in 
1729.
97
 The exercise appeared to lack substance because the next re-statement was in October 
1739
98
 and, significantly, neither the 1729 nor 1739 resolutions included the February 1728/9 
resolution disenfranchising voters with Catholic wives. That resolution was no dead letter: 
Johnston-Liik comments that 'proving and disproving [this requirement] was to be a considerable 
problem in subsequent rules until 1793'.
99
 The Commons did not consider modifying the 
Westminster rules. The reason may have been that these resolutions were largely superficial and 
that the substance of the changes was made by another route. 
The second limb of the changes in the 1727–28 session was legislative, and here the Commons 
exercised much more discrimination. Trotter brought in heads for the further regulating of elections 
for MPs in December 1727.
100
 The provision which has attracted attention was the removal of the 
franchise from Catholics.
101
 The purpose of the statute was, however, wider, tackling 'the evil 
practices and irregular proceedings of sheriffs, mayors, sovereigns and other officers in the 
execution of writs and precepts for electing Members to serve in parliament'. It (i) set out the 
bureaucratic process and timetable to be followed and attempted to ensure officers' compliance by 
threat of financial penalties and (ii) sought to end disputes about entitlement to vote by clarifying 
the date by which a voter had to have certain interests in property and a freeman carrying on a 
trade. While not incorporating each of the items in the sessional resolutions, it had the effect of 
superseding them. The 'penal' provision was not, however, to prevent disputes but 'for the better 
preventing papists from voting in elections' and was a blanket prohibition on Catholics voting 
                                                        
 
95
  CJI(III), p.465; set out in Appendix 6.13.2 (1727 sessional resolutions)  
96
  CJGB(XVIII), p.5 
97
  CJI(III), p.582  
98
  CJI(IV), p.297  
99
  HIP, biography for George Purdon (declared not duly elected as a result of the contest) 
100
  1 George II c.9  
101
  See, for example, HIP biography for Trotter, and Connolly, Religion, pp.290-91.  
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without allowing any proviso for those taking any oath. The law was probably catching up with the 
actuality.  
The 1728 Act, and an ineffectual precursor in 1716
102
―also taken through by the chairman of the 
Committee of Privileges and Elections at that time, St. John Brodrick―drew on several English 
acts.
103
 In contrast to the sessional resolutions, on both occasions the Irish legislators selected and 
amended parts of the English legislation as well as including provisions not found in English acts. 
For instance, the 1716 ban on bribery and some of the 1728 Act's requirements for notice of a poll 
follow with modifications earlier English legislation. Most of the detailed timetabling of the election 
processes found in the English statutes were not replicated in the Irish―possibly because they 
were unnecessary or offered too many openings for challenges. The process was one of 
pragmatic adaptation.  
3.1.2  Induction of Members 
In 1665 the House had required the clerk of the crown to supply a certificate of the return to the 
clerk of the House, 'who is to acquaint the Speaker ... so notice may be given to the House, and 
two or three Members appointed to bring in such new elected Members'.
104
 There is no obvious 
reason in the Journals for this change but it brought the Dublin House in line with Westminster. 
The certificate was read and the Member 'being sent for, was accompanied into the House with 
several Members, who took his place'.
105
 On the Westminster requirement for Members to take an 
oath Dublin was out of step until 1692. With one exception,
106
 the Journals for the first half of the 
seventeenth century record no requirement on a Member to take an oath before taking his seat 
and the contrast with England is striking where Members had been required to take the oath of 
supremacy since the 1560s, an oath of allegiance and abjuration from 1610 and a declaration 
against transubstantiation from 1678.
107
 (These oaths, if applied before 1660, would have 
                                                        
 
102
  1 George II c.9; see also p.89ff above. 
103
  Principally English legislation from the 1690s: 7&8 William III c.7, c.4 and c.25; Bergin, 'Irish Legislative 
Procedure', pp.235-38 notes that English legislation was pragmatically amended to meet the requirements of 
those drafting Irish legislation.  
104
  CJI(I), p.671  
105
  CJI(I), p.748  
106
  The exception occurred at the height of the civil war in 1642 when the Commons introduced a requirement to take 
an oath of supremacy, which became part of a mechanism to expel MPs in rebellion. The provision may not have 
been legal or available as the records were missing and was not enforced when the Irish Parliament met in 1661.  
107
  Porritts, Unreformed House(I), pp.127-38, HoP(1690)(I), pp.317, 531  




excluded Catholic MPs from the Irish Commons.) The 1661 House, exclusively Protestant, 
appointed a committee to consider of the 'manner and way, how the oaths of supremacy and 
allegiance may be taken, by all that are now, or hereafter shall be, Members of this House';
108
 the 
committee does not appear to have reported. But Members attended St. Patrick’s Cathedral in 
Dublin (as was practice at Westminster, where Members attended St. Margaret’s)
109
 where they 
received the sacrament from the Protestant archbishop of Armagh,
110
 which acted as a proxy for a 
declaration of political and religious loyalty, though not a requirement of membership.  
In 1692 there was no checking of precedents or setting up of committees. Immediately the 
Speaker was seated a motion was made that the English '"Act [of 1691] for abrogating the oath of 
supremacy in Ireland, and appointing other oaths" [be read and] the House immediately proceeded 
to the swearing of their Members'.
111
 There is no evidence that the Commons, beyond the 
resolution, stood on its constitutional dignity or made any adaptations. The 1691 Act applied 
beyond Members to require that all office holders were Protestant and accepted the new regime. 
The inclusion of the parliamentary provisions in the 1691 Act may have been coloured by the 
recent experience of the 1689 parliament and uncertainty about the composition of the electorate; 
the Act itself explained: 'great disquiet and many dangerous attempts have been made to deprive 
their majesties and their royal predecessors of the said realm of Ireland by the liberty which the 
popish recusants there have had and taken to sit and vote in parliament'. Each Member was 
required to pledge allegiance to William and Mary and to deny the power of the papacy to depose 
sovereigns. In addition, parliamentarians had to deny transubstantiation 'without any evasion 
equivocation or mental reservation whatsoever and without any dispensation already granted ... for 
this purpose by the pope or any other authority'.
112
 The 1691 Act prescribed how the oath and 
declarations were to be taken, apparently on the assumption that the Irish Commons would 
operate and had the same layout as Westminster. The bulk of Members were sworn in at the start 
of a parliament. Members waited outside the door to the chamber, were called in and sworn in 
                                                        
 
108
  CJI(I), p.387  
109
  Porritts, Unreformed House(I), p.130; 13 May 1661 all MPs were ordered to attend St. Margaret's, Westminster 
and to take communion (CJE(VIII), p.247).  
110
  CJI(I), p.400  
111
  CJI(II), p.9  
112
  3 William III and Mary II (England) c.2  
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front of the House at the Table in the middle of the Chamber.
113
 The clerk of the House was 
required to make a record in rolls prepared for the purpose and Members had to pay him a shilling 
for making the record.
114
 These records were not published in the Votes (probably because of 
space) nor recorded in the Journals (following Westminster practice). This episode was one of the 
few instances where the government directly imposed Westminster practice on the Dublin House 
of Commons. The Irish House and its procedures, already modelled on Westminster, had little 
difficulty adapting to the practice. 
Candidates could stand for election in more than one constituency. From 1695 the Commons 
imposed a time limit within which the elected for more than one constituency had to decide the 
seat they wanted to sit for.
115
 The Journals record the choices made because they precipitated by-
elections in the discarded seats. Table 8 below gives the numbers that were doubly (or more) 
elected at each general election between 1692 and 1727.
116
 (Excluding 1692, just under half of the 
double elections
117
 involved seats where there was a petition which indicates the advantage of 
having a seat in reserve as insurance.) Table 8 shows a pattern in the choices made: county seats 
were clearly preferred over all others but beyond them there is a pecking order with county 
boroughs, cities and then seats with an electorate beyond a closed corporation or handful of 
electors. County seats carried prestige and showed status, which appears to have carried down 
the hierarchy of seats. The other factor which had some bearing, particularly in some closed seats, 
was local connection such as landownership in the county.  
                                                        
 
113
  CJI(II), p.391  
114
  3 William III and Mary II (England) c.2, section IV  
115
  The Westminster Commons had imposed time limits on both election petitions and for MPs doubly returned to 
make their choice of seat since 1620s (CJE(I), p.673).  
116
  In 1692 and 1703 several MPs were returned for three constituencies and in 1692 Robert Smith was returned for 
four. The HIP biography states that little is known about Smith other than that he was a nephew of Ormond, which 
may account for the constituencies he was returned for. The 1703 general election marked the last multiple 
returns―probably as a result of firmer control established by patrons over corporation, manor and ecclesiastical 
seats meaning nominated candidates were bound to be returned and so there was no need to have further seats 
in reserve. The term 'double election' is used here rather than 'double return', which is applied to cases where a 
returning officer returned more than there were vacancies in a seat. 
117
  See fn 116 above for the distinction between 'double election' and 'double return'. 












County chosen Seat with larger electorate 
1692 11 3 1 4 (out of 4) 4 (out of 4) 
1695 6
118
   1 (out of 1) 3 (out of 3) 
1703 7 2  3 (out of 3) 2 (out of 2) 
1713 9   4 (out of 4) 3 (out of 3) 
1715 10   4 (out of 4) 5 (out of 5) 
1727 15   3 (out of 3) 4 (out of 5) 
Table 8  Double elections after general elections 
 
3.1.3  Attendance 
Three methods have been used to measure Members' attendance. First, the numbers taking part 
in divisions. Second, correspondence and diaries commenting on attendance. Third, entries in the 
Journals indicating that the House was pressing Members to attend. The figures for divisions taken 
from the Journals and other sources
119
 are set out in Appendix 6.19 and have been plotted in 
Table 9 and Table 10 below. Caution has to be exercised in using the figures as they are not 
evenly spread and divisions were occasioned by the failure to reach a consensus―particularly 
during periods of political conflict―and as a result they may over-represent average attendance 
rates. The most divisions in a month and the largest voting figures (258, plus two tellers on 25 
November 1713
120
 in the contested election for the Speaker) were recorded in the 1713 session. 
That said, Table 9 points to increasing attendance from the 1690s (with some falling back in 
1698/99) to 1713, then a falling-off at the start of the Hanoverian regime, which was slowly 
reversed until 1725. This trend is clearer if the numbers are used to produce an average voting 
over a parliament (there are insufficient to do this separately for most sessions) (see Table 11).  
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  In addition, there were double elections at two by-elections—CJI(II), p.252.  
119
  See Appendix 6.20. 
120
  CJI(II), p.743  
























































































































































































Totals voting in divisions 1695-1730 
(excluding tellers) 


























































































































































































































Totals voting in divisions 1721-1730 (exc. tellers)  









1727 (to 1730) 125 
Average 1695 to 1730 148 
Table 11 Average number of Members voting in a parliament 
The data for the 1720s, when sessions followed a much more regular pattern than during the 
previous 30 years, are firmer for analysis. Table 10 indicates, however, that there was no 
sessional pattern of attendance, other than each session had its own dynamic: for example, the 
1725 session fuelled by the controversy over Wood's halfpence recorded the highest figures in the 
decade. Nor are there enough statistics for the 1720s to see clear patterns within each session 
beyond an indication that attendance may have built during the pre-transmission half of the 
session and that attendance after the transmission recess fell away, sometimes significantly.  
Sir John Perceval's diaries show that what held his attention and pushed up attendance was well 
argued debate and high political drama. He also had to attend when he was responsible for 
business such as moving an address,
121
 and, though not always there at the start of business, he 
appears to have sat through debates which bored him.
122
 Correspondents reporting parliamentary 
proceedings to the government in London highlighted the same items―for example, Richard 
Warburton providing accounts in 1695 on the attempt to impeach Porter, which had two groups of 
partisans for and against Porter and entailed late sittings and several divisions.
123
 In 1703 when 
the House was debating supply and William Robinson was under attack there 'was not above 56 
Members at most absent'.
124
 Once Members had been in Dublin a few weeks, however, it became 
more difficult to keep them 'in town'. There are regular references to Members wanting to finish 
and get back to their estates.
125
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  Perceval Diaries, p.126  
122
  For example, debate on whether the doorkeeper was entitled to 6s/8d from each MP—Perceval Diaries, p.127.  
123
  BL, Add. 28,879 ff. 190-91 (10 Oct 1695)  
124
  BL, Add. 28,891, f.135 (Dun to John Ellis, 15 Oct 1703)  
125
  For example, BL, Add. 28,893 f.78 (Chief Secretary Southwell to John Ellis, 14 Mar 1704/5)  




As was the case at Westminster, there is evidence that the day in the House got off to a slow start 
with Members drifting in during the morning. Lieutenant-General William Steuart, an administration 
supporter, explained in a letter dated 9 November 1703 to John Ellis that after he had finished on a 
committee:  
I went into the House which I found to be barely a House and scarcely one of ... 
[Ormond's] friends in it; as soon as the Speaker saw me he made me a sign to come to 
him he being in the Chair; he told me by way of a whisper, that they had just then (being 
hardly 11 o'clock) passed a vote that the representation sent to the queen should be 
printed ... I told him I was very sorry that an affair of [this] consequence should have been 
moved so early in so thin a House adding that I had reason to think it would be looked 
upon as done to surprise the House into a vote, which when well debated and duly 
considered would never have been in a full House.
126
 
Steuart went to the Castle at once and the administration managed later in the day to reverse the 
decision. The episode shows that the administration was at risk of ambush in a thin House, 
particularly with the connivance of a dissembling Speaker covering his back and feigning to be 
powerless to head-off a tactic of the administration's critics,
127
 and that the expectation was that 
important and controversial matters would get a thorough airing in debate. Steuart also 
admonished the administration's friends who should have been at their station for not being more 
diligent in their attendance.
128




As at Westminster, the Commons used the 'call-over' (a roll call) to drum up attendance. The 
procedure appears to have been more effective in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
than later, a pattern also noted by P.D.G. Thomas.
130
 In the 1661 parliament the House was called 
                                                        
 
126
  BL, Add. 28,891, f.191  
127
  Southwell also gave an account indicating that there were 45 in the House and the original decision had passed 
unanimously, which shows that the administration was not present and that no arguments on its behalf were 
presented. Ormond called leading supporters together and Southwell was sent to the Speaker: 'But he said that it 
being an order of the House he did not think it proper to intermeddle therein. Whereupon I moved it to the House 
... I told the House that this paper having been transmitted for England it was not a decent respect to Her Majesty 
to have it appear in print till some answer were returned... There was a pretty deal of argument on both sides, but 
in conclusion the House came to a resolution of the deferring the printing of it till the second day after our next 
meeting' (SP, 63–363 f.128(stamped 18) (13 Nov 1703)).  
128
  The Administration was aware of the risks of a thin House since the 1690s. On 6 Nov 1697 Lord Chancellor 
Methuen wrote to Secretary of State Vernon that 'for being apprehensive of great designs, we were able to bring 
up every country gentleman in Ireland so as to have a fuller house than at any time this session. So that I am 
confident we can prevent any attempt whatsoever and end the session quickly and quietly and part very great 
friends' (SP, 63–359 f.176(stamped 375)).  
129
  See Orders, Standing Orders, and Resolutions of the Honourable House of Commons, relating to the Forms of 
Proceeding, Privileges, etc, etc Collected out of the Journals and Undigested under there are several Heads 
(London, 1747). 
130
  Thomas, Commons, pp.96-110, who suggests that the government used calls at Westminster and then frequently 
postponed them, to keep MPs in London.  
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over frequently and Members not in attendance and who had not been given leave to absent 
themselves were fined.
131
 After 1692 it was first used in September 1695 but when the 'Order for 
calling the House over this day being the read, and the Question put, that the House be now called 
over, it passed in the negative' and the call over was delayed.
132
 The House was eventually called 
over and defaulters were excused when several Members currently in England on business were 
given a month to appear.
133
 Later attempts to call over the House were frequently postponed, 
excuses of illness were accepted and absentees were given several opportunities to appear.
134
 
The process, although often postponed, had some teeth. Members were taken into custody in the 
1698/9 session and had to pay fines for non-attendance before being released.
135
 This aggressive 
approach continued into the next parliament. On 2 November 1703, when the House was called 
over, Sir Michael Cole, MP for Enniskillen, was told that, if he did not turn up in a fortnight, the 
Speaker would issue his writ for a by-election; two Members were told to attend within a month; 
and three others were ordered to be taken into custody by the serjeant-at-arms .
136
 The House's 
decision in 1703/4
137
 that it would no longer declare seats vacant for non-attendance, however, 
weakened the penalties for unauthorised absence. What emerged was a system with three 
elements. First, from 1715 circular letters from the Speaker urging Members to attend. On re-
assembling after a Christmas or transmission recess the House ordered a call over in two weeks 
and the Speaker was ordered to 'write circular letters to the sheriffs of the several counties, to 
acquaint the Members in their respective counties'.
138
 Second, after 1715 the calls of the House 
were more frequent, especially in sessions when there was a major issue in contention―such as 
the national bank in 1721
139
―or political tensions were running high―such as Wood's halfpence 
in 1723 and 1725. The sanction threatened for non-compliance was to be taken into custody.
140
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  CJI(I), pp.406, 408-09, 412, 511-12, 543, 699; see also Scobell, Memorials, pp.84-86. 
132
  CJI(II), p.65  
133
  CJI(II), p.73  
134
  CJI(II), p.181, 244  
135
  CJI(II), p.250ff, 289  
136
  CJI(II), p.355  
137
  See p.130 below. 
138
  CJI(III), p.60 Similar instances: CJI(III), pp.255, 317, 365, 444  
139
  A call may have been especially necessary when a substantial issue arose during a quiet session such as 
1721/22: Philip Perceval to Lord Perceval 'Our parliament either in upper or lower House never had less to do; and 
were it not for the supply, and the business of the Bank, the Commons would not sit once a week' (BL, Add. 
47,029 f.71 (5 Oct 1721)).  
140
  CJI(III), pp.255, 408  




The regularity with which Members sought leave of absence (to avoid sanction)
141
 and Journal 
entries showing that defaulters' circumstances were reviewed is evidence that the process had 
substance. In December 1723 12 defaulting Members were ordered to be taken into custody. On 
this occasion it appears that a faction saw advantage in keeping attendance up by setting an 
example to their own followers.
142
 Third, there was what later would be called whipping and 
caucusing and is examined below (see page 191). 
These procedures and tactics were used together by both the administration and its opponents. 
The rising political temperature occasioned by Wood's halfpence illustrates how the levers 
combined with other tactics could be used to manipulate attendance at the 1723–24 session (as 
well as showing how this session departed from the norm). Lord Lieutenant Grafton reported that 
the 'copper coins' had occasioned circular letters and 
the early order for the call of the House at the beginning of the session brought up 
Members to town from the most distant parts ... their passions having been so 
awakened.... [they] protract and disquiet the session by vexatious observations... They are 
still carrying on the same part by starting every day new business and moving for bills 
(which they would not otherwise have regarded or at least have so long neglected) on 
purpose to keep the Houses sitting in expectation of His Majesty's answers to their 
address concerning Mr Wood's grant, so that the recess which might otherwise have been 
before this time is now removed to a farther distance.  
[Our opponents are] vigilant and active in gaining new friends and in keeping all those in 
town who are attracted to them on this subject with insinuations that the welfare of their 




In November 1723 at Grafton's instigation the House adjourned to 12 December but he noted: 
The recess of the parliament after having prepared ... heads of bills ... has usually been 
understood as the conclusion of all the difficulties of the session, and the country 
gentlemen have generally taken advantage of it to excuse themselves from further 
attendance when very little duty remained besides the formal part of passing those bills ..., 
which might be transacted by a few, but ... the present recess is only to be considered as a 
cessation of business for a time, for a few days ago it was ordered ... that the House be 
called over the first Monday after their meeting again ... accordingly, the motion for which 
                                                        
 
141
  See for example, requests following orders to call in the House in CJI(III), pp.262, 290. 
142
  CJI(III), pp.369-73 (Dec 1723) This episode stands out for the application of sanctions and the numbers taken into 
custody and reinforces Burns' point that measures were taken to keep up attendance as the political temperature 
rose against Wood's halfpence (R.E. Burns, Irish Parliamentary Politics in the Eighteenth Century, 2 vols. 
(Washington, 1989–90), (I), p.146). On the basis of the HIP biographies, most sanctioned were Tories (Richard 
Cox, William Flower, St. Leger Gilbert, Brent Spencer), Presbyterian leaning (Archibald Edmundstone) or obscure 
independents (Thomas Christmas, Henry Edgeworth, John King, John Mason, Robert Ross). The procedure was 
used again in 1725–26 when three MPs were ordered into custody―(III), p.409 and Hayton, Ruling Ireland, pp.98-
105. Two were Tories or had Tory connections (Acheson Moore, Arthur St. Leger).  
143
  SP, 63–382(stamped 1 (2 Nov 1723))  
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Members in Dublin but not attending the House could be rounded up by the serjeant-at-arms. On 
26 October 1695 the House ordered him 'to require all the Members ... without doors to attend the 
service of this House immediately'.
145
 The serjeant-at-arms had to scour 'several coffee-houses 
and places adjacent' to Chichester House to ensure Members attended.
146
 In 1710 Perceval 
recounted how activities in coffee-houses could spill into the House: 
A person came the other day into the coffee house very drunk, and nothing would serve 
his turn but he would make everybody there drink Sacheverell's health; he swore that was 
the way in England and he was resolved for the future that should be the way here too. 
And accordingly he called for a bottle of brandy and made several drink it and amongst the 
rest Andrew Young [Member], and this was talked of in the coffee [house] by the 
Parliament House; and ... Serjeant Caulfield getting it ... came into the House and made a 
very dismal compliant of breach of privilege against ... Mr Young, who was present, and 
was called, but declared that for this part he had no force put upon him, yet he liked the 
health very well, only that he wished [there] had been better liquor to drink it in, and so the 
matter ended with Caulfield being soundly laughed at.
147
 
The anecdote also shows how an attack could be deflected with humour. 
By far the most frequent Journal entries concerning attendance are those granting Members leave 
of absence. Typically a Member was allowed two to four weeks 'to go into the country ... about 
urgent business',
148
 'to go into the country for ... for recovery of his health'
149
 or 'have leave ... to go 
into the country to his command'.
150
 Leave was also frequently given for Members to go to 
England, usually for at least a month.
151
 Leave could also be extended.
152
 The point of the process 
was that a Member given leave would not face penalty if the House was called over during his 
absence and it protected his privilege while away. For the process to have effect Members had to 
pay the clerk for the order
153
 because it had to be recorded in the Journal 'otherwise the House will 
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look on such Members to have withdrawn ... from the service of this House without the leave'.
154
 
When the House stopped allowing Members to resign
155
 the process developed to allow longer 
leaves of absence. In May 1707 Colonel William Southwell was given leave of absence for six 
months 'to attend her Majesty’s service'.
156
 But as Table 12 indicates requests for leave of 
absence fell off after 1707. They had a revival in use from 1719 reaching an average of more than 
three requests every four sitting days in 1725–26; this is likely to be related to the stiffening of the 
attendance regime noted above. There is a loose correlation between requests for leave and the 
point at which the House started to consider returned bills, especially in the earlier sessions; in 
1725 requests started earlier and may come from a realisation that with the withdrawal of Wood's 
patent the session would not be as momentous as expected.  
Session Requests for leave of absence 





















Table 12 Requests for leave of absence 
 
3.1.4  Expulsion  
When parliament reconvened on 21 June 1642, after a five month adjournment civil war had 
started. On the following day the Commons expelled 41 Members, who were 'either in open 
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rebellion, or stand indicted of high treason' and ordered the Speaker to issue his warrants for by-
elections.
158
 By the time that the 1692 parliament met the terms and force of the oaths had, as 
noted, effectively excluded those who were not prepared to accept the new order. Mass, summary 
expulsions no longer occurred but individuals who transgressed were expelled. The procedure had 
developed from 1642 and allowed the Member to respond to the allegations. The first instance 
was on 11 October 1692 when George Crofts, having been given notice, was from his place in the 
House (rather than the bar) called upon to respond to charges. Having heard him, the House 
asked him to withdraw and decided that there was substance in the charges that Crofts had joined 
'with the late rebels in many notorious instances' and ordered him to be taken into custody by the 
serjeant-at-arms. He was immediately brought to the bar where he was shown evidence in the 
form of a letter, which he accepted he had signed. He then spoke again in his defence and 
withdrew again. The House then resolved that he had been 'a notorious betrayer of the English 
and Protestant interests, and laws of this kingdom, during the late rebellion', he was expelled and 
'forever [was] made incapable of being a Member of this House'. Crofts was called in and on his 
knees at the bar—the required posture for a person receiving a reprimand at the time in both 
Dublin and Westminster—received the sentence. The Speaker was ordered to issue his warrant 
for a by-election.
159
 Two days later Crofts, still in custody, petitioned the House 'setting forth his 
hearty sorrow for his offence' and was discharged on payment of the usual fees to the serjeant-at-
arms.
160
 That appears to have been the extent of his punishment and the end of the matter. There 
was a second very similar case a few days later which followed the same two-stage process (of 
indictment and trial) allowing the Member to defend himself before he too was expelled.
161
 Only 
where a Member refused to take the oath, or in a case in 1696 refused to sign the Association for 
the protection of William III, was he summarily expelled.
162
 In other cases—following the 1692 
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63–359 f.304(stamped 98)). Having expelled him the Commons was not prepared to have its decision flouted. But 
Saunderson did sit again, in the 1713 parliament, where he was classified as a Tory.  




precedents—the Member was allowed to respond. The first case in the 1703 parliament related to 
a statement in the report of the commissioners appointed to enquire into the Irish Forfeitures and 
delivered to the Westminster Commons in December 1699. Francis Annesley, lawyer, forfeiture 
trustee and Irish MP, was one of the commissioners and the offending paragraph alleged that 
current Irish freeholders were 'scarce willing to find any person guilty of the late rebellion, even 
upon full evidence'.
163
 Chief Secretary Southwell explained that Annesley: 
yet having been one of the authors of that Report which they think drew on [English 
legislation], and there being a great deal of personal malice mixed with it, they thought 
they might very well express their resentment in a thing which reflected upon 
themselves and yet could not be taken ill in England.  
Southwell regretted the attack as Annesley was a 'gentleman of a very fair character' who has 
often been useful to this country, and because 'such heats do not easily stop where they are 
intended'.
164
 In the event, due process was followed. The House agreed that Members’ questions 
to Annesley would be put from the Chair. When the House asked Annesley whether he had 
'signed any writing or report' to this effect, he asked to be excused from answering. (As far as the 
evidence shows the idea of privilege attaching to the commissioners’ report or to his work for the 
Westminster House played no part in the proceedings.) The House found that he had 
'scandalously and maliciously misrepresented and traduced the Protestant freeholders [of Ireland] 
to create a misunderstanding and jealousy between the people of England and the Protestants of 
this kingdom'.
165
 His case, unlike those of the 1690s where there appears to have been unanimity, 
was subject to debate on two days and the final decision, although apparently not subject to a 
division, was not unanimous.
166
 The decision too differed in that his expulsion was not for life 
(Annesley returned as MP for the same constituency, Downpatrick, in 1713) and the House 
ordered that no warrant for a by-election be issued that session
167
―possibly to prevent him 
winning a by-election (as Saunderson had done in 1696) or to allow a contrite Annesley a route 
back; he was, as the HIP notes, a 'prominent politician' and had been nominated to many 
committees. The Annesley case has the appearance of the cut and thrust of politics within what 
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was acceptable behaviour and therefore a suspension rather that disqualification may have been 
judged the right penalty. The next Member expelled was because of his heterodox religious views. 
John Asgill was expelled in October 1703 for publishing a heretical pamphlet,
168
 the decision was 
nemine contradicente and was for life.
169
 There was one added procedural twist as at the time of 
his expulsion the House had received a petition challenging Asgill’s election from a sitting MP. The 
petitioner agreed to withdraw the petition and at that point the Speaker was ordered to issue his 
warrant for a by-election.
170
 
3.2  Members’ privilege 
Coleman Dennehy sets out the background to the theory and practice of privilege, or special 
protections, in the seventeenth century.
171
 The purpose of privilege was to allow the House and its 
Members to carry out parliamentary business without interference. There were two strands to its 
development: (i) law and precedent; and (ii) practice. Ireland, like England, relied on law, 
precedent and the Commons' autonomy to set the parameters of its own privileges. Infringement 
of the right could be met by the House with censure, summons or incarceration. The administration 
could not interfere with it.
172
 In 1613 the Commons had clarified―in effect, expanded―the 1463/4 
Irish statute on the privilege of Members that they were free 'from all suits, troubles and vexations' 
when it resolved that 'the true meaning' of the statute was that privilege 
shall extend to all Members ... their servants, goods and possessions, for forty days before 
the beginning of every Parliament, and for forty days after the end and dissolution of the 
same; and likewise for the whole space of time between the beginning and end of the 
Parliament, as well during the time of every adjournment and prorogation.
173
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1697―11 June 1697).  
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  CJI(I), p.26; 2&3 Edward IV, c.1  




In 1662 the House of Commons stated explicitly that Members' privilege drew on English as well 
as Irish precedents.
174
 The rationale was probably to bolster privilege. The story from 1692 was 
one of, first, narrowing of the scope of privilege, especially as it applied to individual MPs (a 
process that had started in the Commons in the 1640s)
175
 and, second, a differentiation in the 
handling of types of cases. As in England one stimulus was to curtail abuse. At the start of the 
1692 and 1695 parliaments the House reiterated a 1661 order that no Member was 'to protect any 
other person but his menial servants, and that the names of such servants be entered with the 
clerk of this House, and that none but such so entered shall be protected'.
176
 This order not directly 
precedented in manuals such as Scobell's Memorials is based on Westminster practice
177
 and 
was repeated at the start of the next parliament in 1703.
178
 Its effectiveness is open to question. 
On 21 August 1697 John Burt MP, facing financial problems,
179
 admitted to the House that he had 
protected several persons who were not his servants. He was ordered to be taken into custody 
and the protections he had given were declared void.
180
 His case stands out and he may have 
been an egregious offender among a small number of cases in the 1690s, most of which came to 
light when the House received complaints against the protected persons.
181
 Muddle and 
inconsistency also characterised the arrangements. In the 1703–04 session Speaker Brodrick 
recorded that the House had ordered that court officers be taken into custody for arresting an MP's 
menial servant not entered on the clerk's list in accordance with the order of the House.
182
 Nor 
does it appear that the clerk's list was definitive. In February 1704/5 the House ordered the clerk of 
the House, the clerk of the Tholsel, the sheriffs of the city of Dublin, the sheriff of the county of 
Dublin, and other sheriffs to lay before the House an 'account of protections from the Members ... 
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which were entered with them'.
183
 The House attempted to produce a reconciled and 
comprehensive list but failed.
184
 The upshot was that the House declared the entries on all lists 
void
185
 and resolved unanimously that 'if any Member shall grant a protection to any person who is 
not his domestic menial servant, receiving wages from him, such Member shall incur the highest 
displeasure and censure of this House'.
186
 Speaker Brodrick endorsed this approach and added 
that 'some were willing to compound for what was past for anything in future',
187
 that is write off the 
past for a tighter but workable arrangement in the future, and possibly frustrate attempts to limit 
how long privilege ran for.
188
 This approach drew on Westminster practice and it had ordered that, 
'if any [improper protection] shall be granted by any Member, such Member shall be liable to the 
censure of this House'. Westminster had also limited privilege to Members' menial servants but 
added a requirement that where a servant was arrested or detained he or she required an order 
from the Speaker to be released.
189
  
The Irish House started with a fresh master list held by the clerk and the 1704/5 resolutions were 
repeated in February 1715/6, but with the addition that they were to be posted on the Four Courts, 
Tholsel and the gate of Chichester House.
190
 In September 1721, after lists were checked, it was 
discovered that 20 protections in contravention of the 1715/6 resolutions had 'been granted by 
several Members ... since the last session' and they were declared void.
191
 The episode shows 
that the list system―presumably intended to cover genuine menial servants―was still in place 
with lists held by the clerk of the House and the sheriffs of the county and City of Dublin.
192
 The 
ineligible names may have been added after the end of the previous session. This may give an 
indication of the reason the House did not follow Westminster in requiring a warrant from the 
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Speaker as the breaks between sittings were more frequent and long. There was another instance 
of alleged abuse in 1725 when William Martin, a newly elected MP, gave a protection to Dominick 
Donnelly, a teacher of mathematics, arrested for debt, causing him to be released. The creditor 
petitioned the House and the matter was rapidly resolved, presumably with Martin withdrawing the 
protection or Donnelly settling the debt.
193
 The 1721 and 1725 events show that, despite the clear 
warning in the February 1715 resolution, no censure of the Members issuing these protections 
was made. These cases may, however, have been the exceptions showing that the rule restricting 
protections to menial servants was operating as intended. There was a counter-weight to abuse as 
the Martin case showed: the party running up against privilege could petition the Commons for 
redress. 
The system of protections had a sectarian dimension. In November 1696 the Commons resolved 
unanimously that 'no papist be protected by any Member of this House as his menial servant'.
194
 
The resolution was not referred to again in the period covered by this thesis and it was not 
included in the later 1715 resolutions on protections. The implication is that no Member would 
have considered giving such a protection. Edward and Annie Porritt took the resolution as part of 




The Journals show how a lists system worked. In June 1705 the sub-sheriff of the city of Dublin 
petitioned the House for release from custody having issued a warrant for the arrest of an MP, 
William Phillips. A bailiff had come to the sheriff's office with a writ already sealed against Phillips. 
There was a list of Members in the office (presumably the published list), to which the clerk had 
'recourse when any process comes to the office'. On this occasion the sub-sheriff was not present 
and a junior officer found 'William Phillips Esq' on the list of Members but as the writ was made out 
to William Phillips without Esq he believed it could not be the same person. He filled out a blank 
warrant and Phillips was arrested but, when he explained to the bailiff that he was an MP, was 
released. The sub-sheriff told the Commons that he had warned his staff always to check the list 
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before initiating a process; he was discharged paying his fees.
196
 The incident illustrates that, for 
the system of protections to operate, up-to-date lists of those protected were essential for the 
sheriffs in Dublin, when MPs and their servants were in the city. Local officers were obviously 
aware of the effect of protection of privilege and the risks of violating it. The House attached some 
blame to the sub-sheriff as he had to pay his fees before release. And it shows the significance 
attached to status and titles. 
In contrast to the relatively few breaches of privilege concerning servants, allegations of breaches 
concerning property were frequent. The Journals record 70 allegations of breach of privilege for 
the parliaments of 1692 and 1695. A typical entry reads: 'Ordered, That Phelimy More Mac-Lornan 
be summoned to attend this House, to answer a breach of privilege complained of by Mr Dawson 
[Member]';
197
 there was usually no further entry. Over 60% of these record neither the nature of the 
alleged breach nor the outcome. Entries from the 1660s and the 1700s are more informative and 
provide an indication that these terse entries in the 1690s were probably local disputes over land 
and property. In the 1690s it appears that the House did little more than enter the allegation in the 
Journals. There was probably little appetite to allow the contestants to open up a new front before 
the House. It should, however, be noted that in the example cited the respondent had a Gaelic 
name. There are other examples,
198
 as well as respondents with Old English names, which may 
not only point to local land disputes, but also provide another pointer to the sectarian flavour of 
some of these disputes. However, caution has to be exercised as names are not a sure guide to 
religious affiliation and there are many examples where respondents have New English, Protestant 
names.
199
 For the latter, however, there are fewer records of summonses. From the 1703–04 
session the Journals provide more information on the allegations but by then there was a 
downward trend with the number of allegations of breach of privilege falling to around 15 in each of 
the final three sessions of the 1703 parliament. This downward pattern continued until 1721 before 
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reversing in the 1720s.
200
 The changes are illustrated by comparing three sessions: 1709, 1719 
and 1729–30.  
Cases of breach of privilege allegations (outcome recorded) 1709 1719 1729–30 
Entering MP's land, dispossessing tenants or taking possessions 6 (1) 4 8 
Stopping a road  1  
Interfering with MP's servants 2 2 1 
Commencing legal action against MP 3 (1)
201
 1 1 
Arresting an MP   1 
Complaint from House of Lords against an MP 1   
Proposal to print Votes/ printing without authority 1 (1)  1 
Discharged from giving evidence to committee  1  
Prevaricating or giving false evidence to Commons/committee   2 
Failing to produce/ falsifying documents to Commons/committee   2 
Counterfeiting name of MP to frank letters   1 
Failed to make return of writ   1 
Absconding from custody   1 
Total 13 9 19 
Alleged perpetrator(s) summoned 4 4  
Alleged perpetrator(s) ordered into custody 3 2 9 
Report by Committee of Privileges and Elections 1 1 2 
Table 13 Breach of privilege allegations 
 
In contrast to the 1690s,
202
 nearly all the 1709 cases were sent to the Committee of Elections and 
Privileges, though in most the outcome was still not recorded and they were dominated by cases 
about land and property. The pattern was broadly the same in 1719. By 1729 a distinct category of 
breaches against the operation of the House emerged and these were dealt with summarily, with 
perpetrators often ordered into custody, a symptom of a more assertive House. There was also an 
increase in land and servant cases from 1721 but for the most part these cases were left to the 
committee, which in the majority, as before, did not report. In a few the committee reported that 
satisfaction was given and in others that the committee's responsibilities were discharged by the 
House. This implies that the rest were still before the committee and lapsed with the end of the 
session or that the parties reached agreement. 
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In 1695 the Commons made a standing order that 'no Member of this House who shall be sued as 
trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, or otherwise, in autre droit, shall have the privilege of 
this House, so that his person be not molested'.
203
 The Commons widened the derogation in 
December 1697 to include non-payment of rent and the House sought and secured the 
concurrence of the Lords.
204
 The change may have been precipitated by a case. A possible 
candidate is the case of brothers Hercules and Henry Davys, both MPs, who was ordered on 1 
December 1697 to attend the following morning and 'show cause why he should not waive his 
privilege at the suit of Mr Hercules Davys [MP], being only a trustee'.
205
 On 2 December, the day 
the House agreed the order on non-payment of rents, it ordered that both had 'leave to waive their 
privilege mutually, in any suit to be commenced by either person',
206
 and so stood back from this 
fraternal wrangle. Irrespective of whether or not the case was directly relevant to the order, it does 
illustrate a dilemma for the courts and litigants: how to deal with an obstructive Member insisting 
on his privilege. It is not clear whether the general orders of the House were directions to Members 
to waive privilege in the circumstances described, but which they could still refuse to do. The 
solution adopted in the next parliament was to legislate. 
The House also reduced the duration of privilege. By the 1690s it was recognised that the 
provision of privilege starting 40 days before a parliament met
207
 and lasting 40 days after it ended 
was excessive. Litigants wishing to take action against an MP on a matter subject to a statutory 
limitation were prevented unless they petitioned the House to lift privilege.
208
 In a letter written on 
21 February 1704/5 Alan Brodrick explained that when the 1463/4 statute 'was made ... the use 
was to dissolve and not continue parliaments by prorogation' but that pattern had changed in the 
seventeenth century and by the 1690s 'notice was taken of the mischiefs occasioned by 
privilege'.
209
 In December 1695, ahead of a recess expected to last several months, the Commons 
ordered that every Member who wished to 'waive his privilege in any suit brought against him 
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during the recess shall have leave to do so'.
210
 This tentative measure left the balance of 
advantage with the MP. On 16 March 1696/7 the House took a further step when it proposed to 
the Lords that both Houses restrict the privilege during the forthcoming recess which was due to 
run to 11 May, which they agreed. With Thomas Brodrick, Alan's brother, leading the process, the 
Commons suspended privilege for Members 'in any suit or matter whatsoever against a 
commoner, except only as to the person of such Member'.
211
 On 11 May 1697 the Lords proposed 
to the Commons a further extension of the suspension but there was opposition and a lengthy 
debate in the Commons. The 1614 resolutions and the 1463/4 legislation were cited and only on a 
division (64:45) the Commons resolved to suspend Members' privilege protecting 'goods and 
services from the payment of debts or other legal or equitable demands', until 15 June, after which 
because the matter was generating friction it was allowed to lapse.
212
 The subject did not come up 
again until the end of the 1698/99 session when the House withdrew privilege (except 'as to his 
person') from those Members who had not attended since 25 March 1697. But an attempt to 
project the withdrawal forward more generally to cover the impending recess failed on a division 
(89:49).
213
 Alan Brodrick explained:  
Sir W[illia]m Handcock was very angry ... and [said] my brother deserved to be impeached 
for his motion, as tending to repeal a statute by a vote: but all agreed his motion had no 
such tendency and many in the debate (and I particularly) said they thought there was no 
reason to expound the word finished in that statute so largely as that privilege should 
continue during a prorogation of six of twelve months. Last Trinity term upon some case or 
other the Chancellor and Judges agreed that by that Act privilege was not continued more 
than 40 days after a prorogation.
214
  
Privilege remained in place until 40 days after the parliament was dissolved on 14 June 1699.  
                                                        
 
210
  CJI(II), p.141; the House also ordered that any protection granted without an expressed time-limit continue for no 
longer than a week after the recess of the House.  
211
  CJI(II), pp.151-52; the terminology, some of the concepts in the Irish order such as the treatment of arrest and the 
need to communicate with the Lords are found in the Westminster resolutions on privilege of 30 Nov 1696 but the 
English resolution went further suspending privilege (but not arrest) when the House was not sitting (CJE(XI), 
p.602).  
212
  CJI(II), p.153; when the Houses returned on 15 June, they did not renew the suspension, although both adjourned 
until 27 July 1697. According to Lord Chancellor Methuen, the matter was raised on 15 June 1697 and was one of 
'several things of party and faction were laid with great heat ... but we had timely notice and gained our point so 
entirely as to have both Houses adjourn without doing anything' (SP, 63–359 no.21(stamped 58) (To Lords Justice 
Galway, 15 June 1697)).  
213
  CJI(II), p.304; the Porritts, Unreformed House(II), p.459 suggest that the reason for the former was that there were 
many MPs continually absenting themselves but divisions in period from Mar 1697 do not appear consistently low 
and reached 200 in Aug 1697.  
214
  Midleton Letters (1248/2/171-72) (To St John Brodrick, 21 Feb 1704/5); Handcock had a point, the Irish parliament 
had previously legislated in 1634–35 to clarify and limit parliamentary privilege (10&11 Charles I c.12).  
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In 1703 the House made its first attempt to legislate on this issue. On 8 October leave was given 
for Clotworthy Upton and William Conolly to bring in a heads of a bill to regulate the privilege of 
parliament. An unusual aspect of the instruction for the heads (but not in view of the foregoing) 
was that they inform the Lords, seek their concurrence and request they agree to set up a joint 
committee to draft the heads.
215
 The Lords never responded and an entry in the Lords Journal for 
4 March 1703/4 stated that it was unanimously resolved that 'for the future any bill, that takes away 
or diminishes the privileges of this House, or any Member thereof, shall not be read a second time, 
unless such bill had its rise first in this House'.
216
 Given that the Commons could reasonably take 
the same view if the legislation originated in the Lords an impasse loomed. A solution was found in 
the next session, though it would take a second attempt in the 1707 session before legislation 
reached the statute book. On each occasion both Houses started drafting heads. The timing of the 
preparations indicates that the Commons was in the lead, completing the draft ahead of the Lords, 
which started but never completed its heads but that allowed it to meet the letter of the March 
1703/4 resolution.
217
 Southwell threw light on the reasons why the 1705 bill failed. He explained 
that it would 'take off all the objection to the stop of justice in the long continuance of a parliament, 
and will be much for Her Majesty's service as well as the public in general'.
218
 Subsequently, 
'although it had its rise with us [the Irish parliament], and was occasioned by the unlimited rise of 
protections, yet upon a second consideration they were loath to part with the privilege, and so 
upon a division the bill was lost'.
219
 The second heads brought in during the next session, 1707, 
                                                        
 
215
  CJI(II), p.330; see also Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.30-31.  
216
  LJI(II), p.86 Message requesting a joint committee had been delivered to the House of Lords 9 Oct 1703―LJI(II), 
p.14.  
217
  1704/5 heads of bill Commons (data from Bill no.2156 (ILD)) Lords (data from Bill no.5175 (ILD)) 
 Leave or order  10 Feb   17 Feb  
 Read and committed  17 Feb   — 
 Reported   9 Mar   —     
 Sent to lord lieutenant 9 Mar   — 
 1707 heads of bill Commons (data from Bill no.2157 (ILD))  Lords (data from Bill no.5249 (ILD)) 
 Leave or order  7 July   11 July   
 Read and committed  12 July   19 July  
 Reported   18 July    —     
 Sent to lord lieutenant 29 July   — 
218
  SP, 63–365 f.156(stamped 172) (Signed by Lord Lieutenant Ormond but text appears to be written by Southwell to 
Secretary of State Hedges, 29 Mar 1705) 
219
  SP, 63–365 f.281(stamped 263) (Southwell to Hedges, 26 May 1705) CJI(II), p.469 records it was negatived when 
the question was put to commit the bill.  




were managed by Samuel Dopping and reached the statute book in October 1707.
220
 The main 
provisions in the 1707 Act, which applied to Members of both Houses, are listed in Appendix 6.15 
with a commentary and include comparison with the English Act of 1701 on privilege.
221
 While 
starting from the same concept of privilege and overlapping in terminology and seeking to reduce 
the coverage of privilege, the Irish provisions were not in step with Westminster. They followed 
some of the English developments but at a slower rate and were crafted to meet the requirements 
of the Dublin House. This is shown by omissions. The Irish provisions contain no mention of 
servants, the inclusion of which may have limited Members' scope to issue protections. In its 
standing orders the Irish House, in contrast to Westminster, had no explicit role for the Speaker or 




From 1707 to 1730 the Journals contain orders for the summary arrest of those in alleged breach 
of the privilege of an individual MP. In most of these cases the Member claimed that he had been 
physically or verbally attacked or libelled.
223
 A few concerned land or property or where legal 
processes were initiated against an MP
224
 and they fell into two categories. The first were those 
where the circumstances were aggravated―for example, where the serving of a subpoena was 
accompanied with 'disrespectful and provoking language'.
225
 The second category is problematic 
in that it may, again, have a sectarian bias. Two cases illustrate. In the first Thomas Brodrick MP 
alleged breach when an action for ejectment was commenced by 'Francis Murrough, the son of a 
forfeiting proprietor in the rebellion of 1641'; on 23 June 1710 Murrough was ordered to be taken 
onto custody and his solicitor to attend the following morning; and on 8 August he was discharged 
having acknowledged the breach, expressing sorrow, and being reprimanded on his knees at the 
bar of the House.
226
 The second case was in October 1711 when Cornelius Donovan and Teigue 
Dyer were ordered to be taken into custody for forcibly entering lands of Ralph Freke MP. The 
outcome of the case was not recorded but Cornelius Donovan Jr. assaulted a messenger assisting 
                                                        
 
220
  Bill no.2157 (ILD): 6 Anne c.8  
221
  12&13 William III (England) c.3  
222
  CJE(XI), p.343  
223
  For example, CJI(III), pp.84, 170, 255, 370, 551  
224
  Most were sent to the Committee of Privileges and Elections; for example: CJI(II), pp.587, 650; (III), pp.155, 636  
225
  CJI(II), p.719  
226
  CJI(II), pp.668-70, 672  
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the apprehension of his father, and the Commons asked the lord lieutenant to direct the attorney 
general to prosecute him.
227
 This case again rests on the likely provenance of the names of the 
respondents and the punishment meted out to Donovan. The absence of a requirement for 
examination before ordering custody allowed the House to exercise a sectarian bias.
228
 
On the basis of its standing orders Westminster's narrowing of the scope and duration of privilege 
was in advance of Dublin's, which, while treading the same path as Westminster, progressed at a 
slower pace. One reason that the Irish House did not replicate Westminster was practical. The 
lifting of privilege when the House adjourned for more than 14 days worked at Westminster as 
sessions were not usually interrupted with lengthy adjournments. In contrast the Irish parliament, 
because of the requirements of Poynings' Law, was usually adjourned for between three and six 
weeks while bills were sent and returned to Whitehall. Not only would Members' protection have 
lapsed but also that of those in debt and sheltering under the House's privilege while private 
legislation was obtained. The alternative was frequent, short and inconvenient sittings every two 
weeks.  
Over time the pattern of prorogations changed. During prorogation the 40 day rule counted twice: 
from the date of the proclamation and 40 days before the House was due to reconvene as set in 
the proclamation.
229
 Short prorogations led to criticism as Southwell noted in 1712: 
the country having often complained that short prorogations (as they had been lately 
practised) had for many years hindered the course of justice against such as had privilege, 
it was the unanimous opinion of those [Ormond] consulted ... that it should be for the public 
service to have the prorogation at least clear of the 3 [ensuing?] terms.
230
 
The end result was a pattern of long and short prorogations (see Appendix 6.1) which normally 
gave a period which was out of privilege for several months and which overlapped with a legal 
                                                        
 
227
  CJI(II), pp.721, 730-31  
228
  On 12 Dec 1698 Westminster: 'Resolved, That no Person be taken into custody of the Serjeant at Arms, upon any 
Complaint of breach of privilege, until the matter of such complaint have been examined by the Committee of 
Privileges; and reported to the House' (CJE(XII), p.349).  
229
  Proclamations(II), p.129: citing Whalley's Newsletter: 'The parliament of Ireland was prorogued ... till 25
th
 of March 
next, when it is thought it will sit to despatch business, so the privilege of parliament will be out from the 18
th
 day of 
Oct next, till the 14
th
 of February. [Dublin,] the sixth of September 1722'.  
230
  SP, 63–367 f.322(stamped 266) (Southwell to Secretary of State Dartmouth, 16 Aug 1712) The same point was 
concerning Lord Lieutenant Grafton when he wrote to Secretary of State Carteret seeking a long prorogation (SP, 
63–383(stamped 63) (12 Feb 1723/4).  




term when the courts were sitting. (The 40 day period was eventually shortened and brought into 
line with Westminster in 1728.)
231
 
Limitation of privilege by legislation (and standing order) was supplemented by waivers ordered by 
the House. Waivers had two functions. First, the House collectively could lift its privilege in 
individual cases. Second, it gave certainty to the position of an MP participating in legal action. 
Waivers fell into two categories. First, those sought voluntarily: (i) by an MP to enable him to 
respond to, or appear as a witness in, litigation,
232
 though these fell off after the 1707 legislation on 
privilege;
233
 and (ii) to allow Members who were barristers to appear before the courts.
234
 Leave 
was nearly always granted by the House.
235
 The second category was to allow legal action against 
a Member where the MP was actively or passively (usually by non-attendance in the House) 
resisting the granting of a waiver. The procedure, as in 1698 when Mary Burt petitioned praying 
that her husband John Burt MP waive his privilege to allow her to sue him for alimony, was for the 
Member to be summoned to respond.
236
 In this case Burt, having been summoned several times, 
failed to appear and the House ordered that his privilege be waived.
237
 
3.3  Corporate privileges of House of Commons  
The beginning of the 1695 parliament also saw rules on the privileges of the House itself, as a 
discrete body and to ensure the effective operation of emerging processes such as heads of bills. 
On 16 September the House ordered that all persons summoned as witnesses were protected 
during such attendance.
238
 Those seeking bills to pay creditors faced risk of imprisonment given 
                                                        
 
231
  1 George II c.8  
232
  For example, CJI(II), pp.222, 284, 371, 508  
233
  From 1707 when consent was given to an MP it was often qualified 'at his own request' (see CJI(II), pp.619). That 
was unlikely to mean that earlier consents were given in the face of objection by the MP but may indicate that 
rather than wait for the lapse of privilege during prorogation the MP had requested the waiver. The qualification 
ceased to be used from 1710 to 1715 ((II), pp.658) which is unlikely to indicate a change in circumstances under 
which the waiver was sought but was done to a standard formula. It re-appeared again from 1716 ((III), pp.107, 
160, 366, 375, 422, 562).  
234
  For example, CJI(II), pp.259, 287, 335, 404 (on this occasion six MPs were given a waiver to appear in a case 
before the House of Lords), 463 (an example of Speaker Brodrick being allowed to practice during the recess), 
679; (III), pp.291, 368, 419 (with the ending of the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords in 1720 the nature of 
business changed to pleading on petitions and privilege cases).  
235
  There is one instance where it was refused: 12 Nov 1729 the House refused leave to Richard Tighe in the suit of 
the church-wardens and parishioners of St. Anne's, Dublin (CJI(III), p.596).  
236
  CJI(II), p.275  
237
  CJI(II), pp.277-78, 280  
238
  CJI(II), p.61  
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the uncertainties and length of the time the heads process required. On 7 October 1695 the 
Commons ordered that: 
all such persons as have obtained the protection of this House, or shall hereafter obtain 
the same, to enable them to prosecute bills for payment of the debts, to prosecute the 
same within ten days after such order is obtained, otherwise their protections to be void.
239
  
Immediately before the order was made the House had issued four protections to debtors mostly 
as the request of their creditors―or more correctly Protestant creditors―seeking legislation to 
allow assets to be sold.
240
 With the October 1695 order the Journals no longer record protections 
issued in tandem with private bills but the process may have been carried out by an entry made by 
the clerk in his book of protections. It is unlikely protections were issued by MPs in respect of 
legislation they were supporting,
241
 though, as the case below suggests, those sheltering under the 
House's protection may not have understood the technicalities. 
The 1703 case of Jeffrey Blake shows that those seeking bills had protection (as well as revealing 
how the heads process worked). Blake had turned Protestant about eight years before and had 
previously failed twice to secure a bill to prevent his father, Walter, disinheriting him. By 1703 he 
was destitute and living in England when Francis Lynch, a Catholic Dublin Merchant
242
 whose 
daughter was married to Blake's younger brother, Valentine, brought him back and funded a 
petition and the drafting of a bill for relief against his father (for the sum of £50 sterling).
243
 Blake 
asked his counsel, John Rivet, who drew up the bill, to insert a clause to secure that Lynch would 
be the first paid when he obtained the inheritance but Rivet said that it was 'not proper to be done'.
 
Walter petitioned against the heads asking to be heard by counsel at bar―an indication of the 
family's wealth
244
―but the Commons rejected his request.
245
 At this point his father died and, 
                                                        
 
239
  CJI(II), p.83  
240
  CJI(II), pp.48 (31 Aug 1695), 54 (7 Sep 1695), 55 (9 Sep 1695), 61 (16 Sep 1695), 83 (7 Oct 1695); the explicitly 
sectarian bias of the petitioners was aimed at securing a favourable response in the Commons; it did not appear to 
mean that the debtor was left vulnerable to litigation by Catholic creditors.  
241
  The first limitation (CJI(II), p.48; 31 Aug 1695) on protections restricts protections to MPs ' menial servants and to 
no other group and therefore a protection issued by an MP as sponsor would be in breach of this order.  
242
  Sylvester Lloyd described Lynch as 'eminent for making his fortune with hands not head', Ian McBride, 'Catholic 
Politics in the Penal Era: Father Sylvester Lloyd and the Devlin Address of 1727", Eighteenth-Century Ireland, vol. 
26 (2011), p.134.  
243
  Lynch may have been protecting part of the estate for his second son; the case predated, just, the 1704 act (2 
Anne c.6) which enhanced the position of eldest sons who turned Protestant. The legislation was before the Privy 
Councils between July 1703 and Jan 1703/4 and was presented to the Commons on 14 Feb 1704/5. 
244
  £400 was to be settled on Valentine. 
245
  Walter was not only a member of the family to petition or make representations to the Commons: James in Nov 
1697 and Oct 1703 (CJI(II), pp.230, 353; Bills nos. 5139, 5162, ILD); and Valentine in Nov 1703 ((II), p.376; Bill 
no. 2441, ILD).  




though a considerable estate descended to him, Blake needed more money to pursue the bill and 
Lynch loaned him another £60 in return for a mortgage. The money was handed over but Blake 
refused to sign the mortgage. Relations deteriorated rapidly. Hearing that Blake was planning to go 
to England, Lynch commenced proceedings resulting in the Dublin sheriff arresting Blake on board 
ship. Blake pointed out that 'he had a protection of a Member of the House of Commons'
246
 and 
was discharged immediately and put back on board. According to Lynch, Blake then 'out of 
prejudice' got him arrested by the serjeant-at-arms 'merely to blast his reputation; and not content 
with that, but would insinuate to the ... Commons, [that Lynch] took him ashore, kept him three 
days in custody, and hindered his voyage to England. All [of] which [Lynch] can prove to be false' 
and Lynch asked the Commons to be released and order Blake 'to pay him the expenses he has 
unjustly put him to'.
247
 Although the bill was rejected by the English Privy Council, the dispute 
continued. Blake petitioned the Commons complaining of breach of privilege by Lynch and the 
bailiffs who had arrested him. The House ordered them to be taken into custody. Lynch petitioned 
on 25 January 1703/4 (and took the unusual step of having his petition printed)
248
 to be released 
from custody. Blake petitioned for more time to call witnesses from England. The House, running 
out of patience, denied Blake his request on 28 January and ordered that the case be heard at the 
bar that day. Lynch and the bailiffs were released without having to pay their fees. Blake, in 
contrast, was reprimanded on his knees by the Speaker 'for trifling with [the] House in his evidence 
given at the bar [and] begging pardon of the House was discharged'.
249
 
In terms of privilege the case shows that those seeking a bill were during the heads process 
protected by privilege. There is no entry in the Journals providing protection to Blake at the stages 
the heads were prepared. The claim of protection by Blake resulted in his immediate release from 
custody without challenge and when he petitioned the House alleging breach by Lynch and the 
bailiffs they were taken into custody at once. Investigation and weighing the evidence followed. 
Blake was given short shrift. More significantly, the case shows a rich Catholic engaging with the 
                                                        
 
246
  The MP managing the heads appears to have been John Forster, recorder of Dublin, though, as noted, there is no 
evidence that such MPs issued protections and the protection may have rested on the 1695 order. 
247
  BL, Add. 34,777, f.94, The Case of Francis Lynch of Dublin, Merchant, in reference to a Complaint made against 
him to the Honourable the House of Commons, of a breach of Privilege, by Mr Jeffrey Blake (n.p., [1703?]); CJI(II), 
pp.228, 230, 243, 321, 353, 365, 367-68  
248
  Knights makes the point in Representation that publication could confer credibility and authenticity (p.236).  
249
  CJI(II), pp.391-92  
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Commons, though going to remarkable lengths to bolster his position by printing and publicising 
his case. Publication of cases put to the Irish parliament was intermittent from the 1690s and 
uncommon. In this instance, Jeffrey Blake's case had already been made in print,
250
 and the 
publication putting Lynch's case may have been designed to counteract the presumably earlier 




While the trend during the 30 years after 1692 was to focus privilege on protecting the House's 
authority over its own operations and to ensure that it was not impeded in carrying out its key 
functions of legislating and hearing and investigating grievances, there were some transgressions 
outside the House where it used its powers derived from privilege. In earlier parliaments the 
division between what would later be characterised as executive and legislative functions was 
hazy with the Commons operating in the manner of a national grand jury. By the 1690s executive 
action by the House was declining and passing to the administration and the House’s interventions 
were usually to request the lord lieutenant to carry out executive action or to bargain. The case of 
John Cuthbert illustrates the transition. On 15 September 1697 he was ordered into custody 
following a complaint that he had breached previous resolutions of the House not to cast money 
weights by uttering and selling false and deceitful weights. The House resolved that he 'was in 
breach of violation of the orders of this House and a great fraud of his Majesty's subjects'. As well 
as ordering him into custody for a gross violation of its privileges the House sent a delegation to 
the lords justices requesting an order prohibiting Cuthbert from making any more weights.
252
 From 
1703 such direct executive action reduced. With a few notable exceptions the Commons preferred 
to proceed by representations to the authorities to take action
253
 or by legislating.
254
 Where the 
                                                        
 
250
  The case of Geffry Blake a Protestant, the eldest son of Walter Blake, of Drum, in the West-Liberties of Gallway, 
Esq; humbly offer’d to the consideration of the Honourable the House of Commons (n.p., [1703?]); presumably 
publication funded by Lynch.  
251
  A small number of publications survive which aimed at influencing the attitude of the Commons to legislation; the 
outcome was mixed. The publications and outcome of the legislation, at which they are aimed, are at Appendix 
6.16. 
252
  CJI(II), p.197; Cuthbert was taken into custody, blamed the selling of weights on his wife and was released paying 
fees (p.201). On the last sitting day of the 1698/99 session the House ordered (as opposed to asking the lords 
justices to order) the attorney general to prosecute a receiver of the poll tax in co. Limerick (Patrick Felan) and his 
clerk (Darby Hayes) for altering assessment records. It could be this action was ordered in haste on the final day 
of the session ((II), p.307).  
253
  See action following breach of privilege by Donovan and Dyer, p.113. 
254
  An example of the latter is the action the Commons took in response to a petition in 1710 from tobacco merchants 
alleging malpractice in the disposal of seized tobacco and in payment of informers. It set up a committee which 
reported and recommended that heads be brought in. Drafting of the heads was given to the same committee 




'fraud' was widespread direct, executive action was impractical. In 1707 when the House debated 
the quality of cloths it could only urge: 
that the Master and Wardens of Weavers in the city of Dublin and Master and Wardens of 
Weavers in all other cities and corporate towns ... and of the seneschals of liberties, and of 
Justices of the peace ... to view, search and try all sorts of goods of the old and new 
drapery made in this kingdom; and where they find any fraudulently made and contrary to 
the resolution and directions [of the House], that they cause the offenders to be prosecuted 
at the next assizes or sessions as common cheats.
255
 
The House’s exhortations could take several forms. In response to a petition the House resolved 
on 24 February 1703/4 'that no man or woman, who lives on alms and is not able to get his or her 
living by his or her work or labour, is liable to pay hearth money'.
256
 How effective declarations like 
this were is difficult to measure. There was no spate of petitions to the Commons alleging breach 
of the resolution which may mean all ignored it or were unaware of it or, less likely, that it was very 
effective. The next level up was reminding officials to do their duty. On 29 October 1707 the House 
resolved unanimously that all Catholic priests were obliged to take the oath of abjuration and that 
any priest refusing or neglecting to take the same ought to be prosecuted and that 'it is the 
indispensable duty of all judges and magistrates to put the said laws in execution against Popish 
priests'.
257
 Again there is little evidence as to the effect of the resolutions, specifically whether they 
led or followed popular Protestant sentiment. These two instances highlight the near impossibility 
of the legislature itself policing and enforcing comprehensively the application of economic and 
repressive measures.  
Where the House attempted to act was by singling out individuals through the impeachment of 
senior office-holders
258
 or pursuing an individual committing a transgression to which the House 
took particular exception. What particularly provoked the House was an attack in print on the 
political or religious beliefs underpinning the regime. It treated these in the same manner as a 
document containing a direct attack on the House itself.
259
 Two examples illustrate. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
(CJI(II), p.658). When a petitioner in 1711 alleged that a coal merchant was giving short measure―even though 
the merchant had attempted to intimidate the petitioner and his supporters―the House asked the lord lieutenant to 
give directions to the attorney general to prosecute, albeit with a strong recommendation; the merchant was not 
ordered to be taken onto custody (CJI(II), pp.724-25, 729-30).  
255
  CJI(II), p.566  
256
  CJI(II), p.402  
257
  CJI(II), p.567  
258
  See p.155 below. 
259
  For example, in 1701 Edward Lloyd's pamphlet reflecting on the proceedings of the House (CJI(II), pp.513, 517), 
Pue's Occurrences of 27–30 Mar 1714 reflecting critically on the justice and honour of Commons ((III), p.16)  
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October 1698 The paper, 'The Injured Protestant vindicated and false and unjust 
Aspirations of Papists and Jacobites' ...was declared false, scandalous and seditious. The 
printer was identified as Joseph Ray and the House appointed a committee to go 
immediately and seize his papers. The House also appointed a committee to investigate 
who had written the paper. Ray was arrested by the Serjeant-at-Arms and his house 
searched. At the bar he owned up to printing the paper but denied authorship. The House 
ordered him to be kept in close confinement incommunicado. The House then asked the 
lords justices to issue a proclamation promising a reward to anyone who discovered the 
author. Committees working on the case came up with two names, who were summoned 
and taken into custody. The House then ordered another eight people to be summoned to 
attend. They were released and the case fizzled out with Ray acknowledging 'unbecoming 
behaviour and undue dealing with this House, by denying and prevaricating when first 
under examination, ... and praying the pity and compassion of this House'. After a 
reprimand he was released.
260
 
November 1703 The House ordered James Malone, a bookseller apparently 
responsible for selling a memoir of the life of James II, be brought to the bar of the House. 
The serjeant-at-arms was ordered to ensure that he spoke to no one. Under examination 
in committee it was established that the book had been delivered to Malone by James 
Eustace; the House ordered that he be taken into custody and that his papers seized and 
sealed up. The House also ordered that the printer be taken into custody. The House 
authorised the Speaker to issue the warrant 'to take into custody such persons, as Dr 
Saunders, the chairman of the committee appointed to examine Mr Malone, bookseller, 
shall desire'. The outcome is unclear.
261
 
These cases show that the Commons had energy in initiating and pursuing investigations but 
turning indignation into effective action―that is identifying, assembling effective cases and 
punishing the culprits―could be elusive. The House was not a court of law and, while it could 
order detention for breach of privilege, its use of this power for what were essentially alleged 
breaches of the criminal law looked anomalous by the 1700s. 1703 marked a turning point. From 




3.4  Procedural rules and orders made by House of Commons 
This section examines rules, standing orders and precedents that the Irish House of Commons 
developed and used as well as its use of English/British rules and precedents. Betty Kemp, 
reviewing Westminster, has drawn a distinction between categories of procedural rules. She points 
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  CJI(II), pp.250-56, 258-59, 262-64; a proclamation covering both limbs of the request was issued by the Privy 
Council on 18 Oct 1698 (James Kelly with Mary Ann Lyons (eds.), The Proclamations of Ireland, 1660–1820: 
James II, 1685–91; William and Mary, 1689–1702; Anne, 1702–14, vol. 2 (Dublin, 2013), p.426.  
261
  CJI(II), pp.367-68, 370-71, 379-81, 389  
262
  The latter offered an indirect route―as in the case of Lord Chancellor Phipps in 1713―to examine why a 
executive action was or was not carried out. 




to the first standing order that Westminster made,
263
 a standing order of 1678, which established 
that the House could only be adjourned with the consent of the House and not by the Speaker 
alone.
264
 It was designed to put a stop to Charles II's directions that the House adjourn. Kemp sees 
standing orders as emerging as a distinct class of procedural arrangement, indeed self-assertion. 
In contrast she considers other orders—such as 'ancient orders', 'fundamental orders' and 
'essential orders'—as declarations of acknowledged, past practices or discoveries in Journals. 
Whereas the 'declared' procedures were analogous to unwritten customary law and looked to the 
past, she sees standing orders as 'new' promulgated law and looking forward responding to 
political events or procedural requirements. This section examines Kemp's view of standing orders 
as a distinct category that can be applied to the self-conscious procedural directions of the Irish 
Commons.
265
 The development of promulgated procedural directives by the Irish House provides 
a measure not only of Kemp's concept of standing order but also of the extent to which the Irish 
legislature developed procedures to meet its own needs and circumstances. A related issue is the 
extent to which the procedural directives of the House were made to address political or 
procedural difficulties or were made by the Irish House copying Westminster procedure.  
The Journals of the 1613 parliament show the House making procedural rules. The entries for 22 
and 24 October 1614 record three 'rules of the House' that:  
— before any private petition be read, it must be first moved by one of the House;
266
 
— if the bar be down, no Member that comes in may open it, but must go about to his place; and 
— five pounds be given to the poor for every private bill that passes.
267
 
The second was for the convenience of the House. The first and third rules are of more 
significance as they contain no reference to precedent but echo procedures in operation in 
England―for instance, 'that upon every private bill, something must be given to the poor'.
268
 While 
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it may be correct―as Dennehy notes
269
―that it is difficult to discern what, if any, impact the 
procedures set out in the available treatises, particularly John Hooker
270
 may have had on the 
operation of the Irish parliament, Hooker's purpose was to show the operation of a model 
parliament based on Westminster for the benefit of those sitting in the Irish parliament in Elizabeth 
I's reign. The idea of looking to Westminster would not therefore have been alien to Irish Members 
in the seventeenth century.  
During the seventeenth century Irish parliaments often reviewed their procedural arrangements 
and made rules in batches at the beginning of a parliament (see Appendix 6.13.1). By the 1661 
parliament the Commons had become more aware of its status and precedents when it appointed 
a committee 'to view the orders and former practices made and observed by preceding 
parliaments in this kingdom' and to report;
271
 there are no entries in the Journal of a report but 
there was a burst of rule-making in June-July 1661 (and two more in May-June 1662 and 
February-March 1665/6). The provenance or circumstances are not given but they appear to be a 
combination of imported (and adapted) practice from England and constructions to meet specific 
cases or problems.
272
 The terminology appears inconsistent as most of the changes were made 
simply as orders but in one case as a rule. Two other categories make single appearances―the 
opinion and the view―the status and provenance of which are not clear. They imply both a 
clarification of an older rule and new departure. Variation in terminology continued after 1692 with 
'sense of the House' appearing in place of view and opinion.
273
 The 'new' Westminster terminology 
of standing order was first used in September 1695 when the Irish House, as noted, 'Ordered, and 
declared' that a Member sued as trustee, etc. did not have parliamentary privilege and that 'this be 
the standing rule and order of this House'.
274
 The belt-and-braces terminology of 'rule' and 'order' 
and 'ordered' and 'declared' may indicate a degree of unfamiliarity or, more likely, it may copy the 
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form used at Westminster in the 1690s.
275
 The rule-order was a clear statement of general 
application defining, and limiting, the parliamentary privilege of Members and was of application 
both to those inside and outside the House. The same issue was covered at Westminster by a 
standing order made in 1691.
276
 The two orders are derived from the same principle, though they 
differ in detail. Terminology in Dublin remained fluid and followed in the wake of Westminster. In 
November 1695 the House made a 'standing rule' that 'no report or new motion be made this 
session after one of the clock', in Westminster terms a sessional order. In September 1697 it made 
another 'standing rule' that 'after this day no public or private bill is passed, without being first 
committed after second reading, and that this be the standing rule of this House', essentially a 
standing order in line with Westminster practice.  
A turning point was reached with the 1703–04 session. That is the last time that standing rules 
appear but they are clearly the equivalents of standing orders within the Kemp definition.
277
 
Thereafter only standing orders are made. (Orders and resolutions continue to be made―in some 
cases dovetailing with standing orders―but have a greater coherence than the orders and rules of 
the 1660s). While the standing orders are within the Kemp definition of a new departure, they 
fall―with a few exceptions―into two categories.  
The first group was directly grounded in Westminster procedures, though this was never explicitly 
acknowledged. The exclusion of strangers provides an example of both derivation and also the 
implementation of a standing order. From 1668 Westminster made a number of orders excluding 
strangers. On 15 November 1705 it made a standing order excluding strangers from the 'body of 
the House' and its galleries 'during the sitting of any committees therein'.
278
 The Irish House made 
its first order, a standing order, excluding strangers in 1711, though from 1707 there had been 
attempts to exclude strangers.
279
 The Irish arrangements contained an additional provision made 
as an order during the turbulent 1713 session on 11 December: 'That the serjeant-at-arms take 
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into custody all papists that are, or shall presume to come into the galleries'.
280
 Setting aside the 
obvious inference that the 1711 standing order was a dead-letter—at least for those identifiable as 
Protestants—it is clear that procedure was anchored to Westminster but the Irish House applied 
variations to meet local circumstances and priorities. On implementation, in a letter of 10 
December 1715 Charles Dering, former MP, complained to Lord (John) Perceval, then also a 
former MP, that since he left the House, they 'have made a very strict order against admitting any 
person into their House to hear the debates excepting their own Members'.
281
 Although more 
restricted than previously, access seems to have been fitful. Philip Perceval, another former MP, 
having previously supplied his brother, John, with accounts of debates starting with the 1717 
session told him on 9 November 1723: 
Perhaps you may wonder I have entertained you so little with an account of the debates in 
Parliament.... The Commons are grown so retired, that they shut themselves up, and will 
let nobody in, and thus we know nothing till the votes appear.
282
 
His difficulties continued in the next session: 'as to our Parliament affairs, I cannot give you any 
perfect account not having often attended their debates, being unwilling on every occasion to be 
turned out with the crowd'.
283
 The correspondence shows that application of the standing order 
varied with the public turned out at points―possibly not only during divisions or sensitive debates. 
The second group are those that are required to ensure the smooth and consistent operation of 
the processes that were particular Irish procedures: heads of bill and supply.
284
 On finance, 
standing orders at Westminster
285
 were neither transferred nor applied wholesale in Dublin. One 
significant standing order that was not applied was that made at Westminster on 11 June 1713 that 
'this House will receive no petition for any sum of money relating to public service, but what is 
recommended from the crown'.
286
 Such a standing order applied in Ireland would have altered the 
operation, if the not the equilibrium, of the supply arrangements. The rationale for it in England was 
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to stop MPs loading supply bills with expenditure that benefitted them directly or interests to which 
they were linked. In stopping pork-barrelling it gave the initiative for increasing expenditure to the 
government. In Ireland such a measure would have come up against both the operation and 
symbolism of 'sole right'. Instead it was overlooked, leaving Irish Members free to make proposals 
for public expenditure without the administration’s prior approval.
287
 Where the Irish House used 
standing orders was to bolster its control and scrutiny of supply. At the end of the 1715–16 session 
the House unanimously made a standing order 'that no money bill be read in this House until the 
report from the committee of accounts be first made'.
288
 This was a clear marker, with the short 
money bill preserving the royal prerogative out of the way, that the House would take full control of 
supply in the future sessions of the parliament. At the beginning of the 1727 parliament 
Marmaduke Coghill described attempts to undermine the residual prerogative: 
The only ruffle we have had ... Vesey moved for reviving an order of the House made last 
Parliament that no money bill should be received till after the report was made by the 
Committee of Accounts. [The] topics they insisted on were the security this would be 
against a practice that had been used of bringing money bills when there was no occasion, 
or perhaps giving more in such money bills than was wanting. 
Coghill set out the counter arguments both constitutional and practical that having 'resolved to do 
as much for His Majesty as any of his predecessors, we should not the next minute contradict that 
resolution by refusing' the money bill and  
if [the short money] bill was not passed, the funds would expire and we should have such 
a quantity of goods brought in, before the report from the Committee of Accounts could be 
made and a money bill framed, that neither civil nor military list could be supported for want 
of additional duties.  
The opposition lost the arguments and decided not to oppose the bill but Richard Stewart 
proposed a resolution that: 
the exigency of His Majesty's affairs requiring a money bill at this time before the report 
from the Committee of Accounts could be made, that the same should be received and the 
resolution dispensed with. It was said that this would be as a great compliment to the King, 
as we could make him, by breaking through a rule of such importance for his service, this 
indeed surprised everybody, that a motion so unparliamentary should come from a man of 
so good sense, and was no way relished by anybody.
289
 
The exchanges, although taking place at the end of a debate with the opposition in retreat, show 
that the concept of a standing order running from one parliament to another was not established. 
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Nor was the concept of making a standing order and then allowing an exception. The upshot was 
that the House passed the bill and then reiterated the standing order. The Kemp model of the 
standing order as a new rule is a useful starting point for the analysis of the Irish House's rules and 
standing orders. But it does not work for the Irish House. New rules, that is Westminster 
procedures, had been imported from the sixteenth century and were given a variety of labels. By 
the early eighteenth century the term standing order had become familiar in Dublin and could be 
used to import Westminster procedures, as necessary, without acknowledging the provenance. 
They could be adapted for Irish use. But their position as elevated procedures was not given 
special status and could be reversed or ignored. 
The dogs that did not bark can be missed. Westminster's orders, rules and standing orders 
covering everything from decency and behaviour in the House to the handling of private bills were 
not replicated in the orders recorded in the Irish Journals.
290
 Some may not have been needed 
such as those directed at keeping the passageways around the chamber free and well lit. Those 
on behaviour may have been framed because of a particular incident at Westminster which did not 
arise in Dublin. Others such as the Westminster prohibition again tobacco,
291
 which were not 
replicated in the Irish Journals, pose a problem. The absence of any contemporary comment that 
Irish MPs smoked in the chamber points to the Irish House following Westminster, which indicates 
that behaviour and even procedures in Dublin followed Westminster without the need of orders 
and rules. In other areas―Westminster's rules on supply and bill procedures―did not fit with the 
operation of Irish House and were not transferred. In some cases―privilege and setting time at 
which business could or could not be taken―the Irish House lagged behind or adapted 
Westminster's rules and orders to meet its requirements. 
3.5  Use of precedents 
The use of precedents by the Irish House throws light on both its actual autonomy and pretensions 
to sovereignty. Irish parliamentarians in the 1690s claimed a discrete, institutional pedigree back to 
the twelfth century. This claim, as was the norm in the seventeenth century and fitted Whig legal-
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historical orthodoxies summed up by Mark Goldie as "immemorialism",
292
 was underpinned with 
an 'ancient' text, the Modus Tenendi Parliamenta et Consilia in Hibernia, a fifteenth-century 
document that was an Irish version of an earlier English treatise. It was first published by Bishop 
Dopping ahead of the 1692 parliament assembling and purported to show that parliaments had 
been called in Ireland from the twelfth century and firmly anchored to the Irish parliament to the 
English model. (Henry Elsynge in The Ancient Method and Manner of Holding of Parliaments in 
England, published in 1660 and 1679, gave prominence and cited the English Modus as had 
commentators such as Sir Edward Coke.)
293
 The Modus (nor Elsynge's either) was of little 
practical use in running a parliament in the 1690s and it was never cited as a source in any 
discussion of precedents in the Commons or in correspondence.
294
 What it showed was an 
increasing awareness of, and sensitivity to, the status of the parliament. William Molyneux in The 
Case of Ireland, cited it several times as it fitted with his argument on the longevity and autonomy 
of the Irish parliament.
295
  
If Molyneux was accurate, there should have been procedural divergence and a growing 
separation between Westminster and Dublin but that was not the case. The start of the 1692 
parliament, as on previous occasions, stimulated examination of procedural arrangements. 
Appendix 6.13.3 shows that the Commons examined its own records from earlier in the century 
(but not from 1689) on questions such as whether the Speaker could present bills for royal assent. 
The House's interest in its own precedents declined and within a decade had narrowed to little 
more than its dealings with the House of Lords. (Conferences between the Houses were often to 
resolve a conflict and as the dignity and privileges of each House were on show both Houses had 
recourse to precedents; this was also the pattern at Westminster.) William Molyneux chaired at 
least one committee which examined parliamentary precedents and while he cited precedents in 
The Case of Ireland, they were legal and had a focus on the making of law and the applicability (or 
                                                        
 
292
  In Glassey, Reigns, p.32 
293
  Henry Elsynge, The Ancient Method and Manner of holding Parliaments in England (London, 1660) [facsimile 
edition 1971] (London, [4th edition] 1679), p.2 
294
  Its medieval anachronisms―deliberations on war and peace, involvement of Peers in supply, and the fact that it 
predated and took no account of the arrangements derived from Poynings' Law―cut across not only how the Irish 
parliament operated in the seventeenth century but in procedural terms undermined claims that the Commons was 
asserting in the 1690s. 
295
  Molyneux, Case, pp.56, 63, 71, 85-86, 104, 110, 142 
Chapter 3: The corporate identity and functions of the House of Commons 
129 
 
not) of English statutes to Ireland.
296
 None appear to have came from the records of the Irish 
parliament. There were several reasons. First, once the Irish parliament began to meet frequently 
and procedures were used regularly and became familiar, there was less reason to have recourse 
to precedents.
297
 Second, the examination of precedents was not a dispassionate exercise 
producing a result acceptable to all parties. In October 1695 the House appointed a committee to 
search for precedents that judges could administer oaths to witnesses before the Commons.
298
 
Alan Brodrick reported that it was no infringement of the judicature of the Lords and that it was 
'parliamentary of the House of Commons to receive evidence of witnesses who have been sworn, 
of which there are several precedents', which were not cited in the Journal entry.
299
 The Lords did 
not share his view. Third, what precedents should the Commons use, which begged the question 
of what to do if Irish and Westminster's precedents diverged? At the start of the seventeenth 
century there had been some uncertainty about the application of English precedents when the 
Commons in 1614 considered arrangements for a conference with the House of Lords: 
Several Motions were made, touching the manner of the conference in point of sitting or 
standing, [heads] covered or uncovered. 
In England, the precedent is that the commissioners for the Commons do, in the 
conference, stand uncovered, the Lords commissioners sitting covered; but because there 
is no such precedent here of any conference, it is questioned, whether the new 
commissioners shall follow the precedent in England, or to sit covered, as a new precedent 
for this Kingdom, where there is none other yet to follow.
300
 
This entry captured the predicament of the Commons: should it set its own precedents and diverge 
or should it instead give weight to those of Westminster? The entry shows that the Irish House had 
knowledge of Westminster practice―possibly manuscript copies of the Journals. (Hooker has 
nothing to say on conferences between the Houses.) 
The parliament that met in 1613 also had access to at least the records of the previous parliament 
(1585–86) because when considering whether judges could sit in the Commons 'it was thought fit 
... that the rolls and books of the last parliament be brought' to establish if there were any 
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 At some point in the early seventeenth century the pre-1613 records appear to 
have been lost as no pre-1613 precedents were cited in the printed Journals or in any later 
parliament. When searching for precedents on the swearing of the clerks the committee appointed 
in 1692 cited four precedents from the Irish Journals—25 November 1614, 18 April 1615, and 17 
and 18 July 1634.
302
 On the basis of the printed Journals this is a comprehensive list of the Irish 
precedents.  
As the 1614 entry on conferences makes clear the absence of precedents could have been a 
stimulus for the Irish House to strike out on its own. It did not. By the middle of the seventeenth 
century, English precedents carried equal weight with, if not more than, Irish. In 1662 the House 
ordered the Speaker to peruse the precedents of former parliaments of Ireland and England and 
'to make a collection'.
303
 The episode shows that the Irish House not only regarded English 
precedents to be of relevance but also that it had access to Journal entries from Westminster. 
Moreover, the Speaker was seen as a repository for precedents and procedural knowledge.  
Sabina Baltes has argued that the Irish House of Commons had a sense of historic continuity as 
well as its privileges as a representative body.
304
 At first sight these concepts would appear 
complementary but two case studies on the use of precedents show inconsistencies between 
them. The first is the treatment of Irish MPs who wanted to resign their seats. The Commons at 
Westminster resolved in March 1623/4 'that a man, after he is duly chosen, cannot relinquish' his 
seat.
305
 The rationale was that serving in the Commons was an obligation many only accepted 
reluctantly and they should not be able to escape it.
306
 Neither of the parliamentary printed 
manuals most likely to have been available in Dublin―Elsynge's Ancient Method and Scobell's 
Memorials―address the matter. In contrast, when in October 1665 the Irish Committee of 
Privileges and Elections examined the issue, it reported six precedents going back to the 1634 
parliament showing that Irish Members had resigned and warrants for by-elections had been 
issued. In five cases, the Members were absent in England and in the remaining case the Member 
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'wilfully refused to appear [during the] last and the present sessions'.
307
 The House accepted the 
precedents and reaffirmed its approach to allow resignation (presumably because Members would 
continue to leave the country for long periods and needed to be able to resign and be replaced). 
There was no reference to English precedents which pointed to a different conclusion. The Irish 
practice of allowing MPs to resign continued after 1692.
308
 In December 1695 the House made a 
determined effort to improve attendance going as far as to expel Sir John Trevor, MP for Newry, 
because he had not been 'excused, having hitherto neglected to attend the service of this House, 
or to make request that he might be excused'.
309
 
All changed in March 1704/5. The most recent case of voluntary resignation had only been on 28 
February when an MP had been allowed to resign.
310
 When, however, on the following day the 
Speaker informed the House that he had received a letter from St. John Brodrick (brother of Alan 
Brodrick, and St. John had previously been allowed to 'resign' in 1695) 'expressing his concern 
that he cannot attend the service of the House, and desiring some other might be chosen to serve 
in his room',
311
 no writ was issued. A committee was appointed 'to search precedents where 
Members have withdrawn from the service of the House'. On 20 March 1704/5 William Conolly 
reported, on behalf of the committee, precedents from 1634 to the recent February 1704/5 
instance but came to a resolution: 
that the excusing Members at their own request, or upon their letters, from the service of 
this House, and thereupon issuing out new writs to re-elect other Members to serve in their 




On the following day the House unanimously endorsed the report and resolved: 
That it be declared the standing order of this House, that no new writs for electing 
Members of parliament, in the places of Members excusing themselves from the service of 
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It is difficult, however, to see how the resignation of a handful of MPs since the 1630s could 
subvert the constitution, and while it may have been that the numbers wishing to resign were 
increasing, there appears to have been no difficulty in finding replacement candidates. So in 
operational terms the justification does not seem credible. But the decision taken on 21 March 
could not have been clearer: it was made unanimously and was a deliberate reversal of a well-
established procedure. One possible explanation for the about-turn may have been what was 
happening at Westminster. At this time English MPs who accepted 'offices of profit' from the 
government were under increasing pressure to leave parliament. In 1705 a compromise emerged 
at Westminster: those who accepted certain offices triggered a by-election, at which they could 
stand for re-election. (Within the next decade the mechanism evolved into a device to allow MPs at 
Westminster to vacate their seats voluntarily.)
314
 It was, however, predicated on the basis that it 
was parliamentary practice that Members could not resign voluntarily. The 1705 change in Ireland 
brought the Irish House into line with Westminster practice.  
Evidence for the change is meagre. Of more significance may be what was not said in making the 
change in March 1705. There was no reference to Westminster precedents, though, as noted, until 
the 1690s English precedents had previously been examined and cited. Nor are there any 
references to published parliamentary manuals such as Elsynge's Ancient Method or Scobell's 
Memorials, which extensively cited English precedents.
315
 To cite English precedents to justify the 
1705 change would have meant that they carried more weight than Irish precedents. Instead, 
Westminster practice was adopted under the guise of the 'constitution of parliament'; in reality a 
replication of English procedures and a pattern of representative legislature seen in the British 
colonies across the north Atlantic. This had the advantage of side-stepping the question of which 
precedents predominated and the even more problematic answer―the English. The position and 
status of a Member was central to operation of parliament and once the Irish House decided to 
make the change to follow the only parliamentary model available, Westminster, cloaking its 
decision in accordance with the 'constitution of parliament' preserved the facade that Ireland was a 
separate and distinct kingdom with the Irish parliament as the keystone.  
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In taking the step the Irish House was, however, going down a procedural cul-de-sac, though this 
was not clear at the time. Ireland would not have a Place Act until the end of the century, to allow 
Members to resign, and had no equivalent of the English Triennial Act, to flush out regularly those 
who had given up. In addition, there were few effective sanctions to require attendance by the 
infirm, the lazy and those who had left Ireland. No alternative mechanism to facilitate resignation 
was developed. The reason may have been that there was no Westminster equivalent other than 
the Place Act arrangement. In practical terms, however, the ill-effects of the change were marginal 
and unforeseen―until probably the 23-year-long parliament of George II. There was no obvious 
requirement to make the change, in order to make relations with Westminster functional.  
The second case concerns 'sole right'. The government of William III, in calling a parliament in 
1692 after the war ended, may have expected a re-run of the 1661 parliament with, on this 
occasion, a focus on enacting the resented Treaty of Limerick that concluded the war along with 
an administration-led refurbishment of the statute book and an advantageous financial 
settlement.
316
 Instead, circumstances had changed and the Irish administration stumbled into a 
constitutional crisis on supply. The 1688 Revolution in England had enhanced the role of the 
Westminster parliament and the Commons had become central to the raising and authorisation of 
finance for William III's wars. These changes were known in Ireland, not just to Protestants who 
had gone into exile in England after 1689 but through personal political links with English 
politicians and also through print.
317
 In addition, the Irish parliament that James II had called in 
1689 had pressed for the repeal of Poynings' Law. After 1692 repeal of Poynings' Law may not 
have been practical but the 1689 discussions exposed a vulnerability of the pretence that the Irish 
parliament was autonomous. Finally, the government, understandably but naïvely, expected a 
parliament of Protestants to be grateful and generous for saving their lands and positions. Like 
others in such positions, the government by highlighting their inferior position and dependence 
provoked the opposite. 
As a curtain raiser to the dispute on 'sole right' the House appointed a committee on 11 October 
1692 to consider 'how the Committee of Grievances may come at records, accounts and papers in 
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the hands of any [of] their Majesties' officers of the Revenue, and others'.
318
 On 14 October it 
reported citing the following precedents: 17 April and 30 May 1662 Irish House of Commons; 8 
and 11 October 1690 English House of Commons; and 8 and 24 October 1692 English House of 
Commons.
319
 The committee concluded on the basis of the precedents, predictably, that the 
House could have the records; the House addressed the lord lieutenant for a direction to the 
produce papers, which were supplied. Of significance was, first, that the Irish precedent was far 
from conclusive and, second, that there were more relevant English precedents but from before 
English Votes were printed, that is before 1689.
320
 The Irish House therefore had access to printed 
English Votes and was still at this stage prepared to use precedents from England, and the lord 
lieutenant accepted the force of the case. This skirmish over, the Commons then rejected the 
supply bill on 27 October 1692 and resolved:  
That it was, and is, the sole and undoubted right of the Commons to prepare heads of bills 
for raising money [and] to prepare and resolve the ways and means of raising money.
321
 
In other words, supply legislation had to start in the Commons, not in the privy councils. In this 
case the issue was much bigger than access to papers and there was no searching or appeal to 
precedents in the Journals, which until then was a method of operation of the parliament.
322
 James 
Kelly considers that the claim that sole right went back to the 1660s was an affectation.
323
 There 
had been some Irish precedents in line with the claims underlying 'sole right'. The most relevant 
was from July 1662 when the Commons, rejecting an attempt by the Lords to alter the basis for 
raising £30,000 to be paid to Lord Lieutenant the duke of Ormond, 'resolved, declared and 
asserted ... that the proposals of Ways and Means of levying all monies to be raised in this 
kingdom, is the ancient and undoubted right of this House only'.
324
 The precedent which, however, 
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appears to have animated the House―as historians have pointed out
325
―came from 
Westminster, when on 3 July 1678 the Commons had resolved that the granting of supplies was in 
its 'the sole gift'. In general terms the Irish House may been aware of the 1678 claim, and the 
principle underlying it, but the wording used in the Irish resolution is not an exact copy. While 
details of Votes were circulated in manuscript and with the crises of the late 1670s and early 1680s 
pamphlets made some proceedings available in print, they were only regularly and systematically 
published from 1689.
326
 This may explain why the 1678 wording is not cited and the reason earlier 
English precedents are not used.
327
 Alternatively the use of right rather than gift represented an 
updating of the claim clearly echoing the rights claimed by the Westminster parliament in the 1689 
Bill of Rights. In addition, the 1678 dispute had been between the Commons and the Lords, not 
the Commons and monarch and it may have been judged best to adhere to the key issue—the 
preponderance of the Commons in initiating supply—without inviting scrutiny into precedents. The 
'sole and undoubted right' claim in terms of exclusively of Irish parliamentary history and precedent 
was at best arguable, not unanswerable. It was the replication and development of an English 
procedure dressed up as an 'undoubted right' that carried the force. During the 1690s a 
compromise was worked out by which the government conceded the substance of the claim to the 
Commons in return for regular, time-limited supply.  
In contrast to the 1705 prohibition on resignation by MPs, money mattered and the procedures of 
the Dublin Commons adapted to Irish circumstances and the Irish supply processes had a greater 
knock-on effect of the operation of the Irish parliament. The consequence, as in England, was that 
the supply process and the authorisation of taxes became the pillar on which the eighteenth-
century Irish parliamentary edifice rested.  
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the Commons of England'.  




The silence of the Irish House in its 'public' use of Westminster precedents and procedures 
contrasted with the position that was acknowledged 'privately'. Although accounts of debates in 
Commons are rare, there appears to have been no reticence about making comparisons with 
England when MPs advanced arguments. In the debates on the process for the impeachment of 
Lord Chancellor Porter the Commons examined the procedures used to impeach Lord Chancellor 
Clarendon in England.
328
 During debates in 1711 on the tillage bill and whether the Irish Privy 
Council should have power to ban exports of corn Sir John Perceval recorded that the language 
echoed debates at Westminster with the Irish Commons seeing itself as the 'the grand inquest of 
the nation'.
329
 He noted that reference was made to the experience in England when the crown 
had proposed legislation for restraining export of corn and it followed that 'the Crown owned itself 
to have no prerogative in this case'.
330
 In other words the boundary of the royal prerogative had to 
be the same in both kingdoms. To do otherwise and to have relied exclusively on Irish precedents 
on the exercise of the prerogative would have taken the governance of Ireland back to the days of 
Charles I and Strafford.  
The 1692 parliament represents a high water mark in searching precedents, which fell away 
quickly. There was no reference to a precedent from Westminster in the Irish Journals after the 
1690s. Second and partly as a result, the Irish House had a much narrower corpus to draw on. 
The contrast with Westminster is marked. For example, in May 1690 the English Journals record 
investigations into precedents on the 'Method of freeing their Members under arrests' that were not 
only the result of a search of parliamentary records but also judicial records going back to the reign 
of Henry VI with the precedents set out in detail.
331
 The range of topics covered by precedent at 
Westminster was much greater than recorded for Dublin, running from privilege to what censures 
had been inflicted on officers for making false returns of MPs.
332
 Not only did Westminster have a 
storehouse of precedents to draw on but also explicit reversion to precedent was part of its make-
up and method of operation. For the Irish House to do the same it would have had to draw on 
Westminster's precedents. But, third, with the rise of patriotic sensibilities, explicit citation and 
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application of English precedents became problematic as their use could convey the subordination 
of the Irish House to Westminster. Instead, the Irish House used bald assertions of its 'undoubted 
rights' and the 'constitution of parliament' or promulgate changes by standing order.
333
 Fourth, the 
cutting edge of constitutional developments was in London and, to harness the changes which 
enhanced the position of the Commons, the Irish House had to import its changes. Fifth, one of the 
most fertile fields for citing and developing precedents at Westminster was conflicts between the 
two Houses and between the Commons and the courts. Precedents were an exchangeable 
currency for these bodies and each could give as good as it received. In Ireland, while there were 
some skirmishes with the House of Lords and also with Convocation, the main battle lines were 
between the Commons and the Privy Council and between the Irish and Westminster parliaments 
and government in Whitehall. Neither, especially the latter, were prepared to entertain claims 
resting on precedents derived from the Irish parliament or indeed Westminster precedents 
explicitly claimed and applied in Dublin. Instead, what mattered were political realities, though once 
a method of operation and working together emerging in the 1690s and solidified during the reign 
of Anne, the forces giving buoyancy and stability to that reality included an attachment to 
established methods and resistance to innovation.  
Reliance on precedence, a characteristic of an ancien-régime legislature was displaced by 
personal, political and institutional bonds between Ireland and England. Both Irish Members and 
House staff had access to the operational methods of the English parliament. The politics of 
Ireland and England were broadly in step: the battle between political parties to 1714 then followed 
by the supremacy of the Whigs. To those sitting in the Irish Commons the constitution of Ireland 
had four pillars which resembled England's: the common law; the established church; an ancient 
parliament; and the royal prerogative. In addition, in Ireland Poynings' Law functioned as a quasi 
prerogative power tightening the link. Perceval summed up the position: 'By our constitution we 
cannot alter a letter in any bill that we sent over and is returned from the [Privy] Council ... in 
England whatever amendments they think fit there to make'.
334
 In addition, continuity in Ireland had 
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been fractured in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and, while the institution of parliament 
survived, its purpose and methods of operation did not have deep roots. How Westminster 
functioned after 1689 guided, tentatively at first, both the Irish House's practices and how it saw 
itself. The regular sessions from 1703 saw a development of methods of operation to ensure the 
Commons operated effectively. But they took time to permeate.  
Direct comparisons or comments on the differences between the Commons at Westminster and 
Dublin are rare. This may be because contemporaries with experience of both noticed few 
differences. One of the few comments comes from an Englishman, Lord Chancellor Methuen, 
writing to London on 12 August 1697: 
It is impossible for me to explain to you the difficulty I have to keep things in good order not 
now from the faction ... but from the ignorance of business in most men and an impertinent 
humour of imitating the parliament in England in all things how improper soever.
335
 
At the start of the 1703 parliament, commenting on the arguments deployed and tone of the 
debate on Francis Annesley's criticism of the Protestants of Ireland,
336
 Southwell touched on a 
possible motivation for this behaviour when describing the speeches made in the Commons 'ran 
upon the aspersions on the country and the ill consequences it had by misrepresenting us in 
England as persons not fit to be trusted in juries, or other execution of that power which afterwards 
came here'.
337
 A sense of inferiority was not universal. On 30 October 1703 Sir John Perceval 
explained how he and other new entrants to the Irish parliament spent an evening revelling in their 
new roles as MPs: 
We [are] to sit and are so used to parliamentary language that there must be a set speech 
for every toast we drink. When we meet at a tavern ... I move for a glass of wine, I second 
that worthy Member that drank last, put the question shall we stay another bottle, noes-
ayes―the ayes have it. Then after a hot supper and a debate of 5 hours, one moves that 
we adjourn ... another [says], 'tis the opinion of the Committee says a third that we 
acquaint the House they send up the bill. Up rises a fourth and makes a new motion ... at 
which all the Members rise and declare no new motion ought to be made after 12 o'clock. 
And so we adjourn till 8 o'clock. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
bills were approved and arrived from London (SP, Ireland King's Letter Book 1, p.343 (CSPD: William and Mary, 
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This parliament has spoiled all intrigues with the ladies for it has given us a grave air of 60 




The behaviour of Perceval and his drinking companions shows that they saw themselves as 
belonging to an exclusive institution with its distinctive procedures and practices and which―as 
Pasi Ihalainen and Kari Palonen looking across the legislatures at the time note―manifested in the 
formation of a distinct parliamentary vocabulary, related to both the procedural technicalities and 
the principles of parliamentary deliberation and representation.
339
 That manifestation appears to be 
largely British and, more specifically, grounded at Westminster. There is little evidence that the 
Irish House struck out on its own with, for example, as noted by Ihalainen and Palonen, as in 
Britain and Sweden its codification of parliamentary procedure, although the use of committee 
facilitated specialisation and efficiency.
340
 It is difficult to see any difference between the behaviour 
and use of language of the group in 1703 and how men in Perceval's position in London would 
have behaved. The attitudes and culture came naturally to the participants. In addition to their 
backgrounds these young gentlemen had a training which made entry into either parliament 
easier. As Sir Robert Southwell advised Perceval in 1702 when preparing for a public career: 
You cannot avoid getting so much of the law as will make you a justice of the peace, and 
of such other knowledge as is needful to serve your country in parliament, for these two 
things will come without seeking.
341
 
While Perceval was at the upper end of the spectrum of wealth, connection and links with England, 
he was not atypical as evidence of the ease with which he participated in the political 
establishments of England and Ireland. 
3.6  Position and role of monarch and lord lieutenant  
Jonathan Swift took a critical view of the speeches from the throne to the Irish parliament: 
Nothing hath humbled me so much, or shewn a greater disposition to a contemptuous 
treatment of Ireland in some Ministers, than that high style of several speeches from the 
Throne, delivered, as usual, after the Royal Assent, in ... the two last Reigns. Such high 
exaggerations of the prodigious condescensions in the prince, to pass those good laws, 
would have but an odd sound at Westminster ... After a speech ... delivered by my [Lord 
Wharton], ... he desired ... my opinion of it: My answer was, That his Excellency had very 
honestly forfeited his head on account of one paragraph; wherein he asserted by plain 
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consequence, a dispensing power in the Queen. His Lordship owned it was true, but 
swore the words were put into his mouth by direct orders from Court. From whence it is 
clear, that some Ministries in those times, were apt, from their high elevation, to look down 
upon this kingdom as if it had been one of their Colonies of Outcasts in America.
342
  
Swift demonstrates that the speech carried significant political meaning beyond a narrow reading 
of the content, in the terms of the 'continuities and changes in the official formulations of the 
political role of the people' and that it showed the 'constitutional relationship between the monarch, 
the ministry, parliament and the people'.
343
  
The Irish parliament was in the position of a parliament in a kingdom without a resident monarch. 
The British and Irish concept of a functioning parliament required Commons, Lords and monarch. 
But no king of Ireland set foot the country after 1690 (until 1821). Swift's account suggests that the 
absence of the monarch could be manipulated to the advantage of the government in London. In 
this instance ministers could treat Ireland as constitutionally pre-Revolution with some of the 
monarch's powers―by then considered obsolete even unlawful in England―claimed and 
exercisable in Ireland by ministers. One reason they could was because across the Protestant 
political spectrum―from high Tory through Whig to ardent Patriot―all were locked into a quasi-
religious relationship with a remote and ideal kingship. This was made easier after 1702 when 
William III died as, in Julian Hoppit's words, he 'was easier to love as an idea than as a man'.
344
 
The gap in reality was filled by a largely absentee lord lieutenant, whose functions, when he 
arrived in pomp to reside in Ireland between 1714 and the 1760s, were primarily parliamentary. 
But as Swift suggested the lord lieutenant was a stand-in (over-) playing the role. While he carried 
out royal functions such as opening parliament
345
 and making speeches from the throne and giving 
royal assent, he was not comprehensively in loco reginae aut regis. There were both theoretical 
and practical dichotomies. First, not only were the monarchs absentees, but from Anne they took 
little more than passing interest in Ireland. The Irish political elite could therefore attach their ideals 
not only to deceased kings―such as William III, 'the deliverer'―but also to live monarchs 
untroubled by the inconvenient shortcomings of the actuality. This allowed the use of the 
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ceremonial rituals of parliament copied directly from Westminster
346
 to exaggerate both Ireland's 
status as a kingdom and a defining and excluding deference to the idea of its Protestant monarch. 
There was also a clear advantage for England in keeping the monarch aloof. As Methuen wrote to 
London when drafting the speech from the throne in 1697: 
I have received ... the remarks of the lords justices of England, which I find generally very 
just, and have accordingly altered the speech in every place, and am returning it so altered 
... I had it in my thoughts that it was for a parliament in Ireland, but considered that it was to 
be spoken by fellow subjects in their own name and not the King's, which might lead me 
into the mistake of using some expressions to please the parliament.
347
 
In other words, it was a useful device for articulating English interests and suzerainty. 
The political situation in which lords lieutenant operated changed from the 1690s when their 
political authority shifted from having the confidence of the monarch to the ministers in London, to 
which Irish politicians had greater links than their predecessors in the seventeenth century. That 
said, when commenting on the prospects for the new parliament elected on the accession of 
George II, Coghill, conscientious and deferential public servant, imagined the new monarch as 
having a direct relationship with the Irish parliament: 
the welfare of this kingdom will much depend on our behaviour this session for if we make 
such impressions on him ... by our conduct as may induce him to think well of us, we may 
have just reason to expect his favour and protection ... whereas if we be peevish and ill-
natured, and obstruct the business of the session with unreasonable disputes, His Majesty 




Lords lieutenant were regarded as having two personas: the public and the private.
349
 The latter 
comprised personal qualities, intelligence and interpersonal, social skills, which impacted on the 
management of business. Lord Lieutenant Sydney naïvely and prematurely told Secretary of State 
Nottingham on 6 October 1692 before the session opened that 'there is great reason to hope that 
this parliament will answer the ends for which Their Majesties have been pleased to call it, and 
establish this country upon a firm and lasting English and Protestant interest, whereunto I shall 
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think myself happy if I can any ways contribute'.
350
 Within two weeks, however, he wrote of the 
Commons: 
They have begun like a company of madmen, for they don't know themselves what they 
would have. Whether they will come into better temper or no, I cannot tell, but at present 
they talk of freeing themselves from the yoke of England, of taking away Poynings' law, of 
making an address to have a habeas corpus bill, and twenty other extravagant discourses 
have been amongst them. [All the problem] comes from four or five lawyers, most of them 
of the King's counsel, they being the only talkers.
351
 
The outburst showed not only Sydney's political clumsiness and incomprehension
352
 with his 
recourse to conspiracies
353
 to explain his difficulties but also the narrowness of his expectations for 
the operation of the parliament and the constitution of Ireland. His more effective successor, lord 
Capel, co-opted rather than attacked and recognised in December 1695 that the 'influence and 
power of the lawyers in the kingdom is very great, especially in parliament, and ... without their 
concurrence ... I could not have asserted His Majesty's right as to the beginning of money bills '.
354
 
The lord lieutenant's role in explaining and cajoling Members to support the administration was a 
feature throughout this period as Lord Lieutenant Bolton explained in 1719 : 'I had between 50 and 
60 Members with me last night and they have promised to go into the supply today'.
355
 
As the monarch's direct political role retreated, formal communication through the address 
expanded after 1692. With a few adaptations it followed Westminster procedure.
356
 In the 1661 
parliament addresses had been infrequent. There were only two to Charles II: the first was a joint 
address with the Lords to congratulate him on his marriage to 'a daughter of Portugal'
357
 and the 
second to ask that no provisos be added to the bill of land settlement. The latter was of such 
importance to parliamentarians they sent a delegation headed by the Speaker to London. The 
process was cumbersome, disruptive of parliamentary business and of questionable value.
358
 After 
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1692 sending a delegation to London was only mooted as pressure on the government to 
withdraw Wood's halfpence peaked.
359
 From the 1690s there was no procedural attempt to by-
pass the lord lieutenant and all addresses to the monarch went via him. (As power seeped from 
monarch to ministers after the 1690s there was probably little point in expending the effort in 
mounting an expedition and the lord lieutenant was part of the ministry in power.) Although 
addresses were presented to the lord lieutenant for transmission to London, individual MPs might 
still have a role as the messenger carrying the address. On 15 July 1711 Ormond informed 
Secretary of State the earl of Dartmouth that 'Mr O'Brien a gentleman of considerable fortune in 
this country ... was Chairman of the Address to Her Majesty; and being desirous to go over and 
pay his duty to Her Majesty. He carries with him the said Address'.
360
 There is no evidence that 
such messengers had any political role but this case offered an opportunity to consort with the 
court. In 1703 in response to its address to Anne on her accession the Commons received an 
answer.
361
 Chief Secretary Southwell reported: 'The answer was accordingly delivered to them at 
the Castle, and has had an extraordinary good effect, as being the first time they ever had a Royal 
message or answer directly to an Address from this Kingdom'.
362
 The Commons now had a direct 
and reciprocal line of communication with the monarch.  
The 1690s had seen more frequent addresses than in the 1660s. The 1692 parliament continued 
the tradition of the congratulatory address. The Commons agreed a joint address with the Lords, 
thanking William and Mary for the deliverance of the nation, and the Journals record a process of 
three readings and agreeing to Lords amendments.
363
 The bicameral approach did not, however, 
continue. First, from 1695 many addresses concerned money, which was seen as the preserve of 
the Commons. Second, Poynings' Law did not foster co-operation between the Houses; 
specifically the Houses did not develop expertise in working together to hammer out compromise 
texts; rather there was a rivalry around exercise of prerogatives and a difference in political outlook 
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with the Lords having a Tory flavour to the Whiggish Commons.
364
 Third, Westminster itself in the 
1690s discouraged Irish bicameralism.
365
 Fourth, once the arrangements were settled and working 
satisfactorily there was little appetite for change.
366
 
The address retained the quality of a justificatory petition, albeit of an exceptional type, from a 
supplicant to a superior (see below)―an attitude that could not have been used with an English 
minister. The finalised addresses were set out in the published Votes as were the answers. In 
September 1703, the Commons in the backwash in England from Molyneux's Case, went beyond 
the congratulatory to refute 'our enemies ... groundless and malicious calumnies [that] we thought 
ourselves, or desires to be, independent of the crown of England'. The Commons declared and 
acknowledged that 
the kingdom of Ireland is annexed and united to the Imperial Crown of England; and by the 
laws and statutes of this kingdom is declared to be justly and rightfully depending upon, 




It was careful not to acknowledge any subordination beyond that to the crown. Addresses from 
1703 became a device to circumvent the political realities. By addressing the monarch the 
Commons had a public way to reach the English ministers without acknowledging the subordinate 
position of the kingdom.
368
 Three issues recur in these addresses to the monarch (effectively, to 
the London government): the poor state of the country and its economy;
369
 the need to keep the 
military establishment paid, housed and well armed;
370
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session, that this kingdom may have leave to export their manufacture of linen ... into the western plantations' 
(CJI(II), pp.361, 373, 377, 384-86; and see also pp.616 and 668).  
369
  For example, CJI(II), p.333, 341-43; (III), pp.71-72, 171  
370
  CJI(II), pp.366, 660; (III), p.62  
371
  CJI(II), p.609; (III), pp.169, 451; opposition to the reversal of outlawries was not confined to backwoodsmen in the 
Commons but permeated the administration; Coghill in preparation for 1729 session was 'sorry to find that every 
session of [the British] Parliament, some bill or other is constantly brought in to the prejudice of the Protestant 
interest in this kingdom, it looks as if the policy of England was to keep this a popish country' (Coghill Letters, nos. 
47 (To Edward Southwell, 11 Mar 1728/9) and 49 (To Lord Perceval,4 Apr 1729); also Carteret to Newcastle (SP, 
63–390(stamped 8-10), [Feb?] 1727/8). 
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Exchanges between the Commons and the lord lieutenant himself became more formal during the 
seventeenth century. In the 1613–14 session the Commons had sent the administration a 'wish-
list' list of 24 legislative and executive measures. The responses to the items were set out as 
'answers' in the Journal, some of which were in the first person from the lord deputy—for example, 
on the request for an act against dilapidations and to restrain alienations by ecclesiastical persons 
of their possessions, the answer was: 'very necessary: but I fear the steed is already stolen in most 
parts'.
372
 By the time of Charles II the question and answer had disappeared. In February 1662/3 
Ormond grandly told the Commons 'that he could take no notice of a message unless it had come 
to him as it ought ... in writing'.
373
 As Table 14 indicates, from 1692 the majority of the addresses to 
the lord lieutenant focussed predominately on administrative matters. In the 1690s many were 
seeking fulfilment of past obligations
374





 When the 1703 parliament met, the number of addresses to Ormond reduced and 
the perspective encompassed the future as well as the past. For example, in November 1703 the 
Commons sought assistance (i) for Captain Neville to survey for a canal between Newry and 
Lough Neagh and (ii) to make officials keep proper office hours.
377
  
                                                        
 
372
  CJI(I), p.33  
373
  CJI(I), p.633  
374
  For example. Speaker Mervyn's family's initial unsuccessful attempts to recover his expenses (CJI(II), pp.80-81, 
98, 100) before a tack to the supply bill (see p.50 above). 
375
  For example, CJI(II), pp.103 (Margaret Maxwell, whose husband was executed by James II's government), 121 
(Dr Leslie for services and suffering during the war)  
376
  For example, CJI(II), pp.83 (inhabitants of Bandon), 136 and 199 (Protestant refugees), 141-42 (inhabitants of 
Londonderry)  
377
  CJI(II), pp.390, 364  




Session Addresses to monarch Addresses to lord lieutenant  Other addresses 
1692 1 1  
1695–97 2 19  
1698–99 - 7  
1703–04 7 9 (1 to be passed to Anne)  
1705 3 3 (1 to be passed to Anne)  
1707 4 2  
1709 7 3  
1710 3 8 (3 to be passed to Anne)  
1711 5 6 (1 to be passed to Anne)  
1713 4 1  
1715–16 9 17  
1717 4 5  
1719 2 13  
1721–22 3 16 (1 to be passed to George I) Speaker Conolly  
1723–24 6 10  
1725–26 3 5  
1727–28 4 4  
1729–30 2 7  
Table 14 Addresses presented by House of Commons 
 
The total number of addresses in the 1705 and 1707 sessions fell but picked up in 1709 after Lord 
Lieutenant Wharton became lord lieutenant. There seems to have been some uncertainty about 
which addresses should go to him and which to Anne. By 1715 a much clearer differentiation of 
which items of business went to which addressee emerged. 
To the lord lieutenant To the monarch 
Bills, copies of Economic and fiscal, major decisions (e.g. national bank, Wood's 
halfpence) 
Clerical preferments (below bishop) Military matters such as overall pay, significant movement of troops 
Military contracts, inspections and 
building 
National debt, overall management and level 
Papers, returns and accounts, requests 
for 
Outlawries, representations against removal of 
Petitioners, support for Industries, major support 
Prosecutions Removal of major office-holders 
Supply matters  
Support for projects   
Table 15 Recipients of addresses (by content) 
 
As routine business increased, two changes occurred. First, processes became standardised. In 
the 1690s there are several instances of addresses being conveyed to the lord lieutenant by a 
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single MP or groups of MPs who were not privy counsellors.
378
 That stopped. Second, the process 
of addressing the lord lieutenant was streamlined: the previous step requiring privy counsellors to 
seek an appointment to present the address was dropped; and by the end of the 1690s in several 
cases the House did not draw up a bespoke address but ordered that a committee’s resolutions be 
treated as an address and taken directly by privy counsellors.
379
 Within ten years even the token 
reference to address had been jettisoned: the House ordered privy counsellors to attend the lord 
lieutenant with the resolutions supporting a petitioner and 'recommend [him] to his excellency’s 
favour'.
380
 One reason for breaking away from the more formal address procedure may have been 
the development of the heads of bill process in the 1690s as it appears from the Journals that the 
heads were ordered to be presented to the lord lieutenant—via privy counsellors—without an 
address, to ensure that they were sent to England quickly. On occasion a more formal 
presentation of heads to the lord lieutenant gave the draft bill some protection against the Irish 
Privy Council. Ormond told Secretary of State Sir Charles Hedges in 1705 that a bill for regulating 
elections 'was presented to me by the whole House, for which reason only it is sent over. But I 
believe it will be thought too strict a regulation'.
381
 Similarly, when an address was considered of 
political importance, it would be presented to the lord lieutenant by the House: on 10 August 1710 
the House agreed, nemine contradicente, an address to lord lieutenant to request a proclamation 




The lord lieutenant's first public task in parliament was the opening speech from the throne which 
set the tone and direction of the session. The draft of the speech was cleared in London, and in 
1725 Lord Lieutenant Carteret read the speech in draft to MPs at the Castle before the session.
383
 
As well as being entered in the Commons and Lords Journals the speech was printed 
                                                        
 
378
  For example, by a single MP, though others could attend him (CJI(II), pp.138-39, for assistance for Protestant 
refugees; p.142, for assistance for the inhabitants of Enniskillen; and p.83, by MPs for Cork for assistance of the 
inhabitants of Bandon. These sought financial assistance; the route to resources was via London and in 
transmitting petitions the lord deputy made a recommendation. In the case of the 'Inniskilliners', Lord Deputy Capel 
told Shrewsbury that 'I am told they made good advantage by the war' and did not support their claim (SP, 63–357 
f.78(stamped 167) (31 Dec 1695).  
379
  For example, CJI(II), pp.258, 268, 273 and 279 (Oct and Nov 1698)  
380
  CJI(II), p.512 (29 July 1707)  
381
  SP, 63–365(stamped 172) ( 29 Mar 1705); the practice of the lord lieutenant writing in parallel with transmissions, 
to criticise a transmitted heads, was not unusual―see also Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.134-35.  
382
  CJI(II), pp.673–74  
383
  Coghill Letters, no.17 (To Edward Southwell, 9 Oct 1725)  






 The published speech and address were the public face of parliament. Although set 
within a prescribed and reverent form, nuance and politics were not lost in the speech, address 
and response. (See page 168 for an example in 1719 of how carefully Chief Secretary Edward 
Webster had to tread when the speech from the throne promised some relief to Protestant 
Dissenters.)  
From 1703, following Westminster practice, the Irish House produced an address of thanks for the 
speech from the throne to Ormond.
385
 In order not to leave the monarch out, who was, in theory at 
least, responsible for the content of the speech, the House produced two parallel addresses to the 
lord lieutenant and Anne. The address to the monarch following the earlier Irish practice of the 
1690s focused on a significant recent event.
386
 In England the process had evolved of an address 
at the start of the session combining representations on a significant matter with thanks for the 
speech from the throne.
387
 By the reign of George I Irish addresses to the monarch drew on 
English practice of commenting on legislation as well as events such as the 1715 rebellion. The 
main elements, for example, of the 1729 address to George II paint a rosy, mythological picture of 
the relationship between Commons and monarch, which were: 
— an idealised and harmonious picture of monarch and his loyal subjects in Ireland; 
— the well-worn claim of providence's protection of the sacred person of the king; 
— a bald assertion that the king had the 'constant care' of his loyal subjects in mind; 
— a dubious claim the royal family was united and mutually supportive; 
— measures the Commons approved of were singled out for praise and evidence of the king's 
goodness; 
— the lord lieutenant was praised; and 
— in return for 'many blessings' under his and George I's reign supply would be voted.
388
  
                                                        
 
384
  For example, Ormond's at the opening of the 1711 session (SP, 63–367(stamped 80-81)); Ormond's prorogation 
speech 1711 (SP, 63–367(stamped 193)).  
385
  CJI(II), p.317  
386
  1703  Anne's accession (CJI(II), pp.344-45)  
 1704/5 Marlborough's victories (pp.425-26)  
 1707  union with Scotland (p.494)  
 1709  death of Anne's husband (pp.578-79)  
 1710 success of arms and prospects for peace (pp.645-46)  
387
  CJE(XIV), pp.8-9 (26 Oct 1702)  
388
  CJI(III), p.581  
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The address sits well with the findings of Mark Knights in England that the address set out a 
constructed political identity; albeit idealised but under the hyperbole the address shows the outline 
the bonds of loyalty of a political construction that held those represented in the Commons to the 
state with the hard political reality of supply for protection.
389
 
There was a closing speech. In the 1690s this was a fluid process. Sydney in 1692 tore into the 
Commons on his own initiative and his speech was printed separately.
390
 In 1710 Lord Lieutenant 
Wharton asked the government in London for instructions and said the speech 'shall be dispatched 
by tomorrow night's post ... But I do not see how it can be possible to keep the parliament together 
many days longer'.
391
 Timing was a problem and, unless there was some pressing need for 
clearance from London, there was little point in making speech beyond expressing thanks and 
leaving the lord lieutenant to tailor it as necessary. This was the pattern after 1715.  
The lord lieutenant may have exercised some royal functions but he was not the monarch in 
parliament. While in both London and Dublin no criticism of the actual monarch in parliament was 
permitted, during the reign of Anne when party rivalry was strong, in a debate in 1711 Ralph Gore 
stated that 'he should not be afraid of speaking his mind against the Privy Council nay, nor even 
against my lord lieutenant [Ormond] if occasion were in that place'. His comments did not raise the 
temperature and 'the debate went on with temper'.
392
 While it is hardly conceivable that Gore 
himself, as pillar of the Whig administration, would have uttered the same words after 1715, the 
absence of evidence leaves it unclear whether such sentiments and such criticism persisted. What 
evidence there is points to a more nuanced and coded style of criticism, possibly made easier as 
the distance between Members and the lord lieutenant lengthened with the appointment of English 
aristocrats.  
3.7  Relations with House of Lords 
The 'official' relationship between the Commons and the Lords was circumspect and formalised in 
protocol. The procedures governing the relations between the Houses copied Westminster and the 
same characteristics and sensitivities can be seen with each House vigilant to preserve its 
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  Knights, Representation, pp.44, 127, 152, 154 
390
  CJI(II), pp.35-36  
391
  SP, 63–366 ff.230-32(stamped 11-12) (to [Dartmouth],14 Aug 1710)  
392
  Perceval Diaries, p.113  




prerogatives or, in the case of Commons, reluctant to allow the Lords to turn their social superiority 
into parliamentary dominance. The prickly formality regularly required decisions to be made by the 
Commons and therefore resulted in entries in the Journals and recourse to precedents.
393
 The 
procedures examined in this section are: 
a) messages between the Houses; 
b) conferences; and 
c) privilege, especially conflicting privileges. 
An exchange between the Commons and Lords illuminates the process and sensitivities. On 9 
June 1705 the Commons took umbrage at a message from the Lords and instructed a select 
committee to prepare a message pointing out that the message―that the Lords had agreed to the 
engrossed money bill sent up by the Commons without any amendment―was not in the correct 
form: 
And take notice, that the messengers did not, at the same time, deliver in at the Table of 
their House the money-bill, which they conceive ought to have been done; and therefore 
have not entered the said message on their Journal, nor taken other notice thereof, than 
by reminding your lordships of the omission. 
Just as the Commons ordered the managers to set off, a message arrived from the Lords saying 
they had approved the bill but adding 'which bill being delivered in at the Table, with the message 
by the messengers'. The Commons cancelled the request for a conference.
394
 The incident shows 
that communication between the Houses operated on two levels. On the formal level, failure to 
follow the 'correct' procedure could be used to halt processes and be construed as an affront to the 
dignity of the House. Second, there was informal communication as the Houses shared a building. 
Rather than stand on their dignity the Lords back-tracked without the need of a conference. The 
exchange also shows the Commons insisting upon a procedural consequence of its 'sole right' 
claim. English practice from the late sixteenth century had been for the Speaker to present bills of 
supply for royal assent on the last day of the session.
395
 The procedure demonstrated the primacy 
of the Commons in supply. The pre-1705 entries in the Irish Journals are unclear that the Irish 
House followed English procedures and leave the impression that supply bills were treated as 
                                                        
 
393
  See p.127 above. 
394
  CJI(II), p.478  
395
  John Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons, 4 vols. (London, 1818) (Reprinted 1971), (III), 
pp.158-65; Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.194-95 points out that the practice of sending bills for royal 
assent was not settled in the 1690s and the procedures only become clear from 1705. 
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other bills to be presented by the chancery clerks in the Lords.
396
 The Commons did not claim 
precedents but rather asserted what ought to have been done. This approach resembled that 
which the Commons adopted when it ended resignations by MPs.
397
 It was another instance of the 
House bringing its procedures in line with those of Westminster.  
Formal communication between the Houses was by message. The table at Appendix 6.14.2 sets 
out the procedure when a message came from the Lords to the Commons requesting a 
conference, which was the mechanism by which Houses met face to face to transact business, to 
negotiate or resolve a dispute. The procedure had been used since at least the 1613 parliament
398
 





 As the higher House the Lords claimed superiority which, as in 
England, it expected to be displayed through customs and ritual which demonstrated rank; 
especially contentious was whether the Commons Members could sit in the presence of the 
Lords.
401
 The 1661 parliament had ended on a sour note. At a conference on 17 July 1666 the 
Lords walked out when MPs sat down and one exiting peer told the MPs that they 'had a mind all 
to be Lords' whereupon an MP answered: 'Why not; another rebellion may make some of us lords, 
as former rebellions did make some of your lordships’ predecessors so'.
402
 The procedures for 
conferences were next tested in 1695 when the Commons requested that six Members of the 
House of Lords give testimony to the Commons as it prepared articles of impeachment against 
Porter.
403
 The sharpness of the exchanges led the Commons to appoint a committee to examine 
precedents for procedures for conferences, and William Molyneux reported back in November 
1695 that: 
great inconveniences have happened to the public affairs of this nation, by the Commons 
insisting on the right of sitting covered at conferences with the Lords, an absolute rupture 
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  CJI(II), pp.220, 305  
397
  See p.130 above. 
398
  See CJI(I), pp.21-22.  
399
  For example, CJI(I), pp.520, 540-41  
400
  For example, CJI(I), pp.492, 762ff  
401
  CJI(I), p.541 (10 July 1662) sets out the ceremony for meetings with the Lords when 'upon several precedents 
produced by the Speaker ... ordered that the Committee of this House should take their seats after the Committee 
of the Lords, and sit covered, if their Lordships so do, and not to proceed in any case their lordships should not 
assent thereunto; and to intimate the reason of their not proceeding, if it were necessary'; see also (I), pp.597, 
715, 731, 752-72.  
402
  CJI(I), pp.752-53, 765-72  
403
  CJI(II), pp.91, 103-08; see also pp.155ff below.  




between the two Houses has ensued [in the 1660s and that for] avoiding the like mischiefs 
and inconveniencies the future, and that the great business of the nation may not have any 
time thereafter suffered by adhering to the manner sitting covered, the Commons ... do 
think it requisite to settle this matter, and the precedent therein to be observed thereafter. 
Perhaps as a way of fastening the precedent, Molyneux examined English practice and reported 
without any qualification that 'in conferences with the Lords, [the Commons] do stand uncovered, 
we conceive it not necessary or convenient to insist upon more in this matter than the Commons of 
England'. He added portentously a political necessity to the justification: 
the two Houses of parliament are employed in settling this nation after a most unnatural 
rebellion, upon establishing a lasting Protestant foundation, and a rupture ... may prove at 
this time of the worst consequence, rather than hazard any such mischief, we think it 
requisite to decline what has formerly been insisted on, as a privilege of this House in 
conferences with the Lords, and to leave this as a memorial to future generations, by 
ordering it to be entered in its journals, as a precedent settled and agreed by this House.
404
 
There the matter―based on the Westminster precedents―was left and disputes over the process 
of holding conferences receded.
405
  
Without the need to resolve disagreements over legislation, conflicts over their privileges 
predominated. Operating like two sovereign entities, each House, in order to safeguard its 
privileges, insisted that its Members, and their servants, could only appear before the other with its 
permission.
406
 When in July 1707 the Lords requested that an MP appear at the bar, the 
Commons set up a select committee to examine the precedents.
407
 William Conolly reported that it 
had found a 1661 precedent for appearance. The House then sent a message that it would give 
leave for the MP to appear once 'they are informed by your Lordships, in what cause or matter he 
is to be examined'.
408
 It appears that the Commons' answer was designed to show that it had no 
objection in principle provided the Lords went through the necessary procedures. The Lords then 
sent a messenger who explained the reason. When the messenger withdrew, the MP said that he 
was willing to be examined in the Lords. The Commons then gave leave for him to appear.
409
 The 
                                                        
 
404
  CJI(II), p.118  
405
  The other option was an appeal to the administration. When the Houses reached an impasse over privilege in 
1641 an appeal was made to Charles I (CJI(I), p.252) and in 1666 to Ormond (pp.765-72). Neither appears to 
have produced a satisfactory outcome, and there is no evidence either approach was repeated. Such appeals 
gave the administration a means to crack the protective shell of privilege, which from the 1690s was inimical to the 
constitutional claims of the Commons and the constitutional norms at Westminster.  
406
  See for example, CJI(II), pp.79, 269-70, 335, 402.  
407
  CJI(II), p.497  
408
  CJI(II), p.498  
409
  CJI(II), pp.498-99  
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distinctiveness of the Houses’ privileges was further entrenched in March 1704/5 when the 
Commons resolved that no Irish peer had the right to vote in an election for a Member of 
parliament.
410
 The resolution was made following an election petition which unseated a sitting 
Member, where a peer may have voted, though his vote—as opposed to his influence—was not a 
determining factor.
411
 The wording of the resolution followed closely that of a resolution made by 
the English Commons in 1699.
412
 The Commons, perhaps wishing to avoid a confrontation with 
the peer or, more likely, following English practice
413
 did not request a conference with the Lords 
as it regarded election matters as within its exclusive cognizance. This is a further instance in 
1704/5 where the Commons was not only applying but also again bringing its procedures into line 
with Westminster. 
Not all disputes about privilege were settled amicably. On 1 June 1709 the Lords sent a message 
to the Commons complaining that the Commons had violated its privileges by commencing action 
against two servants of a bishop.
414
 A select committee chaired again by Conolly was set up and 
reported that the two were acting in a public capacity and were therefore outside the privilege of 
the House of Lords.
415
 The Lords responded that it was for it to decide its privilege and that should 
be an end of the matter.
416
 When the Commons came to consider how to respond it ordered the 
gallery door locked,
417
 possibly to limit its deliberations leaking to the Lords. The Commons 
prepared a full reply which concluded that 'each House of Parliament is equally and only the judge 
of the privileges of their respective Houses, and whether the same be violated, or not; and that the 
same are not to be taken into consideration elsewhere'.
418
 The Lords, unsurprisingly, rejected this 
view
419
 and stalemate was reached. In the other direction, on 4 August 1711 the Commons was 
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  CJI(II), pp.456  
411
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  CJE(XIII), p.64 (14 Dec 1699) 
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matter in which their Privileges are materially concerned'.  
414
  CJI(II), p.596  
415
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  CJI(II), p.601  
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  CJI(II), p.602  
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  CJI(II), p.605  
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  CJI(II), p.619  




informed that the Lords, in an address to the queen had 'reflected on the honour' of the Commons, 
and a paper alleged to be a copy of the address was read out. The Commons took exception to 
the construction of the Lords that the commendation by the Commons of the Revolution was a 
reference to that of the Commonwealth in the 1640s rather than that of 1688.
420
 The Commons 
then appointed Ralph Gore and the attorney general to 'go immediately and inspect the Journals of 
the House of Lords' and compare the paper with the entry in the Journals. They went and 
'demanded of the clerk attending in the office of the clerk' to see the Journals. The clerk said that 
the 'address is not yet actually entered in the Lords Journals' but showed them the original 
address, which, he said, was the warrant for entering it in the Journal. They compared the texts at 
the Table and reported back that they agreed exactly and presented a copy of the paper shown to 
them by the clerk, which was entered in the Commons Journal. As the Lords had already made its 
address to the lord lieutenant, the Commons followed with an address of its own criticising the 
Lords for 'highly infringing the rights, privileges and liberties of the Commons' and an address to 
the queen clarifying their focus on the recent 'happy revolution'
421
 and their 'utmost abhorrence and 
detestation of all principles that have any tendency to any other revolution, or to weaken your 
majesty's undoubted and hereditary and parliamentary right'. To underline the importance of the 
address, it was presented by the Speaker to the lord lieutenant.
422
 The dispute showed that the 




As the Porritts noted, in the early seventeenth century, when an Irish MP was elevated to the 
Lords, the Commons had a distinct Irish ritual, which was recorded in 1614 when Walter Butler 
succeeded to the earldom of Ormond and it self-consciously revived in 1662 when Thomas Butler 
became earl of Ossory. The MP acquainted the Commons that he had received the king’s writ to 
be made a peer and, after some pleasantries on his 'happiness of sitting as a commoner' the 
whole House accompanied him to the bar of the House of Lords.
424
 The procedure is not recorded 
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  The episode underlines the points Knights makes in Representation, pp 152-53, that language in addresses and 
petitions has to be deconstructed and was not as anodyne as it appears. 
421
  CJI(II), pp.710-11  
422
  CJI(II), pp.714-15; for another case in which the Commons inspected the Lords Journals for precedents of the 
Lords having permission to appear before the Commons and its committees see (II), p.731.  
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  CJI(II), pp.98, 550, 555ff, 710, 730-31 
424
  CJI(I), p.558  
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after the 1660s. One reason may have been that it was unknown at Westminster and so would 
have lacked a stimulus for revival.  
3.8  Impeachment 
The process of impeachment emerged in the English House of Commons late in the reign of 
James I.
425
 It was first used in Ireland in the turbulent 1640s when the Commons took revenge on 
Strafford’s administration
426
 and at that time it was also used regularly at Westminster.
427
 It fell out 
of use in England until 1666 and this dormancy was reflected in Ireland as the process was 
unknown in the 1661 parliament. In England the procedure was used regularly from 1666 and 
again from 1689.
428
 It made a dramatic return in Ireland in 1695 when the Commons started 
impeachment of Lord Chancellor Porter. The impeachment process gave each House distinct 
responsibilities: the Commons to prepare the case for the prosecution and the Lords to judge. The 
Irish House followed English procedures adopted against Porter himself at Westminster in 1693
429
 
with detailed consideration of the case taking place on the floor of the House.
430
 On 30 September 
1695 Colonel Ponsonby presented to the House 'Articles of High Crimes and Misdemeanours' and 
'took upon him to prove the ... Articles'. The House received them and had them read. Debate 
ensued and, although a motion 'that the Articles be now read a second time' was negatived, the 
House resolved to continue the debate on the following day.
431
 Over the next two weeks the 
supporters of impeachment tried to prove the evidence in the articles but failed to bring the debate 
to a close.
432
 The House resolved that the testimony be taken on oath; that witnesses be sworn 
before two judges in the Speaker’s chamber before appearing; that notes of the testimony taken by 
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  Hatsell, Precedents(IV), p.72, 104ff  
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  Porter successfully fought off the Westminster House in Dec 1693–Jan 1693/4; HoP(1690), biography for Porter. 
Westminster procedures see: CJE(XI), pp.33-34 (presentation of articles); p.40 (witnesses examined at the bar, 
written evidence received and papers ordered to be presented); p.43 (committee appointed to take evidence from 
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  CJI(II), pp.76-77  
432
  CJI(II), p.82, the previous question motion was negatived  




the clerk at the Table be 'settled by the House' and agreed by the witnesses; and the Members 
undertaking the proof of the articles were empowered to send for papers and records.
433
 These 
arrangements taken with the request to the Lords for six of its Members to appear at the bar of the 
House
434
 gave the Lords acute procedural problems. The Lords resisted the attempt to call its 
Members as witnesses pointing out that  
the House of Peers, being a Court of Judicature and judges for all impeachments brought 
from the House of Commons, will examine such of their Peers as the Commons shall 
show shall desire, if any impeachment shall be brought before the lordships, according to 
the usual methods of parliaments.
435
  
After three conferences the matter was unresolved
436
 when on 25 October Porter was given 'leave 
... to appear' (rather than responding to a summons) in the Commons. With due ceremony 
following Westminster ritual he appeared 'with the purse', the symbol of his office, in which the 
great seal of Ireland notionally was kept, and with subtle choreography balancing his status with 
the privilege of the Commons 
a chair being placed for him on the right hand within the bar, he laid down the purse and 
his hat at the back of the chair, and uncovered, was heard what he could say on the 
articles exhibited against him.
437
  
When he withdrew, the Commons on a division found his answers to be 'satisfactory' and dropped 
the proceedings.
438
 The episode shows that even when pursuing a highly charged political dispute 
both Houses managed to operate what were essentially Westminster procedures and although 
strained they held and delivered a result that was accepted. 
3.9 Conclusions 
Given that the Irish House of Commons aspired to a corporate identity comparable to that of the 
Westminster Commons, it is unsurprising that, when faced broadly the same issues from 1692 to 
1730, it came up with similar responses. As it strove to act and operate like Westminster, which 
had faced the same problems, it is to be expected that it reached for Westminster's procedures. 
Two characteristics stand out: (i) the consolidation and (ii) the development of procedures to 
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  CJI(II), pp.102-05, 107-08  
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respond to increasing quantity and greater complexity. A caste of Protestant landowners and 
professionals linked by family connections rapidly established a near monopoly over membership 
of the Commons and had broadly similar interests. As part of this consolidation, the franchise of 
Catholics was steadily eroded by legislation, practice and perception flowing from the Commons. 
As the grip of the Anglo-Irish landowners tightened and general elections became less frequent, 
election disputes became more common and sophisticated as agents and lawyers were employed 
and dozens of witnesses were produced before the Committee of Privileges and Elections. The 
Commons responded by copying, adapting and enacting parts of Westminster statutes and 
procedures and orders, to reduce the more egregious election abuses. Similar patterns can be 
seen in areas such as the expulsion of MPs and the refinement of privilege. Although development 
of procedures could be erratic, variable and tainted with a sectarian bias, the direction was towards 
greater due process and developing procedures that focussed on the House carrying out its main 
functions more effectively and efficiently. These developments required some adaptation to the 
particular practices followed in Dublin―for example, the protection of creditors pursuing heads of 
bills. 
In the seventeenth century the calling of a parliament had been the occasion for a spring-cleaning 
of the House's rules and procedures at the start of the first session and often required an 
examination of Irish and Westminster precedents. When, from 1703, the House met regularly such 
an approach no longer worked. Nor was there a thriving corpus of distinct Irish precedents, as at 
Westminster, to search. The nascent patriotic self-awareness did not flow back into an attachment 
to the precedents and the procedural arrangements of the Irish Commons. Why should it, when 
the MPs sitting in the Irish Commons in the first third of the eighteenth century saw themselves as 
the 'English in Ireland'? The Irish House's own precedents had a minor impact on its development 
and, if they been systematically applied would have taken the Commons back to the early 
seventeenth century. Their use was largely confined to Irish intra-parliamentary disputes, 
particularly with the Lords; Westminster was not going to give them much credence. They were set 
aside when political reality and imperatives intruded. The way ahead was to emulate Westminster. 
Through a process of copying Westminster silently the Irish House was able to assert parity and 
overhaul its operations by keeping in step with Westminster. There were therefore clearly limits on 
the scope and direction of its institutional drift. At the heart of the relationship between the 




Commons in Dublin and Westminster—as expressed in procedural and operational 
developments—was a tension: the Irish House to be independent and distinct from its Westminster 
sister had to be similar to function effectively and claim parity. The control of supply was central to 
the predicament. Like Westminster Dublin strove to assert, with some success, its primacy over 
supply. To justify the claim, no precedents were cited, just the 'the constitution of parliament', in 
this case code for 'what Westminster has, we claim too'. But to translate the principle into practice 
in Dublin, Westminster's supply procedures had to be adapted to the requirements of Poynings' 
Law. On the one hand the Irish House of Commons had to concede the crown's residual 
prerogative to initiate supply with a short money bill at the start of each parliament. On the other 
the crown (that is the government in London) had to allow Irish MPs greater freedom, than their 
counterparts at Westminster, to propose expenditure. 
In contrast, the address, especially that to the monarch, allowed the Commons and the 
government to construct a political identity. It provided an opportunity to proclaim the correct 
operation of the political system of dutiful subjects publicising their direct loyalty to the sacralised 
crown. In addition, through the careful use of nuanced language it could convey the concerns of 
Members to the government in London. 
.  
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 4  The operation of the House of Commons 
This chapter examines how the Irish House of Commons conducted business. It begins with the 
business carried on within the House: the methods of decision, debate and divisions. It examines 
the structure of debate and procedures used to extend or curtail discussion and, similarly, how 
decisions could be precipitated or delayed. Drawing on the work of P.D.G. Thomas on the 
eighteenth century House of Commons at Westminster, the chapter and linked annexes chart the 
daily order of business and how it developed from 1692. For the most part these procedures 
followed Westminster closely but the heads of bill procedure produced significant procedural 
differences and shaped the dynamic of the session, most notably requiring a transmission recess 
when heads were sent to London for approval. The chapter considers the effect that Poynings' 
Law and the heads process had on the rate of legislative success from the 1690s.  
The chapter also examines―as far as the available material allows―the activities of the Speaker 
in his capacity as chair of the House: his procedural powers and the tensions in his role as both 
custodian of procedures and party or faction leader and business manager. Others' roles are 
examined: the chief secretary, the 'undertakers' and the country gentlemen. Although 'the king's 
business'―especially supply and key measures the government wished to enact―are covered, 
the chapter looks at business initiated by Members and how it required mini-undertakers. The 
chapter sets out the financial procedures of the Commons and investigates the extent to which the 
processes for the scrutiny and agreement of supply shaped the session. The final section reviews 
committees: why they were established, what they did and how they were refined to handle the 
business of the House. This chapter assembles the evidence relating to their powers and methods 
of operation. 
4.1 Decision and debate 
The Irish Commons like its English counterpart proceeded by binary question or, as Erskine May 
put it in 1844, 'every matter is determined ... upon questions put by the speaker, and resolved in 
the affirmative or negative'.
1
 The Speaker would point to a Member who was responsible for an 
item of business for which there was an order of the day or who had given notice of a motion. The 
Member initiated the business and framed a question. Debate could only take place when a 
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question was before the House. When the debate was exhausted the question was put again by 
the Speaker, he 'collected the voices' and by the number and level of the responses he weighed 
up which side was in the majority and announced his assessment. If his evaluation was 
challenged, a division took place.
2
  
In the vast majority of cases the putting of the question and the answer in the affirmative were 
formalities leaving no trace in the Journals beyond the smooth transaction of business. But, when 
the political temperature rose, questions had the potential to become the subject of debate and a 
division, and procedural arrangements could be tested. There was some shading in the Journals. 
As noted, where a significant decision is taken unanimously it was recorded as nemine 
contradicente, showing the House acting with one voice. The converse—that is, the absence of 
the phrase—usually meant that voices had been raised against the question but not sufficient for a 
division. In addition, to echo P.D.G. Thomas' comment on Westminster,
3
 the rarity of complaint 
seems to mean that the Speakers in Dublin were impartial in putting questions and collecting the 
voices. Sir John Perceval's diaries covering parts of the 1711 and 1713 sessions contains no 
disapproval of the Speakers' (Forster and Brodrick) chairing.
4
 There were, however, criticisms. In 
October 1703 the House passed a resolution that Vice-Treasurer Robinson was unfit for public 
employment. C.I. McGrath records that the resolution was considered by many Members unfairly 




As well as business on the orders for the day, a motion could be presented without notice. Isaac 
Manley MP gave an account of a 'trial of strength' in the Commons at the end of the 1725–26 
session on an address to George I. On cue a motion expressing thanks was moved by an 
administration supporter 'as had been before concerted' but then St. Brodrick 'Brodrick and his 
friends objected, and as a [counter?] resolution' was offered and a copy 'delivered at the Table all 
in his own hand writing, and prepared before he came into the House, which was not much 
regarded', and was after some time withdrawn.
6
 The episode indicates that when an item of 
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  This paragraph draws on Thomas, Commons, ch.11.  
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  Thomas, Commons, pp.192, 243-44  
4
  He had concerns about the Speaker’s reporting of a decision in the Votes—see p.59 above.  
5
  McGrath, Irish Constitution, p.170  
6
  SP, 63–387 ff.152(stamped 73) (Isaac Manley to Charles Delafaye, 25 Feb 1725/6) 
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business came before the House a motion without notice could be sprung―in this case―on the 
administration. A written copy was handed in at the Table and Manley was able to get a copy; as it 
was withdrawn it was not entered in the Journals or printed in the Votes. 
There were rules on debate. Members could only speak once in a debate in the House (as 
opposed to committee where they could speak more often). As debate could be adjourned
7
 it 
made sense not to allow much other business to interpose before debate resumed otherwise it 
would not be clear who had spoken. This rule had been applied in the seventeenth century: on 24 
July 1661 debate was adjourned until 10am the following day and the House ordered that 'nothing 
to intervene; and that no Member, who has already spoken to the same business since that 
question was put, do, without the leave of this House, speak further thereunto'.
8
 
At Westminster there were two well established methods of curtaining debate: moving the 
adjournment; and moving the previous question.
9
 Both were used in Dublin. At Westminster the 
motion 'that this House do now adjourn' took precedence over any earlier question. If carried, the 
House adjourned to the next sitting day. The first recorded division on the adjournment was during 
the 1661 parliament.
10
 After 1692 there is some evidence of the adjournment being used as a 
procedural device to curtail debate or kill business. On 25 September 1703 a motion to adjourn 
was put, to delay taking a decision on the arrangements for the election of a chaplain. The motion 
was negatived without a division.
11
 On 24 October 1707, after the House found unanimously in 
favour of George MacCartney MP on a complaint brought against him by the Countess of 
Donegall and inhabitants of Belfast, there was a division on the adjournment in an attempt to head 
off a move to require the burgesses of Belfast to conform to the established church. Although the 
adjournment was negatived on a division, after further late night debate the House adjourned.
12
 On 
resumption on 28 October debate was curtailed by the use of the previous question which was 
carried on a division and the resolution requiring conformity was also carried on a division.
13
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  CJI(I), p.435  
9
  Scobell, Memorials, pp.28-29 
10
  On 24 Apl 1662 when the House adjourned to 1 May (CJI(I), p.493), though strictly a motion to adjourn, in order to 
take precedence over other business, it had to be unencumbered with a date and time. The effect was identical.  
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  CJI(II), p.318  
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  CJI(II), p.560  
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  CJI(II), p.564  




Adjournment had the disadvantage that the day’s business was lost with the consequence that the 
'previous question' was the preferred dilatory tactic (see below). 
Although the Commons controlled its timetable by deciding when and for how long to adjourn,
14
 
external factors such as the need to transmit bills to and from London meant that the 
administration sought substantial influence on adjournments.
15
 On the receipt of bills from England 
Lord Lieutenant Sydney sent a message to the Commons on 22 October 1692, to give it 'timely 
intimation' that it had two weeks to complete consideration of the bills and that 'their Majesties 
intending that this parliament shall rise about a fortnight hence, and meet again sometime next 
spring'.
16
 But it was not all one way. On 28 October 1695, the first sitting day after it agreed the 
terms of supply, the House, having sought the concurrence of the Lords, told Lord Deputy Capel in 
convoluted language that it wanted a three-week adjournment: 
so as it might be no prejudice or interruption to his Majesty's affairs; an intimation thereof 




From the administration’s point of view there was no reason to keep the House sitting when the 
supply heads had been presented and a batch of bills had received royal assent. Next time, the 
contrivance was dropped and on 14 December 1695 and again on 28 March 1696 the Journals 
recorded that, after Capel had 'signified his ... pleasure that the House do adjourn itself', it 
adjourned.
18
 There followed a series of single day sittings and adjournments through to June 1697; 
the adjournments were sought from the lords justices signifying William III’s pleasure that the 
House adjourn.
19
 The wording follows in outline that used at Westminster in the early 1690s.
20
 The 
messy situation arose from the decline and death in May 1696 of Capel and the political instability 
that followed combined with uncertainty about the powers of the lords justices to prorogue 
                                                        
 
14
  The control was set out in a standing order made on 19 Dec 1678: 'Resolved, That Mr Speaker shall at any time 
adjourn the House, without a Question first put, if it be insisted on' (CJE(IX), p.560).  
15
  CJI(II), p.22; it is not clear whether this was notice of prorogation or adjournment; the session was prorogued on 3 
Nov after it ended in acrimony over supply.  
16
  CJI(II), p.22; the procedure was repeated subsequently—see (II), pp.145, 148-51 (Dec 1695–Nov 1696).  
17
  CJI(II), p.112; an address to the lord deputy and his reply are not recorded in CJI.  
18
  CJI(II), pp.145  
19
  CJI(II), pp.148-51: this form of wording is used in the following sessions—pp.393 (4 Feb 1703), 462 (22 Mar 
1704/5), 534 (14 Aug 1707), 620 (29 June-28 July 1709), 670 (24 June-1 Aug 1710), 719 (11 Aug-20 Sep 1710).  
20
  For example: 'the Lord Chief Baron ... declared to both Houses, That it was his Majesty's pleasure, That both 
Houses should adjourn themselves until the one-and-thirtieth day of March next ensuing; and that if His Majesty 
should think fit, That the Parliament should then sit to do business, his Majesty would give notice thereof by his 
Royal Proclamation' (CJE(X), p.536; 5 Jan 1691/2).  
 'Resolved, That this House do now adjourn until the one-and-thirtieth day of March next ensuing'. (CJE(X), p.536).  
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parliament in the absence of instructions from London.
21
 In August 1696 the lords justices of 
England (William III being abroad) objected to their Irish counterparts' proposal: 
for the parliament sitting upon an adjournment [as] they doubt the same thing may be 
pretended to there as it is in England; that there cannot be two demands of a supply made 
in one session; and therefore, unless there were a prorogation or a new parliament called, 
there would not be [more] money given than had been asked for by Lord Capel.
22
 
The exchange shows that the government in London expected the rules governing the operation of 
the Westminster parliament to apply to the Dublin parliament. In the event they did not, as the 
session continued with adjournments until 27 July 1697 when the Commons was summoned to 
the Lords to hear a speech from the throne and a fresh request for supply, which was granted.
23
  
The consequence of proceeding by adjournment meant that the parliament had to meet to adjourn. 
This allowed the House not only to carry out house-keeping business such as the issuing of writs 
for by-elections but also substantive business such as the endorsement and signing of the 
association in support of William III
24
 and the expulsion of a Member who refused to sign it.
25
 
There was one division―on 11 May 1697―with 109 voting,
26
 which indicated that these were not 
token sessions but Members were turning up in expectation of transacting substantive business.
27
 
These one-day meetings also gave the administration the opportunity to test the political 
temperature and the team replacing Capel to hone its management skills as well as meeting the 
government's needs. As Methuen observed after the meeting on 15 June 1697: 
The success of this day in parliament makes me think a little prudent management cannot 
fail of success. Both Houses take a liberty here of proceeding in some business, 
notwithstanding the meeting is only to adjourn and this day several things of party and 
faction were laid with great heat upon occasions of votes of privileges the last day of 
meeting; but we had timely notice, and gained our point so entirely as to have both Houses 
adjourn without doing anything.
28
 
The last eight adjournments of 1695–97 session, however, made it explicit that the question for an 
adjournment was put. In other words the decision to adjourn was for the Commons. The entries 
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  CJI(II), pp.145-47 (28 Mar 1696)  
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  When, however, the House reconvened on 27 July 1697 there was an expectation of a further adjournment and so 
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  SP, 63–359 no.21(stamped 58, Lord Chancellor Methuen to [Vernon], 15 June 1697)  




are not nemine contradicente, but it is unclear to what extent there was opposition. The House’s 
authority to decide whether or not to adjourn was clearly demonstrated on 29 December 1698 
when the lords justices asked the House to adjourn for a day. The House divided and agreed by 
70 to 40 votes.
29
 The purpose appears to have been to register a protest about the delay in the 
return of bills from England. The practicalities of legislative management required by Poynings' 
Law meant the lord lieutenant had a greater role than the monarch at Westminster where the 
adjournment was evidence of its control of its own affairs.
30
 Heads of bills had to be reviewed by 
the Irish Privy Council, sent to London, representations exchanged and, if agreed and weather 
permitting, bills returned. This process was reliant upon the administration’s management. From its 
perspective, the business of the parliament was supply and legislation. Leaving the parliament 
sitting while heads bills were transmitted risked longer sessions as a fresh batch of heads were 
prepared―and a return to the pattern of sittings of the 1661 and 1695 parliaments―or, worse, idle 
parliamentary minds turning to mischief. This is what happened in May 1716 when bills failed to 
arrive back from London. Chief Secretary Delafaye explained when the Commons reassembled: 
we were in hope to have had four of our bills to lay before [them?] but none being come 
were obliged to adjourn them for a week longer ... after the question of adjournment had 
been put upon a message from the lords justices ... which was ever looked upon to put 
stop to everything, young Allen moved that the lords justices might be addressed for an 
account of what had been done in pursuance of [the] former vote of credit; they were told 
that it was pretty odd to call for that so soon, that however on their next meeting an 
account should be laid before them of what had been borrowed and how it was applied; 
their desire was to have it appear in the Votes that this account was demanded on 
purpose to insinuate into the people a jealousy of the government which however they 
could not carry. In this debate angry speeches were made... the great cry is against 




Pensions were the most frequent target. In contrast expenditure on the military establishment and 
construction of barracks across Ireland was usually spared such criticism and the imperative of 
safety put a limit on how far the Commons would go in threatening supply. 
The only time the lord lieutenant's management of adjournments came under strain was in the 
1723–24 session, as pressure on Wood's patent was growing and St. John Brodrick threatened 
that 'no power could adjourn [the Commons] but by their own consent by which and his behaviour 
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since it is very plain that he has a mind to keep [the administration] in hot water'.
32
 By the end of 
the decade the normal pattern re-emerged and Lord Lieutenant Carteret complained to Edward 
Southwell on 26 February 1729/30, when the House began on a tranche of bills: 
we have employment for one week. I hope other bills will come, so that we may proceed 
without further adjournments, which are very inconvenient to the country as well as to me. I 
am forced to detain the principal lawyers from going the Circuit that I may not want that 
strength in the House in case of accidents. I must still be upon my guard against the few 
peevish people, who talk about bringing in representations about the state of the nation in 
case the bog bill ... miscarry.
33
 
The second mechanism for curtailing debate was the 'previous question', a two-edged procedure 
used both to force a matter to a decision or avoid a parliamentary decision on a subject without 
losing the rest of the day’s business. It had first been used at Westminster in 1604.
34
 The 
procedure appeared in the Irish Journals from the 1661 parliament.
35
 The previous question was 
frequently used at Westminster from 1689 and was recorded in the printed Votes. It reappeared in 
Dublin on 31 August 1695 when it was used to postpone consideration of supply.
36
 Between then 
and 1730 the procedure was used about 20 times and the bulk of these were in the 1690s with a 
revival from 1707 to 1713. It was rarely used after 1715 and when it was, as on 7 November 1721, 
it appears to have been used to end a lengthy debate―in this instance on the national bank. The 
sharp decline was probably a symptom of the lowering of the temperature of debate in the 
chamber after 1715. 
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34
  Thomas, Commons, p.178; Erskine May (pp.173-74) explains that 'When there is no debate, or after a debate is 
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35
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36
  CJI(II), p.48  




4.2  The parliamentary session 
A comparison of the timing of the introduction of (i) heads of bills and (ii) finalised bills between the 
1695–97 (Table 16)
37













1695-97 session: comparsion of  numbers of heads and bills introduced in House of Commons  
 
Table 16 1695–97 session: comparison of heads and bills introduced in House of 
Commons 
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1729-30 session: comparsion of  numbers of heads and bills introduced in  Commons
 
Table 17 1729–30 session: comparison of heads and bills introduced in House of 
Commons 
 
Table 16 (1695–97 session) shows that, while the heads process was taking off, legislation was 
perceived as a rolling programme with, especially in 1695, no pressing need to present heads 
early. The bulk of the heads had been presented by September 1697. The legislative success rate 
of the Commons was 26% (35 out of 135) for the session (compared to 32% for all legislation). 
The following session, 1698–99, saw the pattern that emerged in 1697 strengthening with the bulk 
of the heads presented before December, when there was a transmission recess. The legislative 
success rate of the Commons fell, however, to 10% (4 out 40 and compared to 22% for the total) 
in part because the session was prorogued upon supply being secured. By 1703–04 the pattern 
seen in Table 17 (for the 1729–30 session) was clearer with nearly all heads presented before a 
transmission recess and most bills introduced after the transmission (other than a diminishing 
number originating in the Privy Council). The success rate of the Commons in 1729–30 was 63% 




(24 out of 38, with only four legislative initiatives starting in the Lords or Irish Privy Council).
38
 The 
structure of regular meetings of parliament built around the heads process was emerging from 
1703 and, moreover, petitioners and MPs increasingly understood how to work the system to their 
advantage, to secure the passage of legislation. The preponderance of the Commons and its 
improving success rate from 1703 rose (see Appendix 6.8).  
Because of the transmission requirement, better handling in the Irish Commons was not the 
exclusive determinant of improved legislative success. Bills needed to be actively managed in 
London. In some cases the messengers carried out the functions of agents able to explain the 
background and to provide information. In November 1703 Lord Lieutenant Ormond told Secretary 
of State Nottingham that: 
the bearer is the son of Judge Echlin and a Member of the House of Commons here. He 
has shown great zeal and forwardness in all things relating to Her Majesty's service, and 
can give ... a particular account of every transaction here during the session.
39
 
The messenger sent to London in July 1709 was Alexander Denton MP (in both Dublin and 
Westminster), Second Secretary of the Castle Secretariat of Lord Lieutenant Wharton,
40
 who told 
Secretary of State Sunderland that he had 'attended all the Council Board when the bills of any 
consequence were passing there, will be able to give ... a better account and more ... than I can 
write ... and to answer any questions or difficulties that may arise upon' them. He added that he 
had given Denton 'what my thoughts are, as to some of them, which I have directed him to 
communicate to your lordship'.
41
 These agents were not acting for the Commons but at the 
direction of the administration and could report its views on legislation as expressed in the Privy 
Council. In 1723 the bills were sent over with a Mr Downs, a relation of the duchess of Grafton, 
who had previously worked in the Treasury and with under-secretary Stanyan in London, who 
therefore knew his way around Whitehall.
42
 Others were not so experienced. Chief Secretary 
Webster explained in 1719 that a Mr Hoy [Hoey], one of the lord lieutenant's ushers, who had 
taken over the first transmission of bills needed assistance and that Mr Reynel,  
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  SP, 63–363 f.123(stamped 7) (Lord Lieutenant Ormond to Secretary of State Nottingham, 9 Nov 1703); the next 
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42
  SP, 63–381(stamped 196) (Whichcote to Temple Stanyan, 31 Oct 1723) 
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whom my lord lieutenant has ordered to solicit those and all the others that shall be 
sent over. Mr Hoy is a stranger in the public offices, and ... not very well acquainted 
with the steps he is to take in passing these bills.
43
  
By 1729 the administration was taking no chances with the money bills: Mr Broughton was sent 
with the money bills via Chester and Mr Wells sent with duplicates via Holyhead.
44
 No such 
insurance was offered to other bills. 
As the Hoy case shows, the messenger was often supplemented by agents acting for the officers 
of the administration. In 1711 Southwell's agent in London, William Wogan,
45
 reported that 
Ormond's agent, Thomas Medlicott,
46
 had put the case for the contentious molasses clause in the 
supply bill as 'it seems to interfere with the power of the parliament here. But Mr Medlicott having 
attended [the Privy Council] and offered several reasons in favour of the clause I hope [it] will 
pass'.
47
 Communication sometimes faltered. On 25 December 1729 Secretary of State the duke of 
Newcastle explained to Carteret why changes had been made to the supply bill: 
that the only reason for altering the bills in the manner it was done, was to make it 
consistent, and that all those who advanced their money to supply the exigencies of His 
Majesty's government might have an equal security for their interest till the principal were 
repaid them: But that if the Privy Council [and] those employed in the management of the 
Revenue had been informed of the several steps taken in passing the this bill through the 
House of Commons, and that the substance of the most essential of those alterations had 
been proposed there, but they would not receive it, the Lords of the Committee would have 
advised sending it back as it came how incorrect soever it might appear, rather than to 
have its being lost in Ireland, for the sake of these alterations'.
48
 
One 'messenger' with a noteworthy name occurs in a letter of 7 October 1707 from Chief 
Secretary Dodington, who was impatient to get bills back and before the Irish parliament quickly. 
He stated that he expected Jodrell to bring them directly from the ship.
49
 No other information is 
given. But Paul Jodrell was clerk of the Westminster House of Commons from 1683 to 1727.
50
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  SP, 63–377(stamped 17) (To [Delafaye], 16 Aug 1719) 
44
  SP, 63–391(stamped 234) (Thomas Tickell to Delafaye, 20 Nov 1729) 
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  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.181, comments on Wogan: 'Wogan emerges from his own letters as earnest 
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prototype of the official known later in the eighteenth century as the ‘resident secretary’. As was the pattern in the 
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  He was also Ormond's secretary and estate manager and an MP at Westminster. 
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  BL, Add. 37,674, f.29 (Wogan to Chief Secretary Southwell, 6 Sep 1711); for molasses clause see p.194 below.  
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  SP, 63–391(stamped 280)  
49
  SP, 63–366 f.92(stamped 234)  
50
  Williams, Clerical Organization, pp.35-47, portrays Jodrell as an assiduous and systematic record-keeper and 
organiser, setting up what became the Journal Office of the Commons and a drafter of bills. There is another piece 




Westminster was in recess until the first parliament of Great Britain convened on 23 October 1707 
and so, if this is Paul Jodrell, it would be surprising if he were not a conduit for advice on procedure 
and record-keeping to the clerks in the Dublin parliament, which met throughout October. The 
traffic was not all one way. Lords Justice Galway recorded on 28 May 1716 that 'Mr Sterne arrived 
yesterday' with several bills.
51
 Enoch Sterne had been a committee clerk in the Commons in 1710 
and was by this time Clerk of the (Irish) Parliaments. Direct contact between the clerks of the 
Commons at Westminster and Dublin was nothing new. As Coleman Dennehy notes, William 
Bradley, clerk of the House in 1613, was sent to 'serve an apprenticeship of sorts at Westminster, 
just at a critical point when the Irish journals were first being used and the English parliament was 
rapidly organizing its own procedures, records etc'.
52
 Direct evidence of contact and exchanges in 
the following century is lacking but the development of the Irish House in step or a few steps 
behind Westminster points towards contact. The pattern established in 1613 of observing and 
adopting Westminster's processes can be detected in 1692 and again from 1703. The references 
to Jodrell and Sterne point to a continuing link. 
Reconvening the Irish parliament after the transmission could not be fixed with certainty but the 
authorities in Dublin appear to have been consistently optimistic about turn-around times
53
 
resulting in the need for further adjournments if bills did not appear;
54
 short adjournments kept 
Members in Dublin and were grist to the rumour mills that particular bills would not come back or 
would be altered.
55
 Most transmissions were therefore accompanied by pleas from Dublin for bills 
to be turned round quickly and unchanged.
56
 After mishaps in the 1690s when bills had gone 
astray, the administrative arrangements from 1703 proved to be more efficient. Whitehall 
scrutinised the bills though an Irish committee of the Privy Council drawing on expert opinion from 
the law officers and where necessary, from others such as the Board of Trade, as well as giving 
petitioners their say. Whitehall was aware of the timing constraints but was not to be rushed at the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
of evidence of direct contact with Jodrell: in 1703 Lt.-Gen. William Steuart MP discussed paying Jodrell for drafting 
a clause in what appears to be an English bill (BL, Add. 28,891 f.283).  
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  SP, 63–374(stamped 244) (Lords Justices Galway and Grafton to Stanhope) 
52
  Dennehy, Administrative History, fn 20  
53
  For example, SP, 63–366 f.173(stamped 43) (Wharton to Sunderland, 29 June 1709) ) and SP, 63–367(stamped 
343) (Ormond to Secretary of State Dartmouth) on 8 Aug 1711 Ormond estimated a five week recess was 
necessary; the actuality was two months.  
54
  See CJI Jan-Feb 1703/4, May 1705, Sep 1707, July 1709, Aug 1710, Sep-Oct 1711, Feb-Mar 1715/6, Sep 1719, 
Dec 1721, Jan-Feb 1725/6, Feb 1729/30. 
55
  See fn 329 below. 
56
  For example, SP, 63–366 f.194 (stamped 118) (Southwell to Dartmouth, 13 July 1710) 
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expense of thorough examination. One problem the Privy Council encountered was the absence 




One significant change that emerged from 1715―showing that the procedures matured―was that 
royal assent to the supply bill(s) no longer marked the end of the session. As noted, the 1698–99 
session finished abruptly when the supply bill had become law. In the reign of Anne supply bills 
had to tread water in the Lords while other legislation completed its passage for an end-of-session, 
omnibus granting of assent.
58
 By the 1729–30 session the supply bills received assent in 
December 1729, that was before the transmission recess; all other bills received royal assent at 
the end of the session in April 1730. The timing of supply was no longer dependent on the 
administration addressing grievances (by assenting to legislation) but, instead, money was, in 
effect, voted ahead of, or on account for, legislation in the pipeline and emerging later in the 
session. The political process was developing. 
4.3  Divisions 
As in England,
59
 a challenge by one MP to the Speaker’s determination of the voices was sufficient 
to precipitate a division.
60
 Divisions were much more frequent at Westminster than Dublin, 
although some circumspection has to be exercised on any figures derived from the Journals as Sir 
John Perceval's diaries for 1713 show that not all divisions were recorded.
61
 Inevitably the number 
of divisions increased during periods of political controversy—the 1692 and 1713 parliaments are 
cases in point. A division had characteristics of a battle, especially for those opposing the 
administration. When the main supply bill in the 1703–04 session came up for its third reading 
Southwell commented that it was the 'grand day for our supply' and that the opponents arrived 
early to 'observe a little the countenance of the House' before seeking a division.
62
 In this case 
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  In July 1710 the Privy Council's examination was held up as it did not have copies of earlier Irish legislation. Two 
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f.208(stamped 39) (Wharton to [Sunderland], 20 July 1710). 
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  Thomas, Commons, p.244  
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  CJI(I), p.582; for example, in 19 Sep 1662, the 'Speaker declared the affirmatives were the greater vote; but one of 
the Members standing up, and averring upon his judgment, that the negatives carried it, the House divided and 
appointed tellers; who reported, that the affirmatives, that stayed within, 33; and the negatives that went forth, 41'.  
61
  See Appendix 6.20 and p.56 above.  
62
  BL, Add. 28,893, f.65 (Southwell to John Ellis, [20] Feb 1704/5) 




having reconnoitred they did not press for a division. At other times divisions appear to run in 
clusters—for example, of the six recorded divisions in the 1709 session, five took place in June 
1707―or when attendance was such that a division was advantageous to one group. The reasons 
for calling a division were: 
a) to show the administration the strength of feeling—the divisions in the 1692 
parliament appear to fall into this category;  
b) to test the number on each side; Delafaye reported at the beginning of the 1715 
session that St. John Brodrick led an attack in the House of Commons on supply and 
he 'tried his strength ... upon a Question about printing the report of the Committee of 
Accounts wherein all the articles of the king's establishment that could be criticised 
are found fault with. But we carried it by 154 against 51'. The upshot was that 
Brodrick 'did not attempt a division when we came to the supply', because his support 
fell away and 'he would not have had 30 of his side'.
63
 
c) where the House was fairly evenly divided and a division was necessary to determine 
a matter. Between 1692 and 1713 the average majority in divisions recorded in the 
Journals was 25 but in the some sittings such as 1695 and 1697 it fell to 10 and 17 
respectively and in the 1707 session it was 12. The administration's expectation was 
that the opposition would not press for a division if it was going to lose by a large 
majority.
64
 Marmaduke Coghill expressed surprise when St. John Brodrick pressed a 
division on amending the wording of an address to George I, which he lost by 103 
votes to eight: 'what Mr Brodrick meant by this division I cannot tell, but I suppose he 




In procedural terms the Irish House followed Westminster. There were two tellers for each side—
though not always explicit from the Journals—appointed by the Speaker.
66
 Journal entries and 
Perceval's diaries indicate that the Commons followed the English procedure with one side leaving 
the chamber and the other remaining. Members within the chamber were counted by the tellers 
and then they counted those coming back in. The Journals record an apparent exception in the 
division on 25 November 1713 on the election of the Speaker with the 'teller for the yeas (Mr 
Anderson Saunders) on the right ... teller for the noes (Mr John Moore) on the left',
67
 indicating that 
all Members stayed within the chamber. This procedure was that used for a division in a committee 
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of the whole House, where the Members divided by going to different sides of the chamber,
68
 and 
was the procedure used at Westminster for contested elections for the speakership.
69
 It 
superseded the disorderly procedure in the previous election for a Speaker in 1613. On that 
occasion the supporters of Sir John Davies, who were in the majority, went out, but on leaving the 
chamber were locked out allowing those remaining within to put their candidate, Sir John Everard, 
physically, but temporarily, in the Chair.
70
 
In deciding who went out and who stayed the Speaker at Westminster was guided by precedents, 
the principle behind which was that those introducing a new matter or alteration should 'go forth'.
71
 
A comparison of the divisions (from 1692) listed in the Journals with the later guidance in Hatsell's 
Precedents shows not only that the Irish House followed Westminster in the items listed but also in 
applying the principle behind the rule to items not in the Precedents.
72
 The Westminster procedure 
was adopted smoothly and silently: there is no evidence that an MP challenged the operation of 
the rule nor that anyone sought to draw up a list of precedents based on past practice in the Irish 
House. 
P.D.G. Thomas, writing with mid eighteenth-century Westminster in view, suggests that there was 
a perception that the side that stayed had a slight advantage—since they would probably include 
among their number the lazy and those who wanted to retain a seat.
73
 Analysis of the data gives 
some support to this view: those staying in the chamber won 58% of the divisions.
74
 But the 
samples are small and the figures for the first two sessions of the 1727 parliament, which indicate 
those staying in won 74% of the divisions, show the risks of relying on data sets that are 
statistically too small. On the limited contemporary evidence available there is no evidence that 
contemporaries were aware of such a bias or attempted to skew divisions accordingly. Sir John 
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Elizabethan House, p.383).  
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  See Appendix 6.19. 




Perceval's diaries do not mention any advantage in staying in the chamber, even in the tumultuous 
and tight votes in 1713.
75
 If Thomas is correct, the bias was slight and unconscious.  
When the votes tied, the Speaker was called on to cast his vote.
76
 There was no tradition of the 
Speaker at Westminster voting according to precedent until the middle of the eighteenth century. 
(One reason was that it was such a rare occurrence so there was no stimulus to formulate rules.) 
There is only one example of a tie in a pre-1692 parliament. On 7 August 1641 the votes tied at 50 
each and although 'the casting voice was in Mr Speaker', he asked the House’s leave to put off a 
decision until after the recess, which was granted.
77
 The next instance was on 15 October 1695, 
when on the question that a Member be called to the bar to answer a charge of disorder, the 
Speaker voted with the yeas and the Member was called.
78
 The next recorded ties were in the 
1727–28 session on reports from Committee of Privileges and Elections. In the first Speaker 
Conolly voted with the yeas that a returned Member, Henry Ponsonby, a placeman
79
 was duly 
elected. In the second he gave is vote for considering a report from committee forthwith.
80
 
4.4  The Speaker 
Between 1692 and 1730 six men held the post of Speaker.
81
 All were lawyers and held the post for 
more than one session (except Levinge) and were major political figures in Ireland. The 
expectations and attributes of the office mirrored those of the Speaker at Westminster, as did most 
procedures governing his powers, functions and status. There was at Westminster a traditional, 
formalised etiquette that surrounded the occupant of the Chair: he was supposed to be impartial 
and he was not be criticised directly in the House.
82
 The convention was not without purpose in 
that it eased the functioning of the House. It seems to have applied in Dublin as well but the 
political structure of Ireland differed: the administrations in Dublin Castle, more noticeable after 
1711, lacked the direct connections and knowledge to secure a firm control of the parliament. Into 
this space and to secure the management of administration business in the Commons the 
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Speaker stepped. The result was that the Speaker had a degree of independence and influence 
on policy and patronage―often bolstered with another important office
83
―not usual in Speakers at 
Westminster. (The closest parallel at Westminster was Speaker Harley.) Dennehy sees the 
tradition of active, if not independent, Speakers going back to Audley Mervyn in the 1660s.
84
 C.I. 
McGrath suggests that a turning point came in 1703 with the election of Alan Brodrick as Speaker, 
who as a leader of the Whigs, was out of step with Ormond's Tory administration and set out to 
change, if not thwart, some of the administration's policies.
85
 Brodrick does, however, present a 
danger for the historian: of the six the records for his speakership are probably the most extensive 
and personal.
86
 His letters set out some of his thoughts and analyses of events (though he was 
always on guard that his correspondence might be read by hostile eyes and he painted himself as 
more passive and reactive than others perceived him); and Brodrick's abrasive behaviour 
provoked comments by others whose surviving correspondence is both better attuned to the 
activities in the Commons and more voluminous than that for 1715 to 1730. Subject to that caution, 
the focus in this section is on how the Speakers operated as chairman of the Commons. Three 
issues are examined: 
i. the inauguration process for Speakers; 
ii. management of business; and 
iii. procedural rulings.  
The election and installation of the Speaker had five main steps: 
1) instruction from the monarch to the Commons to elect a Speaker; 
2) the election; 
3) royal approbation; 
4) claim by the Speaker of the ancient privileges of the Commons; and 
5) Speaker's report back to the Commons.
87
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The House in 1692 followed these steps and most of the attendant choreography. Having been 
directed to elect a Speaker, the House chose Sir Richard Levinge and, as Sydney reported:  
accordingly he was led to the chair by two of the Members after the usual manner. After he 
was in the chair he stood up and gave the House thanks for the honour they had done 
him, excusing his inability for so great an undertaking, and promising nevertheless his 
utmost endeavours to serve their Majesties and this country, and hoping the House would 
assist and support him therein.
88
  
The 'usual manner' to Sydney meant Westminster procedure. The Speaker-elect presented for 
approbation in the Lords made a formal speech saying how unsuitable and inadequate he was 
and requesting a direction to the Commons to reconsider its choice, which was rejected.
89
 Levinge 
then accepted and requested the House's privileges:  
freedom of speech and debate, and not to be molested in their persons, goods, or 
attendants; that the errors I shall commit in delivering the sense of the House be not 
imputed to the Commons ... and pardoned ... and when the public good shall require, I 
may ... have free access to your Excellency's most noble person.
90
  
But some of the details went awry, in part because Sydney was ill, which caused a delay in giving 
approbation. Members were sworn in by the Speaker-elect when English procedure was that this 
had to wait until the Speaker had received royal approval.
91
  
In 1703 Southwell noted variance from Westminster procedure at the start of the 1703 parliament: 
both Houses met in pursuance of the writs and [Ormond] went to the House of Lords in the 
usual state, and there made his speech, it being according to the precedents upon the 
Journals here, the custom to make it the first day, after which the Commons proceeded to 
their House to choose a Speaker.
92
 
On election as Speaker in 1713 Brodrick did not disable himself in his speech. Instead, he said 
'that the difficulty of discharging that high trust made him tremble'. The reason being his fear that 
the customary offer might be accepted. Lord Chief Justice Cox speculated that:  
No doubt but there was a glorious opportunity for exercising the prerogative in refusing 
him, and provocation enough, but there being no precedent in England since the 
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The comment itself that throws light on the basis for justification for procedures in the Irish House 
of Commons. 
The speech from the throne was given when the Commons appeared for the instruction to elect a 
Speaker. This followed previous Irish practice in 1634, 1639/40 and 1661, when the lords 
justices/lord deputy declared the reasons for calling the parliament at first appearance of the 
Commons. Such an approach sat with the spirit of Poynings' Law, which required a certification 
process for reasons for calling a parliament. Westminster practice was for the speech to be made 
once the Speaker had been approved.
94
 Levinge formally reported the speech when he returned 
after approbation as did his successors. It was not until 1715 that the practice changed and the 
speech was―following the Westminster model―delivered immediately on approbation of the 
Speaker.
95
 One further change bringing the Irish House into line with Westminster practice was 
that when at the start of the 1695 parliament Rochfort returned to the Commons the first item of 
business was the first reading of a bill.
96
 The procedure once established was followed at the 
commencement of all subsequent parliaments and in procedural terms moved the Commons from 
the straitjacket of Poynings' Law imposing the priorities of the administration to the Westminster 
model of a legislature setting its own agenda. 
When arrangements were being made for the 1692 parliament Sydney told Whitehall: 'the Speaker 
of this House of Commons must have an allowance, or else nobody will undertake the office. The 
fittest man, certainly, is the Solicitor [Levinge], but, if nothing be given him, it will undo him. He 
deserves very well every way, and is very likely to please in that employment'. The Speaker's 
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4.5  Management of business 
In 1704 Southwell gave London a critical and illuminating account of Brodrick's methods of 
operation. Brodrick 'sometimes in the chair ... would beckon Members to him, or write notes to 
them, directing them what to propose, and furnish them with arguments against the queen's 
interest'. Frequently he would reproach those  
that did not run in with him, giving some rude language, and asking them how they 
could answer it ... to their own consciences, their country and posterity, and whether 
they meant to make themselves beggars.  
He 'endeavoured to create an aversion' among Members 'to the parliament of England ... crying 
out on all occasions against [its] cruelties and oppressions' and he spoke against the alterations to 
heads of a bill made in England, 'and lamented the sad condition of Ireland, that no good could be 
had from England without some mixture of poison'. Brodrick claimed that 'nothing but his love of 
his country could make him be against' the administration but 'when the necessities of the 
government was at any time insisted upon, he knew the circumstances, and that there was no 
such necessity'. In his endeavours he was assisted by 'his most near relatives and friends [who] 
laboured by his example to discontent the House with the parliament of England'. Brodrick could 
also charm. When the Committee on Supply was sitting, rather than retiring into his chamber as 
the Speaker should, Brodrick was the first to speak from the floor and his going 'from man to man 
... with earnest entreaties' during the ensuing division greeted those who came over 'saying 
welcome, welcome, and calling others over by their names whom he saw stay behind with so great 
passion as in the sum of affairs depended upon that vote'. Southwell explained Brodrick's influence 
'there was never anything done in the House to the prejudice of the Crown, which had not its 
foundation first laid by himself in the committee' but he could be thwarted when 'some things 
projected by him in the committee were retrieved in the House'.
98
 In 1713 Perceval broadly 
confirmed Southwell―at least during Brodrick's first term as Speaker: 
when he was Speaker last time I found his [unruly?] passions were much more prevented 
by his being tied to some decency in their Chair: and could be seldom at liberty, for when 
he was in a committee he had it all to himself.
99
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Southwell's analysis not only exposed Brodrick's tactics but also provided the basis for effective 
counter-measures. The House itself could, and did, check Brodrick. Southwell recorded at the start 
of the 1703 session when the House turned to its examination of Annesley's alleged 'false and 
scandalous assertions ... on ... Protestant freeholders ... the Speaker seeming too partial in the 
examination' of witnesses, it was put to the vote whether the Speaker should examine, or every 
Member of the House propound the questions, which was carried for the latter by 116 against 
111.
100
 Not only was the House curbing the Speaker, it was also moving from the older practice of 
the Speaker speaking on behalf of the House to the procedure that had emerged at Westminster 
where Members themselves put questions.
101
 
Brodrick himself enjoyed both the power and the prestige of the speakership. With supply in mind, 
he wrote on 27 January 1703/4: 
You cannot imagine what an alteration I observe in some men's faces: I have civilities, nay 
visits from some whom till very late I have not had the happiness to be spoken to by in 
some months past; heats are desired to be avoided, and all things were intended for the 
best on all hands, and we shall and must be very good friends again: nay now we are told 
the money bill is not altered (which I will believe when I see cause) they would not have 
given their vote for it, if it had been altered.
102
 
A year later he wrote with some self-awareness (and self-pity) about the position of Speaker: 'I am 
master of temper enough to act as becomes me though others should insult me in the worst 
manner' and 'my personal friends, as well as some who will not (even in me) suffer a Speaker to 
be ill treated secure me against anything my enemies may wish were to be compassed'.
103
 
Bergin's work on the Quaker lobby has also thrown light on lobbying of the Speaker by interest 
groups. He points out that in 1709 the Quaker committee, unhappy with the exemption proposed 
for Quakers in the popery bill, decided as part of their strategy to secure changes, to offer the 
Speaker 20 guineas and find out the clerks' due but Brodrick 'refused taking anything, and said he 
only desired us to believe he acted sincerely and from a principle, believing we were worthy of 
favour and that he was our friend'. Bergin comments that the committee was naïve to expect the 
Speaker should risk having it said his influence was up for sale for such a small sum and that 
some years previously Brodrick had fallen under suspicion of taking money from a Catholic agent 
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in return for supporting a private bill.
104
 There is little evidence about the extent to which Speakers 
promoted private bills. Brodrick does not mention them in detail in his correspondence and there is 
not much evidence on Conolly's activities. On 20 August 1719 Conolly wrote to London, apparently 
as an exception, in support of a private bill of his relative Echlin: 'it is really an honest and just bill 
the family [ill-miscarried?] by the contrivance of one Mr Chilwood who has but an indifferent 
character and whose interest it is to give all the obstruction possible'.
105
 
Active intervention in committee by Speakers was not confined to Brodrick, who records that in 
March 1715/6 Speaker Conolly without adequate support from the administration  
took hold of [an] opportunity when the House was in a committee on heads of a bill for 
farther securing the King's person and government, to propose a clause to be added to 
that bill for indemnifying dissenters for acting in the militia, and also all such as should 
be commissioned or employed in the army within ten years.  
Ironically Brodrick regarded Conolly's action as 'ill-judged' in political terms but made no procedural 
objection.
106
 Like Brodrick, Conolly operated with a coterie of supporters (though fewer were 
relatives) such as Henry Maxwell, whom Brodrick disparaged as 'the Speaker's echo'.
107
 During 
the debates on the national bank in 1721 Brodrick noted that 'Mr Maxwell and Dean Gore
108
 were 
detached from the Speaker's House to a number of the Commons who were met at a tavern 
opposite to the Custom House, to encourage 'them to go on' and 'to assure them that they would 
and should be supported in it, and methods taken to soften or make proselytes' of opponents.
109
 
Conolly's management techniques had less of the splenetic proto-patriot that Brodrick displayed 
and more the patron and fixer. Brodrick records with disdain and apprehension that at Christmas 
1721 Conolly entertained at Castletown not only his usual circle but the lord lieutenant and they 
discussed tactics for managing the Commons such as pushing preferred measures in a thin 
House.
110
 Brodrick himself, according to Coghill, adopted similar, though perhaps more 
dissembling, tactics when attacking the financial accounts presented at the 1725 session: 'he was 
                                                        
 
104
  John Bergin, 'The Quaker Lobby and its Influence on Irish Legislation 1692–1705', Eighteenth-Century Ireland, vol. 
19 (2004), pp.32-33  
105
  SP, 63–377(stamped 34) (To [Stanhope]) 
106
  Midleton Letters (1248/3/316-17) (To [Thomas Brodrick], 1 Mar 1715/6) 
107
  Midleton Letters (1248/3/386-87) ([Lord Brodrick], to Thomas Brodrick, 10 Jun 1716); Hayton classes him a 
lieutenant of Speaker Conolly, Coghill Letters, p.xv.  
108
  William Gore, chaplain from 1716 to 1731, was the brother of Sir Ralph Gore MP, who succeeded Conolly as 
Speaker in 1729. See p.200 below. 
109
  Midleton Letters (1248/5/129-30) ([Alan Brodrick], to Mrs Martha Courthope, 7 Nov 1713) 
110
  Midleton Letters (1248/5/121-24 ([Lord Midleton], to Thomas Brodrick, 17 Dec 1721), 170-173 ([Lord Midleton], 
Dublin, to [Thomas Brodrick], 10 Jan 1721/2)) 
Chapter 4: The operation of the House of Commons 
181 
 
at the Castle professing zeal and regard for [Carteret's] ease and honour in the parliament, and yet 
always kept open table, and attended the ... Commons to encourage gentlemen to pursue the 
methods proposed by his son'.
111
 Conolly was better at observing the courtesies without obvious 
hypocrisy. Charles Dering commented to Lord Perceval on 4 January 1715/6―both were Tories 
and both ceased being MPs when the 1713 parliament was dissolved―'I must do this justice to 
some of the Members to say that they have behaved themselves in a gentlemanlike manner, to 
me particularly Manley and Conolly'.
112
 Dering also interpreted what has sometimes been seen as 
an act of Whig vengeance―the requirement of those who addressed the queen in support of Lord 
Chancellor Phipps―as the Commons being 'willing to mix mercy with justice' when they were 
allowed to beg pardon in their places (rather than the more humiliating on their knees at the bar) 
which was 'an end of that business'.
113
 
On 17 June 1662 the Journals record the earliest example of a procedural ruling by the Speaker 
when he ruled that his estimation of the voices had to be called before the House moved to new 
business (though there may have been earlier unrecorded examples and later ones too). Brodrick 
was conscious of precedent and as a lawyer was reticent to rely on a partially remembered source 
in the heat of debate. In March 1704/5 he had passed to the House the letter from the Lower 
House of Convocation objecting to a clause in a money bill which affected tithes.
114
 The House 
having vigorously rejected Convocation's representations wished to express its anger by taking the 
deliverer of the letter into custody. Brodrick explained: 
Sir Ri[chard] Leving moved to have him taken into custody and the question was called for. 
I delayed putting it for some time, and either twice or thrice asked whether it was insisted 
on to have me put it; for indeed I had in my head the privilege of the servants of the 
Members of the Convocation, though I had not lately read the 8 H.6.Cap.1. and the 
obstruction or hint I gave was as much as I could well justify; but the question was loudly 
called for, and unanimously carried.
115
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The incident shows the limits of his powers and room for manoeuvre in the face a House in full 
cry.
116
 Procedural rulings by the Speaker could be given from the floor, though to be effective they 
needed to be part of a wider strategy. Delafaye reported on an attempt by a new MP, Robert Ross, 
whom he describes as 'the forwardest and silliest fellow of that clan'―presumably dissident 
Whigs―to reopen the question of supply at the end of the 1715–16 session during a debate in the 
Committee on the State of the Nation: 
Nobody else offering to speak on that side the Speaker stood up and [shewed?] how 
unparliamentary it was in a Committee on the State of the Nation to bring on the business 
of the Committee of Accounts and of Supply which were long since closed the supply 
given and passed into Acts of parliament and the sessions near a conclusion and how 
unreasonable, how ungracious, how dangerous it was to come into extraordinary methods 
the tendency of which could not be conceived or the consequences foretold ... The debate 
lasted about 3 hours. Their design was ... to have gone through the Establishment ... fallen 
on the pensions and addressed the King to strike them off. But we prevented them by 
offering at last some amendments to their question which sufficiently puzzled it afforded an 
occasion to move that their chairman should leave the Chair which was carried by 124 
against 60, of which [the] last 30 were Tories [and] discontented Whigs.
117
 
The account shows that Conolly had to lead the counter-attack himself and that his tactics to be 
effected had to be a combination of the procedural, political and psychological. 
4.6  The day in the House of Commons 
Following the pattern established by the 1661 parliament and Westminster the Irish House usually 
sat six days a week (Monday to Saturday) and adjourned to the following day (or on Saturdays to 
Monday).
118
 According to P.D.G. Thomas, the pattern of the day changed during the eighteenth 
century from morning-afternoon to afternoon-evening sittings with the consequence that select 
committees moved from evening to mornings as they could not meet while the House was 
sitting.
119
 Although there were late sittings from time to time, the Irish House down to 1730 followed 
the morning-afternoon pattern. But from the 1690s, when the start time was usually 9am or, 
occasionally, 8am,
120
 the House drifted to a 10am start by the 1720s.  
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As at Westminster the Speaker was in charge of the agenda. In October 1703 Southwell criticised 
Speaker Brodrick's manipulation to secure the expulsion of William Robinson: ''The last Votes of 
incapacity was put on the paper by the Speaker, and went off in a heat before people know of it, as 
many affirm to me that were by'.
121
 A comparison of Sir John Perceval's diaries for the 1711 and 
1713 sessions shows that the Journal entries appear to record business in the order in which it 
happened.
122
 On this basis it is uncertain
123
 that the Speaker did, or could, organise business 
exactly according to the Westminster model order of business, which P.D.G. Thomas sets for a 
day in the English House of Commons in the eighteenth century: 
a) prayers; 
Private business which included: 
b) petitions; 
c) reports of committees appointed to examine petitions; 
d) reports of committees appointed to draw up bills;  
e) private bills; 
Public business which included: 
f) petitions; 




Although not recorded in the Journals, prayers were said each day by the chaplain. Prayers did not 
necessarily mean the start of business. According to P.D.G. Thomas, the Speaker at Westminster 
'generally retired to his own Room or sat informally in the House at the Table ... to await a fuller 
attendance'.
125
 The quorum was 40. There is no evidence either to confirm or disprove that this 
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was the pattern in the Irish House. The Speaker at Westminster signified the commencement of 
public business either by calling for the orders of the day or calling a Member who had given notice 
of his intention to make a motion.
126
  
The day in the chamber normally ended by 4pm. This is firmer ground as this is the time at which 
most committees met and, because they could not meet while the House was sitting, it provided 
an end point. In addition, when the House had to sit later than 4pm, an entry was required in the 
Journals: that all committees adjourn or that a committee due to meet that day adjourn.
127
 One 
other Journal entry gives an indication when the House sat late, as well as implying that it normally 
concluded its business during the hours of daylight: 'That candles be brought in'.
128
 If these two 
entries are counted, cautiously, as possible indicators of late sittings during the sessions, they 
show that the highest rate of late sittings was in the long 1695–97 session with around 30 late 
sittings, followed by the 1698–99 and 1704–05 sessions with 15 each, and the rate continued to 
fall until the 1713 session. On the evidence nearly 40% of the sittings in the truncated 1713 
session went beyond 4pm; the one on 18 December lasted until past 2am.
129
 While Sir John 
Perceval's diaries
130
 show that the House sat and transacted business in the morning and normally 
finished by 4pm and corroborates that where the Journals recorded that candles were brought in 
or committees adjourned the House sat late, the omission of these Journal entries cannot be taken 
as confirmation that the House did not sit after 4pm.
131
 Where the Journals recorded that a debate 
occurred, a division took place, a matter was adjourned or amendments were made, these were 
indications that an item of business occupied the House for some time but the opposite was not 
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the case: as noted, some business such as a lengthy debate on a motion that was withdrawn left 
no trace in the Journals.
132
  
Orders of the day were a convention developed at Westminster that provided some structure to 
business.
133
 These were matters which the House had already agreed to consider on a particular 
day.
134
 The process had two effects: it provided some notice of business coming up and prevented 
an item of business from being taken before the day to which it was set down; and it provided a 
queuing system and loose order of priority for business. According to P.D.G. Thomas, by the 
eighteenth century at Westminster orders of the day were usually confined to public business and 
reading of the orders was supposed to mean that no new business could be introduced after the 
orders had been read, though this was often not the case.
135
 
Although the 1661 parliament set items of business down for consideration on future days,
136
 it 
was rudimentary compared to the system which operated in the Commons after 1703. The term 
'order of the day' appeared in the Journal for 8 October 1692.
137
 Because the volume of business 
was light (compared to later parliaments) or possibly because of the importance Members 
attached to them, items set down for consideration on a particular day were usually dealt with on 
the appointed day
138
 and there was no need for a 'sweeper' entry to carry forward a day’s 
unconsidered business. A Journal entry for October 1695 setting out fees indicated how the 
process was developing: 'to the Clerk of the Lobby, for every order he enters in the Book of Orders 
... 1s'.
139
 Although the Clerk of the Lobby is not known in Dublin or Westminster, the function is that 
of a Table Office, a place where a clerk received notice of items of business entered in the book of 
orders. From November 1703 the Journals regularly contained the entry 'all orders of the day, not 
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proceeded on, be adjourned till tomorrow',
140
 particularly when the House was busy.
141
 By 1711 
the entry occurs in the majority of daily entries. The decision to read the Orders of the day was put 
as a question: 'That the House do proceed on the Orders of the Day'. On 24 October 1711 the 
House divided on the question and it was negatived by 109 to 105 votes. As Sir John Perceval's 
diaries reveal,
142
 the question was put to cut short a debate on a motion made that day. As a 
consequence the debate on the motion continued and the orders of the day not proceeded with 
were adjourned to the following day.
143
  
Notwithstanding the order in which business was actually taken, there was increasing distinction 
between private and public business.
144
 On 15 November 1703 the House 'Ordered, That during 
this session no motion be made in any private business after twelve o'clock'
145
 and on 1 June 1709 
the House 'Resolved, That no new Motion be made, or any Petition received after twelve o'clock, 
without leave of the House; and that the same be a standing order of the House';
146
 it was 
subsequently amended to 1pm on 14 June 1710.
147
 Sir John Perceval's diaries largely focus on 
the business taken according to the orders as the day’s main business and, if he is representative, 
may therefore indicate why attendance in the morning was thin.
148
  
Appendix 6.21 sets out―middle column―for one day, 30 July 1711, the items considered 
'according to Order'. The first and third columns summarise the history of the House’s 
consideration before and subsequently of each item of business taken that day. Analysis of the 
table shows the following. 
a) There was variation in the tightness of the management of business. Not 
unexpectedly, the supply process was managed firmly with only one deferral—from 
26 to 28 July—which was to allow for additional papers to be produced to the 
Committee of Accounts and for it to report on 28 July.
149
 In contrast, although the 
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heads of a bill for the better securing the liberty of the subject and for preventing of 
imprisonment beyond the seas were initially actively managed, they failed to be 
considered by the House despite having been given two slots for consideration (28 
July and 2 August). (Heads of a bill with a similar title had been considered during 
every session since 1695 and had been rejected repeatedly by the Privy Council in 
London; in the pressure on business before the transmission adjournment it may 
therefore not have been given priority.) 
b) As at Westminster one indication that a measure had priority was that it was 
considered before the remaining orders were read—on 30 July both supply and the 
vagabonds heads of bill were taken preferentially ahead of the queue. 
c) The heads for the relief of Dorothy Rawdon, spinster, show that orders of the day in 




d) There was short-term, at least, planning ahead: business not completed on Tuesday, 
31 July was put down for Thursday, 2 August, not 1 August, as that day’s business 
included supply. 
e) The ordering of business to be taken at noon on a specified date 'and nothing to 
intervene' may have signalled some priority but was no guarantee that an item would 
be considered. This echoes P.D.G. Thomas' assessment of Westminster that there 




f) According to Perceval, the main item of business was consideration of the tillage (or 
corn) bill which occupied business from noon to 6pm.
152
  
4.7  Undertaking the management of business 
David Hayton has defined undertakers as providing 'the government with a parliamentary majority 
in return for a voice in policy-making and a substantial portion of official patronage for themselves 
and their dependents'.
153
 He has argued that emergent undertakers, or parts of the undertaking 
system, can be seen from the 1690s (as opposed to the previously established view of the 
1720s).
154
 This section is not a comprehensive review and analysis of the undertaking system but 
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examines how the undertakers' activities fitted into the operation of the Commons. The techniques 
used to manage the administration's business―negotiation, presenting a case, organising 
supporters, mastering procedure, keeping a weather-eye out for problems, dealing with 
difficulties―were necessary to the management of most parliamentary business. (Indeed, they 
can be found in modern legislatures and in the Westminster model are concentrated in the whips' 
offices.) Two contemporaries set out the standard statement of the job of undertaker. The first 
case is a letter written in October 1723 from Archbishop Boulter to Secretary of State Newcastle 
commenting on a threatened contention in the Commons 'about paying the debts of the nation'. 
Boulter reassured Newcastle that 'as the management of [the] affair is put into the hands of the 
Speaker, and the rest of His Majesty's hearty friends, ... all will end well' and while there were 
'great endeavours used to mislead the country gentlemen ... there will be equal pains taken to set 
them right'.
155
 The assessment was accurate as, despite the turmoil over Wood's halfpence, 
supply was secured. Second, when Conolly became ill in 1728 Coghill, reflecting on his skills in the 
Commons considered that he was 
able to unite and keep people together ... by obliging several of them by providing for their 
friends or relations in the Revenue, and such a one will be necessary in the House ... to 
keep people together, or they will either wander as sheep without a shepherd or will get 
into factions that may render the administration here uneasy.
156
 
These extracts highlight that undertaking focussed on an important but specific range of business: 
predominantly supply. As Boulter wrote to Newcastle on 22 November 1729, when supply had 
been secured in that session: 'the King's business is now over'.
157
 In other sessions the list might 
extend to legislation such as enacting the Treaty of Limerick or relief for Dissenters and highly 
charged proceedings such as Chief Secretary Sir John Stanley's attempts in 1713 to influence the 
debates on Dublin election.
158
  
For other business, including public bills, the administration kept a watching brief protecting the 
administration's interests and the royal prerogative and keeping a weather eye out for trouble. 
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Southwell's account of the debate leading to the expulsion of John Asgill
159
 shows him as an 
observer, sympathetic to Asgill but passive: 
Mr Asgill was then heard in his place upon the book laid to his charge; the character of the 
man and his generosity in his profession, together with several useful proposals he has for 
the improvement of the country did at one time seem to dispose the House very much to 
bring him off, or at least to let the matter drop. But Sir Richard Buckley and Mr Tenison 
having exposed the many indecent expressions in that book, and he himself in his defence 
owning the writing such a book, and pretending only there were many errors in the printed 
copy produced to him, and not seeming to make any recantation of any errors therein 




On legislation promoted by Members for parties other than the administration, the administration 
had the protection of the well-used provisions of Poynings' Law providing the power to revise and 
veto. 
Much time was spent by the administration fretting about the country gentlemen, who were more a 
type of MP than a party label. Coghill worried that sheep-like they would be misled 'by insinuations 
of crafty men',
161
 often lawyers spouting patriot arguments. The administration had a dislike of 
rhetoric, especially when coming from those who opposed or questioned its approach, but 
appreciated the value of the clear and convincing exposition of its own case. But it was not always 
able to get its case across to the country gentlemen. In July 1719 Webster complained that when 
debate arose on the terms of the address responding to the speech from the throne on the 
'method of rendering the Protestant Dissenters more useful ... some gentlemen [thought] that by 
any general words of compliance ... in their address, they should lay themselves under an 
unlimited engagement of favour to the Dissenters'. This obtuseness required careful handling. 
Webster continued that if the administration pressed too hard: 
it would very probably produce such heats as would obstruct the more necessary business 
of the session and unite such a number of Whigs with the Tories as to give great 
perplexity. I cannot help thinking from the intimacy I have with several Members, and upon 
observing a great reluctance even in some of His Majesty's servants who are in every 
other respect very zealous for his service, and are of consequence in the House, that, if 
the gentlemen were left to themselves without the government's interposing any further in 
this affair, the terms ... will more easily be obtained.
162
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As this quote also shows the use of undertakers did not mean that the administration contracted 
out contact with Members. Southwell complained to Nottingham in 1703: 
It is a miserable fatigue we are under. We are forced to use a great deal of claret and a 
great many arguments .... There is a most strange mixture of Scotch and fanatical 
principles which sours the mass. They are jealous of everything, and were it not that 
[Ormond] has a great personal interest, and many are ashamed to deny him ... nothing at 
all would be done... We found them mighty hearty and frank before they were chosen; now 
they begin to look angry and forget what they have promised.
163
 
Southwell, a loyal courtier, explained that during the 1705 session Ormond had 'taken very true 
pains to talk with and convince personally most of the Members: and [there] are near 30 of those 
against us last time, come over, who are sensible how they were imposed upon'.
164
 Later lords 
lieutenant continued the practice. At the start of the 1719 session Webster reported that Lord 
Lieutenant Bolton 'had yesterday in the evening a conference with some of His Majesty servants 
and other Members of the two Houses concerning the meeting of the parliament' at which some 
MPs asked for delay as many were detained in the country choosing new mayors and 
corporations and as a result Bolton sent a message to both Houses 'desiring them to adjourn 
themselves to ... 1st July; which they have accordingly done'.
165
 Sensitivity to the needs of the 
country gentlemen cut both ways in managing the timetable. Southwell in planning the 1705 
session appreciated the benefits of beginning the transmission recess at the same time as the 
start of the assizes since 'in this kingdom most of the gentlemen have business of law, or bargains 
to make ... so as they will be very glad to be loose by that time to attend them'.
166
 In 1725 the start 
of the session was delayed because of the 'backwardness of the harvest' (and to give the 
administration time to sort out the accounts before they had to be presented to the Commons).
167
 
Philip Perceval confirmed the advantages of a generous social approach to the country gentlemen. 
When, contrary to the usual pattern, it was rumoured that MPs would be summoned to attend after 
the transmission recess on 1 February 1725/6, he commented with Carteret in view that: 
a little eating and drinking well timed goes a great way with our country gentlemen, and 
this contrary to custom has been very sparing, and according to the general opinion it 
proceeds from too great a frugality which is no way conducing to popularity, for one bellyful 
of good meat and drink is more acceptable to the generality than twenty courteous smiles 
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which people imagine to be put on as occasion serves, and perhaps the next day no more 
notice taken of you than if you were never seen before.
168
 
Southwell on occasion carried out some functions that later would fit the undertaker's job 
description. From the surviving correspondence it is clear that he analysed the opposition and 
temperament of the House, counted and kept track of MPs and weighed up arguments and legal 
issues.
169
 In 1703 he led a team to negotiate with Speaker Brodrick, the effective leader of the 
main group opposing the administration:  
last night by appointment, I went to his house where as he said 8 or 9 of his friends should 
meet so many of the other opinion and discourse matters... I then exposed to him what the 
queen expected; how much [Ormond's] credit was at stake; the advantage to Ireland by 
showing a good temper towards England. We urged and argued the matter every way ... 
he would only consent to give for the support of the government for one year, or give 
£75,000 [on the grounds] that thereby there might be a session the next year and that we 
might have annual parliaments. His company agreed all this, as ours disagreed, and 
showed how different this practice was from what had been done in former governments 
and from the great professions he had made and so we parted without coming to any 
conclusions... It has often been the fate of this country to harken to such as load them into 
wild extravagant counsels, which has made them suffer.
170
 
Southwell's successor as chief secretary, Dodington, lacked his subtlety in managing Members. 
He complained:  
this miserable people ought to be grateful and have such laws as are for their security and 
the benefit of human society and though in some things they differ from our laws in 




With Delafaye the chief secretaryship reverted to the Southwell mode. He explained to Whitehall 
what had been required to get the supply through the 1715 session: 
much application and industry, we were forced to meet every night with the chief of our 
friends to provide against the next day's battle, the rest of the day was spent either in the 
House or in running about to solicit the Members and keep our forces together, whom 
Brodrick with as much diligence endeavoured to debauch and had this work lasted ... a 
week longer it would have killed us all.
172
 
The chief secretary was at the political sharp end in the Commons. He had to be present 
monitoring the debates and organising administration business and ready for anything that might 
happen. In 1703 Southwell explained what happened on a debate on the quantum of supply when 
the civilities required by the conventions of the House were breached and a Member rose up: 
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and said that although many gentlemen had made great preambles and professions of 
duty to the queen and respect to my lord lieutenant, yet it was plain they acted contrary... 
This was immediately caught up and pushed with all the heat imaginable. The words were 
demanded to be writ down. They called out to the Bar, and all the resentment possible was 
shown, and when with all the difficulty in the world we had endeavoured to bring them to 
some temper, and the gentleman had begged pardon, one Member still insisting upon it to 
have it censured, another accident happened; for a gentleman, instead of calling him down 
to order, said to him: you shall sit down. This set them in a new flame, and those that were 
averse to the supply made all the advantage of this they could, and said it was plain that 
things were to be crammed down etc.; whereupon we were forced to excuse the 
indiscretion of both the Members and put off the business till Monday, which in all 
probability had then passed.
173
 
The chief secretary had to be able to read the House. At the start of the 1703 parliament Southwell 
reflected that 'there is no answering for the proceedings of a public body; but no arguments are 
wanting in for Her Majesty's servants' and so he was hopeful for the session.
174
 He noted how the 
House changed its view of absentee pensioners which he cited 'to show the difference of their 
sentiments from one day to another'.
175
 Arguments had an effect. Perceval explained that before 
voting against the 'amended' money bill in August 1709 he had listened very carefully to the 
arguments but he was not persuaded to vote for the bill as there was adequate supply for a year 
ahead: 'I saw this was a proper opportunity to exert and support a part of our Constitution'.
176
 
When the administration failed to perform in the debates on Wood's halfpence in 1723 Sir Robert 
Walpole chided Lord Lieutenant Grafton that the criticisms raised in the Irish parliament should 
have been answered. But at Westminster Walpole had control of a party to back up those 
arguments. As Chief Secretary Thomas Clutterbuck explained on 1729: 'it is a very indifferent 
situation to serve under a government which has neither power, not party, to support it but is left at 
the mercy of a parliament'.
177
 
In the absence of a solid parliamentary majority other tactics were deployed to assist the 
administration. First, opponents could be left to burn themselves out (they too lacked a party 
structure). Bolton explained during a debate on supply in 1719: 'Mr Hamilton and one Macartney, a 
very forward young gentleman,
178
 made a speech in opposition to the supply, and Mr St. George 
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flamed extremely but our friends made them no answer which provoked them so that they went 
out of the House'.
179
 In the 1703–04 session, although the administration was tempted to adjourn 
once it had secured the supply heads, Southwell explained to Nottingham: 
that it will be better to let them tire themselves and spend three or four days extraordinary 
than by seeming to hurry them give an opportunity for them to say they had not time given 
them to do the country's business.
180
 
Second, sometimes it was better to keep quiet and let others speak. Coghill explained in 1729 on 
the debate on the amended supply bill that:  
the prime serjeant, attorney and solicitor generals, Harry Maxwell and Dr Trotter who were 
to have spoken [for the administration], had there been occasion, were silent, finding the 
disposition of the House for the bill, and thought it better that the debate should carried by 
those who were not in the service of the crown, and believing if they should speak, it would 
prolong the debate, and occasion replies.
181
  
Third, compromise could divide opponents. Coghill reported in February 1725/6 that St. John 
Brodrick was not able to carry his supporters in amending the wording of an address to the king 
because 'such a spirit appearing against it, he was forced to let it drop, he afterwards proposed 
another which was much disapproved of ... and finding he could not withstand the intentions of the 
House ... he being answered by many Members'. The administration was able to live with a 
counter-proposal 'relished by the country gentlemen' and Brodrick had to pretend he liked it 'but we 
all apprehend it to be no more than a forced compliance, not being able to carry when he 
proposed, and finding that those he called his friends would not follow him'.
182
  
For opposition to become effective it needed an issue around which to coalesce. In 1727 Coghill 
explained to Edward Southwell that a particular 
motion was made with an intention to try if a party could be framed, upon some topic of 
Patriotism, which ... has often deceived young Members (of which I have been one,) which 
in the end have always proved mischievous to the country, and a means only to help 
designing men to what they aim at: witness the sole right, and the taxes for one year.  
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But for a party to operate it also needed leaders and Coghill commented in the same session that 
in the absence of St. John Brodrick (ill) and Henry Boyle (in England) 'there is nobody ... able to 
cement people together so as to form any party to make much opposition'.
183
 
Management of the parliament and the legislative process outside the chamber rested with the 
chief secretary and lord lieutenant. Although Conolly, a model undertaker, did correspond with 
Whitehall, the written material examined does not show him operating, to secure the smooth 
passage of bills after they left Dublin. The lord lieutenant and chief secretary were in a key position 
to provide information and were expected to. Southwell told Secretary of State Dartmouth at the 
opening of the 1711 session that he would have 'constant accounts of our proceedings'.
184
 The 
administration's key job was to explain supply bills and get them through as quickly as possible.
185
 
Of particular sensitivity was explaining to Whitehall the risks in altering particularly a supply bill. In 
December 1715 Delafaye explained to London that he expected: 
new battles, for our opposers keep together and seem very active and industrious, they 
are most or all of them here, whereas many of our friends could not be kept in town. The 
enemy have a great dependence upon you altering the money bill ... in which case they 
hope they shall be able to throw it quite out.
186
 
As regards other bills most correspondence of the chief secretaries and lords lieutenant was taken 
up with reassuring the government that most bills were in order or greatly desired in Ireland and so 
would assist the smooth running of the parliament. In August 1711 Ormond wrote to Secretary of 
State Dartmouth that very few bills should give trouble and he drew attention to the clause in the 
money bill taxing the import of molasses
187
 and begged that no alteration be made. He pointed out 
that the coal bill
188
 was 'very popular and will prevent a great evil, and therefore I hope no petition 
will be regarded that may put any stop to it' and he requested a quick turn-around.
189
 Southwell 
wrote in parallel to Dartmouth: 
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I hope your lordship will let us have all our bills, or at least a great number of them: for 
people here are very fond of their productions: and I believe there never were so many 
bills that entrenched so little on the prerogative and could give as little jealousy to England 
as these do which has been carefully avoided.
190
 
They also explained Irish sensitivities. In January 1727/8 Carteret advised Newcastle to be careful 
on handling legislation on reversal of outlawries. He drew attention to the 1717 and 1725/6 
resolutions of the Irish Commons against the reversal of outlawries and explained that the 
implications for property rights in Ireland should not be touched except at his peril.
191
 The matter 
was so sensitive that he asked the government not to ask the attorney general for copies of 
outlawries while parliament was in session.
192
  
4.8  Legislative procedures 
Conrad Russell's observation about earlier English parliaments that 'bills are what the Commons 
returned to whenever the heat was off'
193
 holds good for the Irish House of Commons. When not 
pre-occupied with a political struggle such as impeachment the usual fare was petitions and 
legislation. The legislative procedures of both the Westminster and Dublin parliaments appear 
identical with three readings of bills in each chamber before royal assent. There were, however, 
significant differences which hardened into procedural forms. On 9 December 1695 the Commons 
addressed the lord deputy for assistance for Protestant refugees, which included a request for a 
heads of a bill to allow certain refugees to become freemen without payment of the usual dues.
194
 
The request was not for a bill but for the lord deputy to supply a heads of a bill. No heads 
appeared. If they had, the Irish parliament―or more likely the Commons alone―would have been 
in the position of reviewing the administration's legislation (as it did with supply) rather than the 
other way round. In addition, the government in London would have been in an anomalous and 
uncomfortable position if it decided to reject such a heads sent from the Commons. In the event 
legislation emerged in 1697 when the House drafted its own heads.
195
 The administration was, 
however, until around 1705 a significant source of legislation with bills originating in the Irish Privy 
                                                        
 
190
  SP, 63–367 f.173(stamped 354) (Southwell to Dartmouth, 21 Aug 1711) 
191
  CJI(III), pp.169, 450  
192
  SP, 63–390(stamped 8-11) (Carteret to Newcastle, 26 Jan 1727/8) 
193
  Russell, King James, p.186 
194
  CJI(II), pp.138-39 
195
  CJI(II), pp.189, 196, 199; the heads of a bill for encouragement of Protestant strangers to come and settle in this 
kingdom was rejected by English Privy Council; Bill no.5138 (ILD).  






 Although the process of legislation starting in the Irish Privy Council 
never reached the point of being a token exercise, there was a clear decline with the initiation of 
business transferring to the Commons. (Heads starting in the House of Lords tended to focus on 
religious matters and administration but it did not take up the slack from the Privy Council.)  
As Hayton and Kelly have pointed out the 'heads process meant that the Irish parliament legislated 
to meet the concerns of the political nation rather than the priorities of the government'.
197
 The 
pretence that it was a humble petition and request to the Irish Privy Council to draw up the bill fell 
away by the turn of the century
198
 to be replaced by the formula that the heads of bill 'be put into 
form and transmitted into England, according to Poynings' Law'.
199
 The heads process was what in 
today’s terminology would be called draft legislation.
200
 Each House of the Irish parliament had 
scope to devise its own procedures, although anchored to Westminster processes, and those that 
emerged had distinct features with, for example, the Lords more overtly following convention with 
three readings whereas the Commons had only two for a heads.
201
 In contrast to finalised bills 
there was no bicameral handling of heads of bills, which, with a few exceptions,
202
 went through 
one House before being sent to the privy councils. As most heads started in the Commons it gave 
that House a preponderance in the legislative process. This appears anomalous given the 
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 On 7 Oct: the heads were sent down from the Lords and read; the Commons ordered, a select committee 'to 
consider the methods of proceed on the heads of the Bill of Rights ... that all Members who come have voices, and 
report their opinion to the House' (CJI(II), p.83).  
 10 Oct: the committee reported and the House entered upon consideration of the heads 'which being read 
paragraph by paragraph, and the question being severally put, the House did agree, nemine contradicente, with 
an amendment to the fourth head only' (CJI(II), p.85).  
 16 Oct: the Commons sent the heads back to the Lords with changes (CJI(II), p.95).  
 22 Oct: the Lords asked for a conference. The Lords agreed with all the amendments, except on the need for 
frequent parliaments, on which the Lords offered an amendment in lieu. On a division the Commons agreed to 
accept the Lords amendment (CJI(II), p.105).  
 24 Oct: the Lords and Commons agreed a joint delegation to take the heads to the lord deputy (CJI(II), p.107).  
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ingrained bicameral nature of the Westminster system, the legal expertise in the Lords and 
prickliness of the Lords on its privileges. There was, however, no shortage of lawyers in the 
Commons. The Lords had to agree to any bill that eventually emerged and so it could always veto 
the measure. The administration was opposed to bicameral heads. Lord Chancellor Methuen 
reported on 12 August 1697 that: 
Our Lords have had a foolish debate for settling a method with the Commons by 
conference for the two Houses joining in the heads of bills to be presented to the 
government. It is an innovation that must have an ill effect, and therefore I got the debate 




Methuen's actions had the desired effect. He did not elucidate on his reasons but the heads of a 
bill that had been through both Houses would have more of the characteristics of a bill and the 
position of the government would be weaker and risked a reversal of roles with it being reduced to 
the party with the veto. Nor were the Lords enthusiastic. When in October 1703 the Commons 
attempted a bicameral approach and sent up a heads of a bill making it treason to impeach the 
succession of the crown, the Lords sent a message back that it was not convenient to proceed in 
the method proposed by the Commons. The Commons then reverted to the usual procedure by 
sending the heads to the lord lieutenant.
204
 (The Lords not wanting to appear less loyal then 
drafted its own heads.) The exchange shows that by 1703 the heads were a unicameral activity, 
and for constitutionally and politically significant measures, the 'second' House could prepare its 
own heads of bill.
205
 Once the system was established (and accepted by the administration) there 
was no incentive for the lead House to work with the other House. By 1703 the transmission 
recess bisected the session and it became imperative to push as many heads as possible to the 
lord lieutenant before the recess rather than to achieve a consensus with the other House. 
A heads of a bill that came back as a bill was introduced to the Irish parliament and went through 
the standard Westminster procedures of three readings in each House. Henry Scobell in his 
account of Westminster processes recognises that some bills may be prepared in draft as heads 
and he is clear that the decision to endorse a draft does not oblige the House to pass a 
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subsequent bill: 'it is lawful to debate or argue against all or any part thereof, to alter or reject it'.
206
 
But, because of the need for the privy councils’ approval; bills could not be amended, each stage 
of the parliamentary consideration was binary—approval or rejection. The bill procedures of the 
Irish Commons were therefore an evolution, or distortion, of Westminster procedures.  
The Irish legislative process was an elongated version of Westminster processes and required 
nine additional stages
207
 and questions to the 14 identified by P.D.G. Thomas in the Westminster 
legislative process.
208
 Bills introduced after the transmission followed the Westminster procedures 
but because of the constraints of Poynings' Law in a hollowed-out form and, increasingly in the 
1720s, to a shortened timetable.
209
 Procedure in committee, for instance, gave the appearance of 
following that of the Westminster with paragraph-by-paragraph consideration followed by 
consideration of the preamble and title
210
 but given that no changes could be made this was 
procedurally futile. Instead it became an opportunity to examine the extent to which the bill had 
changed since the heads had been sent to the lord lieutenant. (As discussed below, both the 
Commons and Lords expended much effort checking bills against their heads.) 
The two main routes by which legislation was initiated in the Commons were: (i) petition; and (ii) 
motion by a Member. (There were others: (iii) Privy Council; and (iv) the House of Lords, which are 
touched on for the purposes of comparison.) Sitting behind the mechanics of the procedures are a 
number of questions: (i) who initiated, drove and managed legislation; and (ii) what degree of 
scrutiny was carried out by the Commons.
211
  
The consideration of petitions was a substantial component of the work of the Commons. The first 
printed volume of the Journals—covering the parliaments from 1613 to 1666—lists 794 
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 Subjects ranged from requests for recompense to representations against legislation 
before the House.
213
 Dennehy sets out in detail the development of the seventeenth-century 
procedures for petitions.
214
 The volume did not decrease after 1692: the Journals covering 1692 to 
1713 list 619, and for 1715 to 1730 471. Because of the destruction of contemporary records and 
because—as Perceval's diaries indicate
215
—most petitions were neither of interest to the majority 
of Members nor caused much controversy, they have become the background noise of 
eighteenth-century Irish parliaments. The main features of the procedures applying to petitions to 
the Commons before 1692 are set out in Appendix 6.22; it is worth noting that the procedures did 
not follow the detail of Elsynge's Ancient Method with its emphasis on the role of the judges in the 
Lords.
216
 The Journals for the 1692 parliament show two changes over earlier parliaments. The 
first was a requirement that all petitions had to be signed.
217
 As this change was made on the first 
day that the House of received petitions, 12 October 1692, it may have been in imitation of English 
practice.
218
 Second, on 22 October the House ordered 'before any petitions be received for private 
bills, that a committee be appointed to inspect [the] petitions, and report their opinion ... to the 
House', which was coupled with a ban on receiving private bills for two weeks.
219
 What emerged 
was a bespoke process where petitions for private heads of bills were either scrutinised by a 
committee, to establish the facts and to give an opinion on the merits of the request,
220
 or sent to a 
committee for the heads to be drafted. Either variant of committee was empowered or instructed to 
investigate as the House considered necessary. There are two additional changes recorded in the 
Journals from the 1690s. First, the instruction that a petition lie on the Table was first recorded on 
20 October 1692.
221
 This could be used as a device to delay consideration until another process 
had been completed or to discard the petition without explicit rejection. Second, although there 
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  See Appendix 6.20. Perceval does not mention petitions. 
216
  Elsynge, Ancient Method, pp.251ff; Scobell, Memorials, p.87 has little to say on handling petitions. 
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  CJI(II), p.14 (12 Oct 1692)  
218
  The English Parliament had legislated on petitions in 1661—An Act against Tumults and Disorders upon 
p[re]tence of p[re]paring or p[re]senting publick Petic[i]ons or other Addresses to His Majesty or the Parliament. 
The English House had made it a requirement for petitions to be signed in 1685 and 1689. 
219
  CJI(II), p.21  
220
  For example, CJI(II), pp.245 (7 Oct 1698), 273-74 (23 Nov 1698) 
221
  CJI(II), p.20; in this case Table is referred to as the 'Clerk’s Table'.  




was a 1642 precedent, with the leave of the House petitioners were able to withdraw their 
petitions—the first instances were in October and December 1695.
222
 The procedure, which was 
used regularly thereafter (especially for election petitions), ensured that where parties came to an 
agreement the House could be spared time on a pointless process.  
The correspondence of Marmaduke Coghill with Southwell concerning a petition to the Irish 
Commons in January 1727/8, although not concerning legislation, throws light on petition 
processes. The petition concerned the sheriff's actions in pushing aside the usual returning officer 
for Downpatrick, the seneshcal, to fix the date for and run the 1727 election himself.
223
 First, 
drafting a petition and answering for it at the bar of the Commons required both expertise and 
reputation. Coghill advised Southwell to send his solicitor to, and 'employ Mr Lindsay, a gentleman 
well heard at the bar of the House of Commons, and has been often there this session'. He 
cautioned: 'your agent mentioned Mr Nutley ... but you know he has not that esteem in the House 
of Commons that I wish he had, and employing a man any way obnoxious to them will perhaps 
give offence and injure your cause'.
224
 Coghill reviewed the draft petition, showed it to at least one 
other MP for comments and put Southwell's case to others. In the event the prime serjeant, Henry 
Singleton MP, was instructed and presented the petition.
225
 It was not in the name of Southwell but 
his seneschal for the borough. Second, as well as drafting the process required management, 
Coghill advised against presenting the petition on 9 January 1727/8, the first day after the recess 
as 'I feared ... the House would be thin and our friends not there, nor sufficiently appraised before it 
was offered to the House'. Dean Gore (of Down), chaplain to the House, carried out this task.
226
 
The high and sub-sheriffs were summoned to appear.
227
 The next stage was to prepare the case. 
The dean told Coghill that 'he would get some friends to meet in his chamber on Sunday night to 
settle their resolutions, and would appraise all our friends of them'; Coghill advised on the 
arguments to put. In addition, Coghill asked Southwell's agent to do the same and to distribute 
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  CJI(II), pp.105, 129  
223
  CJI(III), pp.496-97  
224
  Coghill Letters, no 30 (To Edward Southwell, 4 Jan 1727/8); Hayton points out that Nutley's career had been 
'compromised by his own high Toryism and association with the Tory ministry in Ireland 1711-14' (fn 150). The 
petition was presented a week later on 11 Jan 1727/8 detailing the facts.  
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  Coghill Letters, no 31 (To Edward Southwell, 9 Jan 1727/8)  
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  CJI(III), p.497  
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copies of the petition.
228
 The other side in the dispute, the Hill family,
229
 requested a postponement 
to allow witnesses to be summoned (and arguments and forces marshalled).
230
 Singleton was at 
hand to see this off. In the event the case was not heard on the scheduled day (25 January) as the 
main business went on until 4 pm but part of the case was heard on 26 January. There were 
several further twists and turns and, to safeguard the petitioner's position, it was essential to have 
someone in the House watching and ready to react.
231
 Behind the scenes the energetic dean was 
doing 'what is most effectual for [Southwell's] service [he is] a solicitor of votes, and ready to 
concert measures with [Southwell's] friends how to proceed, on what may arise on the debates'.
232
 
Also behind the scenes the Hills sought to negotiate a compromise with Southwell's friends. In the 
event the Hills were divided and the case concluded on 5 February, when on a relatively close 
division (74-66) in a moderately full House―Ralph Gore and Thomas Trotter acting as tellers for 
the Southwell camp―found for Southwell with the sub-sheriff carrying the bulk of the blame, and 
being reprimanded by the House on 14 February.
233
 To navigate the process not only were 
political networking skills required but also the specialised expertise and patience to anticipate and 
manage the procedures. (The nearest analogy appears to be that of the courts with the need for 
good preparation, much waiting around and being ready to fend off the expected and unexpected 
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  Coghill Letters, no 34 (To Edward Southwell, 25 Jan 1727/8)  
229
  While this account focuses on Southwell's side of the dispute, the Hills' approach was similar: they may have used 
a lawyer MP, Richard Bettesworth, who was later to became Second Serjeant and they even had a clerical 
supporter, the bishop of Meath, brother of the high sheriff, who opposed the compromise. 
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  Coghill Letters, no 35 (To Edward Southwell, 27 Jan 1727/8)  
231
  The entries in the CJI show the degree of proactive and reactive management that was required: 
11 Jan petition presented and the high and sub-sheriffs summoned; 
24 Jan House ordered the clerk of the crown to produce the returns for Downpatrick 'since the 
Revolution';  
House debated a motion for the sheriffs' attendance tomorrow (adjourned); 
26 Jan House resumed the debate on the motion for the sheriffs' attendance (who were at door), 
the petition read and ordered to be heard at the bar; 
2 Feb sub-sheriff petitioned confessing misbehaviour and asked the House to discharge the 
order to hear the petition at the bar; the House refused and ordered him into 
custody; 
5 Feb case heard at the bar (counsel for both sides was heard and witnesses examined);  
high sheriff was arrested by a bailiff (on an unrelated matter), he and the bailiff were 
called to bar; the bailiff was taken into custody; 
House, on a division (74-66), found for the petitioner; 
6 Feb high sheriff petitioned expressing regret and was released paying fees; 
12 Feb sub-sheriff petitioned expressing regret; and 
14 Feb sub-sheriff was brought to the bar, reprimanded and released paying fees (and the bailiff 
was ordered to be released). 
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  Coghill Letters, no 34 (To Edward Southwell, 25 Jan 1727/8)  
233
  Coghill Letters, no 36 (To Edward Southwell, 1 Feb 1727/8), CJI(III), pp.516, 524  




and seize opportunity.) Coghill, Gore and Singleton used the same skills and methods as 
'undertakers' for the king's business. The striking feature is behind the scenes management and 
not, to contradict the view of Ihalainen and Palonen, reliance on rhetoric and public debate.
234
 The 
methodology was not exclusive to the Speaker/undertaker and government business but 
permeated the processes of the Commons.  
The second petition examined concerned legislation. Sir John Perceval recorded his exchanges 
with Thomas Hodder, who was pressing a petition for a bill against clerical plurality and, in 
particular, he objected to bishops' power to dispense with residence requirements. Perceval's initial 
response in November 1711―after the transmission recess―was that the timing was wrong 'for 
neither was it for your service nor my credit to offer at leave to bring in a new bill when everybody 
knows a second session of parliament never allows time for it '. He showed the proposal to the 
bishop of Cloyne, whose diocese was the focus of Hodder's concern, but then apologised for doing 
so without Hodder's consent excusing himself by pointing out that  
the bishop would have just reason to take ill of me, that I did not first acquaint him with it, 
nor even then it is possible to have kept it a secret from him, since nothing that is 
transacted within our walls is so nor can I conceive why it ought to be so.  
Perceval also made the point that parliament had previously rejected bills against plurality
235
 
because of the nature of the country and recommended that Hodder take the matter up directly 
with the bishop. Hodder replied that no offence had been taken and he had showed the petition to 
a Mr Mead.
236
 Having taken the point on timing Hodder contacted Perceval early in the 1713 
session enclosing a petition which he asked Perceval to present to the new parliament, 'who I 
hope will endeavour to get such a bill to pass as will oblige residence by ... parsons and curates'. 
Perceval replied frankly explaining the political realities: 
this is a matter of such high importance and will meet with such difficulties in its passage 
that it is necessary I should be perfectly well acquainted with your proceedings hitherto, 
and your hindrances you have met with in prosecuting your just and reasonable design... 
Before I shall be able effectively to serve you; you cannot be ignorant that if proper 
methods are taken step by step, there is a course already settled by law, by which you 
may attain your end. It will be very hard to prevail upon a parliament to make a new law 
that must be general purposely to help a particular case, for which former laws have 
prescribed a sufficient remedy. 
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Perceval explained that he did 'not urge this to discourage your pious aim' but as a course more 
likely to succeed than a petition and bill. He continued: 'I have gone so far already in your service 
as to lay your petition before all the bishops, who are to meet next Monday and I have not 
discouraged any ... who are not willing to see your satisfied'. He said that the bishop of Cloyne, to 
whom he had spoken that morning, said he had powers to deal with the situation.
237
 
In contrast to the first case, no money changed hands. Perceval was personally sympathetic to 
Hodder's objective and was prepared to find a solution to the problem and to explain the 
parliamentary process. He regarded legislation, if not the last resort, certainly not the first remedy 
and he was conscious of the need to point out the prospects for legislating. 
Private legislation affected individuals and private rights and property. It followed that those 
affected should be notified and be given the opportunity to make representations. The Irish 
procedures for the initial consideration of private legislation followed the spirit of English 
procedures, the essence of which was a quasi-judicial process with, for example, parties directly 
affected by the legislation given notification and opportunity to make representations. Who 
managed such notification for heads, and how they did it, was subject to some confusion in 
London. In August 1697 Secretary of State the duke of Shrewsbury informed the Irish lords 
justices  
the ancient custom has ever been for all such persons as wish private bills passed in 
Ireland to first petition the King in council for leave to offer such a bill, and his consent has 
always been the foundation of such bill. By this means time is given to all parties to apply, 
and not to be surprised by too hasty proceedings. No doubt you have this time prevented 
this, by transmitting no private bills without first hearing all the parties concerned.
238
 
This 'ancient usage' would have required a petitioner to start with the English Privy Council and 
would have added its approval before the heads of bill process could start. In response the Irish 
Privy Council questioned the claim: 
that upon receipt of their excellencies' pleasure concerning the manner of beginning 
private bills that have their rise at the [Privy Council] we have directed as there has been 
occasion that the party by whom such bill is desired should first make his application in 
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The government in London pulled back, telling the Irish lords justices that it had 'not meant that the 
petition must be presented to the king in Council' but in view of what the Irish Privy Council had 
explained it allowed the private bill under consideration to be transmitted.
240
 The procedures for 
notifying, and considering representations from, affected parties therefore fell to the Irish Privy 
Council. With the growth of private legislation originating in the Commons the English Privy 
Council's retreat allowed the initiative for the legislation to remain in Dublin, though the Irish Privy 
Council had a significant role. In 1705 Ormond said, with some protecting of himself: 'there are 
some private bills, which I must humbly recommend to Her Majesty's favour having, as I am 
informed, been well considered and generally by the consent of the parties'.
241
 In 1710 Wharton 
went into detail to Dartmouth to explain that 'in all cases of private bills the persons at whose 
request they pass the Council here employ agents to solicit them on the other side, and ought to 
be enabled to satisfy the Council of England as to the objections which may be made against 
them'. He said that he could not comment on 'matters of fact' as regards heads and 'therefore if the 
parties concerned did not attend or counter objection, the British Council should proceed [as was] 
most just and proper'. He added that he had 'given notice to the persons concerned in each of 
those bills of the objections that are made against them'.
242
 In other words, the Wharton 
administration was neutral and offered no assistance. 
How notice was given to interested parties was touched on in a letter from Carteret to Newcastle in 
1725 concerning an English private bill to reverse an outlawry. He said that the bill was not in the 
Protestant interest in Ireland, which indicated why it had started in England, and that, although 'the 
petitioner has given notice here, by posting up papers on the Courts, that application would be 
made for such an Act', the papers had only been posted up that term which was not sufficient for 
the 'many persons who might think themselves affected ... and might have made proper 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Ireland', who did not 'find, among the books and papers belonging to the Council Chamber any direction by letter 
or otherwise, for the parties concerned in any private bill to be prepared by the government and Council of Ireland 
to first petition the King and Council in England for leave to have such bills drawn'. (SP, 63–359 no.119i(stamped 
256) (11 Sep 1697)).  
240
  SP, Entry Book 275, p.280 (CSPD: William III, 1697―23 Sep 1697); Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.110, 
comments that the 'surviving evidence supports the position of the Irish government, and there is nothing 
suggesting that the many private Irish bills transmitted from Dublin to the English privy council had previously been 
the subject of petitions to the king'. 
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  SP, 63–365 f.157(stamped 172) (Signed by Ormond but text appears to be written by Southwell to Hedges, 29 
Mar 1705); see also Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.133. 
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  SP, 63–366(stamped 35) (Wharton to Dartmouth, 25 July 1710) 
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application to one or both Houses to have been heard against such a bill'.
243
 As well as throwing a 
light on the notice required, the quote shows that seeking legislation at Westminster did not obviate 
the need to inform parties in Ireland. 
In 1719 when the British Privy Council queried the allegations underpinning a bill for the sale of the 
estate of Sir Maurice Eustace to meet debts, Bolton, in contrast to Wharton, explained that: 
the allegations in the private bills transmitted were not only proved to my satisfaction as 
well as the Council, before the bills were sent from hence, but that in our opinion all proper 
parties were consenting thereto, that is, all those whose consent we thought necessary; 
and [when queried by the British Privy Council] the facts alleged in the bill for sale [of the] 
estate have been examined again by a committee of the Council in the presence of Mr 
Cheetwood who is married to one of the daughter's of Sir Maurice Eustace and such other 
of the creditors who oppose the passing of the bill ... it was mine, as well as the unanimous 
opinion of the Council, that the consent of the said Cheetwood and of those dissenting 
creditors was not necessary, the bill being calculated to enforce them to do justice to the 
other creditors ... Cheetwood and some creditors ... have hitherto very artfully obstructed. 




In response to a further query from the British lords justices whether private bills had been properly 
approved by the Irish Privy Council in October 1719 Webster told Delafaye in London: 'I think the 
sending over the bills implies that consent ... as well as that they carry with them an authority too 
great to admit of any other interpretation.
245
 
In responding to the questions from London the Irish Privy Council did not refer to scrutiny carried 
out by the Commons but instead cited that of the quasi-judicial Privy Council, with the law officers 
in attendance. The Journals indicate, however, that committees delegated to consider petitions for 
heads of bills operated under instructions from the House to check that affected parties were 
aware of the proposed legislation.
246
 In the 1690s the House itself often considered whether other 
parties were affected before deciding what instructions to give a select committee.
247
 While there is 
no evidence as to what certification the Commons required, it appears that interested parties were 
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  For example, on 5 Sep 1695 the House referred a petition from Sir William Domville for a heads enabling land to 
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England and other remote parts' and so the committee sought permission to proceed without notifying all; the 
House agreed (p.63).  
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  For example, CJI(II), pp.157–58 (31 July 1697); in this case the petitioner was a countess, which may be the 
reason for the expedited process.  




aware of the request for legislation. The relatively short time heads took in the Commons would 
have been insufficient for this to have been carried out in parallel with the head process. Instead, 
notification would have been in advance of the petition. In November 1703 the Commons 
reiterated: 'That no heads of any private bill be brought into the House but upon a petition 
preferred to the House, nor until the matter of such petition, and the nature of the case, have been 
reported a committee, with their opinion thereon'.
248
 As many committees were appointed without 
the power to send for persons, papers and records,
249
 it may be that their job was to check that the 
necessary documentation was supplied rather than probe merits in depth. Those who were 
adversely affected by proposed legislation were aware, as the Journals record counter-petitions 
usually submitted in time to be considered during the heads process.
250
 That said, committees 
nearly always reported back in favour of the petitioner and the House instructed the same 
committee (or Members from the committee) to prepare and bring in the heads of a bill.
251
 This of 
itself may be evidence that many private bills were the product of negotiations and the ones that 
generate correspondence are those where there was no deal or it broke down. 
The Irish procedures did not fully follow the Westminster procedures, which had greater focus on 
the House of Lords which provided judicial oversight. In addition, the Westminster Commons 
rapidly developed a procedural framework—which included special provisions for private bills that 
applied to Irish property—which between 1685 and 1710 was subject to over 20 standing 
orders.
252
 The reasons for the difference were, first, the much smaller volume of private legislation 
in Ireland and, second, that the Irish House was dealing with draft legislation against a tight 
timetable and so did not require the same stringency. Moreover, the draft legislation was 
scrutinised by the Irish and English/British Privy Councils, where it was reviewed by law officers. 
This is not to say that the heads process was a smooth track. As Table 18 below indicates, the 
success rate for petitions seeking private legislation between 1692 to 1730 was 35%, although the 
rate improved by the 1720s. The changes in 1703 appear to have made a difference as the 
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success rate increased from 19% in the 1703–04 session to 45% in the 1705 session; but this is 
superficial, as the number of petitions more than halved and the success rate fell back in the two 
following sessions. One point is clear, however, that, if a private bill emerged after the transmission 
recess, it was likely to achieve royal assent,
253
 which underlines the formality of the bill process 
after the transmission recess. 
Session Petitions seeking 
private bills 
Private Acts from 
Commons petitions 
% successful 
1692 3 0 0% 
1695–97 31 9 29% 
1698–99 5 0 0% 
1703–04 26 5 19% 
1705 11 5 45% 
1707 14 5 36% 
1709 19 4 21% 
1710 6 2 33% 
1711 5 3 60% 
1713 0 0 0% 
1715–16 5 3 60% 
1717 3 1 33% 
1719 9 6 67% 
1721–22 10 0 0% 
1723–24 13 6 46% 
1725–26 11 7 64% 
1727–28 3 2 67% 
1729–30 5 4 80% 
Total 179 62 35% 
Table 18 Outcome of petitions seeking private legislation  
 
On the overall content of petitions, the 1695–97 session saw a pattern of petitions which followed 
that of earlier parliaments with 201 covering everything from debtors seeking protection to 
complaints against local officials. Thirty-one of the 201 sought (with another 10 aiming to frustrate 
or amend) private legislation (and nine had the same purpose for public legislation). By far the 
largest category seeking private legislation was the petitioner seeking to sell, mortgage or settle 
ownership of land. But over the next 15 years a pattern emerged. The figures in Appendix 6.23 
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means that only two were rejected at the bill stages: one by the Commons and one by the Lords. 




show a decrease in the number of petitions for private bills over the period from 1695 to 1730, 
though with a revival in the early 1720s.  
An analysis of the legislation sought in 1703–04―set out in Appendix 6.24.2―shows there were 
26 petitions seeking private legislation—in contrast to the sessions in the 1690s all the petitions 
were received within six weeks of the opening, which was the pattern to the end of the period 
under consideration. Of these five resulted in legislation, three were rejected outright and the rest 
faltered during the legislative process.
254
 Five heads were subject to counter-petitions and as none 
of these made it to the statute book lodging an objection had effect. Persistence by petitioners 
could pay off
255
 but it eluded others such as Jeffrey Blake.
256
 While not a hard and fast rule, 
petitions submitted early in the session made more progress than those submitted later. Lawyers 
had no monopoly on handling petitions and when they undertook their management―defined as 
those chairing reviewing and drafting committees―they did not fare better than non-lawyers in 
achieving successful legislation. The table in Appendix 6.24 indicates that in each session there 
was a coterie of men of business―fewer than 20 MPs most session―who managed private bills 
through the Commons. As noted with Southwell's petition, there was no bar on employing office-
holders to take a bill on―and some advantage in that they had experience in taking forward other 
bills including private bills as well as contacts―but it was no guarantee of success. The statistics 
for bills handled by individual MPs are too low to allow firm conclusions to be drawn. But on the 
basis of the management of the two with the largest portfolios some observations can be offered, 
Ralph Gore between 1710 and 1727 managed 22 bills in total and appears relatively successful 
with 14 bills reaching the statute book. But on personal private bills he achieved a lower success 
rate of three out of six. In contrast, William Conolly had a much poorer overall success rate (8 out 
of 31 between 1703 and 1713) but on private bills he achieved a success rate of five out of nine. 
(Conolly was operating in a harsher political climate and many of the heads he was shepherding 
did not make it though the privy councils.) Finally, from the limited correspondence available it 
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appears that the chairmen's responsibilities did not extend beyond the Commons;
257
 agents took 
over when the bills went to London. 
One sub-category of petition was that seeking legislation with an explicit sectarian dimension—
typically, to prevent a Catholic disinheriting a Protestant or favouring inheritance by a Protestant. 
The 1703–04 session―which saw the enacting of the Act to prevent the further growth of 
Popery―was the high watermark with seven petitions.
258
 Yet, despite many being introduced early 
in the session, the success rate was low with only one enacted.  
— Two were rejected by the English Privy Council (to give context, it rejected five heads in total 
out of 74 that had their rise in the Commons in the session). 
— One was rejected by the Irish Privy Council (it rejected six out of the 74).  
— The other three failed in the House of Commons. 
Four that failed were subject to counter-petitions though in two cases the House refused to hear 
the petitions—the petitioners appear to have been Catholic—and both heads were subsequently 
rejected by the English Privy Council.
259
 Although the numbers for other sessions are small, this 
pattern was not atypical: petitions seeking explicitly sectarian personal benefit were considered by 
the House but were not bound to succeed, not least because of a brake imposed by the privy 
councils. A series of petitions from Chichester Philips MP illustrates the pattern. The first sought 
leave to bring in heads to prevent the Catholic heirs of Sir Simon Eaton (George and Martha 
Matthews) excluding him from a remainder. On presentation on 21 September 1703 the House 
without any scrutiny ordered Henry Tenison to prepare and bring in a heads.
260
 The heads were 
presented on 30 September but by then had run into problems as the Matthews objected and the 
heads were sent to a committee headed by Sir Richard Levinge with an instruction to hear 
interested parties and send for papers persons and records.
261
 On 25 October Coghill reported 
from the committee that it had heard counsel on behalf of the Matthews and in favour of the 
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 edn)(III), p.29; the committee had 11 members including Tenison; the committee was enhanced on 11 Oct 
when the attorney general and others were added (CJI(II), p.333).  




petitioner and presented a bill which was agreed by the House and sent to Ormond. A petition 
from the Matthews to be heard at the bar before the heads were agreed was rejected.
262
 
Presumably in the face of further representations from the Matthews the English Privy Council 
rejected the bill.
263
 In the following session the proceedings were largely repeated, though with 
more Protestant parties making representations and no recorded representations from the 
Matthews.
264
 Again the English Privy Council rejected the legislation.
265
 Without the detail of the 
representations and any subsequent changes, any conclusions must rest on the records of the 
process, which show that: (i) the parties were informed of the process and had opportunity to make 
their cases; (ii) Catholic landowners engaged with the parliamentary process; (iii) the issues were 
reviewed by the law officers; (iv) the Commons backed the Protestant interest; (v) and the Privy 
Council in London came down on the side of the Catholics opposing the legislation. The Protestant 
bias of the Commons was underlined when on 2 October 1703 the House ordered that 'it be an 
instruction to all committees appointed to prepare heads of a bill to prevent persons from being 




The trends and pattern identified in the 1703–04 session developed and crystallised. For example, 
in the 1707 session of 14 petitions for private legislation five reached the statute book. In the 1711 
session (see Appendix 6.24.3) there were five petitions seeking private legislation; and for the first 
time in a session none appears to have had an explicit sectarian dimension. All the petitions were 
received before the transmission recess and three made it onto the statute book. By then the 
procedure was standardised with the instruction clear that the committee had to consider the 
allegation in the petition and, if not fully supported or opposed, it was empowered to send for 
persons, papers and records. Most of those who chaired committees on heads were lawyers. The 
House often appointed the same committee to draft and bring in the heads over time it was no 
longer usual for the full 'considering' committee to draft the heads of the bill. Instead that task was 
                                                        
 
262
  CJI(II), p.346 
263
  Bill no.2687 (ILD); Matthews was a relative of Ormond, who lobbied privately on his behalf (see p.215 below). 
264
  CJI(II), pp.426, 440, 444, 448;  
265
  Bill No. 2687 (ILD) 
266
  CJI(II), p.326 
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often given to three Members, who had been on the original committee, so the process was 
streamlined further. 
The editor of the HoP (vol.1) states that it was cheaper and more straightforward to seek a private 
bill applying to Ireland at Westminster than to seek legislation in the Irish parliament.
267
 In addition, 
when the Irish parliament was not sitting and a private act was required, the only legislature 
available was Westminster.
268
 The work of Hoppit and Innes shows that the volume of private 
legislation undertaken by the Westminster parliament increased substantially after the restoration 
of Charles II and that increasing success rates spurred more petitions. This legislation at 
Westminster too was dominated by inheritance, guardianship and the purchase and sale of 
land,
269
 all of which categories had a ready market in Ireland. Westminster did not, however, 
establish either a monopoly or dominance in Irish cases. The figures in Appendix 6.10 show that 
the Irish parliament’s share of enacted private legislation predominated most years from 1703 and 
that the success rate improved after the 1690s. First, as Hoppit has pointed out for Westminster, 
better scrutiny meant that hopeless cases could be killed off early.
270
 Second, once the pattern of a 
session in two parts emerged in Dublin, those seeking private legislation soon realised they had to 
submit the petition early in the first part. Third, although there were overlaps between the private 
legislation enacted by both parliaments, there were differences. The social group covered by the 
legislation enacted at Westminster appears higher than that achieved through Dublin;
271
 legislation 
aiming to protect Protestant creditors or heirs would originate in Dublin;
272
 and legislation reversing 
outlawry had a fairer wind in London
273
—the Irish House composed of those holding forfeited 
estates was much less likely to agree a measure that impinged on the land settlement.
274
 One 
category of petitioner that might be considered a candidate for recourse to Westminster was trade 
                                                        
 
267
  HoP(1690)(I), p.530  
268
  40 private acts were enacted at Westminster between 1699 and 1703; see Appendix 6.10 and HoP(16900(I), 
pp.530-535.  
269
  Hoppit, Failed legislation, p.9  
270
  Hoppit, Failed legislation, p.16; petitions that were sent to the committee for initial examination and never re-
appeared may account for this category in the Irish Commons.  
271
  An electronic search of the House of Commons parliamentary papers for enacted private legislation with Ireland in 
the title returned 15 acts, 11 concerned English or Irish peers and an Irish bishop.  
272
  For example, An act for securing the debts owing to the Protestant creditors of Colonel John Browne (7 William III 
c.2 (private)), An act to prevent the disinheriting of Captain Garret Coghlan, a Protestant in her majesty’s service 
(2 Anne c.7 (private))  
273
  There is one example: An Act To Reverse the Outlawry and Attainder of Christopher Lord Baron of Slane, in 
Ireland (7 Anne c .15 (private))  
274
  See p.195 above. 




associations, such as felt-makers and physicians, who failed to secure legislation from the Irish 
parliament, to enhance or protect their profession by replicating English legislation.
275
 Their 
reasons for not seeking legislation at Westminster can be deduced from the physicians’ petition in 
1695: 
several powers and jurisdictions have been confirmed to the College of Physicians in 
London by divers acts of parliament in England; that the Members of parliament being 
the representatives of the whole kingdom, can best judge what will contribute to the 
public welfare thereof, which, being also the design of the petitioners, they humbly offer 
there are said Charter to the examination of the [Irish] House, ... And therefore praying 
the House to prepare heads of a bill for confirmation of the aforesaid charter, with such 




Having used this patriot-tinged flattery it would have been difficult, and detrimental to their 
reputation, to seek legislation at Westminster. 
Dublin had other attractions. As noted above
277
 its clerks’ fees were lower than those at 
Westminster and they may have been paid at a later stage—after the bill returned from London—
when success was likely. The Irish process starting with a petition for a heads of a bill, rather than 
a bill, may have allowed a lower threshold of parliamentary scrutiny than at Westminster, though 
the review by two privy councils meant that it would be correctly drawn. John Bergin has pointed 
out that 'progress of some petitions seeking private legislation was very smooth: a petition was 
presented, a select committee immediately appointed to prepare heads which were duly presented 
and passed', while other had 'erratic' courses.
278
 
As seen with the Physicians, petitions to the Commons were not confined to personal private 
legislation. Where the petition raised broader issues affecting a wider group the House had a wider 
range of procedural options. Although peremptory rejection was possible,
279
 on the whole these 
petitions were sent down one the following routes:  
1) to a select committee set up with powers to investigate,
280
  
                                                        
 
275
  CJI(II), pp.32, 117, 245; see also Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.34-35.  
276
  CJI(II), p.117  
277
  See p.47 above. 
278
  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.36  
279
  For example, CJI(II), p.59 (13 Sep 1695), when the House ordered a petition from the citizens of Dublin against 
the taking of the 'little oath' to lie on the Table.  
280
  For example, CJI(III), p.596 (12 Nov 1729), when the House sent a petition from the Guild of Dublin Merchants 
complaining about the inadequacy of the laws against smuggling to a select committee with the power to send for 
persons, papers and records, and it allowed all MPs to attend and speak.  
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3) to a committee of the whole House,
282
 or  
4) given leave for a heads to be brought in quickly.
283
  
Where Catholic petitioners against legislation, they often received short shrift. Chief Secretary 
Southwell in a letter to Nottingham explained that when they petitioned against the popery bill: 'the 
Catholics are to be heard pro forma'.
284
 Despite the quality of the case put forward, it had no effect 
on the bill.
285
 The pattern was repeated in 1719 when a group of Catholic merchants petitioned 
against another popery bill. The Commons gave consent for them to be heard by counsel when 
the bill was in committee of the whole House but without effect as the bill was returned to the 
House unamended and was passed unanimously before being sent to the Lords.
286
 In procedural 
terms the incident shows again a Catholic group with resources engaging with the parliamentary 
process but to little effect in the Commons because petitions against bills that had already been 
through the House, as opposed to heads of bills, had little effect and because of the sectarian bias 
of the House.  
More public legislation was initiated by motion rather than by petition. The question put was that 
leave be given to bring in heads of a bill for a specific purpose.
287
 If answered in the affirmative, the 
House then gave leave to a Member, a group of named Members or a formally constituted 
committee, to prepare and bring in the heads.
288
 In the 1720s of the 176 bills that took their rise in 
                                                        
 
281
  For example, CJI(III), p.425 (25 Nov 1725), a petition from the Dublin chair-carriers for more licences to be issued 
was referred to a select committee examining the state and condition of the Dublin workhouse.  
282
  For example, CJI(II), pp.590-91 (26 May 1709), when a petition from three Dublin merchants complained that 
certain trade lay 'under discouragement for want of proper regulations'. Such a committee provided―as Scobell, 
Memorials noted, p.49―'opportunity for fuller debates, for that at a Committee the Members have liberty to speak 
as often as they shall see cause, to one Question'. 
283
  For example, CJI(II), p.331 (9 Oct 1703), when the House ordered two MPs to draft a heads of a bill to provide 
relief to prisoners in the Marshalsea; and (III), p.429 (1 Dec 1729), when in response to a petition from the College 
of Physicians 'to prevent abuses of the necessary art of physic ... by mountebanks and empericks' the House gave 
leave to five MPs to prepare and bring in a heads of a bill.  
284
  SP, 63–364 f.64(stamped 65) (Southwell to Nottingham, 19 Feb 1703/4) 
285
  Chief Secretary Southwell recorded: 'Sir Toby Butler was their chief counsel, who made a very ingenious speech, 
and omitted nothing that was for the advantage of his cause. He examined every particular cause of hardship, and 
the main argument was that the bill was a breach of the Articles of Limerick. Sir Stephen Rice spoke also to the 
same purpose, but, not having taken the oaths, could not speak as Counsel, but as a petitioner. After they had 
withdrawn, the committee considered the bill paragraph by paragraph. The arguments of the Catholics were 
answered, and the clauses against the Papists were passed unanimously' (SP, 63–364 f.75(stamped 78) 
(Southwell to Nottingham, 26 Feb 1703/4)).  
286
  CJI(III), pp.233-35 (29–30 Oct 1719)  
287
  For example, CJI(III), p.422 (19 Nov 1725)  
288
  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.18-20, points out, with reference to the period before 1705, that 'the 
initiation of heads by an order granting leave for their introduction, and directing one or more named members to 




the Commons just under half made it into law (87, out of 113 enacted bills). With private bills (22) 
removed, Table 19 shows the stages at which the remaining 67 pieces of public legislation 
failed.
289
 A third failed because they did not progress to heads and a quarter failed in committee, 
underlining Hoppit's point about weeding out the hopeless. 
Stage heads or bill reached Number 
Leave given for heads 23 
Committee 16 
Report 1 
Irish Privy Council 9 




Table 19  Stages reached by failed public legislation in 1720s 
4.9  Drafting legislation 
The arrangements for drafting Irish bills changed radically in the 30 years after 1692. The 
exchanges on bills between Dublin Castle and Whitehall ahead of the opening of the 1692 
parliament have the characteristics of a 'top-down' process with two bureaucracies agreeing the 
legislative programme themselves with some soundings taken amongst those who were likely to 
sit in the forthcoming parliament. On 18 September Sydney informed London that he was 
'endeavouring to get some money for their Majesties of the parliament here ... I have good reason 
to believe I shall succeed in it, having proposed it to several Members of the House of Commons, 
and ... to the Council, where it was received as well as I could wish'.
290
 Sydney continued his 
thorough preparations. On 24 September he held off sending two supply bills to London: 'it being 
thought advisable to have a business of this nature well weighed and considered before it is 
brought into parliament, that it may not meet with any rubs or disappointment there'. He had a 
committee of the Privy Council 'appointed to consider of the best ways and means of raising' 
supply. It agreed the best method for raising the money was a supply for two years, though they 
were going to play this down as it 'may beget a jealousy in [Members] as though after this ensuing 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
prepare them, was much the commonest method. The appointment of two members was especially common, 
occurring over forty times. The appointment of a single member, or of three members, was also frequent: there 
were over twenty-five instances of each'. He adds that, 'apart from those cases where petitions were presented, 
the journals rarely reveal what moved the houses to order the preparation of heads ... Many orders, especially 
those which appointed committees without saying anything of "leave", must represent the conclusion of debates '  
289
  Data from ILD 
290
  SP, 63–354 f.144 (To Nottingham)  
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session ended, they were not to meet again till after the expiration of the two years'.
291
 This open 
approach gave notice of what was intended and allowed opponents to organise. The 1692 
parliament crashed on supply.  
In 1697 the Irish lords justices and the Privy Council were deciding upon and drafting a slate of 
bills ahead of the reconvening of the Irish parliament, though London retained detailed scrutiny 
and approval as well as suggesting bills.
292
 The corollary of this change was that from the 1690s 
bills sent from Dublin required breviates (explanatory notes), advising on the technicalities and 
handling.
293
 In 1703 Ormond and Southwell, Irish landowners, show the process evolving, though 
they pressed more for specific measures than later lords lieutenant: 
8 December 1703: The Workhouse bill now sent over was encouraged and promoted 
by the Duchess of Ormond, and much followed for that reason;
294
 
8 December 1703: Southwell recommended Sir Hans Hamilton's bill for sale of his 
estate, 'I know his relatives entirely consent thereto. He is my old schoolfellow and 
acquaintance, and stuck by us very well in the House of Commons';
295
  
16 December 1703: on a bill in favour of Colonel Power, 'he has obtained such ample 
certificates of good behaviour in former times that the Council thought fit to 
countenance his bill. The lord lieutenant recommends it';
296
 
16 December 1703: Ormond recommended the case of Captain Mathews, his near 
relation: 'He is a Roman Catholic, but married a Protestant, and she has always 
remained so. The enclosed clause was particularly framed to deprive him of the benefit 
of any settlement his wife may make upon him, and is inserted in the Bill of Popery sent 
over. His Grace was not anxious to appear in the matter on this side for fear of giving 
ground for a charge of what people are so apt to call "favour to Papists"; but as it 




The English lords justices also began to ask the Irish lords justices for their private judgments of 
the transmitted heads of bills, especially those originating in the Irish parliament, as 
it might be too invidious a part to be put upon them, to make all the alterations that may be 
necessary in bills prepared there, and which come recommended to them as designed 
only for the public good; but, if their Excellencies were informed how far their lordships 
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  SP, 63–354 f.148 
292
  SP, 63–359(stamped 54; CSPD translation); SP, Entry Book 275, p.106 (CSPD: William III, 1697―2 July 1697) 
293
  For example, SP, 63–359 no.25(stamped 66-68) (Irish lords justices to English lords justices, 12 July 1697); the 
bill process outlined in Scobell, Memorials, p.41, only required 'If a bill be admitted to be read, the same is to be 
presented fairly written, without any razure or interlineation, together with a breviate of the heads of the bill'. Kelly, 
Poynings' Law, pp.142-43, makes the point that British consideration of Irish bills became dependent on what the 
Irish Privy Council advised and that on occasions the British Privy Council was suspicious that the Irish Council 
was trying to pull the wool over their eyes by not explaining the full import of a bill or re-sending one which had 
been previously rejected such as the tillage bill. 
294
  SP, 63–363 no.150(stamped 77) (Southwell to Nottingham) 
295
  As above  
296
  SP, 63–363 no.156(stamped 96) (Southwell to Nottingham) 
297
  SP, 63–363(stamped 96)  




approved of what the bills contain, or where they have any doubts or exceptions about 
them, it would make less uncertainty in the examining those bills.
298
 
Whitehall was becoming used to reviewing Irish bills which took their rise in Dublin. During the 
1690s the heads of bill procedure took its final form as a device to circumnavigate Poynings' Law 
and these changes went in parallel with an assertion of the primacy of the Commons over the Irish 
Privy Council and a fall in the bills taking their rise there. The period of transition ended in the reign 
of Anne. Southwell explained to Whitehall that in preparation for the 1703–04 session that a 
committee of the Privy Council had produced a list of heads, which 'were distributed to the Judges 
and king's Council to draw up into bills' to transmit in time for a parliament to meet in September.
299
 
The list to which the Council was working survives and is set out in Appendix 6.9. Preparations 
had started in December 1702
300
 and show that the Irish Privy Council expected to have a key role 
in framing both a programme of public bills and the contents of bills themselves. This was a not a 
token list to meet the minimum terms of Poynings' Law for summoning a parliament. An initial list 
was reduced to a first tranche which was sent to London in July 1703 with brief explanatory 
statements.
301
 There then followed exchanges between London and Dublin, in which Southwell 
provided the thrust of the arguments for the bills.
302
 Most of the items on the list emerged during 
the 1703–04 session. Although the Privy Council did not seek to promote all the bills itself, they 
had a good success rate. Of those which emerged as heads in the Commons all but one were 
introduced and managed by administration supporters. Many of the bills looked back to the 1690s 
and were fresh attempts to secure enactment of previously failed legislation.
303
 In contrast many of 
the 74 heads (out of 104 items on the ILD for the 1703–04 session) that originated in the House 
which were not administration sponsored showed the House moving into new areas.
304
 
                                                        
 
298
  SP, Entry Book 275, p.325 (CSPD: William III, 1697―8 Oct 1697)  
299
  SP, 63–363 no.10(stamped 447) (To Nottingham, 8 June 1703); James Kelly considers that the English Privy 
Council tried to exploit the four-year gap since the last session provided a detrimental effect on institutional 
memory, to bolster its role, and that the opposite occurred as the Commons took advantage of the weakened 
English executive, to strengthen the heads of bill process. If that is correct, the Irish Council was working closely 
with the Commons, which is not certain (Kelly, Poynings' Law, p.117) . 
300
  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.102, points out that the 'programme for the 1703–04 session can be traced 
back to 29 December 1702, when the lord lieutenant ... instructed the Irish lords justices to consult about bills for a 
parliament then in contemplation'. 
301
  SP, 63–363 no.10(stamped 447), no.16(stamped 410) (26 June 1703) 
302
  SP, 63–363 no.31(stamped 360–63) (Southwell to Nottingham, 22 July 1703) 
303
  According to ILD, 18 items originated in Irish Privy Council and of these seven were private bills. 
304
  For example, the heads of bills for regulating servants, for encouraging the consumption of the manufactures of 
this kingdom, to encourage the making earthenware, for cleansing the channel of Cork harbour, for making the 
Boyne, Nore and Barrow navigable, to make a canal from Lough Neagh to Newry, for regulating the election of 
MPs. 
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By contrast in 1715 the administration was struggling to meet the minimum requirements of 
Poynings' Law. Archbishop King, protecting the primacy of the Commons on supply, explained to 
Secretary of State James Stanhope that  
it is necessary that the first sessions of parliament should be opened by reading a bill and 
no bill can be read that has not been remitted from England, there must be a bill for each 
House so if the recognition bill had been sent to the Commons there had been none for 
the Lords since money bills cannot be sent there, nor can the Commons open their 
session with a money bill because before any such bill be offered there must be a motion 
for a supply [and] voted in a committee of the whole House and reported and agreed to, 
we saw no other way to get over this difficulty but by sending over some more bills.
305
 
In 1725 the idea of the administration having a slate of bills had disappeared as Newcastle told the 
new lord lieutenant, Carteret:  
as to the instructions for the measures to be pursued in relation to the carrying on the 
sessions of parliament ... it has never been the practice to give instructions of that nature, 
and that it would be impossible for His Majesty's servants here, to judge of those affairs so 
perfectly, as those who are upon the spot, they leave the conduct of them to your 
excellency's great prudence and ability; according to what has always been the practice 
upon the like occasions.
306
 
With a bill originating in the Commons the usual method of preparation was an instruction to 
prepare heads on a specific subject. Typically a drafting committee consisted of fewer than a 
dozen Members and often included a lawyer
307
 and instructions were usually concise but, if 
necessary, the drafters could be instructed to include a particular provision
308
 or to consult certain 
people. In many cases drafting in committee may have been perfunctory as there is evidence that 
Members proposing legislation already had prepared heads: the Journal recorded that on 25 May 
1710 leave was given to bring in the heads of a bill for the better securing of payments on duties 
and a committee was appointed to draft the heads. Two entries later in the Journal the heads of 
the bill were presented and referred to a committee of the whole House.
309
  
Throughout the period under examination it was expected that one of the Irish parliament’s 
functions was to review English legislation and to consider whether and how it could be applied in 
Ireland. In 1695 the Commons appointed a committee 'to inquire what beneficial laws in England, 
                                                        
 
305
  SP, 63–373(stamped 148) (Archbishop King to Stanhope, 7 Oct 1715) 
306
  SP, 63–385(stamped 271-72) (Newcastle to Carteret, 13 July 1725) 
307
  From 1697 these select committees were given, on occasion, the power to send for persons, papers and records 
(CJI(II), p.180). There were attempts to draft heads in committee of the whole House—for example, in Sep 1695 
such a committee had several sessions on heads for the recovery of small debts but eventually appointed a select 
committee, to draft the heads ((II), pp.51ff). Examples of later settled form―(III), pp.12, 123, 321, 608-09. 
308
  For example, see CJI(II), pp.158, 428.  
309
  CJI(II), p.648; confirmed also by Rivet's role in the Blake case (see p.117 above).  




[are] not in force in this kingdom' and on 5 September 1695 instructed it 'to consider, what new 
laws are fit to be enacted in this kingdom, and to draw up heads'.
310
 Such committees became part 
of the sessional procedures of the Commons.
311
 They chime with a theme running through the 
operation of the Irish House, that of asserting its autonomy and distinctiveness by assiduously 
copying and adapting English/British models, which were seen as a prime source of fresh 
legislation for Ireland. Without such a regular legislative update the Irish parliament risked 
undermining its own purpose as the alternative would have been for more groups to look to 
Westminster to legislate. (This process of drawing from the English templates also had the effect 
of curtailing institutional drift both in terms of legislative initiative and outlook.) 
In 1707 when the Commons discovered that a clause in a heads prepared by the Lords was 
missing from the transmitted bill
312
 they set up a committee under William Conolly to investigate, 
fearing that the change had 'been done by some sinister and indirect means'. The committee 
inspected the Lords Journal and records. Its report provided detail on how heads were drafted 
(though this case concerned heads starting in the Lords).  
1) The heads were designed to replicate English law with the expectation that all the English 
provisions would apply, except where they were plainly otiose. 
2) The heads were drafted by lawyers; it appears that in this case the initiative for the legislation 
came from the judiciary. On instruction from the Lord Chief Justice, a senior judge started 
drafting and then, when he had insufficient time to complete the work, passed it to his clerk, 
who failed to compare the completed first draft against the English template. His draft was 
shown to the Lord Chief Justice.
313
 
3) Drafting started before leave for the heads were given; in this case drafting started before the 
House convened. 
4) The drafting process was not secretive and at several points suggestions about the content 
were received and the draft was shown to Conolly, who was planning to bring in similar 
legislation.  
                                                        
 
310
  CJI(II), p.51; for similar later exercise see (II), pp.280, 320-21. The appointment of a committee to review the laws 
was in line with the approach at Westminster for legislative revision (see Scobell, Memorials, p.40). See also 
Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.22-25, which shows measures emanating from the committee in the 1690s 
were taken forward in procedurally diverse forms. 
311
  See Appendix 6.3.14.  
312
  For the amendment of the law, and better advancement of justice (6 Anne c.10)  
313
  The prominent role of the judiciary appears to have feature of the process from the 1690s when the Irish Privy 
Council held the initiative in drafting legislation (Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.113-14).  
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5) The first draft was not put before Members. Instead a second draft was prepared for them. 
Normally the first draft would have been available and checked against the second. In this case 
the first draft had been lost. 
6) The committee charged with bringing in the bill did not rubber stamp the draft but compared the 
draft against the English template, though it failed to notice the significance of the omissions. 
As such drafts would contain some adaptations; this exercise required more than verbatim 
checking. 
7) The lawyer advising the committee was not well prepared; he only obtained a copy of the 
English Act as he was entering the committee room. 
8) The heads approved by the Lords had some blanks which clerks filled in before the heads went 
to the lord lieutenant; normally this would have been done by the clerk who copied out the 
heads agreed by the House to disguise these later additions or the text as agreed would have 
been re-transcribed but on this occasion there was insufficient time. 
9) Checking copies against originals was carried out as a two-person job.  
10) Amendments were pinned to the originals.
314
 
James Kelly has noted that the Privy Council and law officers in London complained frequently 
about the quality of the drafting of Irish legislation.
315
 Galway explained when sending a batch of 
bills to Stanhope in March 1715/6 that there had been 'more bills this session of parliament ... 
since the Revolution' and that as they had been 'generally drawn up by the young Members you 
cannot wonder that there was more time than usually required to consider and put them into a 
better form' in the Irish Privy Council.
316
 At the end of this session the Irish parliament had come up 
with an arrangement to improve drafting (and possibly restrict Privy Council changes), which as 
the lords justices explained to Stanhope the administration quashed: 
Some Members ... moved that to prevent for the future their heads of bills going imperfect 
out of their hands, they should pass the examination of both Houses, before they were 
carried to the Council. As this does not appear to break in upon Poynings' Act, and has a 
show of good intention at least, it was carried almost unanimously in the ... Commons, and 
many of the Peers gave into it, but was we did not know what consequences might attend 
such an innovation in their methods of proceeding in parliament, we thought it proper to 
interpose and prevailed upon our friends in the ... Lords to have it dropped.  
We shall now make it our business to get the bills passed, and the parliament prorogued 
with all possible dispatch.
317
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  CJI(II), p.545  
315
  Kelly, Poynings' Law, p.120; see also SP, Entry Book 275, p.325 (CSPD William III, 1697―8 Oct 1697) and See 
also Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.123-25.  
316
  SP, 63–374(stamped 163) (22 Mar 1715/6) 
317
  SP, 63–374(stamped 285) (15 June 1716)  




Southwell also identified volume as a problem when he wrote to London in 1703: 'We will all stick 
close to the House next week and forward everything ... that is possible. There is a great number 
of public and private bills. I am sure of the former there is several are not digested enough to 
pass'.
318
 (The implication is that the private bills were in better order, perhaps because many would 
follow a relatively standard form.) Irish officials such as Coghill shared London's view on the quality 
of drafting in the Commons: 'our bills ... are so ill prepared ... that they require much longer time 
than could have been imagined to put them into form'.
319
 During the 1703–04 session Lord 
Chancellor Cox identified the problem (as well as indicating that some heads were not drafted 
before the legislative process started): 'whilst people are fond of their own motions, and though 
they may be right enough abstracted by themselves, [they] may be nevertheless incoherent with 
other parts of the bill'.
320
 Whether the changes made in London were all necessary is open to 
doubt from a comment by Secretary of State James Vernon: 'The Council did not meddle with the 
Irish bills this day, the lord chancellor having been indisposed these two or three days'.
321
 
After 1692 the Commons put in place arrangements to monitor the changes made by the privy 
councils.
322
 On 4 September 1695 the Commons appointed a small committee of five―a sign of 
work rather than debate―chaired by William Molyneux 'to examine and compare such copies of 
bills as already are, or hereafter shall be, brought into this House, with the transmissions thereof 
out of England '.
323
 (Such a committee was appointed in nearly every subsequent session and 
became a distinctive feature of the Irish House.)
324
 How effective the Molyneux committee was is 
open to question. It was appointed at the beginning of the session―perhaps expecting a rolling 
programme of bills crossing the Irish Sea. A new committee of four, which did not include 
Molyneux, was appointed on 4 December when bills that had started as heads began to re-
appear, in order to examine engrossed bills against the 'original transmisses'.
325
 On 7 September 
1697 the House added Members to the 'committee appointed to examine engrossed bills by the 
                                                        
 
318
  SP, 63–363(stamped 14) (Southwell to Nottingham, 13 Nov 1703) 
319
  Coghill Letters, no.66 (To Edward Southwell, 22 Jan 1729/30) 
320
  BL, 38,155 f.11 
321
  SP, William and Mary 8, no.27 (CSPD: William III 1697―21 Sep 1697) (Vernon to "Lord Ambassador" Williamson)  
322
  In earlier parliaments there had been reviews of specific bills (CJI(I), pp.14, 99, 388).  
323
  CJI(II), p.51  
324
  CJI(II), pp.247 (for 1698–99 session), 393 (1703–04), 463 (1705), 546 (1707), 611 (1709), 721 (1711); (III), pp.155 
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transmisses out of England', which may mean that the second 1695 committee was still 
functioning.
326
 Certainly attention was paid to drafting changes and later in September the House 
noticed an error in a bill.
327
 In the following session on 16 January 1698/9 Members were added to 
that session's committee to cope with the bills arriving from England,
328
 which may indicate that the 
work was shared out among Members. The administration had a strategy for fending off criticism 
of alterations as Southwell explained to Nottingham when waiting for bills to return in January 
1703/4: 'We must expect to be told of every alteration, but if [the money] bill comes clear and we 
have the main part of our Popery Bill I believe all will do well'.
329
 In other words, for a manageable 
and successful session the money bill should not be amended and the government should agree a 
comprehensive anti-Catholic bill
330
 at the top of the House's legislative priorities.  
In 1709 Stephen Ludlow MP argued that the Commons should as a matter of course refuse to 
admit all amended legislation to the statute book in order to hinder Poynings' Law.
331
 Ludlow's 
assertion did not reflect the reality. As James Kelly notes, this view was not shared in England. Nor 
was it, or did it become, the usual method of the Commons. From 1703 the membership of the 
committee did not include those who were antagonistic to administration, which implies that the 
operation was essentially monitoring and checking rather seeking out issues on which to pick a 
fight.
332
 From 1703 the committees were appointed late in the session when the first batch of 
transmitted bills was expected back,
333
 an indication that they were appointed to carry out work. 
That said, there was evidence of a change in the 1720s, when on 3 January 1721/2 that session's 
committee was re-appointed and given additional powers to send for papers, persons and records 
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and to adjourn and report. The widening of the committee's powers may have provided a 
mechanism for reviewing bills originating in the Irish Privy Council and, if necessary, an opening for 
attack. Kelly suggests that as a consequence of the 1720 Declaratory Act there was a further 
decline in bills originating in the Irish Privy Council.
334
 In the 1723–24 session Members were 
added to the committee and what appears to have been a public bill that started in the Irish Privy 
Council for 'the further amendment of the law' was ordered to be sent to the committee, though the 
order sending it to the committee erroneously stated that it had been transmitted as a heads of 
bill.
335
 There is no report from the committee but the bill was subsequently rejected.
336
 St. John 
Brodrick was nominated to the committee (of 10) in the 1725–26 session.
337
 The 1729–30 session 
followed a similar pattern of a committee with strengthened powers and there is a surviving report 
from the committee. In December 1729 Eaton Stannard reported that 'the Committee had found 
several alterations' made to the supply bill. The House ordered the report to lie on the Table thus 
putting the administration on notice. The bill was, however, passed on a division.
338
  
Data from the ILD show that of the 260 enacted measures between 1692 and 1730 that started in 
the Commons, 222 are recorded as amended by the Privy Council in London (only four were 
amended by the Irish Privy Council). Given the procedures in place the Commons must have been 
aware of these changes and the level of intervention from London but was prepared to overlook it. 
The majority were what Kelly calls 'verbal and syntactical corrections'
339
 through a desire to ensure 
consistency of drafting in accordance with both English law and British political necessities. On the 
Irish side pragmatic and silent acceptance usually prevailed. The alternative would have been to 
reduce drastically the legislative throughput and disrupt the operation of the parliament.  
While the heads of bill process allowed the Irish parliament to sidestep the full force of Poynings' 
Law, both Houses, notwithstanding vociferous complaining about the restrictions, were assiduous 
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in applying the letter of the legislation to the presented bills. At first sight this appears surprising as 
the operation of Poynings' Law during the seventeenth century had changed. Among the changes, 
as James Kelly notes, were that Charles II allowed the Irish parliament to suggest legislation, the 
Parliament worked with the Irish Privy Council and the Parliament developed processes for 
initiating legislation. By 1695 the English Government had conceded that heads were the primary 
route to initiate legislation. But there were limits: no open criticism of Poynings' Law was permitted 
in the Irish parliament .
340
 With these parameters established, there was no major attempt to revise 
this settlement (other than that the initiation of legislation seeped from the Irish Privy Council to the 
Irish parliament , especially to the Commons).
341
 There was no concerted or sustained attempt to 
bend the interpretation of the application of Poynings' Law. One measure is the correction of 
inadvertent errors. When an error, or need for a change, emerged after a heads of bill had been 
sent to the lord lieutenant,
342
 the options were to start again,
343
 or to put up with the legislation and, 
if possible, initiate correcting legislation in a later session.
344
 The only correction permissible to a 
bill was to bring the text in line with the wording as returned from England. In September 1695 the 
Lords discovered that three words had been accidently omitted from the engrossed bill for settling 
intestates’ estates, which the Commons had sent up. The bill was not sent back to the Commons; 
instead the Commons compared the text against that transmitted from England and sent a 
message that the Lords were correct to insert the missing words. The bill then was sent for royal 
assent.
345
 In 1705 when an error was discovered in the linen bill, it was sent back to London 
although it was in breach of the convention against considering the same matter twice in a 
session.
346
 The only other device to rectify an error was the declaratory interpretation. When it 
eventually passed the ill-fated linen manufacture bill in 1705, the Commons had to make a 
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The extended legislative process combined with the Commons’ desire to monitor changes made 
by the privy councils produced an emergent system to track legislation. The death of Capel caused 
an administrative hiatus. On 31July 1697 the House ordered that a list of heads that had been 
taken to Capel but were not transmitted should be entered in the Journals and sent privy 
councillors to the lords justices 'to know what are become of them'.
348
 For the future the House 
ordered that 'notice be taken in the Journal, from time to time, of what bills are sent by this House 
to the chief governors, and by whom the same are sent, and that copies of such bills so prepared 
and sent be kept by the Clerk'.
349
 On 5 August the lords justices replied with a list of heads sent to 
England. The House then ordered the Speaker to write to Capel’s secretary, to ask what had 
become of missing heads and what had become of three bills returned under the Great Seal of 
England and delivered to him. The House then set up a select committee 'to prepare heads of the 
bill for preserving papers, arrears, books, entries and duplicates in the secretary’s office, and 
continuing them here on the change or removal of the chief governor'.
350
 In addition, when 
concerned about progress on heads the Commons would ask the lord lieutenant to write to 
England 'to remind them of [a] bill, which was transmitted thither'.
351
 If a bill appeared to be 




When legislation came back from London it was copied and then presented.
353
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4.10  Financial powers and procedures 
The development of the procedures of the Commons in authorising biennially the raising and 
allocation of taxes was instrumental to, as Patrick Walsh suggests, making Ireland 'an integral but 
yet separate part of the eighteenth-century British imperial or fiscal-military state'.
354
 He notes that 
'concerns about security rather than abstract ideas about liberty were to the forefront of the Irish 
Protestant elite’s minds' and the revenues necessary to maintaining the army on the Irish 
establishment and building a country-wide network of barracks to house them  
could not be raised solely by taxation, although this would be the primary source of 
government income through the century. Public credit structures, just as in Britain, had 
also to be developed with a separate Irish national debt first instituted in 1716. This 
debt took the form of a national loan of £50,000 largely raised from within Dublin’s 
parliamentary and administrative circles. The proximate cause for this development 
was the raising of thirteen new regiments ... upon the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion 




The 1661 parliament had voted substantial increases in taxes and duties without a time limit and in 
the favourable economic climate the voted revenues had been ample to meet the requirements of 
the administration and so removed one incentive for calling a parliament. The war of 1689–91 
increased the administration’s expenditure and debts as well as devastating the economy and 
bringing the collection of revenues to a near standstill. The need to secure additional income for 
the administration―supply―was not the primary reason for calling the 1692 parliament. Only 
when Sydney arrived and learned that the administration’s pay arrears might reach more than 
£100,000 in 1693 did he, on his own initiative, begin preparations for money bills.
356
 The 
administration lost the initiative as it had no bills ready and the House turned to examining 
grievances.
357
 C.I. McGrath points out the 1692 parliament and the assertion of 'sole right' to 
initiate supply saw for the first time in Ireland a number of concepts and procedures that were to be 
developed and refined over the following 20 years: (i) the focus of the Commons on the committee 
of the whole House to establish the money to be supplied and to establish the duties and taxes 
from which the supply would be raised; (ii) the requirement for the administration to justify its need 
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for supply which required the production of papers and scrutiny in the Committee of Accounts; and 
(iii) the concept of short-term additional supply for a defined time and purpose.
358
  
While earlier Irish parliaments had granted supply, the procedures adopted from 1692 drew on and 
adapted those emerging at Westminster.
359
 They enabled the Commons to dominate the supply 
process. By the 1711 session the procedures were nearly fully developed and the stages of the 
process, with some commentary on the development, are set out in Appendix 6.14.4. This section 
examines key features of the adaptations. Supply mattered to the administration. It needed the 
revenue to support the military and civil establishment (and to ensure items taxed did not 
disadvantage England's economy). The events of 1692 cast a long shadow and the administration 
lacked not only control but also nervously feared attack from opponents as well as mishap. In 1703 
Southwell explained how problems could arise:  
I enclose the public papers which were given to the House and the report of the 
committee. There will be some censure ... passed on the officers of the Revenue for not 
bringing in a state of the credits as well as the debts ... There was no fraud in it, yet they 
were very remiss therein ... and it is plain we are now baffled of a very large demand ... In 
[the 1690s] the Brodricks then governing passed their accounts without examining.
360
 
The process of examination of accounts was especially open to 'country' arguments about financial 
waste and patriotic sentiment―the pensions to non-residents were a fertile ground for criticism.  
The Committee of Accounts made its appearance in 1695. Its listed membership of 29 Members 
was supplemented 'with all merchants and bankers that are Members of the House' to inspect the 
papers laid before the House. It had commercial and financial expertise as it included the 
chancellor of the exchequer and Sir Francis Brewster.
361
 The House gave the committee full 
powers to send for persons, papers and records and to adjourn itself and to determine the venue 
of its meetings. In addition, it was given the power to establish sub-committees.
362
 Brewster was 
impressed by the Irish supply process as he commented in New Essays that 'To me there seems 
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the same reason for the Commons to have conduct of trade, as they have of money bills'.
363
 
Adjustments were made: the committee’s quorum was reduced from eight to five and, 
exceptionally, it was empowered to sit at the same time as grand committees, and the chief 
secretary was added.
364
 The first point may indicate a problem with attendance but shows that it 
was intended to function through small groups and the latter the importance and volume of its 
work. The committee reported several resolutions on 23 September 1695.
365
  
The committee did not, however, immediately become a permanent fixture. The Journals for 1697 
contain only a couple of references to a Committee of Accounts
366
 and it is not mentioned again 
until 1703. In its absence the detailed work of scrutiny was carried out by a committee of the whole 
House, to which papers laid by the administration were referred.
367
 In 1703, upon the 
administration laying comprehensive financial documentation, the House set up a Committee of 
Accounts consisting of 34 Members 'together with all merchants and accountants', though it 
appears that all Members had a voice and vote.
368
 Southwell explained how this 'large Committee 
... sat early and late' and that its critical focus was on 'most things which were not for the 
immediate support of the Army'. Speaker Brodrick (not a listed member of the committee) made 
several long, unhelpful speeches which 'turned the minds of a great many ... from us' and the 
administration's opponents proposed the question that the chairman of the committee should leave 
the Chair, which the administration lost on a division of the House (141:88).
369
 The picture 
Southwell paints is of a body operating as a committee of the whole House and a platform for 
debate, fishing for issues to exploit and Speaker Brodrick grandstanding. Southwell also shows 
that the administration was not detached from operation of the committee and could manage it. 
Over 20 years later some of the same pattern can be seen when Bolton explained to Secretary of 
State James Craggs:  
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The Committee for the Accounts met this morning and chose Mr Harrison their chairman, 
and on Monday will subdivide themselves [into sub-committees]; and I will get the King's 
servants to attend as well as I can to hasten the money bill forward.
370
  
As with other committees the chairman not only carried a substantial administrative load but also 
could determine the direction and attitude of the committee. The administration regarded Harrison 
as friendly and had manoeuvred to secure his re-election. Bolton explained:  
There was a design to have made a dispute about the chairman for the examining the 
public accounts and they had persuaded Mr Harrison to go out of town to be out of the 
what; but I sent a messenger on purpose for him and he came.
371
  
The purpose of the sub-committees was to 'give greater despatch to that great affair committed to 
their charge'.
372
 The sub-committees' work was immediately central to the supply process as it 
examined past expenditure and scrutinised the administration’s request for supply.
373
 Each 
focused on a specified area, took about a week to complete its work
 
and reported to the main 
committee which in turn reported to the Committee of Supply.
374
 Webster explained in 1719: 
The sub-committees ... not having been able to finish ... their reports sooner than Monday 
next, and it requiring some time afterwards for the chairman of the Committee of Accounts 
to digest those several reports into method in order to be laid before the House, it was 
found impossible for the House to proceed upon granting the supply on Monday ... but 
they have resolved to do it on Thursday next.
375
 
Central to the maturing Supply process was the provision of papers. In 1703 the Commons asked 
for supplementary papers, including an account of the army’s arrears and a statement setting out 
the Establishment to be laid the following morning, when the House was due to start consideration 
of supply. On the following day 13 papers were supplied.
376
 There was, however, a difficulty when 
the Committee of Accounts requested a year book for 1702. It was not produced and the House 
summoned and imprisoned the deputy receiver general.
377
 The failure to produce information 
quickly became 'the great occasion of [the House’s] suspicion'.
378
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As at Westminster, while the request for papers may have been dressed up in the deferential form 
of the respectful address, the administration did not stand on the dignity that the supplying of 
papers was a favour. To head off problems, the administration realised the importance of the 
timely and managed presentation of the accounts and work on them started well before the 
session opened. Ahead of the September 1717 session the lords justices started examining 
accounts in March.
379
 The second element of the strategy was to explain the accounts. The 1725–
26 session was atypical in that the supply arrangements were more fraught than in any session 
since 1713. Its shortcomings and improvisations highlight both the expected operation and 
resilience of the system. When work started on the accounts for the 1725–26 session,
380
 it became 
clear that the deputy vice-treasurer, John Pratt, had not done his job well. Coghill feared that, if the 
accounts presented to the Commons were unclear, the result would be that those intent on 
mischief could claim debts were less than stated.
381
 In contrast to earlier sessions, Carteret, 
despite warnings about the need to manage presentation, considered that the accounts would 
speak for themselves.
382
 The administration's approach irritated Members:  
the accounts were not laid before them in so clear a light as to give them satisfaction, 
which they looked upon as done on purpose to puzzle matters for which reason after a 
great deal of labour and time spent ineffectually in trying to state the accounts, they were 




Coghill's fears were justified. On 28 October 1725 Carteret informed Newcastle that the Committee 
of Accounts had not yet come to a conclusion but 
the great confusion in the public accounts ... has given a handle for the altering the usual 
method of proceeding in this committee, which formerly used to sub-divide itself into 
several committees ... whereas they have now proceeded upon the whole in the general 
committee. The King's servants in the House ... did not oppose this method of proceeding, 
lest it should give a suspicion that there was the least intention of concealing the truth... 
Those who are most solicitous in opposing the measures taken here, are so sensible of 
this, that they have endeavoured ... to avoid stating the real facts; the arguments made 
use of by them have had great weight with several of the country gentlemen, who seem so 
apprehensive of a new tax, that they are most inclined to believe those who represent the 
debt to be smallest.
384
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Carteret's letter shows the defensiveness and vulnerability of the administration's position, his 
initial failure to grasp the political dimension of the scrutiny, the advantage resting with those 
opposing the administration and the pliability of the procedures. The House dispensed with sub-
committees and moved to the full Committee of Accounts as a platform from which opponents 
could attack the administration. On 26 October Lord Chancellor West told Newcastle that, although 
the debt stood at £200,000, the gentlemen in the House were not inclined to vote extra duties but 
instead attacked the French pensioners and enhanced the revenue 'as much as possible, in order 
that the difference between them might be looked upon as a sufficient fund for the discharge of the 
debt'.
385
 They also estimated the next years' revenue on the basis of the most buoyant recent 
years and a growing revenue. On 16 November Carteret informed Newcastle that the 
administration's representatives in the Commons 'have done their utmost and supported the 
debate in the most proper manner; but all their arguments, and even demonstration, were 
answered by the popular cry of no new taxes'.
386
 Carteret erred in taking Members for granted, 
who were only too willing in the aftermath of Wood's halfpence to interpret muddle as deceit. 
Those in opposition saw their opportunity, exploited error and ambiguity and cherry picked figures, 
including historical figures, to bolster their case. In the end a compromise emerged from what was 




Once the quantum of supply was settled the committee had to decide how the money would be 
raised through the Ways and Means process, which followed a pattern of development seen with 
other procedures in the Commons in the 20 years after 1692. It moved from the sprawling to the 
focused, if not streamlined. The Committee on Ways and Means first met on 16 September 1695 it 
then met five times over the next month
388
 and several petitions seeking money were referred to 
it
389
 before resolutions were produced. The committee’s report was taken fragmentarily on eight 
occasions between 1 and 18 October 1695.
390
 The resolutions specified the rate at which duties 
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would be charged and the period during which they would be levied. The committee’s first 
resolutions formed the basis of a poll tax; the only information recorded was that the resolutions 
were sent to the lord deputy on 7 October 1695.
391
 After three more meetings of the committee the 
House agreed to resolutions from the committee to extend duties on beer, ale and liquors
392
 and 
asked the lord deputy to draft a bill
393
 and then, finally, on 18 October duties on tobacco, drapery, 
linen and wine imports, but this time heads of a bill were sent to Capel, though with drafting 
instructions for two clauses to be included.
394
 This pattern continued in 1697 and in 1698/9. The 
1698 committee took oral evidence from the corporation of weavers at the bar of the House on the 
amount of duty to be levied on draperies.
395
 The House reverted to sending its resolutions to the 
lords justices for them to frame the legislation.
396
 By 1703 the ways and means process had 
reduced to three sittings.
397
 The committee's report included instructions on the drafting of the 
heads of a bill.
398
 The 1707 committee made a single report, the resolutions in which were agreed 
by the House and immediately ordered to be drafted as heads of a bill.
399
  
Appropriation, beyond payments to individuals,
400
 slowly entered the financial procedures. In May 
1709 Sir John Perceval noted the novelty and difficulties in a letter to Southwell: 
this method of appropriating each particular sum though practised in England is entirely 
new to us, and at least not fit to be insisted on at this time because the money in cash will 
not probably answer the Establishment, and we do not know how much of the supply must 
go to make it up, wherefore we should take good care not to pin the government down in 
the disposal of that money.
401
 
The administration's nervousness around supply was not based solely on fears that the Commons 
would deny supply but also that it would proactively levy political taxes. Coghill recorded in 1729 
that 'there will also be a tax of 4s in the pound on the profits of all employments civil and military 
held by those who are absent out of the kingdom, this his Excellency has no great inclination to, 
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but it will go without opposition, for it is impossible to stop'.
402
 Such tactics were not new. In 1703 
Southwell reported a 'bench to bench debate' which illustrates the nature of debate and the range 
of tactics both sides used:  
Thomas Brodrick proposed to lay a tax upon all Papists who had been [restored?] by 
favour since the last war, and was not included in the Act of Resumption. This ... was 
exposed as a very trifling fund, which could not yield above [£]4 or 5,000: that it could not 
be come at without a new court of claims [and] should be in a bill by itself, and proper only 
to be applied to the building of a citadel at Limerick or barracks or some such purposes. 
He then proposed a duty upon calicoes and linens [which would] encourage our own 
manufacturers at home. He next proposed a duty upon gold and silver lace. These 
proposals instead of hurting for us did ... turn much to our advantage for it showed a great 
deal of trifling and a plain design of giving ineffectual funds. Then the additional duties on 
tobacco wine and linen as formerly were also offered to the House; but the 2nd years 
excise was first proposed, it was thought in point of order that ought first to be debated. 
The House seemed to [view?] it very well ... and it growing dark, and candles being called 
for, they moved the chairman should leave the Chair, which question being put we carried 
it for bringing in candles by 138 to 98 so that soon after we came to a resolution for 
granting the excise for a year more, which is to be reported on Saturday; ... They moved 
for Tuesday to go on again on ways and means, which we could not get sooner the 
Speaker quitting the Chair instantly before the question could be put for a shorter day.
403
 
4.11  Committees  
Much day-to-day business was conducted through committees, rather than in the House, as they 
were more flexible and informal. In committee Members could speak more than once. Committees 
could be empowered by the House to send for persons, papers and records and meet away from 
the House and, by order, while the House was sitting. Through committees the House could 
demonstrate its power to set its own agenda to enquire into issues and to frame legislation.
404
 The 
records of their operation and activities are scant as the Journals only record their appointment 
and that they reported to the House. In some cases their resolutions were recorded and, as noted, 
in a few cases their reports. 
The parliament that met in 1692 moved swiftly to follow the precedents of earlier Irish 
parliaments
405
 and to copy English parliamentary procedure
406
 by establishing five grand 
committees . The English parliament had five grand committees and its Journal entry for 22 
January 1688/9 provided an outline for the operation of four: 
                                                        
 
402
  Coghill Letters, no.60 (To Edward Southwell, 8 Nov 1729)  
403
  SP, 63–363 no.117(stamped 135) ([Southwell] to Nottingham, 4 Nov 1703) 
404
  Julian Hoppit (ed.), Parliaments, nations and identities in Britain and Ireland 1660–1850 (Manchester, 2003), p.6 
405
  The Commons in 1661 had appointed three grand committees: Grievances, Privileges and Trade (CJI(I), pp.388-
89, 405-06)  
406
  Scobell, Memorials, pp.35ff suggested that one function of a grand committee was the preparation of matters such 
as bills, which in the Irish context of the evolving heads process, would have been cumbersome.  
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Ordered, That the Grand Committee for Religion do sit every Tuesday, in the afternoon, in 
the House. 
Ordered, That the Grand Committee for Grievances do sit every Thursday, in the 
afternoon, in the House. 
Ordered, That the Grand Committee for Courts of Justice do sit every Saturday, in the 
afternoon, in the House. 




(The fifth was the Committee of Privileges and Elections and is examined separately.) The 
terseness of the entries betrays that the appointment of the four grand committees had become a 
formality as they were on the point of falling into disuse. The Irish Journals for 11 October 1692 
provide for the same grand committees as at Westminster with meeting times in the Speaker’s 
chamber but, following earlier Irish practice, the entries set out the committees’ membership,
408
 
quorums (eight in each case) and powers and terms of reference. Moreover, the volume of 
business expected was such that three committees were allocated more than one slot.
409
 For 
example, for the Grand Committee for Grievances the House: 
ordered that Mr James Hamilton, Capt Henry Nicholls, etc. be appointed a Committee of 
Grievances; that they, or any eight or more of them, have the power to meet in the 
Speaker's chamber thrice a week: viz. on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Mondays in the 
afternoon, to hear and examine all such matters and Grievances which shall come before 
them; and that all Members, who shall come to the Committee have voices, and have 
power to send for persons, papers, and records, to inform themselves by; and from time to 




The Committee for Grievances (see Appendix 6.3.3) was the most active in 1692 reporting 
resolutions to the House expressing concern about the numbers of Catholics in the army and 
carrying arms as well as about the management of forfeited estates. It also examined financial 
mismanagement in the Revenue, the collection of duties in Dublin and Cork and managing 
forfeited goods and lands. It was a platform for Protestant grievances. When the next session 
opened in 1695 the committee was given one afternoon slot and the Journal entry followed the 
formal 'English' pattern: 'Ordered, That the Committee for Grievances to meet and sit every 
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Monday, at four of the clock in the afternoon'; with no listed membership.
411
 But the committee met 
to examine grievances such as local officials taking excess duties.
412
 Later in the session it was 
given an additional slot because the committee had 'much business before them, and not sufficient 
time to dispatch the same'.
413
 This business changed from Protestant grievance―possibly 
because the House had an alternative route via initiating 'penal' legislation―to, for example, the 
examination of a petition that excess duties were being levied on penthouses in Dublin. But from 
this session business in the grand committee dropped off. There is little evidence in the Journals of 
much activity by the grand committee after the 1703 session. A similar pattern is seen the grand 
committees for Religion, Courts of Justice and Trade.
414
  
The explanation for their decline is that they were too cumbersome to deal effectively with the 
volume and type of business coming before the House. One obvious impediment was mustering a 
quorum. Although set at eight in 1692,
415
 English practice was 40,
416
 which the Irish House in 
November 1695 lowered to 24.
417
 Two entries from 5 October 1695 show the emerging pattern.  
— The House appointed a select committee of 19 chaired by Francis Annesley and including Sir 
Francis Brewster, to consider the improvement of trade, as to linen manufacture, butter, iron, 




— A petition from the corporation of skinners and glovers complaining about the effect of a duty on 
the export of skins was sent to the select committee, not the grand committee.
419
 
Although the four grand committees continued to be set up, they were neither drawn into the work 
of the House nor sustained. The appointment of these committees became a formality mimicking 
English practice, which served little purpose other than providing a time at which the House should 
adjourn.  
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Another factor pushing the grand committee aside was a new committee of the whole: the 
'committee on the state of the nation' which was first recorded in the English Journals in 1674
420
 
and its first reappearance after the Revolution was on 29 January 1688/9.
421
 The issues 
considered were of national importance such as the method for paying the army.
422
 P.D.G. 
Thomas defines it as 'an ad hoc institution periodically created by the initiative of the opposition 
Members on the pretext that government policy had created exceptional discontent or disaster'.
423
  
Given the outlook of Irish Members its transfer to Dublin was likely and it first appeared in the Irish 
Journals in 1692.
424
 It did not have time to report before the 1692 session was prorogued, though it 
may well have been set to fit the definition of P.D.G. Thomas of a harbinger of political trouble. In 
its second outing its target was the Restoration regime, though with contemporary resonance. Its 
first report made by Robert Molesworth in 1695 concluded that  
— the long intermission of parliaments in this kingdom has been one principal cause of the 
grievances this nation has hitherto lain under,  
— Charles II and James II had encouraged Irish Catholics, and  
— the proclamation of 8 March 1671/2 dispensing with the Acts of Settlement was contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of the legislation and was therefore illegal.  
The upshot was a decision by the House to draft legislation to protect Protestants’ land titles where 
they had bought land from Catholics after 1671.
425
  
The table in Appendix 6.17 sets out the work of committee to 1730. The pre-occupations that had 
animated the Committee for Grievances in the 1690s found a new home in this committee: fear of 
Catholics; preservation of the land settlement; administration of justice; constitutional matters; and 
elections. It also moved into partisan territory with attacks on Lord Chancellor Cox. P.D.G. Thomas 
suggests that the switch to a Committee on the State of the Nation was because the demand for 
the redress of grievance before the grant of money had become outmoded by constitutional and 
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 The switch in Ireland may have been driven by Westminster showing the 
Irish House adopted new and evolving processes rather than trying to revive older archaic forms.  
At the other end of the committee scale the select committees was much more flexible than the 
grand committee. It could be whatever size the House ordered and it could be set a task by the 
House, meet, investigate and report back quickly. As early as 1692 the task of identifying which 
English legislation since 1494 could be replicated in Ireland was given to a select committee rather 
than the Grand Committee on Courts.
427
 The approach was repeated in 1695 and the select 
committee was empowered to sub-divide and was given an instruction to draw up heads and it 
reported back a first batch within eight days.
428
 Select committees proliferated after 1692 and were 
the work-horses of the Commons. Their staple fare was the one-off task such as reviewing a 
petition or drafting heads of a bill where a group of Members could come together to perform a 
task and report. The range of employment could run from the routine to preparing grounds of 
impeachment against the lord chancellor.
429
 For example, on 23 November 1698, on a petition of 
Charles Northcote the House: 
Ordered, That Mr Thomas Brodrick, Mr Solicitor General, etc, or any three of them, be 
appointed a committee, to meet at the Speaker's Chamber this afternoon, at four of the 
clock, to take the ... petition [of the Galway prisoners praying relief against Colonel Burke] 




The Commons set the membership of the committee, the quorum at three and the time and place 
of the first meeting as well as the purpose of the committee. Meeting in the Speaker’s Chamber 
was a straight copy of arrangements at Westminster at this time.
431
 With Brodrick named first the 
implication is that he would be the chairman. The committee probably only met once and reported 
back to the House on 25 November in favour of the petitioner and that heads of a bill be drafted. 
The House agreed with the committee’s resolutions and then instructed it to prepare heads.
432
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Brodrick reported the heads of a bill on 28 November which were then committed to a committee 
of the whole House.
433
 The committee’s work was done. 
If a committee required additional powers it could be empowered 'to send for persons, papers, and 
records, and to adjourn, from time to time, from place to place, as they shall think fit'. In other 
words, it could assemble and test evidence by calling witnesses to attend and by sending for 
documents and it could set the time and venues of its meetings after the first meeting. These 
powers were frequently recorded in the Journals when select committees were set up, but not 
universally, which indicates that some consideration was given to how a committee might operate. 
(It may that the absence of these powers is an indication that the business had already been 
settled and the committee's function was to rubber stamp it.) Committees could be enlarged, when 
additional skills such as legal expertise of lawyers were required or because wider issues were 
under consideration. Sub-committees could only be established with explicit authority from the 
House.
434
 Exceptionally, all Members could be given voice i.e. allowed to speak at a select 
committee.
435
 Beyond these template powers and routine changes, the House could order 
additional powers or exemptions from existing procedures following Westminster practice. 
a) Select committees could not sit while the House (or a grand committee), which all 
Members could attend, was sitting, but in exceptional circumstances the rule could be 
overridden.
436
 (The fact that select committees were frequently ordered to meet at 
4pm underlines that grand committees fell into disuse from the 1690s.) 
b) When a committee ventured beyond the parliamentary buildings, it usually sought 
leave of the House—for example, a select committee sought permission to take 
evidence at the sickbed of an MP and from a prisoner in the Marshalsea.
437
 
c) The House could empower a committee to sit during the recess.
438
 
d) Joint committees with the Lords were rare.
439
  
                                                        
 
433
  CJI(II), p.279; along with a request from Col. Thomas Bourke to be heard by counsel at the bar.  
434
  For example, CJI(II), p.321  
435
  For example, CJI(II), p.100  
436
  CJI(II), pp.65, 67, 79; in this case the House ordered a committee to meet early and at a time that a grand 
committee was meeting, to examine three witnesses who had shortly to go to sea, though in doing so it was 
careful to ensure that notice of the meeting was given to the person against whom they were giving evidence; see 
also (II), pp.373.  
437
  CJI(II), p.134  
438
  CJI(II), p.234; there are also examples from 1661 Parliament at (I), p.401. Sitting during a recess did not develop. 
There was probably little point over the transmission recess as the main business had to be finished by then. One 
notable example was at the end of the rumbustious1713 session, before the House adjourned for three weeks, it 
appointed a committee to sit during the recess, to examine the accounts so that when the House reassembled no 
time would be lost on supply (SP, 63–369(stamped 31) (Lord Lieutenant Shrewsbury to Bolingbroke, 24 Dec 
1713).  




As noted on supply, the power to send for papers and records added to the political weight of the 
Commons and the bite of its scrutiny. Refusal to supply papers brought a peremptory summons to 
appear before the House.
440
 Significant state papers were sought by address and papers delivered 
to the House were usually referred to a committee for consideration or lay on the Table to be 
perused by Members.
441
 Papers in the possession of a committee were the responsibility of the 
chairman.
442
 While there were sufficient clerks to attend committees of the whole house
443
 and the 
Committee of Accounts, given the number of select committees reviewing petitions or drawing up 
heads it may have been left to the chairmen to manage and report. 
There are no firsthand accounts of procedures in committees but some procedures can be 
discerned from Journals. The initial meetings of committees usually took place at 4pm, after the 
House had finished business for the day (or, exceptionally, at 8am, before the start of business).
444
 
By the 1713 parliament the timing often slipped to 5pm or 6pm.
445
 The venue stipulated for the first 
meeting of a select committee was the Speaker’s Chamber, though, if all committees met there, 
there would either have had to have been several rooms or a queuing system. On 2 December 
1713, there was the first reference to a committee holding its first meeting at 6pm in the 'Clerk’s 
Chamber', the Speaker’s Chamber was already allocated to another committee meeting at that 
time.
446
 While some select committees may have concluded their business in one meeting, others 
could not. The usual procedure for reporting from committees to the House was a two-stage 
process. The chairman reported that the committee was ready to report: 'that he was directed to 
report when the House will please to receive the same'.
447
 The House set a date—usually the 
following day—and that provided an order to report. The chairman then reported according to an 
order of the day. An entry in the Journal for 14 June 1710 set out the procedure: 
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Mr Moore reported from the committee appointed to consider how to enlarge and level the 
street leading from Cork Hill to the Castle of Dublin, and upon what terms the persons 
interested therein may have satisfaction, that they had come to several resolutions in the 




The entry follows the equivalent Westminster entries, though they are explicit that the reading by 
the clerk is a second reading.
449
  
Although the bulk of resolutions from committees were accepted, the House could recommit back 
to the select committee (or another committee) or it could reject resolutions. One notable rejection 
occurred on 13 December 1695 when a select committee reported that the fees demanded by the 
Marshal of the Four Courts were reasonable. The House unanimously rejected the 
recommendation and resolved that the fees where 'illegal, extortious and a grievance'.
450
 




The Irish House of Commons by 1730 operated on the basis of the Westminster model that had 
developed after the 1688 Revolution. An MP may have been complained during a debate in 1711 
that they 'groaned ... under the shackles of Poynings' Law', which subjected them to the British 
Privy Council, and that the constitution was 'mangled and torn'.
452
 The evidence from its operation, 
however, shows that the Dublin House had learned to live with its constraints and had managed to 
operate as the Westminster House did, albeit with adaptations.  
First, and most obviously, Poynings' Law stimulated the heads of bill process. The heads 
process―essentially producing and reviewing draft legislation―was not alien to the Westminster 
way of doing business. In Dublin it evolved in a distinct and extended form, to allow the Irish 
parliament to initiate legislation. In turn it shaped the operation of the Irish parliament . The heads 
process was the only stage at which the Irish House—and it was nearly always just one House—
could make detailed changes to legislation. The Commons became the House initiating most 
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legislation and the highly developed bicameralism―in terms of processes and tensions―seen at 
Westminster did not thrive in Dublin. The need to send heads of bills off to London stimulated 
systems to keep track of the content and progress of legislation and engendered a sensitivity to 
changes made to legislation in London. By the early sessions of the first of Anne's parliaments the 
rhythm was clear both to parliamentarians but to those outside. Petitions and proposals for 
legislation were made early in the session and the significance of the transmission recess as a 
demarcation in handling legislative business and the consequent effect on the part-session after 
the recess of the atrophying of formal processes became apparent.
453
 
The 1692 session collapsed when the lord lieutenant rejected the innovative claim of the 
Commons to have the 'sole right' to initiate supply legislation. The administration embodied by 
Sydney could not accept that the Irish Commons could claim and adopt the privileges and new 
forms of operation emerging at Westminster. He took a paternalistic view of the management of 
the Commons, expecting a re-run of the 1661 parliament. The collapse of the session highlighted 
the tension at the heart of the relationship with Whitehall: Irish Members were now claiming the 
same parliamentary rights as Westminster, and Whitehall's reluctance to acknowledge any such 
claims. A compromise was later worked out conceding the substance of the claim but without 
completely conceding the principle. This compromise brokered by Capel had significant 
implications for the Commons, not least that the near control of supply eventually spurred 
procedural development leaving the procedures and processes of the seventeenth century behind 
and ensured the survival of the Irish parliament. The second session, 1695–97, was by 
comparison successful in terms of securing supply and a productive legislative output (69 statutes 
enacted). As Kelly points out, the session dispelled the spectre of failure that was the main legacy 
of the 1692 session by demonstrating that it was possible for the Irish parliament to operate in an 
effective law-making body manner within the restrictive parameters of Poynings Law and it showed 
that the Protestant interest in Ireland was more than just the passive acceptance of legislative 
ideas of the Irish and English Privy Councils.
454
 In procedural terms it was characterised by 
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improvisation, muddle and innovation
455
 combining features from the sprawling parliaments earlier 
in the century with lengthy adjournments; indeed there was uncertainty whether to treat it as one or 
two sessions. By contrast the 1698–99 session was much tighter and ended once the 
administration had secured supply (12 statutes enacted). By 1703 when the Irish parliament 
returned after more than four years some of the issues of the 1690s were receding. The Articles of 
Limerick had been confirmed, albeit in a truncated form, and, while there were to be skirmishes 
over attempts to reverse individual outlawries, the serious threat to the land settlement in favour of 
Protestants had passed. Events in the 1690s had shown that MPs could use the legislature, to 
buttress the land settlement and initiate penal legislation.  
In 1695 the Irish parliament ordered that the records of the 1689 parliament be 'publicly and openly 
cancelled and utterly destroyed',
456
 a procedure that was used to show public abhorrence of 
traitorous and heretical publications. The destruction of the records was popular with the 
Protestants of Dublin who lit 'bonfires in the streets for joy that the act of attainder and other 
proceedings ... were destroyed'.
457
 This action, underpinned by an Irish statute not only declaring 
its proceedings null and void but also explicitly reversed them,
458
 ensured that none of the 1689 
parliament’s decisions would stand as law or precedent. The obliteration of the records 
represented more than a frightened elite stridently reasserting their claims to land. It asserted that 
those claims were based on Irish statutes made in the Irish parliament, brushing aside an earlier 
English statute reversing the 1689 legislation.
459
 Members' active use of the power to legislate to 
meet the their future needs in Ireland was facilitated by an administration standing back from close 
management of all but those matters it regarded as essential. From the 1705 session the 
administration abandoned the preparation of a detailed legislative programme and let the 
Commons lead.  
By the reign of George I, while there was flexibility, the procedural uncertainty and inconsistency 
had disappeared. The sessions followed a regular and predictable timetable. While the outer form 
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of the House sitting in Chichester House remained, it moved away from the methods of operation 
of earlier parliaments in the seventeenth century. Ireland was a subsidiary realm attached to the 
British crown and the political, constitutional and procedural wind blew from Westminster. The rate 
of development of the Westminster parliament at the end of the seventeenth century was rapid 
and attractive, when, to echo Conrad Russell’s often quoted description of early seventeenth-
century parliaments,
460
 it became an institution, not an event. The operation of the English 
executive and legislature changed with the Revolution, the Bill of Rights, annual parliaments and 
legislative oversight of supply. This subordinate position of the Irish parliament meant that copying 
and securing some of these changes was a piecemeal process. Within the constraints of Poynings' 
Law and the government's refusal to allow the enactment in Ireland of the parliamentary 
programme of the 1688 Revolution―crowned with the Bill of Rights in England and the Claim of 
Right in Scotland―the Commons emulated many of the procedures of the Westminster House of 
Commons.  
Until 1703 the pattern of meetings of the Irish parliament had been one of gaps of several years 
between parliaments. (The 1692 parliament was the first to sit―discounting the 1689 
parliament―since 1666 and there was also a break between 1699 and 1703.) Such discontinuity 
required checking and review of procedures as parliament re-started. The 1692 and 1695 
parliaments examined precedents and past records but they were meagre, outmoded and 
inadequate, if not antipathetic, to the claims that the Commons, in particular, was making and the 
pretensions advanced for the Modus Tenendi Parliamenta ... in Hibernia and in Molyneux’s Case 
of Ireland (1698). For instance in the 1661 parliament the Commons had no compunction about 
using Westminster precedents but by the end of the century explicit references, which jarred with 
growing patriotic sensibilities, had disappeared. The continuous sessions from 1703 removed the 
need for these 'commencement reviews' of processes at the start of the parliament. From 1703 the 
Irish Commons was increasingly in procedural and operational terms closer to Westminster than 
the Irish parliament of the 1660s. This process removes any doubt that, despite the veneer of 
antiquity the Modus, the Irish House of Commons was a traditional, ancien-régime institution 
battling to preserve its time-honoured privileges against encroachment.  
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Molyneux in the Case of Ireland used the 'antiquity' of the Irish parliament and its foundation myth 
in the twelfth century to justify its legal sovereignty. By the end of the seventeenth century there 
was little evidence of institutional drift propelled by the centuries of development of distinct and 
idiosyncratic features and procedural divergence from Westminster. On the contrary the Irish 
House of Commons had a tradition of looking to Westminster: John Hooker in the sixteenth 
century is a prime example of English procedures written down for the benefit and use of the Irish 
Commons and until the middle of the seventeenth century the Commons had no compunction 
about using Westminster precedents. The parliamentary rituals and ceremonies as well as the 
accommodation required were identical to those at Westminster. What the Modus and Molyneux 
represented was the emerging patriotic self-importance of the Protestants who sat in the Irish 
parliament. Members saw themselves as the English in Ireland and entitled to the same legal and 
constitutional rights as other Englishmen. In practical terms the changes made at Westminster 
from the 1670s were needed to ensure that effective operation of the Irish Commons. This 
modernisation was not aimed at adjustments to circumvent Poynings' Law; the heads process 
solidified into final form by 1703.
461
 The explicit copying of Westminster procedures, however, 
undermined the pretension that the Irish parliament was a sister rather than a daughter of 
Westminster. The result was that Westminster's new procedures were from 1692 adopted under 
the guise of 'the constitution of parliament'―a term that carried the concept of applying a model 
post-Revolution legislature to which all Englishmen were entitled to―or silently as standing orders 
to allow the Irish parliament to maintain its claim to parliamentary autonomy. The relationship 
between the Commons Houses in Dublin and Westminster—as expressed in procedural and 
operational developments—was a tension amounting to a paradox: the Irish House to be effective 
and distinct from its Westminster sister had to be as similar as it could. 
As sessions became more regular and, from 1715, predictable, there was no longer a need for the 
seventeenth-century practice of review and revision of operations after long periods of dormancy. 
Changes could be made as and when required and adaptations of Westminster practice could 
develop and become permanent. The handling of petitions, for instance, shows the same 
elaboration and embedding of process, which was noted in the previous chapter. Though in this 
                                                        
 
461
  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.40, considers that 'by the session of 1705 there was a regular procedure for 
heads of bills after they were presented to the house of commons: they were read once, committed, reported and 
read two more times before being sent to the chief governor'. In contrast, 'earlier sessions, which display[ed] 
enormous variety' in procedures on heads of bills, which he sets out in chapter 2 of his thesis.  




case the dynamics of the operation of Poynings' Law appear to have produced a lower threshold 
of parliamentary scrutiny of private legislation than at Westminster: there was pressure to get 
heads drafted and off at the transmission recess leaving detailed examination to the privy councils. 
The privy councils operated as a 'third House' but the roles of each changed between 1692 and 
1730. As the Irish parliament , and the House of Commons in particular, increasingly became the 
source of legislation the Irish Privy Council became a legislative sub-editor, revising heads into bills 
and preparing breviates for legislation before it was sent to London
462
 (though it had more 
responsibilities with private bills where it tested claims and heard petitions and it resisted 
encroachments by the Privy Council in London to appropriate its checking functions). It was the 
Privy Council in London that became the third House: although it had no formal power to initiate 
legislation, it had to agree and could respite, veto or amend as well as hearing petitioners.
463
  
The facility to draft legislation was a key manifestation of the autonomy of the Irish House of 
Commons. From the 1690s the initiative to legislate slipped out of the grasp of the government for 
it to become a reviewer, reviser and refuser of Irish legislation. The result, as with supply, was a 
delicate but resilient compromise. The Commons monitored closely the changes made to heads 
by the councils and armed with details of amendments it could attack the administration. The 
ammunition was, however, used sparingly. Vetoing its own legislation was not productive. On the 
Irish side pragmatic and silent acceptance usually prevailed. The alternative would have been to 
reduce drastically the legislative throughput and disrupt the operation of the parliament. Moreover, 
the bulk of the amendments were drafting changes, a mixture of the necessary, the fussy and the 
symbolic (that the Privy Council had the last word).
464
  
In parallel with the effort put into checking, the Commons consistently and regularly reviewed the 
legislation enacted in England. This chimes with a theme running through the operation of the Irish 
House, that of asserting its autonomy and distinctiveness by assiduously copying and adapting 
                                                        
 
462
  Kelly, Poynings's Law, p.46; Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.177, make the point that managing the Irish 
Parliament meant that had to carry some of the 'odium attaching to the rejection of ... initiatives'.  
463
  Kelly, Poynings' Law, pp.134-35, considers that members of the Irish Privy Council took their duties very seriously 
and points to both the number and backgrounds of those attending―bishops and the lawyers. Kelly also makes 
the point that it increasingly concentrated on ensuring due process was carried out; he points out that that, after 
the fire of 1711, it decided to acquire copies of the rules and precedents of the British Privy Council (p.169). 
464
  Kelly, Poynings's Law, p.148, notes the high level of amendments and considers that the Irish Parliament was 
prepared to accept amendments, particularly where the amendments were in line with the purpose and content of 
the original heads. See also Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.150ff, on reasons for changes; Bergin 
comments that 'literal amendments were sometimes very numerous but do not appear ever to have been 
contentious' (p,156). 
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English/British models, which were seen as a prime source of fresh legislation for Ireland. Without 
such a regular legislative updating the Irish parliament risked undermining its own purpose as the 
alternative would have been for those requiring legislation to look to London. 
The development of the undertaker system to steer supply and government legislation through the 
Commons has been examined by historians. This thesis makes two points. First, although they 
varied in political skills and personal tastes, the chief secretaries and lords lieutenant played an 
active part in the process through personal contacts with MPs, their political antennae and skills, 
and being on guard in the chamber. Second, when heads completed their passage through a 
chamber, chief secretaries and lords lieutenant handled the transmission and contacts with 
London. Below supply and key government legislation, business was managed by a group of 
around 20―mini-undertakers―many of whom were lawyers or held posts in the administration (or 
both), who advised, drafted, negotiated and managed business through the Commons. For the 
most part the administration, while it kept an eye on this business, in order to protect its interests, 
left the Commons to its own devices. 
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 5  Conclusions on the operation, practices and procedures of 
the Irish House of Commons from 1692 to 1730 
The assertion in the HIP that the 'Irish parliament modelled itself as closely as possible' on the 
British House of Commons
1
 needs revision. It would be more accurate to say that the Irish House 
of Commons modelled itself on the Westminster House of Commons for two purposes. The first 
was to show parity of status with Westminster, often without threatening the constitutional and 
political structures of Ireland and Britain. The second was practical: many of the problems the 
Dublin Commons faced were not new and Westminster had already produced a remedy. Copying 
Westminster procedures assisted the efficient and effective operation of the Irish House of 
Commons. Dublin was content to borrow from Westminster on its own terms.  
For the legislatures in the British Isles the last decade of the seventeenth century and the first of 
the eighteenth were a time of constitutional, political and procedural change and, at times, 
turbulence. In the three parliamentary sessions in the 1690s the procedural and operational 
arrangements of the Irish House were far from consistent and its future trajectory was uncertain: 
back to the once-in-a-generation parliaments of the seventeenth century or a pattern closer to that 
emerging at Westminster. Not until the reign of Anne did it become clear that the Irish parliament 
too was on the road to becoming an institution, though one with much less control of the executive 
than its sister at Westminster. The 21 years after 1692 show an institution changing, being 
tested―externally by the government and internally with factional disputes culminating in the 1713 
session―and then consolidating into a body that served the ends of the administration and its 
Members. Following the abortive session of 1692, a political compromise was found by which the 
Commons exercised extensive control over supply, which the government required to finance the 
civil and military establishments in Ireland.
2
 This opened up the way forward. If the tests Julian 
Hoppit applies to indentify the characteristics of the Westminster parliament―a government 
prepared to work through, rather than around, parliament, the normalisation of controversy and 
discord within a resilient legislative process and the use of the legislature by a propertied elite, to 
                                                        
 
1
  DIB(I), p14  
2
  This arrangement had the advantage of financing troops stationed in Ireland to avoid the prohibition on standing 
armies in England. Continuous refusal of supply would have made the Irish parliament redundant with the 
government falling back on enacting supply legislation at Westminster or using the 'Strafford solution' of ruling 
though orders in council. Union would not only have removed control of taxation to London but also the effective 
control over the land settlement, economic development and the penal laws, areas that Irish Protestants feared 
Westminster would put England's interests ahead of theirs. 




protect and further their own interests as the state grew―are applied to the Irish House of 
Commons, they show that it enjoyed a significant degree of self-determination by 1715. With its 
effective control of the supply process and the consequent need for regular meetings the 
Commons began―at first tentatively in the 1690s―to borrow and adapt procedures from the post-
Revolutionary Westminster parliament, which had the double advantage of updating its procedures 
and bringing it in appearance and actuality to resemble Westminster. 
As was case in Scotland, the Irish House took time to absorb changes emanating from 
Westminster. There were two turning points. The 1703–04 session (and the following 1705 
session) break with the sprawling sessions and some of the methods of doing parliamentary 
business that characterised the seventeenth century. The two distinct part-sessions emerge: 
heads were drafted in the first part and then transmitted to London, while the House went into 
recess, and a second part, when the returned bills were taken through their stages culminating in 
royal assent followed by prorogation. These arrangements facilitated, and spurred, the ability of the 
Commons to dominate the initiation of legislation. Those outside parliament who wanted legislation 
quickly learned how the system worked and the consequent need to start the process early in the 
first part-session. This pattern of distinct part-sessions divided by a transmission recess held good 
to 1782.  
Other changes from 1703 can be detected. From this time the House drew back from direct 
executive action in favour of parliamentary processes such as inquiry, pronouncement, legislation 
or impeachment. Processes and procedures appear to be more consistent and systematic. The 
searching for, and use of, Irish precedents receded and no Westminster precedents were cited 
after the 1690s. Instead, changes―often direct copies of Westminster procedures―were 
introduced as standing orders (itself a Westminster term that finally replaced the older standing 
rule still used in Dublin into the 1690s after it fell out of use at Westminster) or being in accordance 
with the 'constitution of parliament'. (This is an abstract and euphemistic term that carried the 
meaning of the ideal, correct, ancient, accepted and English way of doing things.) One of the most 
striking examples is the turn-around on Members being able to resign. The House's resolution in 
March 1704/5 to prohibit Irish MPs from resigning was such a case. It flew in the face of Irish 
precedents stretching back over the previous century. But it was a unanimous and clearly self-
conscious decision justified in terms of ensuring the Commons was operating in accordance with 
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the 'constitution of parliament'. In this context that meant parity of status of both Members and the 
House with Westminster. Such a change resonated with emerging patriotic sensibilities and cost 
little in terms of provoking either the government or parliament in London. It raised no constitutional 
issues, and the authorities in London, apparently, took no notice. In the 1703–04 session for the 
first time a monarch replied directly to an address from the Irish Commons, which greatly pleased 
Members. In addition, following Westminster, the Irish House began returning addresses of thanks 
for the speech from the throne at the opening of the session. Both these developments enhanced 
the status of the Irish parliament in the eyes of its own Members and those outside. From the 
1703–04 session, adopting Westminster procedures and practices not only assisted the efficient 
operation of the Commons but also bolstered its status and the growing expectation of 
permanency. 
The second turning point is the 1715–16 session, which in large measure marks the end of the 
period of change. By this time the Irish House of Commons had adapted itself to become an 
‘institution’. The Commons that emerged by the first session of the reign of George I was a settled 
and permanent body. Notwithstanding tensions and messy compromises, in its settled form it 
proved remarkably resilient. In the years from 1715 to 1730 the pace of procedural change and 
development slowed, though not to a complete standstill as some changes continued to be made 
such as the alternation in supply arrangements, to support the national debt. In part this was due to 
the settling of the political situation in Britain and Ireland and the exhaustion in the supply of 
parliamentary innovations that could be imported from Westminster. In addition, the dying down of 
the rage of party after 1715 and the near monopoly that local families established over seats in 
parliament gave the system stability (though not immunity from local squabbles). While there were 
periods of high political tension such as Wood's halfpence, compared to the 21 years from 1692, 
the sessions after 1715 were subdued and workmanlike. 
That the Commons followed, and adapted, Westminster precedents, but without explicitly 
acknowledging their provenance, throws a light on the nature and limits of Irish Protestants’ 
constitutional patriotism at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It was not only procedures that 
the Commons copied. Each session the Commons appointed a committee to examine what 
English laws should be replicated, a significant spur to the production of public legislation. There 
was no compunction about copying from the Westminster statute book; the point was that the 




Commons chose and adapted legislation as it saw fit, and this sits with Hoppit's finding in Britain 
that within the ruling elite there was readiness to examine laws that needed reformed.
3
 In Ireland 
the process was institutionalised by means of a committee that examined and drew up a list of 
statutes that would be beneficial to apply in Ireland. The initiative for much public legislation rested 
with the Commons―in the face of benign indifference of the administration and the facility 
Poynings' Law provided to the government to amend and, if necessary, veto―and the Commons 
used it extensively and increasingly from Anne's reign, to legislate in a variety of areas, from 
economic improvement to underpinning sectarian advantage. Significantly, both these areas were 
the focus of much of the growing number and range of publications produced in Dublin. The poor 
state of Ireland's economy and panaceas feature in publication ranging from the thoughtful to the 
polemical from the reign of William III. The Commons responded with a steady stream of 
improvement legislation, much of which roused the opposition of British interests.
4
 The sectarian 
dimension not only ran through the legislation emerging from the Commons but also coloured how 
it operated its procedures. There is some evidence that the Commons used its powers, in order to 
enforce its privileges more harshly against Catholics. A Catholic petitioner against legislation had a 
better chance of success in pressing his or her case in Whitehall. Often those heard in Dublin were 
allowed to go through the motions for the sake of form. 
Ireland's institutions and systems of governance were, unlike Scotland's, based on England's and 
the centripetal forces stronger than those in Scotland before 1707. Many of those who sat in the 
Dublin parliament were familiar with, and integrated within, English systems of governance as 
were the administrators who worked in the Irish parliament. The degree to which England and 
Ireland were locked in step is remarkable: the similarities ran from the rage of party, through the 
use and popularity of procedures such as impeachment to father-and-son clerks. The history of the 
Irish Commons looking to Westminster for procedural guidance since at least the sixteenth century 
was reinforced by personal contacts. The clerks in the Dublin House of Commons had links to 
England and connections with the English bureaucracy. In addition, clerks who worked in 
Westminster may have visited Dublin. After 1692 these links were supplemented with the 
                                                        
 
3
  Hoppit, Land, p.135 
4
  See Hoppit, Parliaments, pp.7, 103ff, note that in percentage terms Dublin produced much more public legislation 
than Westminster; other reasons were the emphasis on penal legislation, less local improvement and less regional 
diversity in Ireland.  
Chapter 5: Conclusions on the operation, practices and procedures of the Irish House of Commons from 1692 to 1730 
251 
 
publication of Westminster's printed Votes providing easy access to, and intelligible, procedural 
guidance and a route for English procedures to be adopted. It was not necessary to rely on 
increasingly out-of-date manuals as the Votes, suitable annotated and indexed, provided the latest 
parliamentary guidance. Notwithstanding the frustration of some lords lieutenant and chief 
secretaries at their inability to exercise 'party' control and some sneering at the pretentions of those 
who sat in the Commons, the administrative geography and etiquette and norms of civility of the 
Irish parliament was recognisably the same as that at Westminster and understood to be so. Even 
the tactics used in the Commons and procedures employed by those supporting and opposing 
government measures―the dilatory motion and the use of rhetoric and argument―were common 
tools used at Westminster. 
To make the parliamentary arrangements work, skill combined with compromise was required. The 
procedures also had flexibility which meant they could be adapted, or exploited, to the ends of 
those who could command the House. There was no point importing Westminster procedures 
unless they served a purpose. The Commons neither followed slavishly nor imported every 
procedural change and development at Westminster. Its processes were developed from 1703, to 
became responsive to the needs, and protect the predominance, of the Protestant ruling class and 
its supporters. It was happy to claim control of supply but ignored changes in procedure made at 
Westminster at the beginning of the eighteenth century that required the crown to sanction 
expenditure proposals; these would have undermined the compromise established after the 'sole 
right' struggle and were unsuitable to be applied to heads process.  
One tangled area was private legislation, where there was overlapping jurisdiction between Dublin 
and Westminster. As Hoppit, Innes and Styles note, the initiation of private legislation was an 
investor-led process which was not cheap, particularly if there was going to be opposition. The 
process made both parliaments responsive to sectional interests.
5
 Rather than attempt to 
challenge Westminster's right to legislate, which was probably an unsustainable approach, the 
Irish parliament sought to undercut Westminster in terms of fees and process. The Irish 
procedures follow the spirit but not the letter of English procedures. The process was in broad 
terms the same: a petition had to be made in a set form and request redress of a grievance; the 
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  Hoppit, 'Towards a History', p.319 




House considered the merits and, in the case of a request for private legislation, informed all 
parties with an interest; and the House reached a view. But the parliaments' processes were not 
identical. The Irish House did not introduce Westminster's system of standing orders applying to 
private bills. The Irish processes had less judicial rigour, possibly because of the less prominent 
position of the House of Lords but also because the immediate outcome of a successful private 
petition in Dublin was a heads of a bill. In other words the threshold to start the process was lower 
than at Westminster―legal scrutiny came later when the heads reached the Irish and British Privy 
Councils. The clearer delineation of the procedures from the 1690s not only improved handling but 
gave those seeking private legislation confidence in how to proceed. The success rate of petitions 
for private legislation improved after the 1690s and the Irish parliament's share of enacted private 
legislation applicable to Ireland settled at around 50%. 
The arrangements that settled around the operation of Poynings' Law show how pragmatic 
compromise and hard-headed adaptation allowed the Commons to develop and how it had some 
un-Westminster consequences on the Irish House of Commons. The heads process of producing 
draft legislation pulled the legislative initiative away from the Irish and English Privy Councils to the 
Irish parliament . It did so in a manner, however, that was anomalous in a bicameral legislature. It 
skewed the legislative balance in favour of the House initiating the heads, predominantly the 
Commons. The heads process twisted and hollowed out some Westminster procedures, 
particularly draining the substance out of post-transmission bill procedures, when applied in the 
Irish House of Commons. Even the procedural innovation of a committee to check the extent of 
changes made to heads by the privy councils was usually only a monitoring feature of, rather than 
an obstacle to, the legislative process.
6
 From a questionable legislative record in the 1690s the 
heads process propelled the Commons to both legislative success and dominance.  
The pattern of managing business employed by the government―undertakers and agents―was 
replicated, though on a smaller scale for other business. Members skilled in the procedures of the 
House―often also officials in the administration―operated as mini-undertakers for the interests 
promoting items of private and public business. In most cases they would have been paid. The 
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  Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', p.192, drawing on J.L. McCracken, 'Central and local administration in Ireland 
under George II' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1948) points out that later in the 
eighteenth century however the procedure became politically much more important, when the committees of 
comparison compared returned bills with the heads of bills; on the evidence it would appear that this process 
started in the reign of George I in the 1720s..  
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focus on the top-level undertaking―the shepherding of administration business―and the 
tendency to see many parliamentary proceedings in partisan terms of Whig and Tory has too often 
coloured the way historians have seen the operation of parliament. Neither permeated every 
aspect of business.  
The functions of, and procedures that applied to, Speakers in the Irish House of Commons 
overlapped with those of Speakers at Westminster in terms of their election and the bureaucratic 
organisation of business, an essential prerequisite to the efficient operation of the House. But they 
had additional tasks which today would be classed as business management, especially whipping 
Members to support (mostly in Conolly's case) or oppose (often in Brodrick's case) the 
administration's proposals. Although there was much criticism of the Speakers, there were 
limitations on their ability to manipulate. The House could, and did, assert itself to overrule the 
Speaker both on measures such as the relief of dissenters and on procedures when the House 
removed Brodrick from questioning witnesses at the bar.  
The Irish parliament, and in particular the Commons, that emerged in the 1690s had a model for 
functional and operational development in the post-1688 House sitting at Westminster. It was 
keenly aware of the Westminster model and developed itself to initiate legislation and tax-
authorising powers, which were critical to the solvency of the administration. The administration 
took it and its activities seriously but, except on supply and legislation of importance to the 
administration, gave the Commons a large degree of freedom to manage its business. The 
Commons sat at the junction of the relationship between Britain, Irish politics, administration, social 
change and the interface between the local and the national and provided legal sanction to the 
confessional state. As an almost exclusively Anglo-Irish institution it also provided a protected 
arena for intra-Protestant rivalries as well as space for patriot ideology to form, develop and 
express itself. These procedures had enough resilience to allow competing factions and interests 
within the Anglo-Irish to manage their differences without resort to violence or the legislature 
becoming irrelevant or it being shut down. 




 6  Appendices   




Session started,  
first sitting day 
Session ended,  
last sitting day 




Dates are inclusive 
Days 
adjourned








First parliament of William III and Mary II, 1692–93; sat from 5 Oct 1692; dissolved 26 June 1693 
1 5 Oct 1692 3 Nov 1692   25 5 (20%) 
   (3 Nov prorogued to 6 Apl 1693)    
   (27 Mar prorogued to 6 June 1693)    
   (17 May prorogued to 5 Sep 1693) (234)   
   Dissolved 26 June 1693 792   
Second parliament of William III, 1695–99; sat from 27 Aug 1695; dissolved 14 June 1699 
1 27 Aug 1695 3 Dec 1697   166 30 (18%) 
   29 Oct-17 Nov 1695 20   
   15 Dec 1695–27 Mar 1696 106   
   29 Mar-26 June 1696 90   
   28 Jun-3 Aug 1696 37   
   5 Aug-7 Sep 1696 34   
   9–21 Sep 1696 13   
   23–29 Sep 1696 7   
   2–14 Oct 1696 13   
   16–28 Oct 1696 13   
   30 Oct-11 Nov 1696 13   
   13 Nov 1696–15 Mar 1696/7 124   
   17 Mar 1696/7–10 May 1697 55   
   12 May-14 June 1697 34   
   16 Jun-26 July 1697 41   
   26 Sep-19 Oct 1697 24   
   21–25 Oct 1697 5   
   27 Oct-1 Nov 1697 6   
   4–7 Nov 1697 4   
   (3 Dec prorogued to 10 May 1698)    
   (27 Apl prorogued to 7 June 1698)    
   (2 June prorogued to 5 July 1698)    
   (30 June prorogued to 13 Sep 1698)    
   (29 Aug prorogued to 27 Sep 1698) (298)   
2 27 Sep 1698 26 Jan 1698/9   80 15 (19%) 
   28 Sep-30 Sep 1698 3   
   4–19 Dec 1698 16   
   21–26 Dec 1698 6   
   30 Dec 1698–1 Jan 1698/9 3   
   (26 Jan prorogued to 30 May 1699)    
   (12 May prorogued to 28 Sep 1699) (139)   
   Dissolved 14 June 1699 1,560   
First parliament of Anne, 1703–13; sat from 21 Sep 1703; dissolved 6 May 1713 
1 21 Sep 1703 4 Mar 1703/4   80 15 (19%) 
   28 Nov 1703–10 Jan 1703/4 44   
   12–19 Jan 1703/4 8   
   21–24 Jan 1703/4 4   
                                                        
 
1
  Prorogations taken from CJI and Proclamations, vols. 2 and 3; they are not comprehensive. 
2
  These are tentative figures based on references in primary sources to late sittings and motions to bring in candles 








Session started,  
first sitting day 
Session ended,  
last sitting day 




Dates are inclusive 
Days 
adjourned








   29–31 Jan 1703/4 3   
   5–7 Feb 1703/4 3   
   (4 Mar prorogued to 3 Oct 1704)    
   (25 Sep prorogued to 10 Feb 1704/5) (342)   
2 10 Feb 1704/5 16 June 1705   59 5 (9%) 
   11–13 Feb 1704/5 3   
   2–9 May 1705 8   
   11–14 May 1705 4   
   27–29 May 1705 3   
   (16 June prorogued to 13 June 1706)    
   (27 May prorogued to 4 Mar 1706/7)    
   (15 Feb prorogued to 13 May 1707)    
   (1 May prorogued to 23 June 1707)    
   (5 June prorogued to 1 July 1707) (745)   
3 1 July 1707 30 Oct 1707   68 10 (15%) 
   2–5 July 1707 4   
   15 Aug 1707–19 Sep 1707 36   
   (30 Oct prorogued to 6 May 1708)    
   (27 Apl prorogued to 28 Feb 1708/9)    
   (15 Jan prorogued to 28 Apl 1709)    
   (22 Apl prorogued to 5 May 1709) (553)   
4 5 May 1709 30 Aug 1709   68 5 (7%) 
   12–14 June 1709 3   
   30 Jun-27 July 1709 28   
   29 Jul-4 Aug 1709 7   
   (30 Aug prorogued to 30 Mar 1710)    
   (9 Mar prorogued to 27 Apl 1710)    
   (27 Apl prorogued to 11 May 1710)    
   (8 May prorogued to 19 May 1710) (262)   
5 19 May 1710 28 Aug 1710   51 5 (10%) 
   28–30 May 1710 3   
   25 Jun-31 July 1710 37   
   (28 Aug prorogued to 8 Mar 1710/1)    
   (2 Mar prorogued to 1 May 1711)    
   (27 Apl prorogued to 31 May 1711)    
   (26 May prorogued to 18 June 1711)    
   (12 June prorogued to 9 July 1711) (315)   
6 9 July 1711 9 Nov 1711   53 5 (9%) 
   12 Aug-19 Sep 1711 39   
   21 Sep-3 Oct 1711 13   
   5–9 Oct 1711 5   
   (9 Nov prorogued to 2 Sep 1712)    
   (29 Aug prorogued to 19 Feb 1712/3)    
   (7 Feb prorogued to 21 May 1713) (544)   
   Dissolved 6 May 1713 203   
Second parliament of Anne, 1713–14; sat from 25 Nov 1713; dissolved 1 Aug 1714 (Anne's death) 
1 25 Nov 1713
3
 24 Dec 1713   26 10 (38%) 
   25 Dec 1713–14 Jan 1713/4    
   (4 Jan prorogued to 18 Jan 1713/4)    
   (14 Jan prorogued to 27 Jan 1713/4)    
   (Date?] prorogued to 3 Feb 1713/4)    
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  Parliament was due to meet 20 Nov 1713 but on 19 Nov it was prorogued to 25 Nov. 







Session started,  
first sitting day 
Session ended,  
last sitting day 




Dates are inclusive 
Days 
adjourned








   (24 July prorogued to 12 Oct 1714)    
   (1 Feb prorogued to 10 Aug 1714) (220)   
   Anne's death (1 Aug 1714) 468   
Parliament of George I, 1715–27; sat from 12 Nov 1715; dissolved 11 June 1727 (death of monarch) 
1 12 Nov 1715 20 June 1716   93 4 (4%) 
   23 Dec 1715–15 Jan 1715/6 24   
   10–19 Feb 1715/6 10   
   21 Feb-7 Mar 1715/6 15   
   10 Mar 1715/6–28 Mar 1716 19   
   30 Mar-2 May 1716 4   
   4–9 May 1716 6   
   20–23 May 1716 4   
   (20 June prorogued to 25 Aug 1716)    
   (15 Aug prorogued to 25 Sep 1716)    
   (22 Sep prorogued to 12 Oct 1716)    
   ([Several?] prorogations to 1 July 1717)    
   (11 June prorogued to 15 Aug 1717)    
   ([Date?] prorogation to 27 Aug 1717) (432)   
2 27 Aug 1717 23 Dec 1717   69 1 (1%) 
   13 Oct-6 Nov 1717 25   
   21–24 Nov 1717 4   
   14–18 Dec 1717 5   
   (23 Dec prorogued to 14 Aug 1718)    
   (18 July prorogued to 19 June 1719)    
   ([Date?] prorogued to 26 June 1719) (550)   
3 26 June 1719 2 Nov 1719   69 0 (0%) 
   27–30 June 1719 4   
   13 Aug-9 Sep 1719 28   
   22–27 Sep 1719 6   
   (2 Nov prorogued to 14 Dec 1719)    
   (8 Dec prorogued to 23 June 1720)    
   (16 June prorogued to 20 Sep 1720)    
   (27 Aug prorogued to 24 Mar 1721)    
   (6 Mar prorogued to [Date?])    
   ([Several?] prorogations to 12 Sep 1721) (678)   
4 12 Sep 1721 18 Jan 1721/2   73 1 (1%) 
   12 Nov-5 Dec 1721 4   
   22 Dec 1721–2 Jan 1721/2 12   
   (18 Jan prorogued to 13 Feb 1721/2)    
   ([Several?] prorogations to 25 Mar 1722/3)    
   ([Several?] prorogations to 29 Aug 1723) (587)   
5 29 Aug 1723 10 Feb 1723/4   95 0 (0%) 
   30 Aug-4 Sep 1723  6   
   16 Nov-11 Dec 1723 26   
   25 Dec 1723–6 Jan 1723/4 13   
   24–26 Jan 1723/4 3   
   (10 Feb prorogued to 7 Mar 1723/4)    
   (3 Mar prorogued to 27 Aug 1724)    
   (7 July prorogued to 24 Mar 1724/5)    
   ([Single?] prorogation to 6 Aug 1725)    
   (20 July prorogued to 7 Sep 1725) (635)   
6 7 Sep 1725 8 Mar 1725/6   76 0 (0%) 
   8–20 Sep 1725 6   
   26–29 Sep 1725 4   








Session started,  
first sitting day 
Session ended,  
last sitting day 




Dates are inclusive 
Days 
adjourned








   9–11 Oct 1725 3   
   19 Dec 1725–26 Jan 1725/6 39   
   28 Jan-16 Feb 1725/6 20   
   18–23 Feb 1725/6 6   
   (8 Mar prorogued to 14 Apl 1725)    
   ([Several?] prorogations to 14 Apl 1726)    
   (25 Mar prorogued to 17 May 1726)    
   (4 May prorogued to 11 Aug 1726)    
   (28 July prorogued to 23 Mar 1726/7)    
   (At least one further prorogation) (460)   
   George I's death (11 June 1727) 170   
Parliament of George II, 1715–27; sat from 12 Nov 1715; dissolved 1760 (death of monarch) 
5 28 Nov 1727
4
 6 May 1728   82 0 (0%) 
   24 Dec 1727–8 Jan 1727/8 16   
   22 Feb-11 Mar 1727/8 19   
   20 Mar 1727/8–1 Apl 1728 13   
   19–25 Apl 1728 7   
   (6 May prorogued to 4 June 1728)    
   ([Two?] prorogations to 19 Dec 1728)    
   (13 Dec prorogued to 17 Apl 1729)    
   (29 Mar prorogued to 21 Aug 1729)    
   (25 July prorogued to 23 Sep 1729) (504)   
6 23 Sep 1729 15 Apl 1730   97 1 (1%) 
   27 Sep-5 Oct 1729 9   
   7–12 Oct 1729 6   
   24–28 Dec 1729 5   
   4 Jan-9 Feb 1729/30 37   
   11–23 Feb 1729/30 13   
   1–8 Mar 1729/30 8   
   21 Mar 1729/30–1 Apl 1730 12   
   (15 Apl prorogued to 14 May 1730)    
   (12 May prorogued to 22 Dec 1730)    
   (2 Dec prorogued to 22 Apl 1731)    
   (7 Apl prorogued to 2 Sep 1731)    
   (19 Aug prorogued to 5 Oct 1731) (551)   
  
                                                        
 
4
  Parliament was due to meet 14 Nov 1727 but on 4 Nov it was prorogued to 28 Nov. 
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6.2  Speakers of the House of Commons (1613 to 1730) 















Sir Audley Mervyn 8 May 1661
7
–6 Sep 1661 
Sir John Temple 6 Sep 1661
8
–1 May 1662 





Sir Richard Nagle 7 May 1689
11
–[20?] July 1689  








































                                                        
 
1
  J. McCavitt, 'Fracas', p.228 
2
  16 May 1615 last sitting day; dissolved 24 Oct 1615 (CJI(I), p.58)  
3
  CJI(I), p.63 
4
  Last sitting day of session  
5
  CJI(I), p.133 
6
  Last sitting day of session 17 June 1647; House appears to have assembled 15 June 1648 when Eustace was 
voted unanimously into Chair but adjourned immediately until 17 Mar 1949; it never met again. Technically 
parliament dissolved on death of Charles I (30 Jan 1649 (NS)). 
7
  CJI(I), p.386, 8 May, elected; 11 May approved by lords justices (p.387) 
8
  CJI(I), p.449, 6 Sep; Temple was Speaker while Mervyn in England 
9
  CJI(I), p.494; 1 May Mervyn resumed Chair 
10
  CJI(I), p.386, 8 Aug 1666 Parliament dissolved; 7 Aug 1666 last date House sat 
11
  [William King], A True account of the Whole Proceedings of the Parliament in Ireland (London, 1689), p.2 
12
  CJI(II), p.9, 5 Oct elected; 10 Oct approved by lord lieutenant (p.10) 
13
  Date of dissolution; 3 Nov 1692 last day House sat  
14
  CJI(II), p.43, 27 Aug elected; 29 Aug approved by lord deputy  
15
  CJI(II), p.310, 24 June 1699 dissolved; 26 Jan 1698/9 last day House sat 
16
  CJI(II), p.315, 317, 21 Sep elected; 25 Sep approved by lord lieutenant 
17
  Brodrick was appointed Lord Chief Justice of Court of Queen’s Bench 24 Dec 1709 (HIP(II), p.398); 'called up to 
the House of Lords' (CJI(II), p.643) 
18
  CJI(II), p.644, elected 19 May; 20 May approved by lord lieutenant  
19
  Date of dissolution; 9 Nov 1711 last day House sat  
20
  CJI(II), p.743, Brodrick elected 25 Nov; 26 Nov approved by lord lieutenant  
21
  CJI(II), p.777, 1 Aug 1714 dissolved on death of Anne; 24 Dec 1713 last sitting day  
22
  CJI(III), p.9, elected and approved on same day 
23
  Death of George I (11 June 1727) 
24
  CJI(III), p.463, elected and apparently approved on same day 
25
  CJI(III), p.583; resigned due to ill-health. 
26
  CJI(III), p.583, 13 Oct 1729 elected; probably approved on 14 Oct 
27





6.3  Chairmen and activities of principal committees 






 Alan Brodrick (reports on behalf of the committee on 29 
Oct and 1 Nov 1692) 
1695–97
30
 Alan Brodrick (reports on behalf of the committee on 11, 
13, 18, 20 and 21 Sep, 19 and 24 Oct, 5 Dec 1695) 
 Sir John Meade (reports on behalf of the committee on 26 
Sep and 11 Dec 1695) 




 (reports on behalf of the committee 
on 12 and 21 Aug, 15 Sep 1697) 




 Alan Brodrick 
 Thomas Brodrick (reports on behalf of the committee on 
15 Nov 1698) 
1703–04  Sir Richard Levinge
33
  
1705  Sir Richard Levinge
34
  
1707  Sir Richard Levinge
35
  
1709  Sir Richard Levinge
36
  
1710  Sir Richard Levinge
37
  






1715–16 St. John Brodrick
40
 
1717 St. John Brodrick
41
 
                                                        
 
28
  Dates of reports listed below are from CJI entries. 
29
  In the order setting up committee, Col Echlin is named first (CJI(II), p.13) but did not make any reports to the 
House on behalf of the committee, which were made by Alan Brodrick (pp.29, 32). 
30
  No MPs are listed in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.45). 
31
  Lord Chancellor Methuen reported a plot to oust Solicitor General Brodrick when Parliament reconvened in July 
1697. Methuen was able to 'counterplot, and got Mr. Molesworth to town, and had him chosen without the least 
reflection on Mr. Solicitor' (SP, 63–359 no.34(stamped 84) (To Secretary of State Vernon, 29 July 1697)). 
32
  In the order setting up committee, Alan Brodrick is named first (CJI(II), p.242) but did not make report back, which 
was made by Thomas Brodrick (p.267). 
33
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.317) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.338, 353, 
381) 
34
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.424) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.453, 473-
74) 
35
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.491) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.508, 518, 
542, 551) 
36
  Although not listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.570), which position fell to Mr Recorder 
(presumably, John Forster, recorder of Dublin), Levinge reported on behalf of the committee (pp.601, 612) . 
37
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.644 and reported on behalf of the committee (p.655) 
38
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(II), p.696) and reported on behalf of the committee (p.727) 
39
  Simms, 'Irish Parliament of 1713', p.87, Post Boy, London, 5 Dec 1713; no reports to the House in CJI 
40
  A 'Mr Brodrick' was listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.10) and reported on behalf of the 
committee (pp.24, 40, 46, 55, 56, 65, 76, 79). 
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1719 St. John Brodrick
42
 
 Richard Tighe (reports on behalf of the committee on 30 
Oct 1719) 




 Richard Warburton (reports on behalf of the committee on 
11 Nov 1721) 
 Henry Rose (reports on behalf of the committee on 20 Dec 
1721, 10, 14 and 27 Jan 1721/2) 
1723–24 St. John Brodrick
44
 
1725–26 St. John Brodrick
45
 








6.3.2  Chairmen of the Grand Committee for Grievances 
Session 
1692 Robert Rochfort reported on behalf of the committee on 14 
and 31 Oct,
48
 on 20 Oct
49
 and 3 Nov.
50
 
 Thereafter grand committees were appointed at the 
beginning of each session; no members were named.  
1695–97 Sir St. John Brodrick reported on 17 Sep and 12 Oct 
1695
51
 and on 25 Aug 1697
52




1703–04  Marmaduke Coghill reported on 28 Sep 1703.
54
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
41
  Although not listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.120), which honour falls to William Brodrick, 
St. John reported on behalf of the committee (p.145). 
42
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.184) and reported on behalf of the committee (p.201, 207); 
does not act after Aug 1719 
43
  Joshua Allen was listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.248) but does not present any recorded 
reported on behalf of the committee. 
44
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.315) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.335, 
338, 340) 
45
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.399) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.410, 
418) 
46
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.464) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.486, 
488, 489, 498, 502, 505, 510, 512, 516, 520, 524, 525, 533, 543, 546, 555, 562); Hayton classes Trotter as a 
lieutenant of Speaker Conolly, Coghill Letters, p.xv. 
47
  Listed first in the order appointing committee (CJI(III), p.580) and reported on behalf of the committee (pp.594, 
598, 610, 621)  
48
  CJI(II), pp.16, 31  
49
  CJI(II), pp.20, 21 
50
  CJI(II), p.34 
51
  CJI(II), pp.63, 88 
52
  CJI(II), p.175 
53
  CJI(II), pp.135-36 
54





6.3.3  Recorded activities of the Grand Committee for Grievances 
Oct 1692  Committee reported on the following grievances: (i) 
Catholics admitted to the militia; (ii) farming of forfeited 
estates; (iii) Catholics having horses; (iv) need for a select 
committee to examine Revenue papers. House 




Oct 1692  Committee reported on extortion by Alexander Gordon, 
Sword-bearer of the city of Dublin, and William Culliford, 
commissioner of the Revenue.
56
 
Nov 1692  Committee reported on the seizure of goods, stock and 
corn and land made without proper authority since 15 Aug 
1689 by persons that used the property for their own 
personal advantage. The House ordered the committee to 
prepare charges, even if an MP.
57
  
Sep 1695  Committee reported again on extortion by Alexander 
Gordon, Sword-bearer of the city of Dublin.
58
 
Dec 1695  Committee reported on a petition against William Cloudes 
concerning penthouses in Dublin and found that he had 
been making illegal exactions. The House agreed and 




Aug 1697  Committee reported on corporation of butchers and 
quarterage to be paid by butchers in Dublin.
60
 
Sep 1703  Committee reported on the need for legislation to register 




Oct 1703  Committee reported two resolutions condemning grand 
juries for raising money, which the House agreed and 
referred papers to a committee of the whole House 




Oct 1703  Committee reported that a clause in the charter of 




July 1707  Petition against the sub-sheriff of Westmeath was referred 
to the committee; nothing appears to have happened as 




                                                        
 
55
  CJI(II), pp.20-21 
56
  CJI(II), pp.16, 27, 31-33 
57
  CJI(II), pp.34-35 
58
  CJI(II), pp.63, 83 
59
  CJI(II), p.140 
60
  CJI(II), p.175 
61
  CJI(II), p.321 
62
  CJI(II), pp.334-35 
63
  CJI(II), pp.343-45 
64
  CJI(II), pp.511, 537 
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6.3.4  Chairmen of the Grand Committee for Courts of Justice 
Session 
1692 Thomas Whitshed reported on behalf of the committee on 
25 Oct (on civil bills).
65
  
 Thereafter grand committees were appointed at the 
beginning of each session; no members were named.
66
  




6.3.5  Recorded activities of the Grand Committee for Courts of Justice 
Oct 1692  Committee reported that trials and proceedings by civil bills 
were arbitrary, illegal and burden to the subject; the House 
agreed. Committee also recommended the need for heads 
“to impower the respective judges in their circuits [...] in a 
summary and cheap way, to determine all differences 
between party and party in matters of debt not exceeding 
£10 and in matters for damage not exceeding £5'; the 
House agreed and instructed the select committee 
reviewing bills to draft.
68
  
Sep 1695  House order the deputy clerk of Council to deliver 
abstracts of dockets of fees from time to time as directed 
by the committee and instructed the committee to examine 
the fees charged by officials. Committee reported that 
Revenue collectors were exacting fees from the king's 
tenants arbitrarily and illegally; the House agreed but 




Nov 1697  House ordered the committee to inquire into the practices 




Nov 1703  Committee was empowered to sit during the recess to 
examine and settle dockets of fees returned and 
empowered it set up sub-committees.
71
 
6.3.6  Chairmen of the Grand Committee for Religion 
Session 
1692 John Osborne listed first on appointment of committee 
 Thereafter grand committees were appointed at the 
beginning of each session; no members were named.
72
 
                                                        
 
65
  CJI(II), p.26 
66
  Orders appointing committee: CJI(II), pp.12, 45, 242, 316, 424, 491, 576, 644, 696, 744; (III) 10, 120, 184, 248, 
315, 399, 464, 580  
67
  CJI(II), pp.72-74 
68
  CJI(II), p.26 
69
  CJI(II), pp.71-73 
70
  CJI(II), p.213 
71
  CJI(II), p.388; there is no evidence that the grand committee reported; subsequently the review of dockets and 
fees was carried out by select committees―see CJI(II), p.751 (2 Dec 1713). 
72
  Orders setting up committee: CJI(II), pp.12, 45, 242, 316, 424, 491, 576, 644, 696, 744; (III) 10, 120, 184, 248, 





1695–97 Sir Richard Bulkeley reported on 9 Sep 1697
73




6.3.7  Recorded activities of the Grand Committee for Religion 
Sep 1697  Committee reported that John Toland’s book, '"Christianity 
not mysterious" contained several heretical doctrines 
contrary to the Christian religion and ... of the Church of 
Ireland' and it was of the opinion that the 'book be publicly 
burned by the common hangman'. The House then 
proceeded to order the serjeant-at-arms to take Toland 
into custody and ordered the attorney general to prosecute 
him. The House prescribed arrangements for the burning, 




Nov 1697  Committee reported―subject not specified.
76
  
6.3.8  Chairmen of the Grand Committee for Trade 
Session 




 Thereafter grand committees were appointed at the 
beginning of each session; no members were named.
78
  
1695–97 Sir Francis Brewster reported on 23 Sep
79 
and 16 Oct 
1695 and on 28 Aug
80
 and 3 Sep 1697.
81
 
1703–04 John Forster reported on 7 Oct
82
 and 1 Nov.
83
 
1727–28 William Maynard reported on 5 Feb.
84
 




6.3.9  Reported activities of the Grand Committee for Trade 




Oct 1692  Committee reported on the need for legislation for a 
commission of sewers; resolution lay on the Table.
87
  
                                                        
 
73
  CJI(II), p.190 
74
  CJI(II), p.216 
75
  CJI(II), p.190 
76
  CJI(II), p.216 
77
  CJI(II), pp.18, 31-32 
78
  Orders appointing committee: CJI(II), pp.12, 45, 242, 316, 424, 491, 576, 644, 669, 744; (III) 10, 120, 184, 248, 
315, 399, 464, 580 
79
  CJI(II), pp.68-69, 94-95 
80
  CJI(II), p.178 
81
  CJI(II), p.184 
82
  CJI(II), p.329 
83
  CJI(II), p.354 
84
  CJI(III), pp.501, 516, 520 
85
  CJI(III), pp.603, 611 
86
  CJI(II), p.18 
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Oct 1692  Committee reported its opinion that the lord lieutenant 
should renew the application to king and queen to guard 




Sep-Oct 1695  Petitions referred to the committee from (i) weavers on the 
shortcomings of legislation and the misdemeanours of the 
alnagers, (ii) Dublin merchants for a bank, (iii) bakers on 
the regulation of the price of bread and (iv) felt-makers for 




Sep 1695  Committee reported in favour of a duty on linen imports 




Oct 1695  Committee reported on the woollen manufacture and 
recommended the appointment of a select committee to 
prepare legislation on the regulation of woollen 
manufacture and to include provision on alnagers' fees; 




Aug 1697  Committee reported on money weights sold by Henry 
Paris and John Cuthbert; the House ordered them to be 
taken into custody and attorney general to prosecute.
92
  
Sep 1697  Committee reported on the need for duties on import of 
paper, pasteboard and playing cards (except from 
England), to encourage Irish paper manufacture.
93
 
Oct 1703  Committee reported on the need to improve maritime 
security against privateers impeding trade between Ireland 
and England; the House agreed and sent privy counsellors 
to the lord lieutenant.
94
  
Nov 1703  Committee reported in favour of Robert Pease having a 
monopoly for five years on the production of black soap 
from rape oil. The method for achieving the monopoly was 




Feb 1727/8  Committee reported on Dublin Merchants' petition to 
improve trade, which covered disputes with Revenue 
officers and payments of duties, and it recommended 
legislation to prevent abuses by officers; the House agreed 
and order the drawing up of legislation.
96
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
87
  CJI(II), p.31 
88
  CJI(II), p.32 
89
  CJI(II), pp.62-63, 92-93, 101; a select committee to consider the improvement of trade was appointed on 4 Oct 
1695 (p.79). 
90
  CJI(II), pp.68-69 
91
  CJI(II), pp.94-95 
92
  CJI(II), p.178 
93
  CJI(II), p.184 
94
  CJI(II), p.329 
95
  CJI(II), p.354 
96





Dec 1729  Committee reported on Dublin Merchants' petition on 
smuggling and recommended legislative changes to 








1692 Henry Boyle 
1695–97 Thomas Brodrick (1695), Alan Brodrick (1697) 
1698–99 Alan Brodrick 
1703–04  Stephen Ludlow 
1705  Stephen Ludlow 
1707  Stephen Ludlow 
1709  Stephen Ludlow 
1710  Stephen Ludlow 
1711 Stephen Ludlow 
1713 Stephen Ludlow 
1715–16 Sir Ralph Gore 
1717 Sir Ralph Gore 
1719 Sir Ralph Gore 
1721–22 Sir Ralph Gore 
1723–24 Sir Ralph Gore 
1725–26 Sir Ralph Gore 
1727–28 Sir Ralph Gore 
1729–30 Marmaduke Coghill 
  




1692 Henry Boyle 
1695–97 Thomas Brodrick (1695), Alan Brodrick (1697) 
1698–99 Alan Brodrick 
1703–04  Stephen Ludlow 
1705  Stephen Ludlow 
1707  Stephen Ludlow 
1709  Stephen Ludlow 
1710  Stephen Ludlow 




1715–16 Sir Ralph Gore 
1717 Sir Ralph Gore 
                                                        
 
97
  CJI(III), pp.603, 611 
98
  Entries are based on MPs listed in CJI as reporting to the House from the committee. 
99
  As above 
100
  House prorogued before it reached Ways and Means; presumably Ludlow would have chaired. 
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1719 Sir Ralph Gore 
1721–22 Sir Ralph Gore 
1723–24 Sir Ralph Gore 
1725–26 Sir Ralph Gore 
1727–28 Sir Ralph Gore 
1729–30 Marmaduke Coghill 
  
6.3.12  Chairmen of the Committee on the State of the Nation 
Session
101




1695–97 Robert Molesworth reported Sep 1695,
103







1703–04  Robert Molesworth
106
 
1705  Robert Rochfort
107
 
1707  John Forster
108
 
1709  - 


















                                                        
 
101
  Entries are based on MPs listed in CJI as reporting from committee. 
102
  CJI(II), pp.26, 28 
103
  CJI(II), pp.65, 69 
104
  CJI(II), p.89 
105
  CJI(II), p.272; the committee met on 21 Nov 1698 but the name of the chairman is not recorded. 
106
  CJI(II), pp.330, 333 
107
  CJI(II), pp.467-68, 470, 472, 480 
108
  CJI(II), pp.504, 506, 511 
109
  CJI(III), pp.23, 37 
110
  CJI(III), pp.322-23 
111












1695–97 Philip Savage reported on 23 Sep 1695
114
 and William 
Neave on 13 Dec 1695.
115
 
1703–04  Laurence Clayton  
1705  Philip Savage 
1707  William Conolly 
1709  William Conolly 
1710  Henry Maxwell 
1711 Samuel Dopping 
1713 Oliver St. George
116
 




1719 Francis Harrison 
1721–22 Francis Harrison 
1723–24 Sir Ralph Gore 
1725–26 Richard Warburton 
1727–28 Sir Thomas Taylor
118
 
1729–30 Sir Thomas Taylor 
 




1692 John Osborne (to examine English laws since 10 Henry 
VII fit to be enacted in Ireland)
120
  












                                                        
 
112
  Entries are based on MPs listed in CJI as reporting from the committee or the first named in list of MPs appointed 
to the committee and, in a few instances from 1703, named as chairman in a vote of thanks from the House. 
113
  CJI(II), p.20; Pearce was listed first in a committee appointed to examine the Revenue accounts laid before the 
Committee of Grievances. 
114
  CJI(II), p.69 
115
  CJI(II), p.144 
116
  CJI(II). p.757; listed as first MP in list of appointments to the committee 
117
  SP, 63–377 f.135(stamped 161) (Lord Lieutenant Bolton to Secretary of State Craggs, 9 July 1719) 
118
  Coghill Letters, no.27 (To Edward Southwell, 8 Dec 1727) 
119
  Entries are based on MPs listed in CJI as reporting from the committee. 
120
  CJI(II), pp.14, 19 
121
  CJI(II), pp.48-49, 51, 59, 70, 73, 77, 86, 101-02, 105, 121, 126, 145, 159,161-62, 169, 183, 185-86, 203; on 17 
Sep 1695 the committee was empowered to split into sub-committees (p.64). 
122
  CJI(II), p.245; William Molyneux is named second on list of appointments; 28 Nov 1698 Mr Upton (two MPs had 
this surname) and Sir Richard Bulkeley were ordered to inspect the English laws against clipping and coining and 
to prepare heads (p.280). 
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1705  -  
1707  Mr Moore (either Charles or John) (to examine what 
temporary laws to be made perpetual)
124
 
1709  - 
1710  - 
1713 - 






































1703–04   - 
1705   Mr St. George (three MPs have this title and surname)
134
  
1707  - 
1709  - 





                                                                                                                                                                 
 
123
  CJI(II), pp.320-21 
124
  CJI(II), pp.493, 498 
125
  CJI(III), p.14  
126
  Although Brinsley Butler is named first in appointment of committee (CJI(III), p.123), Parnell reported (pp.125, 
148). 
127
  CJI(III), pp.251, 255, 261, 265-65, 274, 285, 298, 303-06 
128
  CJI(III), pp.322, 334, 355, 365, 382-83, 385 
129
  CJI(III), pp.407, 430, 433 
130
  CJI(III), pp.487, 502, 508, 510-11 
131
  CJI(III), pp.588, 603-04, 634 
132
  Names are those listed first in MPs appointed to the committee. 
133
  CJI(II), p.51 
134





















6.4  Clerks and officers of the House of Commons (1613 to 1730) 
Notes: dates in italics are dates of patents for life/lives, unless indicated otherwise―and 
where there are dates for patents issued in both Whitehall and Dublin, the latter―which 
are taken from the Liber Munerum (see bibliography); dates not in italics are derived from 
other sources, usually CJI, and indicate that the patentee was carrying out the functions of 
the post;  
♣ indicates that the person was an MP at the time he held the office; and  
♦ indicates that the person was an MP but not at the time of holding the office. 
6.4.1  Clerks of the House of Commons 
William Bradley 24 Sep 1608
140
 
 1613–25 Nov 1614 
Matthew Davis 25 Nov 1614–?
141
 
Edmond Midhopp (or Medhop)
142
 24 Nov 1615
143
 





  4 Aug 1628
146
 





                                                                                                                                                                 
 
135
  CJI(III), p.20 
136
  CJI(III), pp.293, 295 
137
  CJI(III), p.368 
138
  CJI(III), p.437 
139
  CJI(III), p.620 
140
  Liber Munerum Publicorum Hiberniæ, 2 vols. (London, 1852), Part II, p.94 
141
  CJI(I), p.26 (25 Nov 1614): the House ordered that Davis 'shall attend and execute [Bradley’s] place, until he shall 
be able to perform it himself'; Bradley was ill and it is not clear whether he returned to post before he was 
permanently replaced by Edmond Midhopp on 14 Apl 1615 because he 'was so sick that he was not able to attend 
the service of the ... House' (p.31). 
142
  Midhopp’s background was Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas in Dublin; Midhopp’s wife was a niece of Leticia 
Perrot, wife of Lord Deputy Chichester and may have owed his positions within the administration to him 
(Dennehy, 'Manuscript Alternatives', p.140); see also Dennehy, Administrative History, pp.116-17. 
143
  Liber Munerum, Part II, p.94 
144
  End of session 
145
  Ferneley was Clerk of the Commons from 1628 to 1673. There is evidence of continuity: on 17 July 1661 Ferneley 
reminded House of petition he had made in 1641 and that he had not been able to collect the money due to him 
from the Ulster counties. MPs with knowledge confirmed the veracity of his petition and revived the order for 
payment (CJI(I), pp.428-29). Arthur Vicars, Index to Prerogative Wills of Ireland (Dublin 1897) indicates Ferneley 
died in 1673. 
146
  Liber Munerum, Part II, p.94 
147
  CJI(I), p.64 (18 July 1634) 
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  7 May-18 July 1689  
Francis Skiddy and 26 Oct 1713–5 Dec 1713
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 and 10 Nov 1715–23 Aug 1716
160
–Dec 1743 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
148
  CJI(I), p.386; 8 Aug 1666 dissolution; there are references to Ferneley up until end of the Parliament—for 
example, (I), pp.755, 759 and 764. 
149
  Liber Munerum, Part II, p.94; Becher never carried out duties as no parliament met while he held patent.  
150
  A Thomas Tilson was admitted to the Inner Temple on 5 Jan 1658, which would indicate that he was born around 
1640 (Inner Temple Admissions Database: http://www.innertemplearchives.org.uk/index.asp). This would make 
Tilson Sr. in his 60s in 1703. According to a 1703 petition in CJI, for losses sustained by Henry Tilson in the 
1640s, Thomas Tilson Sr. was the son of Henry Tilson, Protestant bishop of Elphin 1639–55. It shows the family 
kept detailed records of what they were owed and been paid and, as expected, a deftness in using the House’s 
procedures for personal advantage—for example, the petition was considered by the House, notwithstanding an 
earlier resolution not to consider any further requests for money that session (CJI(II), p.412). The money had not 
been paid in Oct 1707 when Tilson Sr. petitioned again (p.540) and yet again in May 1709 (p.582) but on this 
occasion Tilson timed his petition to feed into the supply process. The thrust of the petition is confirmed by an 
instruction on 22 June 1662 from Charles II to the duke of Ormond that in consideration of great services and 
sufferings of late bishop of Elphin, Thomas Tilson, son of said bishop, was to have the sum of £1,000, out of 
moneys payable by the Adventurers in virtue of terms of the Declaration for Settlement (Carte Calendar, vol. 
XXXIII, Jan-Aug 1662, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, Edward Edwards, 2005). See section 2.4 above. 
 Tilson Sr. also held; (i) patent for the office of craner, wharfinger and packer of the port of Dublin from 1667 and (ii) 
with Edward Corker from 1669 the registrarship of the Court of Chancery (CTB, vol. 7 (1681-1685), pp.688-89, 
CDSP (1677–78), pp.548-617) (CTB, vol. 7 (1681-1685), p.688). In 1696/7 he tried unsuccessfully to convert a 
£60 annuity into forfeited land (CTB, vol. 7, 1681-1685, p.1075; CTB, vol. 12 (1697), p.116); CTBP, vol. 2 (1697–
1702), p.7). Tilson Sr. was still craner when in 1695/6 he secured a reversionary interest for Tilson Jr.―the 
reversionary interest had previously been held by Chief Secretary Richard Aldworth (SP, 67–2 p.66(stamped 28); 
20 Mar 1694/5). In addition, Manuscripts of the House of Lords 1692-1693, HMC, vol. I (London, 1900), p.71, 
indicates Tilson held the office of Usher of Court of Chancery in Ireland in the name of Oliver Grace, who refused 
to take the oaths and make declaration as prescribed by the 1691 Act. Tilson had taken the oaths and made 
declarations. In Feb 1692/3 a clause added to an English supply bill 'That the Office of Usher of the Court of 
Chancery in Ireland, taken by Tho. Tilson, senior, in the Name of Oliver Grace of Dublin, gentleman, in trust for the 
said Tilson, shall not be forfeited by any act of the said Oliver Grace, by not taking the oaths, and subscribing the 
declaration, or otherwise; but that the said Tho. Tilson, subscribing and taking the oaths, may enjoy the said office' 
(CJE(X), p.659). Tilson Sr. was a parishioner of St. Paul’s, Dublin; his successor, Bruen Worthington, had been 
involved in the formation of the parish in 1698 and had its subsequent administration (see Twomey, Smithfield, 
p.43); Index to Prerogative Wills indicates Tilson Sr. died in 1722. 
151
  Thomas Tilson Jr. was baptised on 14 Jan 1672 at St. John's, Dublin (Irish Genealogy Database, accessed 1 Apl 
2015); Index to Prerogative Wills indicates he died in 1744. Thomas Tilson son of Thomas Tilson admitted to the 
Inner Temple on 7 June 1689―Inner Temple Admissions Database. 
152
  SP, 63–361(stamped 242 to 245) (CSPD: William III 1701―Dec 1701)  
153
  Liber Munerum, Part II, p.94 
154
  CJI(II), p.12 (10 Oct 1692), the House approved appointments and appointed a committee to search for 
precedents on how clerks should be sworn; the committee reported that they had been sworn (pp.17-18; 14 Oct 
1692). However, CJI records that on 5 Oct the question that Sir Richard Levinge was a fit person to take the Chair 
was 'put by the Clerk'―presumably by one of the Tilsons. 
155
  The 1711 session was prorogued 9 Nov; 26 Oct 1713 Tilsons sold their patent to Thomas Trotter and Francis 
Skiddy (SP, 63–374 (stamped 291) (Attorney General Gore to Lords Justices, 21 June 1716)). 
156
  Davis, Patriot Parliament, p.170; no record of a patent has been located. 
157
  5 Dec 1713 Skiddy sold his interest to Trotter (SP, 63–374(stamped 291)).  
158
  CJI(III), pp.45-46; although described as 'a clerk' in CJI, the sum paid (£200) indicates that he served as Clerk of 
the House; he subsequently became an MP and Hayton classes him as a lieutenant of Speaker Conolly (Coghill 
Letters, p.xv). 10 Nov 1715 Trotter sold his interest to Ambrose and Bruen Worthington (SP, 63–374(stamped 
291)). See section 2.4 above. 
159
  Two burial records have been found for men named Isaac Ambrose: 18 Dec 1743 for St. Mary's, Dublin and 5 Jan 
1750, St. John's, Dublin (Irish Genealogy Database: https://www.irishgenealogy.ie/en/, accessed 1 Apl 2015); the 
former would fit with parliamentary records. 
160








 and 10 Nov 1715
162
–23 Aug 1716–Dec 1736 
Burdett Worthington
163
 23 Aug 1716
164
–Dec 1743 
6.4.2  Clerk assistants 
[Edmond Midhopp (or Medhop) 1613–14 Apl 1615
165
  
William Sandys 17 July 1634
166
–10 Nov 1634 

























6.4.3  Committee clerks 
Richard Stephens July 1661
176
 
                                                        
 
161
  Between 1708 and 1729 Worthington is recorded as a public notary living in Dublin (Registry of Deeds Index); 
these entries show Worthington was in Dublin when the 1713 Parliament was sitting. He was deputy registrar of 
deeds until 1715 (Register of Deeds). He owned land in Simonstown, co. Meath ('A survey of the lands of 
Symonstown (Simonstown) in the parish of Donoghmore Surveyed for Bruen Worthington' by T. Moland. Octavo 
sheet, 1717; listed by the National Library of Ireland). In 1722 he bought land in Cheshire (Daniel and Samuel 
Lysons, Magna Britannia, vol. II (London 1810), p.796). See section 2.4 above. 
162
  Inferred from the supply resolution in the next session (CJI(III), pp.45-46); although described as 'a clerk' in CJI, 
sum paid (£500) indicates that he served as Clerk of the House.  
163
  Burdett was the son of Bruen and, although a record for this baptism has not been identified, six of Bruen 
Worthington's children were baptised in the parish of St. Paul's, Dublin before 1716 (Irish Genealogy Database, 
accessed 1 Apl 2015); on this basis he was probably a minor when his father obtained the new patent in 1716. 
Moreover, records of Trinity College Dublin list a Burdett Worthington as entering the College in 1728 aged 
16―Alumni Dublinenses. Burdett was admitted to the Inner Temple on 4 Aug 1727 (Inner Temple Admissions 
Database). 
164
  Burdett was remunerated by the House of Commons only after his father's death. 
165
  Dennehy, suggests that Midhopp may have been clerk assistant because surviving the Journal is in hand of 
Midhopp, including brief entries of the first session when Bradley was the Clerk; he considers it likely Midhopp 
recommenced the Journal from the beginning, copying into his notebook all of entries previous to his elevation in 
position; see Dennehy, 'Manuscript Alternatives', p.141. 
166
  CJI(I), p.64, 17 July 1634, Sandys described as 'his [Ferneley's] assistant'. 
167
  CJI(I), p.78 (8 Nov 1634) Sandys petitioned to be allowed leave of absence for the session as he had duties in the 
King’s Remembrancer’s office; 10 Nov the House agreed Sandys’ request and appointed Walter Heighter in his 
place and he was sworn in that day. The Westminster Commons did not have a formally appointed clerk assistant 
until 1640, though the Clerk of the House appears to have had assistance before this date (Williams, Clerical 
Organization, pp.14-15). 
168
  Last sitting day of session  
169
  CJI(I), p.387 (11 May 1661); see also (II), p.113 (28 Oct 1695). 
170
  CJI(I), p.386; 8 Aug 1666 is the date of dissolution; there are references to Warburton up until end of the 
Parliament—for example, (I), p.756 (28 July 1666); see also (II), pp.109, 113 (28 Oct 1695). He was alive in 1695 
when he petitioned for £600, voted to him on 28 Mar 1666 over and above £150 per annum, which had not been 
paid, and the Commons agreed to address the lord lieutenant for payment (pp.109, 113-14, CTB, vol. 16 (1700–
01), p.263). See section 2.5 above. 
171
  CJI(II), p.12 (10 Oct 1692); House approved appointments and appointed a committee to search for precedents on 
how the Clerks were sworn; the committee reported that they had been sworn (pp.17-18; 14 Oct 1692). See 
section 2.4 above. 
172
  CJI(II), p.425, Cuppaidge sought leave to withdraw from attendance on the House. 
173
  CJI(II), p.516 (1 Aug 1707); sums voted to Worthington for services in previous session i.e. 1705 session.  
174
  Date 1711 session prorogued; a new clerk was in post at next session. 
175
  CJI(III), pp.45-46  
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176
  The Clerk attended the agents sent to Charles II in London on 4 July 1661 (CJI(I), p.419); he was therefore not 
carrying out the functions of a committee clerk attending a committee sitting in Chichester House. 
177
  CJI(I), p.731 (31 Mar 1666); he sought payment 'for his service in attending upon committees' since Jan 1662/3; 
he may have continued to work beyond 31 Mar 1666; see also (II), p.199 (16 Sep 1697).  
178
  The Alumni Dublinenses list a Daniel Golborne as admitted to Trinity College in 1668 and the Inner Temple 
Admissions Database has an entry for a 'gentleman' of the this name admitted in 1672. Golborne appears in the 
Registry of Deeds Index as a witness to transactions between 1708 and 1721; in a 1708 transaction his residence 
was given as London. 
179
  CJI(II), p.517 (1 Aug 1707) referred to services including 'two last and this present session'; no payment was made 
for the 1713 session but payment was made for the 1715 session ((III), pp.45-46); Index to Prerogative Wills 
indicates died in 1720. 
180
  CJI(III), p.139 
181
  CJI(II), p.654, June 1710; he was married to the daughter of Col Henry Baker, Governor of Derry ((III), p.49). 
Sterne became Clerk of the Parliaments in Dublin (LJGB(XX), p.593, LJI(II), p.630). He may have been related to 
Dr John Sterne, founder of the College of Physicians in 1667 and whom the House of Lords had appointed 
supervisor of press in 1661 (Dennehy, Administrative History, p.226). Sterne was Clerk of the Parliaments from 18 
Oct 1715 and with his son, Henry Baker Sterne, from 24 May 1728 to 1761; patents (during pleasure) (Liber 
Munerum, Part II, p.94).  
182
  CJI(II), p.709 (1 Aug 1711)  
183
  CJI(III), pp.45-46; there is a baptismal record for a daughter 20 Jan 1704, St. Paul's, Dublin. 
184
  In Aug 1716 Ambrose bought a share of the patent for the clerkship of the House of Commons (see earlier entries 
and pp.36ff). 
185
  CJI(III), pp.46, 205, 267, 334, 409, 496, 594-95 
186
  CJI(III), p.46. Baptismal records for St. Mary's, Dublin list a Matthew Magee as father of twins baptised 14 Oct 
1711. 
187
  CJI(III), pp.139, 205, 267, 334, 409, 496, 594-95 
188
  Names not given in CJI for earlier parliaments, but it is clear that there were Serjeants-at-Arms—see, for example, 
(I), pp.15, 46. Liber Munerum (Part II) lists the following: 
 Morgan Matthew (for life)    31 Mar 1612 
 Henry Suthey and Francis Cave (for lives)   28 Feb 1616 
 William Piesly and Bartholomew Piesly (for lives)  9 Feb 1625 
 Robert Saville and Thomas Bennett (for lives) 6 June 1629 
 Liber Munerum (Part II, p.86) records a patent for a second serjeant-at-arms was issued in 1612 one of whose 
primary tasks was to 'attend the Speaker of the Commons'; see deputy serjeant-at-arms in following Appendix. 
Division of responsibilities became unclear when the Carpenters held both Serjeants-at-Arms patents, and CJI 
entries from 1692 treat serjeant-at-arms as integral to parliamentary business. 
189
  Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
190
  Philip Sr. was dead by this date and the patent surrendered and replaced (for lives) (Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86) 
191











Nathaniel Poole and Simon Towers 3 July 1683
195
–by 27 Sep 1690
196
 










 29 Apl 1697
201
–before 8 May 1742
202
 
 11 May 1697
203
–to 1742 
6.4.5  Deputy serjeant-at-arms
204
 
Edward Davis 26 Sep 1612
205
 
William Piesly and Bartholomew Piesly 23 Aug 1628
206
 
Peter Hill and William Hill 19 Dec 1635
207
 
George Piggott 9 Nov 1638
208
 
―Peter Hill 1639–June 1647
209
 
―Thomas Dee –17 July 1641
210
– 
―George Plunkett –19 Nov 1642
211
– 





―William Tisdell –15 Dec 1662
214
– 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
192
  CJI(I), p.386; 8 Aug 1666 date on which Parliament dissolved; there are references to Carpenter up until end of 
the parliament—for example, (I), pp.756-57, 765 and 772. 
193
  Date of patent (for lives), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
194
  Date patent surrendered, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
195
  Date of patent (for lives), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
196
  Both dead by this date, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
197
  Date of patent (during pleasure), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
198
  Date patent surrendered, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
199
  CJI(II), p.134 (6 Dec 1695); see also pp.45 and 51 (30 Aug and 5 Sep 1695) where Wynn is referred to as 
serjeant-at-arms; Joshua Carpenter petitioned that he had a patent for life to the place or office of serjeant-at-
arms; the House did not admit claim but ordered Wynn to waive privilege, to allow action in courts (see pp. 46ff 
above).  
200
  A Richard Povey appears in transactions recorded in the Registry of Deeds Index, and he may have been related 
to Sir John Povey, Lord Chief Justice from 1673 to 1679. 
201
  Date of the first patent (during pleasure), further patents were issued on the same basis 12 Sep 1702, 10 Jan 
1714/5 and 28 Aug 1727 (Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86). 
202
  Date patent was issued to Edward Brereton, Povey having died, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
203
  CJI(II), p.152, date Povey was sworn in to replace Wynn  
204
  Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 records a patent for the second serjeant-at-arms (or 'first other serjeant) issued in 
1612 and one of his primary tasks was to 'attend the Speaker of the Commons'. Division of responsibilities 
became unclear when the Carpenters held both Serjeancies-at-Arms and CJI entries from 1692 treat the first 
serjeant-at-arms as integral to parliamentary business. A further complication was that position could be exercised 
through a deputy, which may account for the names recorded in the 1640s and 1660s who not appear to have 
acquired the patent. 
205
  Date of patent (for life), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.86 
206
  Date of patent (for lives), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
207
  As above 
208
  Date of patent, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
209
  CJI(I), p.231 (10 June 1641) given leave by the Commons to go to England; active in post ((I), p.338; 3 Mar 
1644/5); still in post on 17 May 1647 ((I), p.367). 
210
  CJI(I), p.260 (17 July 1641); date he started and finished service is not available in CJI.  
211
  CJI(I), p, 310 (19 Nov 1642); date he started and finished service is not available in CJI. 
212
  Date of patent (for life), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
213
  Date patent surrendered, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
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―Henry Rawlin –3 Mar 1662/3
215
– 
George Piggott and George Harwood 24 Dec 1666
216
 
Philip Carpenter Sr. and son, Joshua 13 Sep 1669
217
 
Thomas Houghton 21 Dec 1689
218
 





―Francis Cocksedge 11 May 1697
221
 









6.4.6  Keepers of the Parliament House 





  21 Jan 1711 
James Palmer  16 Apl 1728
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214
  CJI(I), p, 607 (15 Dec 1662) 
215
  CJI(I), p, 638 (3 Mar 1662/3) 
216
  Date of patent, replacing 1638 patent to Piggott, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
217
  Date of patent (for lives), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87; the editor of the Liber Munerum suggests that as the 
Carpenters also held the patent for Chief Serjeant-at-Arms the office 'became incorporated in that'. 
218
  Date of patent (during pleasure), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
219
  Date of patent (for lives), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87; by this date Piggott was dead and Harwood had 
surrendered the patent. Thomas Carter I (circa 1650–1726) MP for Fethard from 1695 to 1713; first wife was 
Margaret Houghon (HIP biography). Morley Saunders (1671-1737) MP for Enniscorthy from 1703 to 1714 (HIP 
biography). 
220
  Date patent surrendered, Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 
221
  CJI(II), p.152, Cocksedge sworn in as deputy to Povey; in post in Oct 1703 (p.343) but not mentioned again in CJI. 
Described in 1721 as Pay Master of the Ordnance in Ireland (The Works of the Right Honorable Joseph Addison 
Esq(IV), London 1721, list of subscribers). Index to Prerogative Wills indicates he died in 1734. 
222
  Date of patent (for lives), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87; the patent was sold in 1723 by Carter I, which had been 
held by Carter and his son (II), SP, 63–385(stamped 121); Lord Lieutenant Carteret expressed reservations about 
the sale of offices and the Carters buying offices (SP, 63–385(stamped 292) and see pp.42ff above). Thomas 
Carter II (circa 1682-1763), son of Thomas Carter I and MP for Trim 1719 to 1726 and for Hillsborough 1727 to 
1760; Thomas Carter III (1720–1765), son of Thomas Carter II and MP for Old Leighlin 1745 to 1760 (HIP 
biographies). 
223
  According to HIP biographies, Thomas Carter II and III held the patent to 1752; Liber Munerum, Part II, p.87 gives 
1754 when George Cuppaidge and his son-in-law, Humphrey Minchin, received a replacement patent. 
224
  The Carters sold their patent to Cuppaidge and Stothard, who sought a new patent but there is no evidence that 
one was issued; SP, 63–385(stamped 121, 283, 294). 1754 Cuppaidge and Humphrey Minchin received a 
replacement patent, and in 1756 Minchin and another son-in-law, John Dawson, receive a new patent (Liber 
Munerum, Part II, p.87). 
225
  Date of patent (for life), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.95; Robinson (1644–1712), originally estate manager for the 
duke of Ormond, MP for Knocktopher 1692, Wicklow Borough from 1695 to 1699 and TCD from 1703 to1712 and, 
among other Irish and English offices, surveyor general from 1684 (DIB). 
226
  Date of patent (during pleasure), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.95 Pacy (before 1671-1727), originally estate manager 
for the duke of Ormond, MP for Callan 1703 to 1713 (DIB). Hayton states that Ormond needed to demonstrate 
access to higher levels patronage to reinforce the loyalty of his employees and was obliged to capitalise on his 
position as lord lieutenant to give employees such as Pacy advancement to keeper (D.W. Hayton, 'Dependence, 
clientage and affinity: the political following of the second Duke of Ormonde' in T.C. Barnard and Jane Fenlon 
(eds.), The dukes of Ormonde 1610–1745 (Woodbridge, 2000), pp.230-31. 
227
  Date of patent (during pleasure), Liber Munerum, Part II, p.95 
228





6.4.7  Door-keepers 









Robert Weir  ?–1713
232
 
Richard West  ?–1713
233
 





























6.4.8  Keepers of the Speaker’s chamber 




6.4.9  Chaplains 
Mr Vesey
246
  11 May 1661–8 Aug 1666
247
 
                                                        
 
229
  In view of spread of references probably doorkeeper for whole of parliament—CJI(I), pp.444 (31 July 1661), 459, 
733 (6 Apl 1666), 755 (26 July 1666). 
230
  Helsham, Long History, p.20, stated he succeeded his father in post. 
231
  Helsham, Long History, pp.20, 48, stated he held the post from the Revolution and he had succeeded his father in 
post; he was dismissed in Nov 1713 (see p.44 above). CJI(II), p.444 (7 Mar 1704/5) petitioned for remuneration. 
There is a marriage record for a George Spike to Leah Chabart, 20 Apl 1716, St. Andrew’s, Dublin (Irish 
Genealogy Database, accessed 1 Apl 2015). 
232
  CJI(III), p.46 (14 Dec 1715) his widow petitioned for remuneration. 
233
  CJI(III), p.46(14 Dec 1715) petitioned for remuneration. 
234
  CJI(III), pp.138-39 
235
  Not listed in supply resolutions in the following session 
236
  CJI(III), p.45 
237
  Not listed in supply resolutions in the following session 
238
  CJI(III), p.205 
239
  Not listed in supply resolutions in the following session 
240
  CJI(III), p.409 
241
  Not listed in supply resolutions in the following session 
242
  CJI(III), p.496 
243
  Not listed in supply resolutions in the following session 
244
  CJI(III), p.594 
245
  CJI(III), p.445 
246
  Either (i) John Vesey (1638–1716), born in Coleraine, 1661 rector of Ightermurragh and Shandrum (Cloyne), 1662 
archdeacon of Armagh, 1667 dean of Cork, 1672/3 bishop of Limerick, Ardfert and Aghadoe and 1678/9 
Archbishop of Tuam; or (ii) John's father, Thomas Vesey (died circa 1669), born in Coleraine, 1629 rector of 
Maghera and of Ballyscullion (Derry), 1634 rector of Camus-juxta-Bann or Macosquin, one of an advisory 
committee of eight ministers summoned to Dublin in Feb 1660 to assist the Convention, 1661 rector of Coleraine 
in 1661, 1662 rector of Killowen (Derry), 1665 vicar of Dundalk, 1662 resigned as archdeacon of Armagh to be 
succeeded by his son but, on his son's resignation in 1663, was reappointed 1665–9 (DIB). Both Bergin in the DIB 
and Dennehy, Administrative History, p.225, favour the former, which would sit with the pattern of later upwardly-
mobile chaplains. 





   10 Oct 1692
249
–26 June 1693 (dissolution) 
Dr John Travers
250
  30 Aug 1695
251




  27 Sep 1703
253
–6 May 1713 (dissolution) 
Hon John Moore
254
  27 Nov 1713
255
–1 Aug 1714 (dissolution) 
Charles Carr
256





to episcopal bench) 
Dr William Gore
259
  5 June 1716
260
–11 June 1727 





 (his death) 
  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
247
  CJI(I), p, 387, 'Mr Vesey' appointed chaplain; subsequently given leave of absence for a fortnight on 18 June 1662 
(p.524) and a further period of leave on 20 Dec 1665 (p.689); and he was still in post on 3 Aug 1666 (p.772). 
248
  Walkington (circa 1652-1699) born in Limerick 1682, rector of Ardtrea and Arboe (co. Armagh) from 1682 and a 
chaplain to regiments, 1693 archdeacon of Ossory, 1695 bishop of Down. According to the DIB (John Gibney), in 
1692 Capel pushed him to be bishop of Down, as a moderate with experience of Ulster but, to judge from his 
sermons, he was a high churchman. Archbishop Marsh had reservations about his fitness for the see because he 
was reported to be lazy and kept dubious company in coffee houses. 
249
  CJI(II), p.12, Dr Walkington 'admitted and allowed' to read prayers 
250
  Travers appears an exception to the pattern of aggressively upwardly mobile clerics found from 1692 to 1715. He 
was vicar (from 1693) of St. Andrew’s (see C. Litten Falkiner (ed.), Illustrations of Irish History and Topography 
(London, 1904), pp.174, 185), which became the parliamentary church, and chancellor of Christchurch, Dublin 
from 1699 (Coghill Letters, no.26 (To Edward Southwell, 21 Sep 1727). Index to Prerogative Wills indicates he 
died in 1727.  
251
  CJI(II), p.45 
252
  According to the DIB, Pratt had independent means and polished manners; he had travelled in Britain and Europe 
and knew Swift in London. In 1703 he was appointed chaplain to Ormond and in 1710, despite opposition from 
Wharton, he was made Provost of Trinity College. In 1710–12 he took leave of absence and he was criticised for 
allowing Jacobite students to make public expression of their views. Archbishop King was a strong opponent and 
eventually forced him out in 1717 when the chancellorship was secured for the prince of Wales. He had to settle 
for the deanery of Down, though he tried to hold out for a bishopric.  
253
  CJI(II), p.320, elected. 
254
  Son of earl of Drogheda, 1707 prebendary of St. Patrick's, Dublin died 1716 (Cotton, Fasti(II), p.154); married in 
1708 Elizabeth Devonish (widow of Edward Devonish), youngest daughter of Lord Chancellor Porter (Peerage 
Database, http://www.thepeerage.com, which cites Cokayne, etc, The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, 
Ireland, Great ...; reprint (Gloucester, 2000)). 
255
  CJI(II), p.747, elected (two candidates) 
256
  Vicar of Kilkea 1701 and chaplain of the Blue Coat Hospital, Dublin; bishop of Killaloe 9 June 1716; died 1741 
(Cotton, Fasti(I), p.469) 
257
  CJI(III), p.11 
258
  CJI(III), p.100 
259
  The Complete Peerage(III), p.273; Cotton, Fasti(III), p.228) 
260
  CJI(III), p.100 
261
  CJI(III), p.465 
262





6.5   House of Commons officers' fees (3 Mar 1640/1) 
6.5.1  Fees due to the clerk: 
'For the copying, engrossing, passing and enrolling of any private or particular bill, which 
shall pass for a law for the advantage, good, or benefit of any private person, city or 
corporation, which such private person being thereby naturalized, or otherwise therein 
concerned, and every such city or corporation shall pay to the clerk of this House five 
pounds, sterling. 
'For the entry and copy of every order, both in the House, or before any grand committee, 
where in any private person is concerned, together with the names of the said committee, 
five shillings, sterling. 
'For the reading and entering of every petition, answer, replication, or other pleadings, 
concerning the private good of any particular person, city, town, or corporation, five 
shillings, sterling. 
'For the copying of any petition, articles, or other pleadings, concerning the private good of 
any private person, by the sheet, twelve pence, sterling. 
'For the entry of every privilege of parliament granted by the knights, citizens and 
burgesses, five shilling, sterling. 
'For the appearance of every delinquent, two shillings and six pence, sterling. 
'For every bond to his majesty’s use, to abide the censure of the House, etc, five shillings, 
sterling. 
'For cancelling the same, five shillings, sterling. 
'For every warrant from the House or grand committee for the bringing in of any 
delinquent, five shillings, sterling. 
'For every discharge, the like, five shillings, sterling. 
'For every summons, two shilling and six pence'.
263
 
6.5.2  Fees due to the serjeant-at-arms: 
'For every bill that pass for a law that concerns any man’s private interest, or for several 
men’s interest, the Serjeant is to have twenty shillings, sterling, and to his men, in like 
cases, two shillings and six pence, sterling. 
'That if any desire to have their counsel, in opposition to any bill that is to pass for a law, 
they are to pay the Serjeant, for admittance for such party and his counsel, ten shillings, 
sterling, 
'That if any be naturalised, as born out of the King’s dominions, he must put in a bill, and 
pay to the serjeant twenty shillings, sterling, and to his men five shillings, sterling.
264
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  CJI(I), pp.189-90 
264
  There is no evidence that naturalisation generated a significant source of legislation or income.  
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'That upon a bill which is to pass for a law, and where it concerns more than one 
corporation, or such like, the Serjeant is to have twenty shillings, sterling, and to his men 
two shillings and six pence, sterling. 
'For the arrest of a knight-bachelor, or baronet, the Serjeant is to have twenty shillings, 
sterling. 
'For every day that he is in keeping within the doors, besides his diet and lodging, six 
shillings and eight pence, sterling. 
'And when he goes abroad with a keeper, per diem, ten shillings, sterling. 
'For the arrest of an esquire, the Serjeant is to have thirteen shillings, sterling. 
'For every day that he is in keeping within the doors, besides his diet and lodging, five 
shillings, sterling. 
'When he shall go abroad with a keeper, per diem, six shillings and eight pence, sterling. 
'For the arrest of a gentleman, or any other under the degree of an esquire, ten shillings, 
sterling. 
'For his keeping within the doors, besides his diet and lodging, three shillings and four 
pence, sterling. 
'When he shall go abroad with a keeper, per diem, five shillings, sterling. 
'For every mile that the Serjeant shall ride, from the place where the parliament is kept, 
unto the place where the party shall be arrested, for every mile’s going twelve pence, and 
for every mile’s coming twelve pence'; .... 
'For every summons, the serjeant-at-arms is to have for every mile for his travelling 
charges, going and coming, six pence, sterling ... 
'No summons in any suit between party and party ought to be directed to the serjeant-at-
arms, but only such summons as is granted at the suit of a Members of this House, or 
where a summons is granted in some general grievance ... 
'If any knight or baronet be brought to the bar as a delinquent, the Serjeant is to have 
twenty shillings, sterling. 
'If any esquire be brought to the bar as a delinquent, the Serjeant is to have thirteen 
shillings and four pence, sterling. 
'If under that degree, ten shillings, sterling.  
'And if they be committed, he is to have, per diem, as aforesaid, Reddenda singula 
singulis. 
'And if anyone be brought in as a witness, the Serjeant is to have of the party that 
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6.6  Comparison of selected fees of officers 
Irish House of Commons (1695)
266
 English House of Commons (1700/1)
267
 
Fees for private bills 
  Mr Speaker £5-0-0 
  Speaker’s secretary £0-10-0 
Clerk from principal sponsor  




Clerk for  
  readings 




  Serjeant-at-arms £1-5-0 
Clerk assistant from principal sponsor 




Clerk assistant £1-0-0 
Clerks without doors from principal sponsor  
Clerks without doors from each additional 
person receiving benefit 
£0-10-0 
£0-5-0 
Chief clerk without doors (and others) £0-10-0 
  Door-keepers £0-5-0 
  Housekeeper £0-5-0 
  Bills concerning counties or corporations Double 
above 
To clerks of select committees 
 for attending a private committee, 
 if the committee adjourned 
 for summons to witness and other functions 






To four clerks without doors 
 for attending a private committee, 
 if the committee adjourned 
 for summons to witness and other 
functions  







Other fees to clerks 
Every Member 




For swearing every new Member £1-5-0 




All orders of the House 
Entering order in Book of Orders 
£0-6-8 
£0-1-0 
For every order £0-6-8 
Entering reports in the Journal £0-6-8   
For every hearing at bar,  
 each delinquent to pay 
 Counsel to pay 





For every hearing at the bar, on each 
side 
£1-13-4 
For searching the records by private persons £0-2-6 For searches of the Journal (by clerks?) £0-6-8 
For copies of bills, per sheet (15 lines per 
sheet and six words in a line) 
£0-1-0 For copies of bills, per sheet 
But if to Members, only, per sheet 
£0-1-0 
£0-0-4 




Fees paid to the serjeant-at-arms (and his men) 
  For taking a knight into custody £5-0-0 
  For taking a gentleman into custody £3-6-8 
  For swearing a knight of the shire into the 
House 
£0-10-0 
  For swearing a burgess into the House £0-5-0 
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  CJI(II), pp.95, 104, xx  
267
  CJE(VI), pp.287-88  
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Irish House of Commons (1695)
266
 English House of Commons (1700/1)
267
 
For every counsel attending committee 
 And to his men 
£0-10-0 
£0-5-0 
For every counsel pleading at the bar or 
elsewhere 
£0-10-0 
For bringing any criminal to the bar—per day £0-13-0 For bringing any criminal to the bar £0-6-8 
  For riding charges, for every mile £0-0-6 
Admitting strangers into the House £0-10-0   
Serving a summons in Dublin at the private 
suit of Member or other party  
£0-3-4   
Fees to door-keepers of the House (unless indicated otherwise) 
For a hearing at the bar of the whole House at 
the conclusion 
£0-6-8 For an attendance at the bar £0-7-6 
For a hearing a committee of the House  £0-3-4   
For delivery of papers, case or proposal at the 
door 
£0-5-0 For delivery of papers at the door £0-5-0 
Upon discharge of every prisoner at the bar £0-2-6 Upon discharge of every prisoner to each 
door-keeper 
£0-2-6 
For every Member introduced and sworn after 
the sitting of parliament 
£0-2-6 Upon swearing a Member on a new 
return 
£0-5-0 
For every counsel pleading at the bar  £0-2-6   












Drawing up bill   £10:15:00 
Expenses necessary in following and transacting a bill £50:00:00 
 If it fails, 20 guineas for pains £21:00:00 
 If it succeeds, £86:00:00 
For carrying a bill that is the, first of its kind [where] a solicitor [is] absolutely necessary and he must 
have if it does not succeed. 
£10:15:00 
And if it succeeds he must have an additional £10:15:00 
Total    (does not add to the total) £239:15:00 
If it miscarries in the first house it is brought into, a good part of the fees and expenses as well as 
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  BL, Add 28,888 f.9 (with papers dated 1701/2) 
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6.8  Success rates of legislation 
6.8.1  Success rates by originating body 
 





























































































































































































1692 0 5 5 0% 0 3 3 0% 4 13 17 24% 20% 25 0% 4 
1695–97 35 95 130 27% 1 27 28 4% 33 23 56 59% 61% 214 51% 69 
1698–99 4 36 40 10% 2 3 5 40% 6 10 16 38% 66% 61 33% 12 
1703–04 14 60 74 19% 2 13 15 13% 12 6 18 67% 69% 107 50% 28 
1705 18 31 49 37% 0 2 2 0% 6 7 13 46% 77% 64 75% 24 
1707 20 19 39 51% 1 5 6 17% 5 5 10 50% 71% 55 77% 26 
1709 10 37 47 21% 7 9 16 44% 2 1 3 67% 71% 66 53% 19 
1710 10 18 28 36% 3 6 9 33% 5 8 13 38% 56% 50 56% 18 
1711 11 10 21 52% 0 6 6 0% 2 5 7 29% 62% 34 85% 13 
1713 0 16 16 0% 0 6 6 0% 1 2 3 33% 64% 25 0% 1 
1715–16 20 16 36 56% 2 4 6 33% 9 4 12 75% 67% 54 65% 31 
1717 13 16 29 45% 3 1 4 75% 2 0 2 100% 83% 35 72% 18 
1719 18 19 37 49% 6 2 8 75% 3 0 3 100% 77% 48 67% 27 
1721–22 14 25 39 36% 2 2 4 50% 0 0 0 0% 91% 43 88% 16 
1723–24 15 24 39 38% 3 6 9 33% 4 2 6 67% 72% 54 68% 22 
1725–26 16 16 32 50% 1 5 6 17% 0 0 0 0% 84% 38 94% 17 
1727–28 18 10 28 64% 8 5 13 62% 4 2 6 67% 60% 47 60% 30 
1729–30 24 14 38 63% 3 1 4 75% 1 1 2 50% 86% 44 86% 28 













  Days per act  
1692 25 4 6.3  
1695–97 166 69 2.4  
1698–99 80 12 6.7  
1703-04 80 28 2.9  
1705 59 24 2.5  
1707 68 26 2.6  
1709 68 19 3.6  
1710 51 18 2.8  
1711 53 13 4.1  
1713 26 1 26.0  
1715–16 93 31 3.0  
1717 69 18 3.8  
1719 69 27 2.6  
1721–22 73 16 4.6  
1723–24 95 22 4.3  
1725–26 76 17 4.5  
1727–28 82 30 2.7  
1729–30 97 28 3.5  
Totals/average 1,330 403  3.3 403 3.3 
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6.9  Outcome of possible bills on list prepared for 1703–04 session 
 Bills on list
271
 Legislative progress Background and commentary Enacted 
1 Act of recognition Draft sent to London July 1703; 
rejected by the English Privy 
Council 
Rejected on grounds that such a bill 




2 Act for opening 
mines 
Heads introduced in the 
Commons in Oct 1703 to 
repeal a statute against 
multiplying gold and silver, and 
to prevent disputes and 
controversies concerning royal 
mines; managed by John 
Cliffe, Tory lawyer; did not 
emerge from the Commons 
Previous attempts to legislate about 
mines in the 1690s had been 
unsuccessful; the attempt in 1695 
had originated in Lords and was 
rejected by the English Privy Council 
- 
3  Act against 
dormant bonds 
and judgments 
Draft sent to London July 1703; 
rejected by the English Privy 
Council 
Previous attempt to legislate in the 
1690s had been unsuccessful; it had 
originated in Lords and failed as a bill 
in Commons. 
- 
4 Act to prohibit 
butchers being 
graziers 
Heads introduced in the 
Commons Sep 1703; managed 
by Edward Singleton, a court 
supporting Member who had 
managed one of the earlier 
bills 
Three attempts to legislate in the 
1690s had been unsuccessful; one 
emerging from each originating body 
2 Anne 
c.15 
5 Act to prevent 
clandestine 
marriages 
Never emerged A previous attempt to legislate in the 
1690s had been unsuccessful; it had 
originated in Lords and failed as a bill 
in Commons; later unsuccessful 
attempts in 1705, 1711 and 1713. 
- 
6 Act to encourage 
Protestant 
strangers 
Never emerged Following legislation enacted in 1692, 
a second Commons heads had been 
rejected by the English Privy Council 
in 1697 
- 
7 Act to prevent the 
further growth of 
Popery. 
Two bills emerged: one as 
heads originating in Commons 
and the other from the Irish 
Privy Council 
ILD advises that it 'has been assumed 
here that the final approved version' 




8 Act to qualify jurors Heads introduced in Lords; did 
not progress further 
Further heads in 1709 did not emerge 
from Lords 
- 
9 Act to encourage 
importation of iron 
and staves 
Draft sent to London July 1703; 
Privy Council bill enacted 
Previously Commons heads rejected 
by the English Privy Council in 1698 
2 Anne 
c.2 
10 Act to prevent 
destruction of the 
fry of herring, 
salmon and pilcher 
Heads introduced in the 
Commons in Oct 1703; 
managed by Robert Echlin, a 
court supporting Member; 
heads did not emerge from the 
Commons 
Previous Irish Privy Council bill had 
been rejected by the English Privy 
Council in 1698 and three 
subsequent Commons heads (1705, 
1707 and 1709) were rejected by the 
Irish Privy Council 
- 
11 Act for the more 
easy recovery of 
tithes of the value 
of 40s or under 
Heads for the more easy 
recovery of tithes and other 
ecclesiastical dues and to 
prevent frequent 
excommunications introduced 
in the Lords; rejected by the 
Irish Privy Council 
Five failed attempts to legislate on 
tithes in 1690s; and further failures in 
most sessions until 1719 
- 
12 Act to improve the 
barren and 
unprofitable lands 
of the kingdom 
Never emerged Heads originating in the Commons in 
1698 rejected by the Irish Privy 
Council 
- 
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  See p.216 above. 
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 Bills on list
271
 Legislative progress Background and commentary Enacted 





Draft sent to London July 1703; 
Irish Privy Council bill enacted 
Two statutes enacted in 1690s for 
confirming estates and possessions 
held and enjoyed by the acts of 
settlement and explanation; in 1703 
also act for quieting ecclesiastical 
persons [in their possessions?] 
2 Anne 
c.8 
14 Act to continue the 
Act against tories, 
rapparees and 
robbers and for 
trials of Regulars 
that come from 
beyond seas 
Draft sent to London July 1703; 
Privy Council bill enacted 




15 Act for making the 
estates of minors 
liable for their 
debts during their 
minority 
Heads introduced in the 
Commons in Oct 1703; 
managed by Walter Pollard, an 
MP in opposition; heads 
rejected by the Irish Privy 
Council 
Two previous attempts in 1690s to 
legislate failed; as did a further 
attempt in 1709 
- 
16 Act for granting the 
additional duties of 
Excise for one 
year 
Draft 'short money' bill sent to 
London July 1703; Irish Privy 
Council bill enacted 
Bill was necessary to safeguard 'royal 
prerogative' agreed as part of the 
compromise on 'sole right' in 1695 
2 Anne 
c.1 
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6.10  Comparison of private legislation enacted at Dublin and 
Westminster 




1692  34 1 
1693  2  
1694  52  
1695 16 41  
1696  28 1 
1697 4 62 1 
1698 3 59  
1699  38  
1700  36 1 
1701  2 1 
1702  101 38 
1703 9 51 4 
1704  61 2 
1705 7 68 3 
1706  48 1 
1707 7 30 1 
1708  36 1 
1709 6 24 0 
1710 6 40 5 
1711 5 41 2 
1712  24 1 
1713  25 4 
1714  48  
1715 7   
1716  33 2 
1717 2 25  
1718  25  
1719 9 36 1 
1720  34 1 
1721  22  
1722  22  
1723 11 26  
1724  43 1 
1725 7 31 1 
1726  36 1 
1727 3 31  
1728  32 1 
1729 5 21 1 
1730  33 1 
Total 107 1401 8% 
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  Based on legislation.gov.uk; figures exclude acts to enable appointees to take oath of office for an Irish post in 





6.11  Members who sat in House of Commons before 1692274 
Surname  Constituencies 


















Barry James Rathcormack ● ● ● ● 1  ● Rathcormack Opposed Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Brownlow Arthur Co. Armagh ● ● ●    ● Co. Armagh Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Butler Francis Belturbet ● ●    1662–66  Belturbet Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 




Coglan Joseph Limerick Bor. ● ●     ● Trinity College Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Cole Michael Enniskillen ● ● ●   1665–66  Enniskillen Opposed Lord 
Chancellor Porter 









John St. Johnstown 
(Longford) 
● ●    1661–66  Clonmines Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Eustace Maurice Harristown ● ●    1664–66  Knocktopher  
Fitzgerald Robert Co. Kildare ● ●    1661–66  Co. Kildare  
Hamilton Charles Killybegs ● ● ●   1661–66  Co. Donegal Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Hamilton Francis Co. Cavan ● ● ● ●  1661–66  Co. Cavan Opposed Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Hamilton James Co. Down; 
Bangor 
● ● ●   1666  [Strabane?] Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Handcock William Athlone; Co. 
Westmeath 




Hoey William Carysfort  ●    1665–66  Naas  Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Ingoldsby Henry Co. Clare  ●    1661–66 ● Co. Clare Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
King William Co. Limerick ● ●    1661–66  Co. Limerick  
King Robert Co. 
Roscommon 
● ● ●   1661–66  Ballyshannon Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Lambard Oliver Kilbeggan ● ●    1661–66  Kilbeggan Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Lestrange Thomas Banagher ● ● ●  1 1666  Banagher Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Loftus Dudley Fethard 
(Wexford) 
●     1642–8,  
1661–66 
Naas; Bannow  
Loftus Nicholas Fethard 
(Wexford) 




Meade John Co. Tipperary ● ● ●    ● Trinity College Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Mervyn Henry Co. Tyrone ● ●    1661–66  Augher Opposed Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Muscamp Denny Blessington  ●    1665–66  Swords Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Nugent James Fore ●      ● Fore  
Plunket Walter Granard ● ●    1661–66  Gorey Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Pooley Thomas Newcastle  ●    1661–66  Mallow Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Shaen James Baltinglas ● ●    1661–66  Clonmel - 
St. 
George 
Arthur Athlone ● ●    1661–66  Athlone Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
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Surname  Constituencies 




















Oliver Co. Galway ● ●    1661–66  Co. Galway  
St. Leger John Doneraile; 
Tralee 
● ●    1661–66  Co. Cork Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 
Upton Arthur Co. Antrim ● ●    1661–66  Co. Antrim A strong 
Presbyterian  
Weaver John Queen's Co.; 
Maryborough 
● ●    1661–66  King's Co Supported Lord 
Chancellor Porter 







6.12  Operation of Committee of Privileges and Elections  
6.12.1  Comparison of terms of appointment of Dublin and Westminster Committees of 
Privileges and Elections 




Ordered, That a Committee of Privileges and Elections be 
appointed, and they are to meet on Tuesday next, at 
four of the clock in the afternoon, in the Speaker's 
Chamber, and to sit every Tuesday and Thursday in the 
afternoon, in the place above-mentioned, and to adjourn 
to the House, if they think fit, and all that come are to 
have voices; and they are to take into their consideration 
all such matters as shall or may come in question, 
touching returns, elections, and privileges, and to 
proceed on double returns in the first place, and report 
their proceedings, with their opinion there therein to the 
House, from time to time; and all persons will question 
returns, are to do in fourteen days next and so within 
fourteen days after any new returns shall be brought in; 
and the committee is to have power to send for persons, 
papers, and records further information; and all 
Members who are returned for two more places, are to 
make their elections by Tuesday fortnight for which of 
the places they will serve provided there be no question 
upon the return for that place and if anything shall come 
in question touching the return, election, or matter of 
privilege of any Member, he is to withdraw during the 




Ordered, That a Committee of Privileges and Elections be 
appointed, of [87 names]: and they are to meet on 
Monday next, at three of the clock in the afternoon, in 
the Speaker's Chamber; and to sit every Monday, 
Wednesday, and Friday, in the afternoon, in the place 
above-mentioned: and all that come are to have voices: 
and they are to take into their consideration all such 
matters as shall or may come in question, touching 
returns, elections and privileges; and to proceed upon 
double returns in the first place; and to report their 
proceedings, with their opinion therein, to the House 
from time to time: and all persons that will question 
returns, are to do it in fourteen days next; and so within 
fourteen days after any new return shall be brought in: 
and the committee is to have power to send for persons, 
papers, and records, for their information: and all 
Members who are returned for two or more places are to 
make their elections by this day three weeks, for which 
of the places they will serve, provided there be no 
Question upon the return for that place: and if anything 
shall come in question, touching the return, election, or 
matter of privilege, of any Member, he is to withdraw 
during the time the matter is in debate. 
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  CJI(II), p.45; in 1692 committee had 94 members (CJI(1
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 edn)(II), pp.583-84). 
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  CJE(XI), p.171 
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6.12.2  Contested elections referred to the Committee of Privileges and Elections  









1692 9 9 4
279
 
1695–97 25 22 14 
1698–99 1 1 1 
1703–04 12 10 8 
1704–05 1 1 1 
1707 6 6 3 
1709 6 3 1 
1710 3 0 0 






1715–16 27 23 15 




1721–22 2 1 2 
1723–24 3 3 3 
1725–26 3 2 1 
1727–28 48
283
 36 21 
1729–30 8 4 1 
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  Includes motions and other complaints; petitions and counter-petitions have been counted as separate cases. 
278
  Cases not referred to the committee include those where the election petition was rejected outright by the 
Commons and cases which the House dealt with directly itself by, for example, summoning parties to the bar. 
279
  Session ended early and so the committee was unable to report on referred cases; one case re-committed. 
280
  One case was referred back to bar. 
281
  Session ended early and so the committee was unable to report on referred cases. 
282
  Two cases were referred back to the bar. 
283


























First parliament of William III and Mary II, 1692–93; assembled 5 Oct 1692; dissolved 26 June 1693 
1  6
288
 (3) 0 2 6/4 0 0 
Second parliament of William III, 1695–99; assembled 27 Aug 1695; dissolved 14 June 1699 
1 19 (11) 4 (3) 3 18/10 0 2 
2  1 (1)  1/1 0 0 
First parliament of Anne, 1703–13; assembled 21 Sep 1703; dissolved 6 May 1713 
1 12 (10) 0 2 9/3 2 3 
2  1 (1) 1 1/1 0 0 
3  6
289
 (4) 0 5/3 0 1 
4  3
290
 (2) 1 3/1 2 0 
5  2 (2) 1 0   2 0 
6  0  0 0 0 0 
Second parliament of Anne, 1713–14; assembled 25 Nov 1713; dissolved 1 Aug 1714 (death of monarch) 
1 19 (8) 0 3 12/1 7 1 
Parliament of George I, 1715–27; assembled 12 Nov 1715; dissolved 11 June 1727 (death of monarch) 
1 19
291





2  3 (2) 1 3/1 0 1 
3  5 (4) 3 4
294
/1 3 0 
4  2 (2) 1 1/1 1 0 
5  2
295
 (2) 1 2/2 0 0 
6  3 (3) 1 2/1 1 1 
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  The figures in the table showing contested elections (or, in the terms of CJI, 'controverted elections' where there 
was a petition or petitions) have required the exercise of judgment―for example, depending on the context some 
counter-petitions and supplementary petitions have been treated as single cases and, where a case was 
recovered from committee to the bar, it has been treated as both referred to the committee and heard at the bar. 
285
  Figures in brackets are an estimate of cases with a recorded outcome by end of session, that is where the House 
determined the case, parties settled by withdrawal of petition or the House refused to consider (i.e. rejected) the 
case. 
286
  Entries which show a successful petitioner unseating sitting MP are included but not cases concerning double 
returns. 
287
  Column records cases where there is evidence of withdrawal, usually a vote entry allowing withdrawal. Numbers 
are probably understated. 
288
  Excludes three counter-petitions and supplementary petitions 
289
  Includes one case that came at the end of the session and was re-submitted at the beginning of the following 
session 
290
  Excludes three counter-petitions and supplementary petitions 
291
  Excludes seven counter-petitions and two supplementary petitions 
292
  Includes four cases where the committee was discharged and which were recovered to the bar of the House 
293
  Limited proceedings at the bar as four petitions were withdrawn 
294
  Includes two cases where the committee was discharged and which were recovered to the bar of the House 
295
  Excludes a supplementary petition 





















Parliament of George II 1727–60; assembled 28 Nov 1727; dissolved 25 Oct 1760 (death of monarch) 
1 37
296
 (29)  11
297
 34/17 3 9 
2 4
298
 (4) 4 (4) 0 5/2 3 6 
Totals 116 (84) 36 (30) 35 123/63 31 29 
                                                        
 
296
  Excludes 11 counter-petitions and supplementary petitions 
297
  Figures exclude double returns and obvious counter-petitioners 
298
  Cases that arose following the general election of 1727 that were not dealt with until the 1729–30 session or were 





6.13  Procedural orders, rules and precedents of House of 
Commons  
6.13.1  Orders, standing orders and rules of the Irish House of Commons  
Orders, standing orders, rules, etc. of the Irish House of 
Commons 
Commentary and English/British equivalent  
Absence from the House  
 
Order 
Leave of absence 
'It is ordered that none of the Members of this House 
shall from henceforth absent themselves from the 
service of this House, but such as shall ask leave 
first of Mr Speaker, and enter their names with the 
clerk of this House'. The House appointed two 
Members (William Plunkett and Stephen Stephens) 
to impose the fines upon several Members, who, 
upon the call of the House, were found to be 
absent (18 June 1641, CJI(I), p.234). 
 
From the earliest surviving records of the 
House of Commons it was a requirement for 
a Member seeking to absent himself to first 
obtain the leave of the House―for example, 





'It is this day allowed by the House for a Rule, that 
five pounds be given to the poor for every private 
bill that passeth' (24 Oct 1614, CJI(I), p.17). 
 
Irish procedure followed Westminster, where it 
was an 'Order that upon every private bill, 
something must be given to the poor, which 
will do them much good, and no harm, to the 





'Resolved, That after this day no public or private bill 
is passed, without being first committed after 
second reading, and that this be the standing Rule 
of this House' (4 Sep 1697, CJI(II), p.185). 
 
Neale, The Elizabethan House of Commons, 
p.376, and Porritts, Unreformed House (I), 
p.331 indicate that by the time of James I 
practice was to send bills to committee after 
second reading.  
 
Resolution 
Counsel, hearing of  
'Resolved, that, in case of counsel, counsel may be 
heard between the second reading and the 
commitment' (22 Oct 1614, CJI(I), p.16). 
 
In Westminster procedure, second reading 
was the usual point at which counsel was 
heard; there are examples of counsel being 
heard at second reading from before this 
time—for example, 3 May 1604, CJE(I), 
p.197, 13 Mar 1606, CJE(I), p.352, 9 May 
1607. CJE(I), p.372 provides instance when 
counsel was heard at third reading). 





Petition, scrutiny of (for private bills) 
'Ordered, That before any petitions be received for 
any private bills, that a committee be appointed to 
inspect such petitions, and report their opinion 
concerning the same to the House' (22 Oct 1692, 
CJI(II), p.21). 
'Resolved, That no heads of any private bill be 
brought into the House but upon a petition 
preferred to the House, nor until the matter of such 
petition, and the nature of the case, have been 
reported by a committee, with their opinion 
thereon.  
'Ordered, That this be entered as the standing Order 
of the House' (12 Nov 1703, CJI(II), p.365). 
 
P.D.G. Thomas states that the 'practice of 
referring private petitions to a committee was 
so customary ... that it was often assumed to 
be invariable: [in] 1724 Speaker Crompton 
had to remind Members that each such 
decision was the choice of the House'. 
(Thomas, House of Commons, p.58) 
In contrast to Dublin, Westminster on several 
occasions, the first of which was 12 Nov 
1705 (CJE(XV), p.18), ordered that all private 
bills be printed. The requirement was made a 
standing order on 5 Mar 1722 (CJE(XX), 
p.161). 
'Ordered, That, for the future, no private bill be 
brought into this house, but upon a petition 
first presented, truly stating the case, at the 
peril of the parties preferring the same: and 
that such petition shall be signed by the 
parties who are suitors for such bill' (26 May 
1685, CJE(IX), p.719). [Made a standing 
Order, 24 Nov 1699.] 
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Orders, standing orders, rules, etc. of the Irish House of 
Commons 
Commentary and English/British equivalent  
 
Order 
Notice of committee meeting (for private bills) 
'Ordered, That notice in writing be fixed on the door 
of this House, eight days before any committee 
proceed to [a] petition [for a heads of a private bill]' 
(12 Nov 1703, CJI(II), p.365). 
 
There is no direct equivalent at Westminster 
but notices were posted up on the door of the 
House―for example, 'Ordered, That the 
standing committee of this House be posted 
up at the door of this House, that persons 
may take notice where they sit' (26 May 
1660, CJE(VIII), p46). 
In addition, parties had to be notified of 
contents―for example, on 31 Mar 1698 the 
House 'ordered That the chairman of the 
committee, upon the report of every private 
bill, do acquaint the House, That the 
allegations of the bill have been examined; 
and that the parties concerned have given 
their consents, to the satisfaction of the 
committee: and that the same be a standing 
Order of the House' (CJE(XII), p.625). No 




Standardised drafting in heads (for private bills) 
'Ordered That it be an instruction to all committees 
appointed to prepare heads of a bill to prevent 
persons from being disinherited upon account of 
being Protestants, to insert the like clauses in such 
heads of private bills' (2 Oct 1703, CJI(II), p.326). 
 
The concept of standard clauses was used at 
Westminster. The House ordered, 'That in all 
private bills, for the future, a clause be 
inserted, That the trustees therein named 
shall be obliged to see the trusts in the said 
bills performed, or be liable to the same out 







Reading of heads 
'Ordered, nemine contradicente, That all heads of 
bill, which pass through a committee of the whole 
House, shall receive a reading after the report 
made, and before the same be made to the 
government, in order to be transmitted in due form 
into Great Britain' (10 Feb 1723/4, CJI(III), p.388). 
 
There is no Westminster equivalent. The 
implication is that this did not always happen 
in the Irish House of Commons and the order 
brought the heads process in line with bill 
procedure where, after report, it was given a 
further reading, third reading. 
 
Orders 
Copies of heads 
'Ordered, That all heads of bills, prepared by order of 
this House, be taken and kept by the clerk of this 
House, for the use of this House' (30 July 1697, 
CJI(II), p.157). 
'Ordered, That notice be taken in the Journal from 
time to time of what bills are sent by this House to 
the chief governors and by whom the same are 
sent, and that copies of such bills so prepared and 
sent be kept by the clerk' (31 July 1697, CJI(II), 
p.157). 
 
The heading in the margin makes it clear that 
the first entry concerned the making and 
keeping of copies. There was no 
Westminster equivalent; it may have not 
been so pressing at Westminster where a bill 
was not taken out of the Palace of 
Westminster. In contrast, in Ireland heads 
sometimes were lost and there was political, 
even constitutional, sensitivities about 
changes made to bills by the Privy Councils 






'It is declared to be the sense of the House, That where 
an order of the House is made to adjourn all 
committees, that it is not intended thereby that any of 
the standing committees, to meet at any day after is 
adjourned thereby; but that any such standing 
committee may need to enter on their business on the 
next following day for their meeting, notwithstanding 
such adjournment of all committees' (23 Aug 1697, 
CJI(II), p.174). 
 
The practice of deferring, adjourning and 
reviving committees at Westminster 
appears from the reign of James I (see for 
example, CJE(I), pp.431, 703 and 891). 
Evidently there was confusion at 
Westminster too as to what an order to 
adjourn all committees meant: P.D.G. 
Thomas records that in 1721 the Speaker 
explained that the order applied only the 
committees meeting that day, not to any 
arranged for the next morning; he said this 
was according to an order of 
1699―apparently that made on 29 Jan 
1699/1700, CJE(XIII), p.158 (Thomas, 





Orders, standing orders, rules, etc. of the Irish House of 
Commons 





Misreported to the House 
'... it was agreed by the House, that if a gentleman 
should mis-report from the committee, one of the 
same committee may stand up, and acquaint the 
House, and, till the House be fully thereof satisfied, 
the gentleman is to deliver in the bill and amendments 
(if any be) and then he is to stand by the clerk’s 
Table, and read first all the strikings out, and then all 
additions' (2 Nov 1614, CJI(I), pp.19-20). 
 
This arose from a specific case but was of 
general application; it does not appears to 
have been repeated. 
Conferences with the Lords 





'Ordered That a committee to meet at the Speaker’s 
chamber this afternoon, at three of the clock, to 
draw up an order, together with the reasons which 
induced this House to agree that the managers for 
this house, on a free conference with the Lords, to 
stand within the rails at the Table uncovered, to the 
end the same may be entered in the Journals of 
this House, to remain in posterity' (24 Oct 1695, 
CJI(II), p.107). 
There is no direct equivalent in the 
Westminster Journals but conferences with 
the Lords were subject to precedents and 
rigid rules and Hatsell's Precedents record 
that 'a rail was set on that side of the table in 
the Painted Chamber on which the Members 
of the House of Commons are to stand at 
Conferences, to the end that those Members 
who are appointed managers or reporters of 
Conferences, may not be disturbed by the 
press of other persons standing behind them' 




Speeches in debate, limit on  
'Ordered ... that no Member, who has already 
spoken to the same business since that question 
was put, do, without the leave of this House, speak 
further thereunto' [Appears to refer to an adjourned 
debate] (24 July 1661, CJI(I), p.435). 
 
On 23 June 1604 the Westminster House of 
Commons 'agreed for Rule if a bill be 
continued in speech from day-to-day, a man 
may not speak twice to the matter of the bill' 
(CJ(I), p.345). Hatsell's Precedents provide 
some information on the provenance of the 
rule by citing an 'ancient' order of the English 
House of Lords: 'No man is to speak twice to 
any bill at any one time of reading it, or any 
other proposition, unless it be to explain 
himself in some material point of his speech; 
but no new matter; and that not without leave 
of the House first obtained;' which was this 
day confirmed' (Precedents (II), p.105). 
Hatsell points out that the Speaker would 
intervene to stop a Member speaking twice 




Speaking more than once in debate 
'Ordered, That the Members of this House take 
notice, that it is the constant parliamentary practice 
and course, that Members speak but once to a 
matter in debate, except in the case of privilege, 
and except were new matter has arisen on the 
debate; and that where any Member shall speak to 
any matter more than once, except in the cases 
aforesaid, Mr. Speaker shall take notice thereof, to 
keep the Members to the orders of the House' (6 
Aug 1697, CJI(II), p.160). 
Divisions   
 
Rule 
Attendance required during debate 
'Ordered upon Question, that it be entered in the 
Journals, as a Rule of this House, that when any 
business is debated, which shall cause a question 
to be put, and the sense of the House for putting 
the same cannot be known, until it comes to a 
question, whether the question shall be put or not, 
that then no Member of the House, who was 
absent at such debate, shall give his vote; and if it 
be carried in the affirmative, and the question be 
thereupon put, those persons are likewise to be 
excluded their votes, and to withdraw themselves 
from the rest of the House, until the matter be 
determined' (27 May 1662, CJI(I), p.510, 9 Nov 
1665, CJI(I), p.664). 
 
There is no Westminster equivalent; this 
appears to be a rule difficult to enforce if it 
refers to the whole debate; Rule never 
referred to after 1665. 
 
Rule 
No Member to persuade another how to vote 
'Ordered, that it be entered as another Rule of this 
House, that when a question is passed, upon 
which the House divided, no person shall solicit or 
privately persuade any Member either to stay 
within the House, or go out; that so all persons in 
such cases may have their free votes according to 
their judgments' (27 May 1662, CJI(I), p.510). 
 
No Westminster equivalent has been found. 
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Orders, standing orders, rules, etc. of the Irish House of 
Commons 
Commentary and English/British equivalent  
 
Resolution 
Time limit on request for division 
'Resolved, That when the Speaker declares upon 
the putting of any question, and the House 
afterwards falls upon other new matters, there shall 
be no division of the House for determination of 
such a question, though it be desired' (17 June 
1662, CJI(I), p.524). 
 
There is no Westminster equivalent; but it was 
implicit in English procedure that procedure 
for triggering division was upon the Speaker 
putting the question and that was the point at 
which the question was put and decided. 
Once decided and the House had moved to 
the next item of business it was not possible, 
in strict procedural terms, to reopen a 
decision. 




'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That in case it shall 
appear any person has procured himself to be elected 
or returned as a Member of this House, or 
endeavoured so to be, by bribery, or any other corrupt 
practices, this House will proceed with the utmost 
severity against such person' (12 Oct 1723, CJI(III), 
p.333). 
 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That in 
case it shall appear any person has 
procured himself to be elected or returned 
as a Member of this House, or 
endeavoured so to be, by bribery, or any 
other corrupt practices, this House will 
proceed with the utmost severity against 
such person' (13 Feb 1700/1, CJE(XIII), 




Confessional restriction on eligibility of Members  
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that the electing of 
persons to be Members of this House, who are newly 
converted from the Popish to the Protestant religion, 
or who are married to Popish wives, or breed up, or 
suffer any of their children to be educated in the 
Popish religion, is highly prejudicial to the Protestant 
interest of this kingdom. 
'Resolved, that no person that is, or shall be, converted 
from the Popish to the Protestant religion, ought to be 
elected or admitted to serve as a Member of this 
House for the space of seven years next after his 
conversion; and unless he produces a certificate of 
having received the sacrament, according to the 
usage of the Church of Ireland as by law established, 
thrice in every year during the said term' (22 Nov 
1725, CJI(III), pp.422-23). 
 




'Resolved, That no person this is, or shall be, converted 
from the Popish to the Protestant religion ought to be 
elected or admitted to serve as a Member of this 
House for the space of seven years next after his 
conversion; and unless he produces a certificate of 
having received the sacrament, according to the 
usage of the Church of Ireland as by law established, 
thrice in every year during the said term' (22 Nov 
1725, CJI(II), pp.422-23). 
 
Hayton points out that the change appears 
to have been precipitated by an attempt 
by a new convert to win a seat at a by-
election (Coghill Letters, fn 95). 
 
Resolution 
Clerk of crown to issue writs expeditiously  
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That it is the duty of 
clerk of crown, as soon as warrant issued by Speaker 
of this House is issued, to send with all expedition the 
several writs, according to the order of this House, for 
the elections of Members to serve in parliament, to 
the several sheriffs to whom they are directed' (13 






Orders, standing orders, rules, etc. of the Irish House of 
Commons 




'Ordered, That it be an Instruction to the Committee of 
Privileges and Elections, in all cases of double 
returns, to report the matter specially to the House, 
with their opinion thereupon' (2 Oct 1703, CJI(II), 
p.326). 
 
When the Committee of Privileges and 
Elections was appointed on 25 Sep 1703 
it contained a standard instruction to 
report on double returns within 14 days to 
the House (CJI(II), p.317). The Irish 
instruction appears not to have been a 
general instruction―for example, allowing 
the committee to examine cases after the 
deadline―but to concern the double 
return for Naas and should be read in 
conjunction with a motion made on 5 Oct 
that the order to the committee 'be 
enlarged, and that they examine and 
report, as well on the merits of the 
election, as the double return for the 
borough of Naas. It passed in the negative 
(CJI(II), p.327). The 2 Oct instruction was 





Members to withdraw 
'Ordered, ... if anything shall come in question touching 
the return, election or matter of privilege of any 
Member, he is withdraw during the time the matter is 
in debate (30 Aug 1695, CJI(II), p.45).  
 
 
The Irish order for the appointment of the 
Committee of Privileges and Elections 
follows English model: 'Resolved, That ... 
And if anything shall come in Question, 
touching the return, or matter of privilege, 
of any Member of this committee, such 
Member is to withdraw from the 
Committee of Privileges during the time 
the matter which concerns himself is in 
debate' (11 May 1661, CJE(VIII), p.247). 
The entry was repeated and included in 
the order of the Irish House of Commons 
appointing committees at that start of 
subsequent sessions. From 1703 the 
standard appointment also included the 
instruction that Members should withdraw 
until their double returns were determined. 
 
Order 
'Ordered, ... if anything shall come in question touching 
the return, election or matter of privilege of any 
Member, he is withdraw during the time the matter is 
in debate; and that all Members returned upon double 
returns do withdraw till their returns are determined' 




Peers prohibited from voting in elections 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That no peer of this 
realm has any right to give vote in the election of any 
Member, to serve in parliament' (16 Mar 1704/5, 
CJI(II), p.456). 
House agreed, nemine contradicente, with resolution 
from Committee of Privileges and Elections: 'that no 
peer or lord of parliament has a right to vote, or any 
way interfere in the election of Members to serve in 
parliament' (27 Oct 1725, CJI(III), p.410). 
 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That no 
Peer of this kingdom has any right to give 
his vote in the election of any Member to 
serve in parliament' (14 Dec 1699, 
CJE(XIII), p.64; and repeated regularly at 
start of parliaments.) 
Standing 
orders 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that no peer of this 
realm has right to vote as mayor, or sovereign, 
portreeve, burgomaster, alderman, burgess, 
freeholder or freeman in the election of any person to 
serve as a Member of parliament. 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that no lord of 
parliament or peer of this realm has any right to act as 
magistrate in making any return of a Member or 
Members to serve in parliament. 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that his House will 
admit of no person that shall be returned by any lord 
of parliament or peer of the realm to sit as a Member 
of this House. 
'Resolved, that the said resolutions be declared the 
standing orders of this House' (20 Dec 1727, CJI(III), 
p.488). 
These orders supplement sessional orders 





Sheriffs' powers to designate place and timing of 
borough polls 
'Resolved, That sheriffs in their mandates to 
magistrates of boroughs in their respective counties to 
re-elect burgesses, have not right to appoint either 
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Restrictions of quit-rent officers from influencing 
elections  
'Resolved, That no collector or officer in the Exchequer 
or quit-rents to concern himself in elections of 
Members of parliament, or influence others in 
disposing their votes in elections, within their several 




Restriction on sheriffs and other officers voting 
'Resolved, That no sheriff of the county, mayor, 
provost, portreeve, sovereign, or other chief 
magistrate of any city, town, borough or corporation, 
nor seneschal of a manner had the right to vote in the 
election (except where the votes of the other electors 
are equal) any usage accustomed to the contrary 
notwithstanding; unless where, by express, words of 
the charter, they have other or greater power, or 
where there has been usage to the contrary time out 





Returning officer must grant poll if demanded  
'Resolved, That the refusing of a poll when demanded 
on the election of any Member to serve in parliament, 
by any sheriff or other officer having the return of 
persons in elected as Members of parliament, or any 
pretence whatsoever, is arbitrary and illegal' (27 June 




Vexatious and frivolous petitioners  
'Resolved, That where any petition against the election 
and return of any Member of this House shall be 
judged vexatious and frivolous, this House will order 
satisfaction to the Member petitioned against' (30 Sep 
1703 and 27 Nov 1713, CJI(II), pp.323, 746). 
 
Repetition in 1713 appears to have been 
part of Dublin election dispute and 




Prohibition on pressurising tenants to vote  
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that the obliging any 
tenant, by covenant, or under a penalty in his lease, 
to vote at the election of Members to serve in 
parliament for such persons as the landlord shall 
direct is a high infringement of the privileges of this 
House and destructive to the rights and liberties of the 
Commons of Ireland' (7 Mar 1725/6, CJI(III), p.453). 
 
No Westminster equivalent has been found. 




'Allowed by the House for a Rule, that if the bar be 
down, no Member that coming in may open it, but 
must go about to his place' (24 Oct 1614, CJI(I), 
p.17). 
 
The bar would be down when someone is at 
the bar of the House. At Westminster the bar 
was down when a witness was called in for 
examination by the House (Hatsell 
Precedents (II), p.140). No direct 
Westminster equivalent but such a rule may 
have been unnecessary as no Member 
would have raised the bar. 
 
Order 
Procedure at rising of the House 
'Ordered, That in going out of the House, no man do 
stir until Mr. Speaker do arise and go before, and 
then all the rest to follow him' (9 Dec 1713, CJI(II), 
p.758). 
 
Westminster Journal entry of 7 May 1607 
'Ordered, upon Question, That in going forth, 
no Man should stir, until Mr. Speaker did 
arise and go before; and then all the rest 





Orders, standing orders, rules, etc. of the Irish House of 
Commons 
Commentary and English/British equivalent  
Fees   
 
Instruction 
Clerks' and officers' fees 
When orders of summons were issued for disturbing 
Members in their possessions or breach of 
privilege 'and, after such orders granted, persons 
... have reconciled themselves unto the said 
Members, who have thereupon forborn further 
prosecuting such persons, by which the officers of 
this House are disappointed of their just fees; for 
prevention thereof, it is ordered upon question, 
That all persons to whom due notice to appear 
before this House, shall ... enter their appearance 
with the clerk of this House and satisfy and pay 
unto the respective officers their fees, 
notwithstanding their agreement with the parties 
complaining against them; which if they shall 
neglect and refuse to perform, the Speaker ... is 
empowered to issue out warrants, from time to 
time, for attaching the bodies of such refactory 
persons, and securing them until they be 
discharged by order of this House' (3 Nov 1692 
(CJI(II), p.34). 
 
For clerks' and officers' fees see Appendices 
6.5 and 6.13.2. 
 
Order 
Fees paid to clerk of House 
'It is ordered, that no petition shall hereafter be 
presented to be read before the House, or before 
any committee, but the clerk is to have his fee first 
paid him for the reading thereof; except of the 
petitions of the Members of this House, for which 
he is to have no fee; and the said clerk is to 
promote the petitions in order, viz. the public 
petitions in the first place' (5 June 1641, CJI(I), 
p.224). 
'Ordered upon Question, no petitions to be read in 
this House until the clerk first receive his fee of five 
shillings due for each petition, whereof all persons 
concerned are to take notice' (13 Dec 1665, CJI(I), 
pp.682-83).  
 
'Ordered, That no private ordinance do pass 
this House, to be transmitted to the Lords, 
until the parties that are concerned therein, 
do first pay such fees for the same, unto Mr. 
Speaker, the Clerk, Serjeant, and others 
belonging to the said House, as has usually 
been paid upon the passing of private bills: 
and all Members, that from any committee or 
otherwise, do present any ordinance, 
wherein the advantage or benefit of any 
private person is concerned, are desired to 
take notice of this order; and to acquaint the 
persons that are or shall be concerned 
herewith; and to appoint them first to pay 
such ancient and accustomed fees, as 
aforesaid, to Mr. Speaker, the clerk, and 
other the officers of the said House' (13 Dec 
1644, CJE(XIII), p.722). 
On fees also see Appendix 6.13.2. 
Financial (supply and ways and means) procedures and privilege 
 
Opinion 
Initiation of new taxes 
It was the House’s opinion 'that no person was to 
bring into the House of Commons a bill to put a 
public charge or tax upon the kingdom, without 
having first the leave of the House granted for his 
so doing' (30 Mar 1666, CJI(I), p.729). 
 
'It was declared, and acknowledged, to be 
against the fundamental Orders of the 
House, for any Member of the House, 
without special Order of the House, to bring 
in any bill of subsidy' (26 Jan 1641/2, CJE(II), 
p.397). 
Resolutions 'Resolved, That it was, and is, the sole and 
undoubted right of the Commons of Ireland, in 
parliament assembled, to prepare and resolve the 
ways and means of raising money' (27 Oct 1692, 
CJI(II), p.28). 
'Resolved, &c. That all aids and supplies, and 
aids to his Majesty in parliament, are the sole 
gift of the Commons: And all bills for the 
granting of any such aids and supplies ought 
to begin with the Commons: And that it is the 
undoubted and sole right of the Commons, to 
direct, limit, and appoint, in such bills, the 
ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, 
limitations, and qualifications of such grants; 
which ought not to be changed, or altered by 
the House of Lords (3 July 1678, CJE(IX), 
p.509). 
See pp.133ff above. 
 'Resolved, That it was, and is, the sole and 
undoubted right of the Commons to prepare heads 
of bills for raising money (27 Oct 1692, CJI(II), 
p.28). 
Derogations 'Resolved, That notwithstanding the aforesaid rights 
of the Commons, this House does think fit, upon 
consideration of the present exigencies of affairs 
and public necessity of speedily raising a supply for 
their Majesties to order a [supply] bill, transmitted 
out of England ... be now read ... 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, 'That the receiving 
or reading of the said bill, so transmitted aforesaid, 
be not drawn into a precedent hereafter' (27 Oct 
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Proceedings to be in committee of the whole 
House 
'Resolved, That this House will not proceed upon 
any petition, motion, address, bill, or vote of credit 
granting any money, but in a committee of the 
whole House, and that this be the Standing Order 
of the House' (5 Aug 1707, CJI(II), p.523). 
1707 order read and made standing order (10 July 
1719, CJI(III), p.191). 
 
English procedure predated Irish and was 
similar. CJE for 18 Feb 1668 records: 
'Resolved, ... that, if any Motion be made in 
the House for any public aid, or charge upon 
the people, the consideration and debate 
thereof ought not presently to be entered 
upon; but adjourned till such further day, as 
the House shall think fit to appoint; and then 
it ought to be referred to the committee of the 
whole House; and their opinions to be 
reported thereupon, before any resolution or 
Vote of the House do pass therein' (CJE(IX), 
p.52; repeated declared a standing order on 





 Money bill dependent on report of Committee of 
Accounts  
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that no money bill 
be read in this House until the report from the 
Committee of Accounts be first made. 
'Resolved, that the said resolution be declared a 




No Westminster equivalent has been found. 
Standing 
order 
 'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that no money bill 
be read in this House until the report from the 
Committee of Accounts be first made. 
'Resolved, that the said resolution be declared a 





 'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that no money bill 
be read in this House until the report from the 
Committee of Accounts be first made. 
'Resolved, that the said resolution be declared a 










Exclusive and required method of representation 
[The convocation of the established church had 
objected to a clause in heads limiting tithes. The 
House] 'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That the 
Commons, in parliament assembled, are the true 
and only representatives, and entrusted with the 
civil rights and properties of all the Commons in 
Ireland, as well as clergy as laity'.  
 
Although no direct equivalent has been found, 
this sits with the constitutional claims of the 
Westminster Commons. 
Resolution 'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That no person, or 
body of men, whatsoever has, or have right to be 
heard against the passing any bill, or heads of a bill 
under the consideration of this House, but by leave 
first obtained from this House, upon the application 
of such person, or body of men by petition to this 
House, and not otherwise' (12 Mar 1704/5, CJI(II), 
p.447). 
 




Prevention of resignation by Members 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That it be declared 
the standing order of this House, that no new writs 
for electing Members of parliament, in the places of 
Members excusing themselves from the service of 
this House, do issue at the desire of such 
Members, notwithstanding any former precedent to 
the contrary' (21 Mar 1704/5, CJI(II), p.460). 
 
Westminster procedure from at least 1624 was 
'That [a] man, after he is duly chosen, cannot 
relinquish' his seat in parliament (2 Mar 
1623/4, CJE(I), p.675). See pp.130ff above. 
 
Order 
Minimum age to be a Member 
'It is ordered that none hereafter, under the age of 
twenty-one years, shall be elected or returned, or 
shall be admitted a Member of this House, to serve 
in parliament' (27 May 1641, CJI(I), p.218). 
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Resolution 'Resolved, That a person under the age of twenty-
one years, being returned to serve in parliament, is 
not capable of sitting as a Members in parliament' 
(19 Dec 1715, CJI(III), p.54). 
Hatsell Precedents (II), pp.9-10, comments 
that the position was not settled until effected 
through legislation, 7-8 William II, c.5 which 
made 'void the election of any person who is 
not 21 years of age'. 
Messages from monarch 
 
Order 
Letters from the monarch 
'Ordered, that, when letters from His Majesty are 
read in the House, the Members thereof do 






Naming a beneficiary of a grant, etc. 
'Ordered, That no Member of the House whatsoever, 
moving for a grant, gift or other favour to be 
conferred on any person, do name such person, 
without leave of the House first had and obtained' 
(19 July 1661, CJI(I), p.432). 
 
No Westminster equivalent has been found; 







'Ordered, That it be a standing order of this House, 
that no new Motion be made after one o’clock, 
unless leave of the House be first obtained' (10 
July 1707, CJI(II), p.496). 
'Resolved, That no new motion be made, or any 
petition received after twelve o'clock, without leave 
of the House; and that the same be a standing 
Order of the House (1 June 1709, CJI(II), p.596). 
'Ordered, That no new motion be made, or petition 
received, without the leave of the House after one 
o'clock, and that this be a standing Order of the 
House (14 July 1710, CJI(II), p.659). 
 
Similar restrictions had been used in the 
Westminster Commons from the middle of 
the seventeenth century—for example, on 22 
May 1644, 'Ordered, That no new motion, of 
any business whatsoever, shall be made 
after twelve of clock: and that Mr. Speaker 
shall not hear any new motion after twelve of 
clock' (CJE(IV), p.152); and a later example, 
from 2 Nov 1696, 'Resolved, That this House 
will, every morning, proceed upon public 
business, at ten a clock: and that no new 
motion be made after one a clock' (2 Nov 
1696, CJE(XI), p.573). 
 
Order 
No new motions after 1 o'clock 
'Ordered, That no new motion be made after one 
o'clock' (19 Oct 1721, CJI(III), p.272). 
 




Moving a petition 
'Agreed, for a Rule of the House, that before any 
private petition be read, it must be first moved by 
one of the House' (22 Oct 1614, CJI(I), p.16). 
'It is ordered, that from henceforth no petition shall 
be openly read in the House, unless it be 
presented by a Member of this House, or called 
upon to be read by a Member of the same' (15 May 
1641, CJI(I), p.206). 
 
According to Edward and Annie Porritt, 
petitions had to be presented by a Member. 
There was one exception, the City of London 
which could present at the bar by its sheriffs. 
City of Dublin enjoyed a similar privilege in 
the Irish House of Commons (Porritts, 
Unreformed House (I), p.574 and Thomas, 
House of Commons, pp.17-19). 
 
Rule 
No letter to be directed to the whole House 
'It is thought to be entered as a Rule, that no letter 
ought to be directed to the whole House' (19 Nov 
1614, CJI(I), p.25). 
 
No rule of similar date has been found. An 
order made on 20 Mar 1728/9 may reflect 
practice: 'That for the future, when any letter 
or packet directed to this House shall come 
to Mr Speaker, he do open the same, and 
acquaint the House at their next sitting with 
the contents thereof, if proper to be 
communicated to the House' (CJGB(XXI), 
p.273). 
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Order 
Petitions to be on parchment 
'All petitions, answers and other pleadings ... to the 
House shall be exhibited in parchment [and be] 
filed by the clerk of the House' (20 July 1641 and 4 
Sep 1661, CJI(I), pp.263, 572). 
 
It is not clear that the Irish practice of the 
1640s and 1660s, which points to a 
requirement for petitions to be on parchment, 
persisted or was in accordance with 
Westminster practice. See 27 Apl 1604, 'That 
no petition, bill or other thing, to be treated in 
parliament, ought to be privately delivered 






Petitions must be signed 
'Ordered, That no petition be read in this House, 
unless it be first signed' (12 Oct 1692, CJI(II), 
p.14). 
 
A petition had to set out a case and be signed 
English exemplar from 26 May 1685: 'Ordered, 
That, for the future, no private bill be brought 
into this house, but upon a petition first 
presented, truly stating the case, at the peril 
of the parties preferring the same: and that 
such petition shall be signed by the parties 
who are suitors for such bill' (CJE(IX), p.719). 
Made a standing order, 24 Nov 1699. 
See also resolution made on 14 Nov 1689: 
'that petitions had 'to be signed by the 
petitioners with their own hands, by their 
names or marks' (CJE(X), p.285). 
 
Order/ Rule 
Petition against Member 
'It is ordered, from henceforth ... that no petition 
against any Member of this House shall be read, 
unless there be first an Order in this House 
conceived for the reading thereof, and the party 
first have notice thereof' (15 May 1641, CJI(I), 
p.206).  
'Ordered upon question, that it be entered as a Rule 
in the Journal of the House, that where any person 
has a petition to prefer against any of the Members 
thereof, it be not read in the House until such time 
as it be first shown unto the Member concerned, 
but if he be absent in the country, without leave of 
this House, then no privilege to lie in the case' (5 
Mar 1662, CJI(I), p.639). 
A Member of this House, 'ought not to have made 
application to the House of Lords in a case, 
wherein another Member of this House was 
concerned, but should, if there had been any cause 
or reason for the same, have acquainted this 
House with his complaint, and have abided their 
order and pleasure therein' (6 May 1662, CJI(I), 
pp.497). 
 
No Westminster equivalent has been found; 
but in line with practice. 
 
View 
Warrant outstanding against petitioner 
No one could present a petition to the House if he 
had a warrant outstanding against him; proper 
course was to 'surrender himself to the Serjeant-at-
Arms' (17 June 1662, CJI(I), p.524). 
 
No Westminster equivalent has been found. 
 See also Elections above in this table.  
Post   
Resolution 'Resolved, That it is the undoubted right and 
privilege of the Members of the House of 
Commons to have their letters post free, during the 
privilege of parliament' (13 Oct 1692, CJI(II), p.15). 
Westminster practice was for Members to 
have their correspondence carried post free, 
subject to certain limitations and restrictions. 
 
Resolution 
 Forging an MP's signature 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, that the forging or 
counterfeiting of the hand-writing of any Member of 
this House, in order to frank any letter, is a high 
infringement and breach of the privileges of this 
House thereof' (7 Mar 1725/6, CJI(III), p.454). 
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Petitions alleging breach of privilege 
'It is ordered upon Question by this House, that all 
petitions touching wrongs of the privileges of this 
House shall be referred to the Committee of 
Privileges, who are from time to time to consider 
the same, and to report their proceedings therein to 
this House, that such further order may be had and 
taken therein, as this House shall think fit' (17 Nov 
1634, CJI(I), p.81). 
'It is ordered upon question, that ... the answers to all 
petitions, exhibited by Members of this House 
against any person for breach of privileges of 
parliament, be referred to the Committee of 
Privileges, to examine matter of fact, and to report 
the same, from time to time, to this House, for their 
future consideration' (5 June 1662, CJI(I), p.517). 
 
The first order was not repeated and in 
subsequent parliaments was not always 
followed—for example, on 24 Oct 1710 the 
petition of John Whalley against John 
Mercer, who had started proceedings against 
Whalley for printing their address to the 
House of Commons (CJI(II), p.724).  
Despite these exceptions―see pp.110ff 
above―at the turn of the 
seventeenth/eighteenth centuries Irish 
procedures appear to have been broadly in 
step with Westminster's: 
'Resolved, That no persons shall be taken into 
custody upon complaint of any breach of 
privilege of this House, before the matter be 
first examined. 
'Resolved and Declared, That the said Order is 
not to extend to any breach of privilege upon 
the person of any Member of this House' (31 
Jan 1694/5, CJE(XI), p.219)  
'That no person be taken into custody of the 
Serjeant-at-Arms, upon any complaint of a 
breach of privilege, until the matter of such 
complaint shall have been examined by 
Committee of Privileges and Elections, and 
reported to the House, and that same be a 







'Resolved, That all protections granted of this House 
granted to any who prosecute any bill extend to 
their persons only; and it is declared and ordered, 
that this be entered in the Journal of this House, as 
the standing Order and Rule of this House' (12 Dec 
1695, CJI(II), p.141). 
 
No direct English equivalent has been found. 
See pp.106ff above. 
Order 'Ordered, That all protections granted by the House, 
which had no express time-limit, continue a week 
after the recess of the House and no longer' (12 
Dec 1695, CJI(II), p.141). 
No direct English equivalent has been found. 
See pp.106ff. 
Rule 'Upon Question, it was ordered and set down as a 
Rule, that every attorney, in any suit against a 
Member of this House, shall be punishable here, 
as well as the principal; but not the learned counsel 




'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That all written 
protections, and all protections entered with the 
clerks of the House, and in all offices of this 
kingdom, are declared void. 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That no person be 
protected by any Member of this House that it not a 
menial domestic servant of such Member receiving 
wages. 
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That if any 
Member shall protect any person who is not his 
domestic menial servant receiving wages from him, 
such Member shall incur the highest displeasure 
and censure of this House. 
'Ordered, That the resolutions be posted up on the 
Four Courts, Tholsel and Gate of the House' (8 
Feb 1715/6, CJI(III), p.82). 
In substance repeated on 25–26 Sep 1721 (CJI(III), 
p.254).  
'Resolved, &c. That all Protections and written 
certificates of the Members of this House be 
declared void in law; and be forthwith 
withdrawn, and called in: and that none be 
granted for the future: and that, if any shall 
be granted by any Member, such Member 
shall be liable to the censure of the House: 
and that the privilege of Members for their 
menial servants be observed, according to 
law: and that if any menial servant shall be 
arrested, and detained, contrary to privilege, 
he shall, upon complaint thereof made, be 
discharged, by order from Mr. Speaker. 
'Ordered, That this be declared to be the 
Standing Order of the House' (7 Feb 1677, 
CJE(IX), p.435). 
Repeated with additions—first instance: 
'Ordered, That this Order be published, by 
setting up the same in the lobby, at the 
House door, at Westminster Hall Gate, at the 
several courts in Westminster Hall, and at 
the Inns of Courts and Inns of Chancery, and 
at the Royal Exchange: and that the knights 
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of the shires do send copies thereof to the 
sheriffs of their respective counties; and the 
burgesses to their several boroughs. 
'Ordered, That such Members as are returned 
to have granted protections, and were absent 
this day, do give an account to the House of 
what protections have been granted by them, 
the next time they come to the House' (23 
Jan 1690, CJE(IX), p.340). 
 
Resolution 
Catholic servants  
'Resolved, nemine contradicente, That no Papist be 
protected by any Member of this House as his 
menial servant' (12 Nov 1696, CJI(II), p.150). 
 
 Members acting in other capacity or autre droit  
Orders and 
resolution 
'Ordered, That no Member of this House you shall 
be sued as trustee, executor, administrator, 
guardian, or otherwise, in autre droit, shall have the 
privilege of this House, so that his person be not 
molested. Ordered and declared, That this to be 
the Rule and Order of the House' (3 Sep 1695, 
CJI(II), p.49) 
'Resolved, That it be a standing Order of this House, 
That no Member ... who shall be sued in autre 
droit, have the privilege of this House' (20 Jan 
1703/4, CJI(II), p.391). 
'Ordered, That it be declared to be the standing 
order of this House, that no person, sued as a 
guardian, trustee, executor, or public officer, or in 
any autre droit, have the privilege of this House' 
(14 Mar 1704/5, CJI(II), p.451). 
There are English precedents: 'Resolved, That 
the Privilege of this House shall not be 
allowed to any Members thereof, in cases 
wherein they are only trustees, a copy of the 
bill or declaration being first left with such 
trustee: and that the same be a standing 
order of this House' (2 Nov 1691, CJE(X), 
p.544). See also 23 Dec 1692 (CJE(X), 
p.762). 
'Resolved, That no Member of this House 
have any privilege, except for his person 
only, against any commoner, in any suit or 
proceedings in courts of law or equity, for 
any longer time than the house shall be 
actually sitting for the dispatch of business in 
parliament; and that the same be a standing 
order of the House' (17 Apl 1699, CJE(XII), 
p.648). 
See also pp.111ff above. 
 Protection of lands and property  
'It is ordered, that the Speaker ... be desired to 
prepare an order for the consideration of the 
House, whereby it may be declared, that the 
sealing of leases of ejectment upon lands in the 
possession of any Members of this House, or their 
ministers, is a breach and violation of the privileges 
of parliament, and the parties so offending shall be 
accordingly proceeded against by the House' (6 
June 1662, CJI(I), p.517). 
 
 For financial privilege see Financial (supply and 







Arrest and exclusion of strangers 
'Ordered, That the gallery door be locked every 
morning at the sitting of the House, and the key 
laid on the Table, and that the Serjeant-at-Arms to 
take into custody any person, not being a Member 
of this House who shall presume to come into the 
House during the sitting of the House, and that this 
be a standing Order of the House' (14 July 1711, 
CJI(II), p.697). 
'Ordered, nemine contradicente, That all such 
persons as shall presume hereafter to come into 
the House, or in the galleries, while the House or 
any committee of the whole House is sitting, be 
taken into custody, by the serjeant-at-arms and 
attending this House without farther order or 
warrant' (9 Dec 1713, CJI(II), p.758). 
Ordered, That the gallery door be locked every 
morning at the sitting of the House, and the key be 
laid on the Table, and that this be a standing Order 
of the House'. (18 Nov 1715 CJI(III), p.18) 
 
There are English precedents: 'Ordered, That 
the Serjeant at Arms do keep the gallery free 
from Strangers: and that the back-door be 
locked up, and the key brought and laid upon 
the Table' (29 Jan 1689, CJE(X), p.15); 
'Ordered, That the Serjeant at Arms 
attending the House do, from time to time, 
take into his custody any stranger or 
strangers, that he shall see, or be informed 
of to be, in the House or gallery, while the 
House, or any committee of the whole 
House, is sitting' (2 Apl 1690, CJE(X), 
p.364); measures against strangers go back 
until at least the sixteenth century—see 
Porritts, Unreformed House (I), pp.576-77. 
On 11 Nov 1705 the English House made a 
standing order excluding strangers from the 
'body of the House' and its galleries 'during 
the sitting of ant committees therein' 
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Catholics   
Order 
 
'Ordered, That the Serjeant-at-Arms take into custody 
all papists that are, or shall presume to come into the 
galleries' (11 Dec 1713, CJI(II), p.764). 
 
'Ordered, That no Papist do presume to 
come into Westminster Hall, the Court of 
Requests, or lobby of this House, during 
the sitting of this parliament. 
'Ordered, That this Order be posted up at 
Westminster Hall Gate, and in the Lobby 
of this House. 
'Ordered, That the Serjeant at Arms 
attending this House do take into custody 
all such persons as shall offend against 






Reimbursement of costs 
'Resolved, That it be a standing Rule of this House, 
That every person summoned to appear as a 
witness in any private matter before this House, be 
allowed his reasonable charges by the party on 
whose behalf he shall be summoned' (22 Oct 
1703, CJI(II), p.345). 
 
No equivalent English standing order has been 
found but there are specific examples of 
reimbursement such as—on 29 Nov 1661, 
'for the Hearing of the Case ... That such 
witnesses, as the parties of either side shall 
think fit to make use of at the said hearing, 
do, and are hereby required to give their 
personal attendance, at this House, upon the 
same day; the parties so summoning them 
allowing their reasonable charges, if it be 






'Ordered, That it be declared a standing Rule of the 
House that all persons attending committees by 
order of the House be protected during their 
attendance' (23 Feb 1703/4, CJI(II), p.432). 
 
'Resolved, &c. That this House does Declare, 
That all Persons that are summoned to 
attend any committee of this House, as 
witnesses, in any cause depending before 
them, ought to have the privilege of 
parliament; and to be freed from arrests in 
coming, staying, and returning from the said 
committee' (25 Nov 1647, CJE(V), p.369). 
The protection of a witness summoned to 
attend a committee is also implicit in a 
number of Journal entries of the Westminster 
Commons: 16 July 1663 (CJE(VIII), p.525), 
14 Nov 1667 (CJE(IX), p.20), 2 Nov 1675 
(CJE(IX), p.366), 2 May 1678 (CJE(IX), 
p.472), 21 Dec 1698 (CJE(XII), p.364), and 
23 Mar 1699 (CJE(XII), p.610). 
 
  
The operation, practices and procedures of the Irish House of Commons from 1692 to 1730 
306 
 
6.13.2  Sessional orders and rules of the Irish House of Commons (selected) 
Sessional orders and rules of the Irish House of Commons (selected)
300





Times at which to be read 
'Ordered, That the Order of this House, whereby no public 
bill is to be read, but between the hours of eleven and one 
of the clock, do stand revived' (13 Aug 1697, CJI(II), 
p.167). 
 
See Appendix 6.13.1 on: Petitions; 
Time deadline for presentation of 
motions. The need to revive the 
order indicates the evolving status 
and permanency of orders. 
Bills, petitions for private heads 
Order 'Ordered, that no petition for private bills be received for a 
fortnight from this time' (22 Oct 1692, CJI(II), p.21). 
 
Order 'Ordered, That during this session no motion be made in any 
private business after twelve o'clock' (15 Nov 1703, CJI(II), 
p.369). 
See Appendix 6.13.1 for items such as 
motions subject to time constraints 
but apparently not restricted to the 
session in which the order was 
made. 
Similar English orders: 
10 o’clock—24 Nov 1691 
10 o’clock—4 Feb 1692 
11 o’clock—16 Feb 1692 
11 o’clock—16 Feb 1699 
Order 'Ordered, That no heads of bills be brought into this House 
after this day, except those already ordered, until the 
House have gone through the heads of bills already 





No case to be heard at bar 
'Resolved, that no election be heard at the bar of this 
House this session of parliament' (19 Feb 1727/8, 
CJI(III), p.545). 
 
See 1727 and 1729 sessional 
resolutions at end of table. 
Fees, clerks', etc. 
 
Rule 
Payment of fees 
'Ordered, That the [clerks' and other officers'] fees be 
entered in the Journal of this House, as the settled 
standing fees of the clerks of this House and the said 
doorkeepers' (22 Oct 1695, CJI(II), p.104).  
 
See Appendix 6.5 and pp.43ff above. 
 
 
Order 'Ordered, That the Members of this House, at the next call 
of the House, do pay unto the clerks of this House the 
accustomed fee settled by order in the last parliament' (29 
Sep 1703, CJI(II), p.321). 
 
Resolutions The House agreed the following resolutions from a 
committee: 
'Resolved, That it is the opinion of the committee that all 
persons having matters to be hears at the bar of this 
House or in any committee, by order of this House, do pay 
to the respective clerks and officers of this House such 
just fees as are severally due to them by the Regulation of 
the Fees of this House. 
'Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that 
upon failure or neglect of payment of such fees, and upon 
application made by the said clerks and officers to the 
Speaker, according to former precedents, the Speaker 
may issue his warrant from time to time, to attach the 
bodies of the persons so failing or neglecting , and secure 
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them until he or they be discharged by order of the House. 
Precedents: 10 December 1661, 13 December 1662 (16 
Nov 1703, CJI(II), p.370). 
Order 
 
'Ordered, That the order of the House made in the last 
session relating to the clerks and officers being paid 
there are just fees by all persons having matters heard at 
the bar of the House or any committee by order of this 
House be revived; and that Mr Speaker, on application to 
him, to issue his warrant, from time to time to attach such 
person or persons who shall fail or neglect to pay such 
just fees until they be discharged by order of this House' 
(21 Mar 1704/5, CJI(II), p.460). 
[Order revived] (11 Aug 1707, CJI(II), p.529) 
 
Order 'Ordered, That the order of the last session of parliament 
that the clerks and officers of this House be paid their just 
fees by all persons having matters heard the bar of the 
House, or any committee by order of the House, be 
revived, and that Mr Speaker, on application to him, do 
issue his warrant from time to time to attach such person 
or persons, who shall fail or neglect to pay such just fees, 
due the last or this session of parliament, until they be 
discharged by order of the House' (24 June 1710, CJI(II), 
p.670). 
 
Order 'Ordered, That the orders of the former parliament relating 
to the clerks and officers of this House being paid their 
just fees by all persons having matters heard the bar of 
this House, or at any committee by order of the House, 
be revived, and that Mr Speaker, on application to him, 
do issue his warrant from time to time, to attach such 
person or persons, who shall fail or neglect to pay such 
just fees, due until they be discharged by order of the 








'Ordered, That the order of the House of 9 Feb 1715/6 
relating to the clerks and officers being paid just fees be 
revived and that the Speaker, on application to him, do 
issue his warrant from time to time, to attach such person 
or persons, who shall fail or neglect to pay such just fees, 
due until they be discharged by order of the House' (24 






Moratorium on raising money for private use 
'Resolved, That this House will not enter into the 
consideration of giving, or raising any more money this 
session for any private use, except what relates to Sir 
Humphrey Jervis, Dr Walker's family, Captain 
Prendergast, and Mrs Margaret Hamilton, widow of Col 
Gustavus Hamilton' (22 September 1697, CJI(II), p.207). 
 
Resolution No more petitions for money once heads of supply bill sent 
to lords justices 
'Resolved, That no more petitions for money be received 
this session of parliament' (22 Dec 1715, CJI(III), p.59). 
'Resolved, That no more petitions or applications for 
money be received this session of parliament' (13 Jan 
1721, CJI(III), p.301). 
 




Time deadline for presentation of motions and reports 
Ordered, That no report or new motion be made this session 
after one of the clock, and that this be the standing Rule of 
this House' (18 Nov 1695, CJI(II), p.116). 
 
Equivalent made in English House of 
Commons on 29 Apl 1679: 'ordered, 
That the Standing Order of the 
House, That no new motion be made 
after twelve of the clock, be strictly 
and constantly kept and observed' 
(CJE(IX), p.606). 
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Time limit on presentation of petitions  
'Ordered upon question, that for the dispatch of public bills 
under consideration of this House, no petitions be read 
after ten of the clock in the morning, without the special 
leave of the House first obtained' (3 Feb 1665/6, CJI(I), 
p.700). 
 
No direct equivalent has been found 
but see above: Petitions; Time 
deadline for presentation of motions. 
 
Order 
No petitions for abatements of rents to be accepted 
'Ordered that no petitions for abating of rents shall be 
hereafter received into this House, until this House shall 




Petitions to be put on the establishment 
'Ordered, That no more petitions for recommendations to the 
government, to put on the establishment the half-pay, be 
received during this session of parliament' (3 June 1709, 
CJI(II), p.599). 
 





Limitation on private business 
'Ordered upon question, that after this day no private 
business shall be heard in this House without special 
licence first granted, until the bills and other public 
business now depending, be dispatched' (22 Feb 1665/6, 
CJI(I), p.709). 
 
There is a Westminster precedent 
from 1648: 'The House then 
Ordered, That no private business 
shall be heard or moved in the 
House for eight days, but only such 
things as may relate to the settling of 
these kingdoms' ('Proceedings in 
parliament: Apl 1st - May 1st 1648', 
Historical Collections of Private 






Time limit on presentation of reports 
'Ordered, That no report or new Motion be made this session 
after one of the clock, and that this be the standing Rule of 
the House' (18 Nov 1695, CJI(II), p.116). 
 
No direct equivalent has been found 
but see above: Petitions; Time 
deadline for presentation of motions. 
1727 sessional resolutions 
'Resolved, that no peer of this realm has any right to give his vote in the 
election in the Members to serve in parliament. 
'Resolved, that where the House shall judge in the petition touching 
elections to be frivolous and vexatious, the House will order satisfaction to 
be made to the person petitioned against. 
'Resolved, that in case it shall appear, any person has procured himself to 
be elected or returned as a Member of this House, or endeavoured so to 
be, by bribery or any other corrupt practice, this House will proceed with 
the utmost severity against such person. 
'Resolved, that if it shall appear that any person has been tampering with 
any witness in respect of his evidence to be given to this House, or any 
committee thereof, or directly or indirectly has endeavoured to deter or 
hinder any person from appearing or giving evidence, the same is declared 
to be a high crime and misdemeanour, and this House will proceed with 
the utmost severity against such offender. 
'Resolved, that if it shall appear that any person has given false evidence in 
any case before the House, or any committee thereof, this House will 
proceed with the utmost severity against such offender. 
'Resolved, that it is a high infringement on the liberties and privileges of the 
Commons for any lord of parliament to concern himself in the election of 
Members to serve for the Commons in parliament' (29 Nov 1727, CJI(III), 
p.465). 
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 Westminster equivalent and 
commentary 
1729 sessional resolutions 
'Resolved, that no peer of this realm has any right to give his vote in the election in the 
Members to serve in parliament. 
'Resolved, that were the House shall judge in the petition touching elections to be 
frivolous and vexatious, the House will order satisfaction to be made to the person 
petitioned against. 
'Resolved, that in case it shall appear, any person has procured himself to be elected or 
returned as a Member of this House, or endeavoured so to be, by bribery or any other 
corrupt practice, this House will proceed with the utmost severity against such person. 
'Resolved, that if it shall appear that any person has been tampering with any witness in 
respect of his evidence to be given to this House, or any committee thereof, or directly 
or indirectly has endeavoured to deter or hinder any person from appearing or giving 
evidence, the same is declared to be a high crime and misdemeanour, and this House 
will proceed with the utmost severity against such offender. 
'Resolved, that if it shall appear that any person has given false evidence in any case 
before the House, or any committee thereof, this House will proceed with the utmost 
severity against such offender. 
'Resolved, that it is a high infringement on the liberties and privileges of the Commons 
for any lord of parliament to concern himself in the election of Members to serve for the 
Commons in parliament' (24 Sep 1729, CJI(III), p.582) 
 
Supplementary 
'Ordered, that the several streets leading to the Parliament House, be kept in good order 
and clean, and that the constables of the city of Dublin see that they be free and open, 
and that no obstruction be made by cars, drays, carts or otherwise, to hinder the 
passage of the Members to and from the Parliament House. 
'Ordered, that the said order be sent to the Lord Mayor of the city of Dublin, and that he 
do see the same put in execution. 
'Ordered, that the constables in waiting do take care there be no gaming or other 
disorders in the passages leading to the House, during the sitting of parliament, and 
that there be no annoyance by chairmen, footmen or otherwise, therein, or 
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6.13.3  Examination of precedents 1692 to 1730 
Irish House of Commons: examination of precedents 
How to obtain papers from the Revenue 
12 Oct 
1692 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: John Poulteney) to search precedents on 'how 
the Committee of Grievances may come at records, accounts and papers in the hands of any [of] their 
majesties officers of the Revenue, and others' (CJI(II), p.15). 
14 Oct 
1692 
Findings: James Sloane reported the following precedents, 17 Apl 1662 (Irish House of Commons), 8 
Oct 1690 (English House of Commons) and 13 Oct 1690 (English House of Commons); the House 





Issue: the House appointed a committee (all barristers and first named: John Weaver) to search 




Findings: Weaver reported precedents from Irish Journals: 25 Nov 1614, 18 Apl 1615, 17 July 1634, 18 
July 1634 and information on practice from clerk of crown and chancery under an English Act (CJI(II), 
pp.16-17). 
Fees for inserting 'private' clauses in public bills 
15 Nov 
1697 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Col Eyre) to examine Journals on the fees paid to 
the clerks and Speaker when private persons inserted clauses in public bills (CJI(II), p.216). 
18 Nov 
1697 
Findings: Edward Singleton reported one precedent from Journals: 21 May 1662. Precedent used to 
require fees (CJI(II), p.219). 
Refusal to pay fees due to clerks and door-keepers 
19 Nov 
1698 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Stephen Ludlow) to search the Journals, to see 
what methods have been used for getting the fees due to the clerks and door-keepers that attend the 
committees from persons that refuse to pay (CJI(II), p.271). 
24 Nov 
1698 
Findings: John Weaver Sr. reported precedents from Journals: 10 Dec 1661, 13 Dec 1662 and 3 Nov 
1692 (CJI(II), p.275). 






Issue: the clerks and other officers of the House of Commons petition for payment for services (CJI(II), 
pp.438, 442, 444). 
12 Mar 
1704/5 
Findings: Stephen Ludlow presented report which (rather than a list of precedents) drew on petitioners' 
submission and set out history of clerks attempts to obtain payment (CJI(II), p.448). 
 See also Fees, clerks', etc. in Appendix 6.13.1 for precedents cited on 16 Nov 1703. 
House of Lords: bill procedures 
12 Oct 
1692 
Issue: the House having been informed that bills that started in the Lords and sent to the Commons 
engrossed 'have many times been detained here, and not returned to the Lords House, but presented 
by the Speaker for the royal assent', appointed a committee (first named: Henry Boyle) 'to search 
precedents, how engrossed bills ... ought to be returned and sent up by this House' (CJI(II), p.14). 
13 Oct 
1692 
Issue: Boyle reported that there were several precedents but that they were inconsistent with some 
showing the engrossed bills returned to the Lords and other retained by the Commons and presented 
by the Speaker for royal assent: 13 Oct 1614, 10 Dec 1634 and 13 Dec 1665 (CJI(II), p.15). 
Outcome: one bill in the session that eventually was given royal assent―for encouragement of 
Protestant strangers to settle in the kingdom of Ireland―does not appear to have been returned to the 
Lords and may have been presented by the Speaker. Ultimately (and silently) Westminster practice 
was adopted: all bills were returned except supply bills which the Speaker presented.  
8 June 
1716 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Mr St. George (more than one)) to inspect the 
Journals to search for precedents in relation to the delivery of bills sent up by the Commons at the bar 
of the House of Lords (CJI(III), p.104) 
 Findings: no entry for report of the committee. 
House of Lords: arrangements at conferences 
15 Oct 
1695 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Alan Brodrick (Solicitor General); second: William 
Molyneux) to search the Journals on Lords giving evidence to the Commons on oath; on 16 Oct terms 
of reference were expanded to include how Members should 'manage themselves on a free 
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  This item is included as a example of limitation of precedents. In light of officer's use of precedents in 1690s (listed 





Irish House of Commons: examination of precedents 
conference with the Lords'; 17 Oct Commons asks Lords if they can inspect their Journals; 18 Oct 
Lords Journals inspected (CJI(II), p.91). 
20 Nov 
1695 
Findings: William Molyneux reported and the Commons agreed the committee's findings and that they 
should be entered in CJI: 
1. It appeared from the Journals that 'great Inconveniences have happened to the public affairs of this 
nation, by the Commons insisting on the right of sitting covered in conferences with the Lords, an 
absolute rupture between the two Houses has ensued thereon, and followed with a dissolution of the 
parliament' after the 1641 rebellion. 'For avoiding the like mischiefs and inconveniences the future, and 
that the great business of the nation may not have any time thereafter suffered by adhering to the 
manner sitting covered, the Commons in this parliament assembled to think it requisite to settle this 
matter, and the precedent therein to be observed thereafter'. 
2. 'In regard the Commons of England, in conferences with the Lords, do stand uncovered, we conceive 
it not necessary or convenient to insist upon more in this matter than the Commons of England'. 
3. 'The two Houses ... are now employed upon settling the nation after a most unnatural rebellion [and] 
upon a lasting Protestant foundation ... and a rupture between the two Houses may prove at this time 
of the worst consequence ... we think it requisite to decline what formerly has been insisted upon ... 
and to leave this as a memorial to future generations, by ordering it to be entered in our Journals as a 
precedent settled and agreed by this House' (CJI(II), p.118). 
House of Lords: witnesses 
21 Oct 
1695 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Joseph Williamson) to search for precedents that 
the judges can administer oaths to witnesses before the House of Commons (CJI(II), p.102). (The 
House of Lords had refused to allow the judges to attend for this purpose in respect of the articles of 
impeachment of Lord Chancellor Porter.) 
22 Oct 
1695 
Findings: Alan Brodrick (Solicitor General) reported that it was no infringement of the judicature of the 
Lords and that it was 'parliamentary of the House of Commons to receive evidence of witnesses who 




Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Thomas Keighley) to examine the Journals in 
order to respond to a message from the House of Lords that an MP be examined as a witness in the 
House of Lords (CJI(II), p.497). 
14 July 
1707 
Findings and process: William Conolly reported that they had found a 1661 precedent which he read 
in his place and delivered to the Table where it was read again. The House then sent a message to 
the Lords that the Commons would not give leave for the MP to be examined as a witness 'till they are 
informed by your lordships, in what cause or matter he is to be examined'. The Lords then sent a 
messenger repeating the request but with the details of the case (the wording appears to draw from 
the 1661 precedent). The Member said that he was willing to be examined and the Lords were told by 
the Speaker that the House of Commons had given leave (CJI(II), pp.498-99). 
31 July 
1711 
Issue: the Commons requested Lords give leave for Mr Justice Coote to appear before a Commons 
committee to explain what he knew relating to the proceedings on the examinations of Dominick 
Langton against various Protestant gentleman of co. Westmeath; 2 Aug Lords refused as they needed 
Coote to be in 'constant attendance in the House of Lords'. In response the Commons appointed a 
committee (first named: William Conolly) to examine the Journals of the both the Commons and Lords 
for precedents relating to the answer of the House of Lords (CJI(II), pp.708-09). 
6 Nov 
1711 
Findings and outcome: Oliver St. George reported that the committee had found precedents for judges 
appearing before Commons committees. The Journal gives the report he read. It cited precedents 
(from Journals of both Houses) from 1707, in which Coote had given evidence at the bar of the 
Commons (from the Lords Journals) from 1704/5 and 1707, and the Commons discovered that their 
request on 31 July had precipitated a decision to investigate the Langton case and thus preclude 
Coote's attendance in the Commons. The report argued that there was no precedent to show that the 
belated decision of the Lords should be an obstruction to meeting the request of the Commons. The 
Commons asked for a conference. On 7 Nov St. George reported the case prepared for the 
conference, at which the Commons would assert 'its undoubted right to require any judge, or assistant 
of [their] Lordships House to appear before them, to give information in any matter under their enquiry'. 
They Commons would tell the Lords that their refusal was 'very unparliamentary and without 
precedent, and which might tend to the interruption and defeating of any future enquiry before their 
House'. The session ended before a further conference could take place (CJI(II), pp.731-34). 
2 Dec 
1715 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: Samuel Dopping) to inspect Journals and search 
for precedents relating to judges giving testimony before the Commons (CJI(III), p.36). (The Lords had 
already agreed that Lord Chief Justice Forester could give evidence. This search was for the 
procedures when he appeared.) 
 Findings: no entry for report of the committee found. 
How Members can resign 
1 Mar 
1704/5 
Issue: the House appointed a committee (first named: William Conolly) to search precedents where 
Members have withdrawn themselves from the service of the House (CJI(II), p.437). 
20 Mar 
1704/5 
Findings: Conolly reported precedents from the Journals where Members had withdrawn: 10 Dec 1634, 
6 Sep 1695, 14 Feb 1704, 28 Feb 1704; but committee came to opinion 'that the excuse in of 
Members at their own request, or upon their letters, from the service of this House, and thereupon 
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issuing out new writs to re-elect other Members to serve in their places, is of dangerous consequence, 
and tends to the subversion of the constitution of parliament' and on the following day the House 
'resolved, nemine contradicente, That no new writs for electing Members of parliament, in the places of 
Members excusing themselves from the service of this House, do issue at the desire of such 







6.14  Procedures of the House of Commons 
6.14.1  The address 
a) A motion for an address was made.
302
 
b) When the House resolved to make an address, a committee was appointed to draw it 
up and, in the case of the response to the speech from the throne, a separate 
committee of privy counsellors was appointed and ordered 'to acquaint [the lord 
lieutenant] with the vote ... for an address of thanks'.
303
  
c) When the committee drafting the address had finished its work, a Member—usually the 
chairman of the committee—reported and read the address in his place.
304
 
d) The address was then delivered 'in at the Table' and read a second time—if necessary, 
at this point it could be recommitted to committee.
305
 




f) The address was given a third reading.
307
 




h) The House ordered Members who were privy counsellors to attend the lord lieutenant 
asking when it would be convenient to present the address.
309
  
i) A privy counsellor reported back the appointed time to the House and the House 
ordered attendance at the specified time.
310
 
j) At the appointed time it was presented. 
k) Those making the presentation would report back and convey the lord lieutenant’s 
formulaic words of acceptance or undertaking to send on to the monarch.
311
 
                                                        
 
302
  See CJI(II), p.248 for an example where the question was put to a division and negatived. 
303
  CJI(II), p.11 
304
  CJI(II), p.13 
305
  See CJI(II), pp.95, 136.  
306
  CJI(II), p.13; in the case in 1692 the address was recommitted and reconsidered and agreed the following day 
(p.14). the procedure for amending was recorded on 14 July 1711: 'an amendment being proposed to the fifth 
paragraph, and the Question being put, that the said paragraph do stand part of the Address without any 
amendment,' the House divided with the yeas 84; noes 39; it was carried in the affirmative (p.697). 
307
  CJI 13 Dec 1695 recorded that after an address to king had been amended, 'then the address was entirely read by 
Mr Speaker, with the [amended] words therein, and agreed to the House' (p. 143). The entry may record an 
exception to the normal process, which―by the 1720s―was for the clerk to read it. Coghill recorded that a 
misreading by the Clerk of an address to the king provoked a sarcastic intervention from St. John Brodrick; Coghill 
Letters, no 17 (To Edward Southwell, 9 Oct 1725). 
308
  In one instance on 12 Dec 1695 the House ordered that 'Mr Vanhomrigh, and such Members of the House as 
please to accompany him, do attend his excellency the lord deputy with the ... address, and humbly present the 
same to his lordship as the address of this House' (CJI(II), p.142). It therefore appears that MPs who were not 
privy councillors presented the address; Vanhomrigh is not listed as a privy councillor. 
309
  CJI(II), p.14 
310
  CJI(II), p.15 
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6.14.2  Procedure in the House of Commons on receipt of a message from the Lords 




1 Message delivered from Lords by two justices desiring a conference at a specific location about a specified 
subject. 
2 Messengers withdrew and waited. 
3 House considered, and usually agreed. 
4 Messengers called in and Speaker told them that the House agreed. 
5 Select committee appointed to manage the conference. 
6 Select committee attended conference; the Commons attended in a ratio of 2:1 to the Lords; and the 
conference took place in the Conference Room (or sometimes, the Robe Room).
313
 
7 Select committee reported from the conference; if Lords provided a paper, it is read at the Table and 
recorded in Journals. 
8 House decided its response. 
9 If House wanted a further conference, it would send a Member to acquaint the Lords of the request and the 
subject of the conference. 
10 Member reports back Lords response which will be usually to agree to meet. 
11 House would appoint a select committee to manage the conference with an instruction on the House’s view 
of the matter; if necessary it might prepare a response which was put to the House for endorsement. 
12 Select committee attended the conference. 
13 Select committee reported back from the conference to the House of Commons. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
311
  CJI(II), p.14 (16 Oct 1692); in earlier parliaments the address was read to the lord lieutenant and his words were 
usually to effect that he was pleased to receive the address and would attend to its contents, or in case of an 
address to the monarch, convey it on. Not all responses from the lord lieutenant were formulaic: 11 Oct 1695 the 
lord deputy was recorded as saying: 'I know something of this business myself, and will take care to represent it 
fully, and lay it before His Majesty' (p.86; 11 Oct 1695). Later entries tended to follow the formula. 
312
  Based on CJI(II), pp.134, 270, 335, 621 
313





6.14.3  Questions put in the Irish House of Commons on heads of a bill 
Questions put in the Irish House of Commons on heads of a bill Bill process as applied at Westminster 
 I. (IA) That leave be given to bring in a heads of bill to/for ... and that 
... do prepare and bring in the same or  
  (IB) That ... [be appointed a committee to] do prepare and bring 
heads of a bill to ...; [That they meet ... have power to adjourn 
from time to time, and place to place, to send for papers persons 
and records, as they shall think fit,] and report their proceedings to 
the House, [and all Members that come are to have voices] 
 
 II. That the heads of a bill to/for ... be received and read  
 III. That the heads for ... be committed to [a committee of the whole 
House] on [named day]. 
 
 IV. That the Speaker leave the Chair   
 [Heads considered in committee during which questions would have 
been put and determined ending with x report and the Speaker 
resume the Chair.] 
 
 V. That ... the report [from the committee] ... be made on [named day].  
 VI. On named day or later order of the day the report was made by 
order and question put That the heads be read   
 
 VII. That the heads be again read   
 VIII. That the House agree with the report of the committee of the whole 
House on ... [If amended, That the House agree with the 
amendments] 
The heads may have been read again 
 
 IX. That ... carry the heads of a bill ... to the lord lieutenant and humbly 
desire his lordship that the same may be put in a form and 
transmitted in England [after 1707, Great Britain] 
 
  1. That the bill be received (unless from Lords) 
  2. That the bill be read a first time 
  3. That the bill be read second time on [named day] 
  4. That the bill be read a second time—main debate on 
principles and this is the point at which counsel was heard 
  5. That the bill be committed
314
 
  6. That the House will resolve itself into a committee on a 
named day 
  7. That the Speaker leave the Chair 
  8. Amendments at committee stage  
  9. That the amendments be read a second time 
  10. That the House agree with the committee in the 
amendments 
  11. That the bill be engrossed (not Lords bills) 
  12. That the bill be read a third time on a [named day] 
  13. That the bill be read a third time 
  14. That the bill do pass 
 
  
                                                        
 
314
  Debate in committee of the whole House provided an opportunity for all MPs to speak and debate. Committee of 
the whole House could be speedier than sending a bill to select committee which would have required 
appointment of members, committee to meet and then to report. Committee of the whole House could be carried 
out as a brief interruption of a sitting of the House or in sequence with other committees of the whole House. 
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The questions and stages in more detail 
The process started with a motion that either a Member (or Members)
315
 have leave to bring in 
heads of a bill or an order for the preparation and bringing of heads of a bill (see pp.195ff 
above).
316
 (If heads were presented without leave or an order, the procedure was for leave to 
be given to withdraw it and start again.)
317
 The formulation at (IA) in the table in this Appendix 
was the usual form and variant (IB), when employed, became after the 1690s an instruct to 
draft rather than to investigate and draft. The process of investigation of the allegations in 
petitions became distinct with a report to the House on the validity of the allegations in the 
petition and then, if the representations were supported, the House decided what action to 
take. In the case of the heads of a bill for the better regulating the Dublin workhouse the 





The instruction to the drafters of the heads was an order of the House and they then presented 
the heads. Presented according to order the heads lay on the Table and were in the 
possession of the House.
319
 On presentation, it appears that there were two processes and 
questions, though―from the Journal entries―they were often taken together. First, the heads 
were read―increasingly from 1697, on presentation a date was set for reading.
320
 The 
question would be as at II in the table in this Appendix. 
Second, the heads of a bill were committed to a committee; in nearly all cases for both public 
and private heads this was a committee of the whole House on a set day.
321
 The question 
would be as at III in the table in this Appendix. On some occasions, a bill might be committed 
to a select committee which was at work in a related field.
322
 In committing the heads the 
House could, if necessary, give the committee instructions on carrying out its 
responsibilities:
323
 That the same committee has leave to receive a clause that ...
324
 or, more 
generally, empowered to receive a clause or clauses, to be inserted in the ... heads of a bill.
325
 
                                                        
 
315
  For example: on 7 Aug 1697 leave was 'given to bring in heads of bill to prevent illegal and undue charging of 
money on the subjects by grand juries and that it be recommended to Sir Richard Bulkely to prepare and bring in 
the same' (CJI(II), p.161); and on 30 Sep 1703 the House 'ordered, That leave be given to bring in heads of a bill 
for securing the liberty of the subject; and that Mr Upton, Mr Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr Bernard do 
prepare and bring in the same' (p.324). 
316
  The instructed could be an MP, an MP who was an office holder such as the solicitor general, a named group of 
MPs or a committee. The drafting committee could be a committee of the whole house, though this could be 
cumbersome. In Sep 1695 having instructed a committee of the whole House to draft a law on recovery of small 
debts, a month later the House appointed a select committee to complete the task (see CJI(II), pp.51, 76). 
317
  CJI(II), p.458 
318
  CJI(III), p.434; the initiative for action was a report from a select committee appointed to inspect the state and 
management of the Dublin workhouse, which found serious shortcomings (p.cccxxiii). 
319
  CJI(II), p.362 
320
  For examples see CJI(II), pp.168, 172, 174-78; the entries for 19 Aug 1697 include instances where heads were 
read more than once and in one case where it appears that detailed consideration of heads for the preventing of 
butchers being graziers was carried out by the House rather than in committee (p.176; 25 Aug 1697). For an 
example of heads rejected see (II), p.207.  
321
  For an example of a division on the question see CJI(II), p.244. The heads of a bill for making a canal from 
Knockbridge to Fathom, co. Down may indicate why a committee of the whole House was preferred. The drafters 
of the heads resolved 'That it is the opinion of this committee that if the said work were considered in a committee 
of the whole House that such easy methods might be proposed for doing thereof as would induce this honourable 
House to promote the same'. The implication is that a committee of the whole House brought not only greater 
expertise but wider support. In this case the House rejected the committee's resolution and committed the bill back 
to the drafting committee and it did not re-emerge. 
322
  The most frequent examples, were from committees examining the need for new laws or laws that needed to be 
renewed. These committees reported on what legislation was needed and the House then instructed them to draft 
heads (see CJI(II), p.73).  
323
  For example, on 22 July 1707 the House instructed a committee of the whole House to consolidate three heads of 
bills (CJI(II), p.503). 
324
  For example, on 17 Feb 1704/5, House ordered an instruction to the committee considering the heads of a bill for 
registering Popish clergy to insert a clause to explain and amend an act to prevent papists being solicitors (CJI(II), 
p.428). 
325





The implication of these directions was that without them the drafters would have to keep 
within the scope heads.
326
 
In most cases the Member who had led on drafting the heads chaired and reported from the 
committee. The process of scrutiny worked by widening the group that examined the draft 
legislation. 
As the House had (usually) ordered the committee of the whole House to consider the heads, 
there was no question put to the House do resolve itself into committee. Instead the question 
put was: That the Speaker leave the Chair. There are a few divisions on this question: in one 
case because the House wanted to consider other business and in another apparently to kill 




Within committee procedure several questions would be put including who would chair, making 
of amendments, that chairman should leave the Chair,
328
 and reporting the outcome of the 
committee's deliberations. Those speaking in debate were expected to speak to 'to each 
paragraph singly and in order, [not ramble] from one to another'.
329
  
At committee stage the heads of a bill were considered paragraph by paragraph and, on 
completion of consideration, the chairman (or sometimes in the 1690s, the Speaker)
330
 
reported he was ready to report and a day set for report.
331
 The question would be That the 
report of the committee ... be read on .... 
As with the presentation of the heads, the committee report on the heads had three elements 
that were often elided. First, heads of a bill were reported, according to order, to the House by 
usually the chairman of the committee. He reported that the committee had gone through the 
heads of the bill with, if necessary, some amendments, which he delivered in at the Table.  
The second stage consisted of consideration of any amendments reported by the committee, 
the making of amendments by the House itself, if any, and a reading of heads, as amended. 
This was the settled order of consideration set down by the House in Feb 1723/4.
332
  
Third, the House had several options, all of which could be debated:  
 ―agree the heads (as amended);
333
 The question was put That the House do agree with the 
committee in the resolution ....  
                                                        
 
326
  For example, on 1 Oct 1717 the solicitor general presented heads for 'the better amendment of the pavements in 
the city of Dublin, and for removing encroachments and nuisances that are or shall be erected thereon' which the 
House committed to a committee of the whole House and empowered it 'to receive a clause or clauses' (CJI(III), 
p.142). When the heads were reported by the committee on 9 Oct the title had been enlarged to 'the better 
amendment of the pavement, and more effectually cleansing of the streets of the city of Dublin, and removing 
encroachments and nuisances that are or shall be erected therein, and for preventing mischiefs occasioned by 
drivers of carts, drays and cars riding thereon, and for regulating the selling of hay in the city of Dublin, and 
liberties thereunto adjoining' (p.150). The implication is that there was a general debate on 1 Oct on Dublin streets 
and that as a result the heads were expanded. In the face of constraints on the legislative process expanding the 
scope of bills though tacking was useful. 
327
  CJI(II), p.248(III), p.339  
328
  For a division on the question see BL, Add. 47,028, f.154 (Charles Dering to Lord Perceval, 1 June1716). 
329
  BL, Add. 47,029, f.74 (Philip Perceval to Lord Perceval, 16 Oct 1721) 
330
  For example, see CJI(II), p.64 (17 Sep 1695): 'Ordered, That the Report made to this House on Saturday last by 
Sir Francis Blundell, for preparing heads of our bill for prevention of robberies, etc. be reported by Mr Speaker to 
this House this day seven-night'; in the event Blundell reported the heads himself ((II)p.85 (10 Oct)). 
331
  Setting a date, rather than taking the report forthwith, became routine from 1697. A committee could report 
immediately, if a recess was imminent —see for example (CJI(II), p.210)―or if the heads were of political 
significance such as the national bank in Dec 1721 (III, p.289.). 
332
  CJI(I), p.615 (10 Feb 1662/3) shows the procedure in use at beginning of the 1661 Parliament. 10 Feb 1723/4 
House made a standing order: 'Ordered, nemine contradicente, that all heads of bill, which pass through a 
committee of the whole House, shall receive a reading after the report made, and before the same be made to the 
government, in order to be transmitted in due form into Great Britain' ((III), p.388); see (III), p.432 for an example. 
It is not clear whether the resolution of Feb 1723/4 was part of a process of codification or in response to a 
problem. The latter seems possible as earlier in the month the House had set out its expectations when copies of 
heads were reported (p.382). A requirement for a reading at the end of the report and before the heads went to the 
lord lieutenant was designed to ensure that everyone was clear what had been agreed and gave consent. One 
possible candidate for muddle was the bill on hempen and flaxen manufactures, the heads of which had been 
amended on report (p.359). 
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 ―amend the heads itself;
334
 The usual procedure was to hear counsel early in the heads 
process―either during the drafting process or during the committee stage―but on occasion 
he was heard at report stage and amendments could follow.
335
 






If the heads of the bill were agreed, the House would usually order the chairman of the 
committee, on a question, attend the lord lieutenant, and desire him that the heads be put into 
form, and transmitted into England, according to Poynings' Law.
338
 Where the House 
considered heads to be of importance, they could be presented by the Speaker on behalf of 
the House
339
 and, if especially important to the House with an address.
340
 (The method of 
enhancement was not to seek wider support, i.e. from the House of Lords but to show the 
importance of the measure to the Commons.) Heads of the bill presented to the lord lieutenant 
were sent to, and considered by, the Irish and English/British Privy Councils and law officers 
and, if agreed, returned to the Irish parliament. If heads were not sent to England the 
Commons could complain to the lord lieutenant.
341
 
When the heads of a bill came back as a bill there was no need for a motion for leave to 
introduce the bill and there was no need for debate which P.D.G. Thomas remarks provided 
Westminster with an opportunity to weed out bills that stood no chance.
342
 In Ireland all 
finalised bills starting in the Commons—irrespective of whether they rose in the Commons, 
Lords or Irish Privy Council—were presented to the House in the same manner; it appears 
that the question put was that the bill be received.
343
 Bills that had been to the Lords followed 
Westminster procedure: the Commons were notified by a message from the Lords that they 
had passed a bill and sought the concurrence of the Commons. The bill was then given a first 
reading by the Commons immediately or shortly thereafter.
344
  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
333
  For an example see CJI(II), p.183. 
334
  For examples see CJI(II), pp.437, 521. CJI 3 May 1709 sets out the procedure for adding clauses to heads at 
report: 'And a clause being offered to the House to be inserted in this ... heads of a bill, the same was received 
and read; and the question being put, that the clause to stand part of the heads of the bill ... It passed in the 
negative'. The heads was then sent to the lord lieutenant (p.582). One variant was to order re-reading of the heads 
(CJI(III), pp.424, 426), which allowed the House to consider further and to make amendments. It was the 
equivalent of adjourning a debate on reading of a bill. 
335
  CJI(III), p.263 (10 Oct 1721) the heads of a bill to prevent frauds and abuses in the making of malt was committed.  
336
  For examples see CJI(II), pp.84, 205. In the latter instance on 22 Sep 1697 the House ordered 'That the heads of 
... bill re recommitted, and that the said committee be revived, and that it be an instruction to the said committee, 
to insert a clause therein to ...' 
337
  CJI(II), p.279; if there was a delay heads were laid on the Table until taken to the lord lieutenant ((II), p.372).  
338
  CJI(II), p.279; but exact wording varied, and after 1707 Great Britain was substituted for England. There are some 
examples, usually from 1690s, of CJI recording lord lieutenant’s response indicating that he would transmit the 
heads in due form to England—see for example, (II), p.83. If presentation did not follow the usual procedure and 
was, for example, carried out by the Speaker, the lord lieutenant’s response could, at the direction of the House, 
be entered in CJI—see for example, (II), p.702. Presentation to the lord lieutenant was usually the end of the 
heads process but CJI record some instances when the Commons sought to amend a bill after presentation—for 
example, (II), p.201. 
339
  For examples see CJI(II), pp.290, 440, 653, 702. 
340
  For an example see CJI(II), p.289. 
341
  CJI(I), p.747  
342
  Thomas, Commons, p.48 
343
  CJI(II), p.49; a review of CJI entries for a sample of bills originating in the Irish Privy Council between 1705 and 
1715 shows no significant difference in their treatment compared with bills originating as heads in the Commons or 
Lords. Entries are a blunt measure but they show, for example, that Privy Council bills took no longer in committee 
or that they were before House for longer. The failure rate of privy council bills was not lower than other 
categories, rather numbers originating in Irish Privy Council fell. 
344
  See, for example, CJI(III), pp.88-90 for bills confirming the grants of first fruits and twentieth parts payable out of 





At first reading the question put was That the bill be read a first time. As at Westminster there 
were occasional divisions.
345
 If a bill failed to be given a first reading, 'then the other question 
was put', that is whether the bill should be rejected.
346
 Without rejection the bill lay in limbo on 
the table and could, in procedural terms, be revived. With first reading the House had 
possession of the bill and Members could have access to its contents.
347
  
Immediately after first reading the question was put That the bill be read a second time on a set 
day. This practice is earlier than 1692
348
 but was not of universal application until after 1697. 
From the 1719 session, however, on occasion the House, particularly towards the end of the 
session, would take second reading on the same day as first reading, especially with private 
acts. This required a separate motion as it was contrary to usual practice.
349
 There is one 
example of a division on a motion to take second reading on the same day as first. The House 
divided on the motion on 16 Mar 1729/30 on a bill to prevent riots in Dublin. The bill had 
started in the Irish Privy Council and had an uneasy passage through the Lords. The 
Commons rejected the motion by 93 to 54. The motion was a device to kill the bill at first 
reading as the House immediately resolved to reject the bill.
350
 (By this time divisions on first 
reading had ceased.) 
P.D.G. Thomas says that at Westminster the main debate took place on principles at this point 
(that is second reading) and, if necessary, counsel was heard. In the Irish parliament second 
reading provided opportunity for such debates and for counsel to appear
351
 but given the 
heads of bill process and that parties could petition both privy councils second reading did not 
have had the same importance in Dublin as at Westminster. Of equal (or more) importance to 
the Irish House of Commons was the origin of the bill and whether it had been amended by 
the privy councils. Although from to time the Irish House of Commons trumpeted it opposition 
to bills that took their rise in the Irish Privy Council,
352
 the ILD shows that its hostility was 
sparingly selective and flexible.
353
 
The question was then put That the bill be committed to committee. If not committed the 
question was immediately put that the bill be engrossed; if this motion was negatived, this 
procedure allowed the House to reject the bill.
354
 Before the late 1690s there are examples of 
                                                        
 
345
  Thomas, Commons, pp.48-49; when a bill came down from the Lords motion was made 'That the engrossed bill 
from the Lords, entitled, ... be now read, ... Ordered, That the said bill be now read the first time; which was done 
accordingly, and ordered to be read a second time to-morrow morning' (CJI(II), p.680). For an example of a 
rejection at first reading see (III), p.639 (16 Mar 1729/30). In the early seventeenth century the procedure was 
looser. For example, MPs could speak at first reading though it was 'unusual' ((I), p.15) and the matter was 
referred to the Committee of Privileges, though the outcome was not recorded; there is no evidence of debate at 
first reading in the period covered by this thesis, though it appears that bills may have been debated at first 
reading until the 1640s—see Tobacco Bill which fell at first reading on 17 June 1641 ((I), p.233). CJI for 1613 
Parliament records a bill receiving three readings on one day (with no committal)—(I), p.14. By the 1630s the 
procedure had developed: a bill could be given first and second reading, 'by the consent of the House' ((I), p.77). 
There is example of a bill going through three readings in a day in 1660s, presumably with paving motions—see 
((I), p.508). 
346
  CJI(I), p.614; this example comes from 7 Feb 1662/3. 
347
  CJI((II), p.49 (77 May 1662) recorded: that the 'Speaker moved the House, that there was a bill for the settlement 
of this Kingdom, which had been long expected, in the hands of the clerk; and that, until the House had attached it 
by reading part thereof, none of the Members could regularly have perusal of the same; whereupon the House 
ordered the said bill to be read, and proceeded therein this day to the beginning of the instructions mentioned in 
the said bill'). 
348
  See CJI(I), p.745 for example, where the House negatived a question and then reject the bill. 
349
  For example, CJI(III), pp.230, 563, 642  
350
  CJI(III), p.639 
351
  For an example see CJI(II), p.215. Counsel could be heard at other stages such as third reading—(II), p.288. 
352
  For example, see the 1707 bill for the better ordering of servants and day-labourers which fell at second reading 
(CJI(II), p.495). According to the ILB, the bill originated in Irish Privy Council. On this day the House gave leave for 
heads of a bill to be brought in on the same subject (p.495). 
353
  The ILD records that between 1692 and 1730 187 measures arose in Irish Privy Council, of which 99 were 
enacted and of 88 rejected 36 failed to get through the English/British Privy Council and 30 failed in the Commons. 
The context was, however, one where number of bills taking their rise in Irish Privy Council was in steady decline 
from 1690s to 1730s (and precipitately thereafter), which may in part be due to declining role of the Irish Privy 
Council and a perception that bills that took their rise in Privy Council were likely to have a difficult time in 
Commons. 
354
  For examples see CJI(II), pp.293, 298, 549(III), p.372. 
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bills bypassing committal for engrossment
355
 but on 4 September 1697 the House made it a 
'standing rule' that 'after this day no public or private bill is passed, without being first 
committed after second reading'.
356




To effect consideration in committee the question was put That the House will resolve itself into 




At the start of committee, the question was put That the Speaker leave the Chair.
359
 
When the committee had completed consideration, the Chair informed the House that the 
committee was ready to report. The question was then put That the report of the committee be 
received on a named day, or, on a motion that the bill be now reported, the House could and 
did move immediately to report.
360
  
On report, the chairman usually reported the simplest resolution of the committee that had gone 
through the bill paragraph by paragraph, and agreed thereto, without any amendment. The 
House was then asked if it agreed with the committee. Where the committee and House 
wished to reject a bill because of a particular provision the House itself could take the bill 
provision by provision, indicating which provision was fatal to the bill.
361
 The committee’s 
recommendations—either to accept or reject—could be overturned by the House.
362
 
The House was then asked That the bill be engrossed. (This process was not required for bills 
that came from the House of Lords, which arrived engrossed.) 
The Irish House of Commons adopted the Westminster practice of putting the question That the 
bill be read a third time on a set day.
363
 (It was not practice or practicable if a bill had to be 




The question put at third reading was: That the bill should be read a third time. 
                                                        
 
355
  For an example see CJI(II), p.163. 
356
  CJI(II), p.185 
357
  For example, see CJI(II), p.188. 
358
  For example, see CJI(III), p.158. 
359
  For an example of a division on the question, though not in respect of a heads or a bill, see CJI(II), p.563. 
360
  For example, see CJI(III), p.448 (1 Mar 1725).  
361
  CJI(II), p.34; in this example, the committee offered alternative wording to the offending provision and the House 
concluded its consideration by rejecting the bill. For examples, upon which House divided, see (II), pp.202-03, 
406. In former example, on 20 Sep 1697 House rejected parts of bill for translating archiepiscopal see and 
cathedral church of Tuam to Galway and the CJI recorded the paragraphs it objected to. Such an entry was, 
however, rare; the usual formula was to reject by refusing to proceed with the bill to the next stage without 
explanation for the decision. 
362
  On 2 June 1705 Mr Singleton reported from the committee of the whole House on the bill on horse stealing. The 
committee had gone through the bill, paragraph by paragraph, and agreed to every paragraph except the last, to 
which they disagreed; which he read in his place and delivered in at Table. The House then considered the 
resolutions being read a second time, and the 'question severally put thereon', were all agreed on to by the House, 
except the last, to which the House disagreed. The House then ordered the bill to be engrossed (CJI(II), p.473). In 
earlier parliaments the bill might have been sent back to the lord lieutenant with suggested amendments or 
suggested a meeting with the Privy Council—for examples see CJI(I), pp.709-10, 716, 718, 720-21, 732-33, 736, 
771—but after 1692 such practice was abandoned.  
363
  Thomas, Commons, p.54; the legislative procedure after 1692 does not always record this question being put but 
it became standard by turn of century; see CJI(II), p.412. 
364
  On 16 Oct 1707, day after the House had received a money bill from the committee of the whole House, it 
accepted its resolutions and ordered the bill engrossed. On the following day the CJI recorded that the House was 
informed that additional duties on tobacco, etc. expired on 29 Sep 1707, with the result that great quantities goods 
had been imported since that day and it noted that her Majesty might lose a great part of the additional duties 
intended to be granted that session. The House thought fit to read engrossed bill a third time and to pass it, 
notwithstanding that the bill was reported from the committee the day before and notwithstanding several other 
bills remaining on the Table that had not yet passed, 'which entry is ordered by the House to be made to prevent 
the reading of the said bill a third time, with such dispatch, from being drawn into precedent, where there shall not 





Immediately on third reading the question was put That the bill do pass
365
 and, if agreed, the 
question was put: That Member AB—usually the chairman of the committee—do carry the bill 
to the Lords, and acquaint them, that this House has passed the same, and desire their 
concurrence.
366
 The bill as sent to the Lords had to have an endorsement that it was to be 
delivered to the Lords and that it had been read in the Commons.
367
 For bills originating in the 
Lords, the Commons ordered a Member (usually the chairman again) do acquaint the Lords, 
that this House has agreed to the ... bill, without any amendment.
368
 Other Journal entries 




                                                        
 
365
  From 1697 this became usual practice.  
366
  CJI(II), p.551 
367
  CJI(II), p.134 
368
  For example, see CJI(II), p.401. 
369
  For example, see CJI(II), p.412. 
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6.14.4 The supply process 
Summary of the supply timetable in 1711 
Stage 1711 Money bill Date Calendar days Sitting days 
1 Lord lieutenant’s speech to Irish parliament 12 Jul 0 0 
 House of Commons  
2 Address of thanks and request(s) for papers 14 Jul 2 1 
3 Papers laid and House considered supply in committee 17 Jul 5 4 
4 Committee on Supply made initial report and Committee of 
Accounts nominated 
20 Jul 8 7 
4 Committee of Accounts reported and Committee of Supply met 28 Jul 16 14 
5 Committee on Supply reported 30 Jul 18 15 
6 Committee on Ways and Means met 4 Aug 23 20 
6 Committee on Ways and Means reported 6 Aug 25 21 
7 Heads of money bill brought in and referred to committee of the 
whole House 
7 Aug 26 22 
7 Committee of the whole House met 7 Aug 26 22 
7 Committee of the whole House reported on heads 10 Aug 29 25 
  Transmission recess 11 Aug 31 26 
8 Money bill first reading in Commons 16 Oct 96 32 
9 Money bill given second reading and committed to committee of 
the whole House 
20 Oct 100 36 
10 Bill considered in committee  25 Oct 105 40 
10 Committee reported 30 Oct 110 44 
11 Money bill third reading 1 Nov 112 46 
 House of Lords 
12 Money bill first reading 2 Nov 113 47 
12 Money bill given second reading and committed to committee of 
the whole House 
2 Nov 113 47 
12 Committee reported 6 Nov 117 50 
12 Money bill third reading 6 Nov 117 50 






Stage I: the lord lieutenant’s speech requesting supply
370
 
The lord lieutenant’s speech at the opening of the session contained a request for supply which 
was directed at the 'gentlemen of the House of Commons'.
371
 No amount was explicitly 
requested but the lord lieutenant in making the request undertook to supply public accounts 
for the House to examine and asserted that the administration had been frugal its use of 
previously voted moneys along with an indication of what the supply requested would be used 
for. (In the subsequent deliberations the administration usually made clear how much it was 
requesting.) In the following days the House proceeded to business which included an 




Development: as early as the lord deputy’s speech opening the 1695 session these elements 
were in place when Capel asked the Commons to 'consider ways and means for raising ... 
sums as are requisite for the [king’s] service, and prepare heads of bills to be passed into 
laws in due form' and he assured the Commons 'that what monies you give shall be applied to 
the uses for which they are given'.
373
 He did not, however, volunteer to supply papers. In 
response, the Commons undertook to supply 'the deficiency in the revenue'.
374
 At the opening 
of the 1698/9 session the lords justices’ speech balanced what amounted to a demand for 
supply—'His Majesty expects that you will enable him to support the charge of the present 
establishment'—with justification of the call and with the provision of accounts of the 
revenue.
375
 By 1703 the form had reached maturity. The part of the speech requesting and 
justifying the need for supply was addressed explicitly and directly to the Commons and 
Ormond said that he had ordered accounts to be laid before Members, 'by which you will 
perceive that the government has expended a very considerable sum toward the building of 
the barracks, more than was given by parliament for that purpose'.
376
 From 1705 this had 




Stage II: the administration lays papers before the House 
Immediately, on the approval of the addresses the House set a date for consideration of the lord 
lieutenant’s speech. By that date the administration had fulfilled its undertakings and laid an 
extensive dossier of papers before the House, including a summary of the state of accounts, 
abstracts showing Treasury Office transactions and lists of entitlement to draw on the civil and 
military establishment. The House ordered that the papers lie on the Table 'to be perused by 




                                                        
 
370
  Based on 1711 session 
371
  CJI(II), p.696 
372
  CJI(II), pp.697-98 
373
  CJI(II), p.44 
374
  CJI(II), p.46  
375
  CJI(II), p.241 
376
  CJI(II), p.315  
377
  Wording from 1707 (CJI(II), p.492); for 1705 see (II), p.424. 
378
  CJI(II), p.700; papers were physically on the Table of the House and MPs examined them (see Coghill Letters, no 
17 (To Edward Southwell, 9 Oct 1725). 
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Development: the main elements of this process appeared in 1695, though the timescale was 
not as compact or as sequentially ordered as in 1711, and the House had to request financial 
papers—including an abstract of receipts and payments and details of the military 
establishment and arrears—which were supplied quickly.
379
 In 1698 with the provision of 
papers promised in the opening speech, the revenue account was laid before the Commons 
immediately after the Commons had presented its address of thanks for the lords justices’ 
speech.
380
 In 1705 the link between papers and the start of the supply process became 
stronger: when the House resolved on 17 Feb 1704/5 that it would go into committee of the 
whole House to consider supply on 20 Feb and it ordered the public accounts to be laid the 
day before, though in the event all were not available.
381
 This was the pattern in 1707.
382
 The 
process of producing papers was no formal exercise with the administration producing 
summaries to assist Members’ scrutiny and the House demanding additional papers—in some 
cases for political rather than financial reasons. 
 
Stage III: consideration in committee of the whole House on Supply 
On the day, or the day after, the accounts were presented, the House, according to order, 
proceeded to take into consideration the lord lieutenant’s speech and a motion was made that 
a supply be granted to Her Majesty. The House then resolved to go into committee of the 
whole House, to consider the motion and the lord lieutenant’s speech and that the papers 
lying on the Table be referred to the committee.
383
 This was a straightforward and formal 
process. 
The committee of the whole House met, according to order, and the main purpose of the 
meeting was to carry out a preliminary examination of the request for supply and of the 
papers. The outcome was that a report was prepared and the House had the opportunity to 
request additional papers, if required.
384
 The House made a request to the lord lieutenant for 
the papers—by sending privy counsellors to him, who then reported back—and set a date for 
consideration of the committee’s report. On the following day, according to order, the 
committee reported its opinion that a supply should be granted. On the question being put the 
House agreed with the committee and resolved to go into committee of the whole House on a 
specified date to consider supply (quantum) and the lord lieutenant’s speech further.
385
  
Development; this was the least developed part of the process in 1695 because at this point in 
the process the committee of the whole House resolved to grant a supply for a specific 
amount ('the quantum') and at the same time appointed a committee to examine the accounts 
and papers supplied.
386
 The quantum granted was the amount sought by the lord deputy
387
 
but it made little sense for the detailed scrutiny to be carried out after the Commons had 
agreed the amount. In 1697 the process was delayed by the vice-treasurer’s failure to deliver 
a particular account.
388
 From 1703 detailed scrutiny moved to the Committee of Accounts and 
no quantum was determined until the Committee of Accounts had reported. In 1709, however, 
the decision in principle to grant supply was made at this stage,
389
 presumably on the basis 
that it was obviously required and that the issue was the quantum and for what period supply 
should be given. 
 
                                                        
 
379
  CJI(II), pp.50-51, 53-54  
380
  CJI(II), p.244 
381
  CJI(II), pp.429-30 
382
  CJI(II), p.497 
383
  CJI(II), p.700  
384
  CJI(II), p.701  
385
  As above 
386
  CJI(II), p.55 
387
  McGrath, Irish Constitution, p.104 
388
  SP, William and Mary 7, no.144 (CSPD: William III 1697――7 Aug 1697) 
389





Stage IV: the Committee of Accounts 
In 1711 the Committee of Accounts had less than a week to carry out its work, though short 
extensions could be given. If any additional papers sought by the House arrived, they were 
referred to the Committee of Accounts.
390
 Once its work was completed, the Committee of 
Accounts, according to order, made its report―typically a short summary report to which was 
attached reports from its sub-committees and papers supplied by the administration.
391
 The 
report and supporting documents were referred to the committee of the whole House which 
was synchronised to meet when the Committee of Accounts reported
392
—see stage V below. 
In 1711 the sub-committees were allocated the following responsibilities to scrutinise: 
 'to consider the establishment; 
 'the queen's letters for extraordinary payments over and above the establishment; 
 'to look into what had been done about the arsenal proposed and begun last year; 
 'the new offices in the room of what had been destroyed by the late fire; 
 'the Palatines; 
 'the Revenue; 




The sub-committees took a week to complete their work
394
 and they reported to the main 
committee and then for its report to be made to the Committee of Supply.
395
 
Development: the Committee of Accounts had been part of the supply process since 1695 
(with a break in 1698). 
 
Stage V: further consideration in committee of the whole House on Supply 
The Committee of Supply was the crucial stage. Armed with the detailed work of the Committee 
of Accounts the House could examine both details and overall amounts. In 1711, upon the 
Committee of Accounts reporting to the House, according to order, it went into committee of 
the whole House to consider its report. This was likely to be a substantial item of business 
running past 4pm requiring the adjournment of committees scheduled to meet at 4pm.
396
 The 
outcome was resolutions which were reported to the House the following sitting day. (There 
could be more than one sitting of the committee of the whole House.) By 1711 the resolutions 
put to the House specified the maximum amount or amounts to be granted and set out the 
broad purposes for which supply was to be granted, including, if necessary, a time limit—
'sufficient to make good the necessary branches of the establishment for two years, 
commencing on 24 June 1711'.
397
 On the House’s agreement to these resolutions, it specified 




Development: by 1707 a method of operation emerged:  
 ―while the Committee of Accounts was at work dates were scheduled for the committee of 
the whole House to meet, the order was read on the scheduled day and, if the Committee of 
                                                        
 
390
  CJI(II), pp.702, 704 
391
  CJI(II), pp.ccxlv-cclvii.  
392
  CJI(II), p.705  
393
  SP, 63–367 ff.138-39(stamped 11-12) (28 July 1711) 
394
  As above 
395
  As above 
396
  CJI(II), p.706 (28 July 1711) 
397
  CJI(II), pp.706 (30 July 1711), 709 (2 Aug 1711) 
398
  CJI(II), p.709  
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Accounts was not ready, a fresh date scheduled, its meetings were not allowed to be rolled up 
with the daily general deferral of orders;
399
 
 ―when the Committee of Accounts reported to the House, its report was referred to the 
committee of the whole House on Supply, which then met and considered the report;
400
 and 
 ―the committee of the whole House usually reported twice—once on the principle that a 
supply should be granted for a specified period and separately on the quantum.
401
 
In 1711 the quantum was £122,953 and some Members attacked the motion arguing that it 
should be split into its component parts, such as the amount for Trinity College, the arsenal 
and buying arms, and their justified separate computations on the grounds that it was 'the 
method used on like occasions in the English House of Commons'.
402
 But eventually the 
'single' motion passed without a division.  
 
Stage VI: consideration in committee of the whole House on Ways and Means 
Having settled the quantum, the House had to decide how it was to be financed. The work of 
the Committee of Accounts fed into this side of the equation as the papers supplied by the 
administration showed how much each tax brought in.  
According to order, the House went into committee of the whole House on Ways and Means. 
This would be a substantial item of business, usually chaired by the same Member who 
chaired the Committee of Supply, at the end of which the committee produced resolutions 
which were reported to the House on the following sitting day.
403
 The resolutions made to the 
House took the form of specified duties on products for specified periods—for example: 
 'Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that towards the supply of [specified 
amount] granted to Her Majesty, an additional duty to be laid upon or silks and stuffs, made 
manufactured in Persia, China or the East Indies, which shall be imported into this kingdom 
from and after the ... 24th day of December, 1711. 




As with the report in the Committee of Supply, the end of the Committee on Ways and Means 
concluded with the House giving leave to the chairman of the committee and the law officers 
to draft and bring in heads of a bill on the basis of the resolutions.
405
 These procedures were 
in step with Westminster. 
 
Stage VII: the heads of money bill  
The heads of a money bill based on the resolutions were drafted by a small committee, which 
included the chairman of the committees of the whole House and a law officer, and would be 
brought in very quickly—possibly the following day—and were referred to a committee of the 
whole House on the next sitting day.
406
 The committee of the whole House met, according to 
the order, and prepared a report, which given the scrutiny already carried out was likely to 
proceed rapidly. A date for the House to consider the report would be ordered at the end of 
the committee of the whole House.
407
 According to order, the House considered the report, 
which would take the form of the standard formula that 'that they had gone through the 
[heads] paragraph by paragraph, and agreed thereto without any amendment, and delivered 
                                                        
 
399
  See CJI(II), pp.503, 507. 
400
  CJI(II), p.510 
401
  CJI(II), pp.511, 516 
402
  Addison Letters, pp.222-23  
403
  CJI(II), p.711  
404
  CJI(II), p.712  
405
  As above  
406
  CJI(II), p.713  
407





the same at the Table, where the same were agreed to by the House, [nemine 
contradicente]'.
408
 The House then ordered the chairman of the committee to take the heads 
to the lord lieutenant for transmission to Great Britain.  
 
Stage VIII: first and second reading of money bill 
The House re-assembled after the transmission recess to deal with the bills that had been sent 
back from London.
409
 At an early stage the money bill to enact the duties was presented to the 
House and given its first reading along with an order for second reading a few days later.
410
 
This was a largely formal process—with the money bill well down the list of bills presented 
and read—probably taking up little time in the House. In 1711 of the five bills given first 
reading on same day (Tuesday, 16 October) as the money bill three were ordered for second 
reading two days later, Thursday (18 October), and one other (tillage bill) for second reading 
on the Friday with the money bill. The bill was therefore within the normal timetable, perhaps 
in the slower lane.  
Development: in 1695 the House resumed, after the transmission recess, on 18 Nov but it was 
not until 30 Nov that the three supply bills
411
 were presented—by the chairman of the 
committees that examined supply and ways and means. As far as the CJI record the names 
of the Member presenting the bills; this was the pattern in the subsequent sessions.  
In 1711 second reading took place according to order on Friday (19 October) and the bill was 
committed to committee of the whole House six days later. Again this was a largely formal 
process probably taking up little time in the House. The timetable may have been slower than 




Development: each of the three supply bills in 1695 were given second readings and 
engrossed without committal.
413
 In 1697 the House made a standing order that all bill given a 
second reading had to be committed to committee; from this date all money bills were 
committed to committee of the whole House (see Appendix 6.13.1). 
 
Stage IX: bill consideration in committee of the whole House 
According to order, the House went into committee of the whole House to consider the bill as 
the last item of substantive business on Thursday, 25 October; the chair was taken by the 
same Member who had chaired the Committees on Supply and Ways and Means. The 
committee completed its work and the chairman informed the House that he was ready to 
report. The House ordered his report to be taken on the following Tuesday.
414
 The pattern of 
the previous legislative stages continued: not an excessive period but it appears long when 
most reports were ordered for consideration on the following day, though the majority were 
rolled forward to later dates. On Tuesday, 30 October, the report was made in the standard 
form that the committee had gone through the bill paragraph by paragraph without 
amendment. The House accepted the report as it ordered the bill engrossed.
415
 As is usual, 
no order for the next stage was made. 
                                                        
 
408
  CJI(II), p.718  
409
  The House had adjourned on 11 Aug and reassembled on 20 Sep and adjourned to 4, 10 and Oct because 
transmitted bills had not yet arrived (CJI(II), pp.719-20). 
410
  CJI(II), p.720 
411
  The first covered the draperies, wine, etc. (CJI(II), p.127); second the poll tax ((II), p.128); and third additional 
duties on beer, ales and liquors ((II), p.137). 
412
  CJI(II), p.722 
413
  CJI(II), pp.129, 129, 138 
414
  CJI(II), p.725 
415
  CJI(II), p.727 




Stage X: third reading 
The engrossed bill is given its third reading on Thursday, 1 Nov, and the House resolved that it 
'do pass' and ordered that it be carried to the Lords—it was carried by the chairman of the 
committee—for their concurrence.
416
 From 1695 it had been the custom for chairmen of 





Stage XI: House of Lords 
The bill was presented by the chairman to the Lords and immediately given its first and second 
reading and was ordered to be committed to a committee of the whole House for 
consideration on the following day, in order to 'inspect and consider of the said bill, and 
compare the same with the transmiss'.
418
 The committee reported to the House a few days 
later that it had gone through and agreed the bill without amendment. The House then read 
the bill a third time, resolved that it should pass into law and ordered that the House of 
Commons be informed accordingly.
419
  
Development: established practice in both London and Dublin was that once approved by the 
House of Lords supply bills were sent back to the House of Commons and were presented for 
royal assent by the Speaker.
420
 When on 30 Aug 1709, the day parliament was due to be 
prorogued, the Commons received message saying that the Lords had approved a money bill, 
the Commons requested a conference with the Lords at which the Commons pointed out that 
the Lords’ messengers had 'omitted to bring in and lay on the Table of the House of 
Commons the ... bill, as is usual in case of money bills'. The next entry in CJI corrected the 
Lords’ oversight to record that 'which bill the messengers delivered at the Table with the 
message'.
421
 The 'usual' practice was resumed. From 1715 Westminster practice was adopted 
and money bills were brought back to the Commons, allowing the House to underline its 




Stage XII: Royal Assent 
Royal assent was given to all the bills that had passed both Houses, including the money bill on 







                                                        
 
416
  CJI(II), p.728 
417
  See CJI(II), pp.129-30, 141. 
418
  LJI(II), p.402  
419
  LJI(II), p.408 
420
  See for example, LJE(XI), p.171, (XV), p.11, CJI(I), p.428, (II), pp.577, 677, 754. 
421
  CJI(II), pp.634-35 
422
  CJI(III), pp.20,159, 236, 441, 624 
423





6.15  Provisions in the 1707 Act limiting parliamentary privilege 
Provision in 1707 Act for explaining and regulating 
privilege of parliament (6 Anne c.8 g) 
Commentary 
I  Limited privilege to 40 days after prorogation as 
well as after dissolution; it was silent on, and 
therefore left in place, the 40 day pre-assembling 
moratorium 
The provision clarified and reduced the scope of the 1463/4 
Irish statute which had previously been the subject of 
dispute in parliament and the courts. The Irish statute did 
not follow the English Act which removed the 40 day rule 
and lifted privilege on adjournments of both Houses after 14 
days in respect of action in court but excluded the arrest of 
Members. Nor did the Irish statute replicate the English 
Act's explicit application to all those covered by 
parliamentary privilege, including menial servants (12&13 
William III (England) c.3). 
II Privilege discounted for purposes of statute of 
limitation, if the case pursued immediately after 
parliament rose 
The provision reduced the scope of the 1463/4 statute; 
previously litigants had to petition for the lifting of privilege; 
the wording of the 1707 Irish provision followed the 
equivalent English provision of 1701 closely, though with 
the addition of requirement for immediate action on the 
rising of parliament. 
III Lawful to distrain goods and chattels of 
Members for arrears of rent, duty or service 
owing 
The provision reduced the scope of the 1463/4 statute; 
previously promulgated as an order of the Commons in 
1697; this provision was implicit in the English statute cited 
at I above but not while parliament was sitting.  
IV MP or peer acting as trustee, guardian, 
executor or administrator not covered by 
privilege 
The provision reduced the scope of the 1463/4 statute; 
previously promulgated as a standing order of the 
Commons in 1695. There was a standing order made by 
the Westminster House of Commons on 2 Nov 1691 




V Debts or duties owed to queen were not covered 
by privilege but the MP or peer debtor could not 
be arrested or imprisoned. 
The provision reduced the scope of the 1463/4 statute; the 
wording of the 1707 Irish provision followed the equivalent 
English provision of 1701, though not as closely as II above. 
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  CJE(X), p.544 
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6.16  Publications aimed as affecting passage of legislation425 
Publication Outcome 
The case of the creditors of Sir Abel Ram, Kt, deceased, humbly presented 
to the honourable, the knights, citizens and burgesses in parliament 
assembled (n.p., [1695]) 
Legislation failed in 1695 in 
Commons (Bill no. 5101) and 
in English Privy Council in 
1698 (Bill no. 5160) 
Sir John Eustace’s case, concerning the bill of Chancellor Eustace, and a 
bill presented in parliament. (n.p., [1697]) 
Legislation enacted: 9 
William III c.12 (private) (Bill 
no.2561) 
The address of the people called Quakers, living in the countrey: relating to 
a bill intituled, An act for the more easie recovery of tythes, &c. Humbly 
offered to the parliament of Ireland (n.p., [1697]) 
Legislation failed in English 
Privy Council in 1697 (Bill no. 
5148) and in 1698 in 
Commons (Bill no. 3977)  
To the knights, citizens and burgesses of the Honourable House of 
Commons in this present Parliament assembled &c. The humble petition 
and case of the poor prisoners for debt, in the Marshalsea, of the four-
courts, and the city of Dublin (n.p., [1698]) 
Two bills enacted in 1698: 10 
William III c.1 (Bill no.0789) 
and 10 William III c.9 (Bill 
no.1067) 
The case of Geffry Blake a Protestant, the eldest son of Walter Blake, of 
Drum, in the West-Liberties of Gallway, Esq; humbly offer’d to the 
consideration of the Honourable the House of Commons (n.p., [1703?]) 
Legislation failed in 
Commons in 1697 (Bill 
no.5139), 1698 (Bill no.5162) 
and in Commons in 1703 (Bill 
no.2441) 
The Case of Francis Lynch of Dublin, Merchant, in reference to a Complaint 
made against him to the Honourable the House of Commons, of a breach 
of Privilege, by Mr Jeffrey Blake (n.p., [1703?]) 
The case of Lieut. Col. Redmond Morres, eldest son of Sir John Morres of 
Knockagh, in the county of Tipperary, baronet [sic]; humbly offer’d to the 
consideration, of the Honourable the House of Commons (n.p., [1703]) 
Legislation enacted: 2 Anne 
c.6 (private) (Bill no. 2707) 
The case of David Power, the younger, of the city of Dublin, gent. a 
Protestant (n.p., [1703]) 
Legislation failed in 
Commons in 1703 (Bill 
no.2767) 
The case of the Roman catholics of Ireland in relation to the bill against the 
growth of popery and other bills now under consideration (n.p., [1703 or 
1704]) 
Legislation enacted: 2 Anne 







No proviso included  
An impartial relation of the several arguments of Sir Stephen Rice, Sir 
Theobald Butler, and Councillor Malone, at the bar of the house of 
commons of Ireland, Feb. 22. and at the bar of the house of lords, Feb. 
28th. 1703. against passing the bill then under consideration of the said 
houses. Intituled an act to prevent the further growth of popery (Dublin, 
1704) 
The case of George Mathew Junr. of Thurless in the County of Tipperary, in 
the kingdom of Ireland, Esq; and of Martha his wife, in relation to a Bill 
lately transmitted from Ireland for Her Majesty’s approbation in Council, 
intitled, An Act to prevent the growth of popery (n.p., [1703]) 
Reasons humbly offer’d for the maintaining a clause in the bill to prevent 
the further growth of Popery in Ireland: notwithstanding the endeavours 
and objections of George Matthews, Esq; against it (n.p., [1703]) 
The case of George Mathew Junr. of Thurless in the County of Tipperary, in 
the kingdom of Ireland, Esq; and of Martha his wife, in relation to a Bill 
lately transmitted from Ireland for Her Majesty’s approbation, in favour of 
Chichester Phillips, Esq. (n.p., [1703]) 
Legislation failed in English 
Privy Council in 1703/4 (Bill 
no.2787) 
A timely caveat of the inferiour clergy of Ireland, against a bill entituled, an 
act for purchasing glebes, &c. (London, 1704) 
Legislation failed in Lords in 
1703/4 (Bill no.5067) 
An act for vesting the estate of Sir Thomas Hackett knt. in trustees, and for 
impowering them to sell the same for payment of his debts, if the value 
thereof amount to so much (n.p., [1705]). 
Legislation enacted: 4 Anne 
c.3(private0 (Bill no. 2597) 
The case of the Right Honourable Francis Lord Conway, in answer to the 
case of Sr. John Rawdon Barrt. [sic] in relation to a bill now under the 
consideration of the Honourable the House of Commons of Ireland 
(Dublin, 1705) 
Legislation failed in 
Commons in 1705 (Bill 
no.2503) 
Reasons humbly offered to the Honourable the House of Commons. 
Against the heads of a bill now in that Honourable House, entituled; A bill 
to supply the defects of several Acts of Parliament made in this kingdom, 
for the keeping of schools (n.p., [1705]) 
Legislation failed in 
Commons in 1705 (Bill 
no.3673) 
                                                        
 
425
  List drawn from Bergin, 'Irish Legislative Procedure', pp.273-74; publications reviewed are listed in bibliography. 





6.17  Matters examined by Committee on the State of the Nation  
Dates operating Issues examined 
Oct 1692 Not identified (CJI(II), pp.26, 28) 
Sep 1695 Infrequency of parliaments, ill-effects of the encouragement of Catholics, illegal dispensing of 
the Act of Settlement (CJI(II), pp.65, 69)
426
 




Nov 1698 Not identified (CJI(II), pp.268, 272) 
Sep-Nov 1703 Distressed condition of the country concerning the sufferings and services of the Protestants, 
decay of trade, absence of coin, threats to liberties, charges levied by the Trustees for 
Forfeited Estates, malicious reports circulated about Protestants, infrequency of 
parliaments, presentments of co. Cork grand juries (CJI(II), p.333, 335)
428
 
May-July 1705 Pamphlets and other publications attacking the Church of Ireland divided Protestants and 
saying mass and preaching and teaching in separate congregations promoted Popery and 
James III, magistrates needed to enforce the law strictly, no scope for seminaries other than 
those of the Church of Ireland (CJI(II), pp.468, 472) 
July 1707 Arrangements for filling vacancy when the lord lieutenant died, surrendered office or left the 
country, legality of Alderman Page's presentment and the attorney general should act on it 
to initiate prosecutions (CJI(II), pp.506, 512) 
Nov 1715–May 1716 Military establishment [and other matters?] (CJI(III), pp.12, 20, 23, 28, 37, 95) 
Sep 1723 Wood's copper halfpence and financial matters (CJI(III), pp.319-23) 
Oct 1729–Apl 1730 Tillage and shortage and quality of coin (CJI(III), pp.589, 613, 647) 
 
  
                                                        
 
426
  Instruction to bring in heads supporting Protestant purchasers given; two heads introduced but did not progress 
Bill nos.2056 and 5190 (ILD) 
427
  A bill on the former had just been enacted but found to be defective and was amended in 1697; a heads to prevent 
grand juries raising money came before the House on 2 Dec but did not progress (Bill no.2366 (ILD)). 
428
  Representation made to Anne on 22 Oct 1703 and to be printed, which was then deferred (CJI(II), pp.342, 345-46, 
365, 367, 391, 393-94) 
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6.18  Holidays and fast days 
6.18.1  Regular anniversaries kept by the House of Commons 
Date Reason First record 
29 May Restoration of Charles II 1705
429
 
1 Aug Accession of George I 1719 
23 Oct Anniversary of outbreak of 1641 war 1692
430
 
4 Nov Birthday of William III (merged with 5 Nov) 1703
431
 
5 Nov Anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot 1698
432
 




                                                        
 
429
  The House never sat on this day in any earlier session, although the House did not sit regularly in May before 
1705. No CJI entry appointing a preacher until 1710 ((II), p.720). 
430
  The House did not sit on 23 Oct 1695 or 23 Oct 1703 during business weeks, though there is no CJI entry 
appointing a preacher until 1709 ((II), p.586), though in 1707 the House met in order to go to Church ((II), p.559). 
431
  In 1692 the House had intended to sit on 4 Nov but prorogued peremptorily on 3 Nov (CJI(I), pp.34-36); in 1695 
and 1697 the House had been adjourned apparently waiting for bills to arrive (pp.115, 212); the House sat on 4 
Nov 1698 (p.262), but not 5 Nov 1698; 3 Nov 1703, that is 18 months after William's death, the House was 
reminded that 4 Nov was the birthday of King William 'of glorious Memory, our delivery from Popery and slavery' 
and that 5 Nov was commemoration of the Gunpowder Plot so the House adjourned until 6 Nov (II, p.358). 
432
  Since 1692 the House had not sat on 5 Nov; the House sat on 4 Nov 1698 (CJI(II), p.262), but not 5 Nov 1698; 3 
Nov 1703 House was reminded that 5 Nov was commemoration of the Gunpowder Plot so the House adjourned 
until Saturday (II, p.358). The House met on 5 Nov 1711, 'in order to go to church' (II, p.731). First reference to 
preacher is 1710 (II, p.720). 
433





6.19  Divisions    . 
6.19.1  Recorded divisions before 1692
434
 
 Date  Yeas Noes Total 
1 18 Oct 1614  95 78 173 
2 10 Nov 1614  64 62 126 
3 29 Apl 1615  62 77 139 
4 03 May 1615  74 83 157 
5 05 May 1615  54 90 144 
6 05 May 1615  71 91 162 
7 16 May 1615   88 80 168 
 Average majority 15 Average number voting 153 
- 17 Nov 1634   69 78 147 
       
1 04 Mar 1640/1   -
435
  
2 05 Mar 1640/1   -
21
  
3 27 May 1641  92 83 175 
4 27 May 1641  61 65 126 
5 25 Jun 1641  56 67 123 
6 25 Jun 1641  56 64 120 
7 07 Aug 1641  50 50 100 
8 11 Jan 1641/2  28 38 66 
9 06 Aug 1642  18 14 32 
10 18 Dec 1643  22 25 47 
11 08 Apl 1644  26 28 54 
12 17 Apl 1644  21 19 40 
13 24 Feb 1645   16 13 29 
14 07 Nov 1646  -
436
   
 Average majority 5  Average number voting 88 
1 20 Jun 1661   -21  
2 24 Jul 1661  56 50 106 
3 24 Jul 1661  56 53 109 
4 10 Sep 1661  20 21 41 
5 24 Apl 1662  41 24 65 
6 23 May 1662  42 64 106 
7 27 May 1662  62 50 112 
8 27 May 1662  58 53 111 
9 20 Jun 1662   -
21
  
10 28 Jun 1662  -
22
   
11 01 Jul 1662  53 49 102 
12 01 Jul 1662  -
22
   
13 18 Jul 1662  40 27 67 
14 02 Aug 1662  47 30 77 
                                                        
 
434
  Figures taken from CJI; tellers not included 
435
  Noes are recorded as being in majority 
436
  Ayes are recorded as being in majority 
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 Date  Yeas Noes Total 
15 13 Aug 1662  63 55 118 
16 13 Aug 1662  61 55 116 
17 18 Sep 1662  45 29 74 
18 23 Sep 1662  48 40 88 
19 02 Mar 1662/3  29 54 83 
20 02 Mar 1662/3  53 27 80 
21 09 Nov 1665  61 53 114 
22 09 Dec 1665  64 74 138 
23 15 Dec 1665  61 94 155 
24 16 Dec 1665  93 74 167 
25 23 Dec 1665  45 37 82 
26 22 Feb 1665/6  37 20 57 






6.19.2  Recorded divisions after 1692
437
 
Date Yeas Noes Total Stayed in chamber 
Sat 05 Oct 1695 94 116 210 Yeas 
Tues 15 Oct 1695 53 155 208 Not recorded in CJI 
  
1695 104 104 208
438
 Not recorded in CJI 
Tues 22 Oct 1695 105 84 189 Not recorded in CJI 
Fri 25 Oct 1695 128 79 207 Noes 
  
1695 114 81 195 Noes 
Fri 25 Oct 1695 121 77 198 Noes 
Thurs 21 Nov 1695 57 31 88 Not recorded in CJI 
Mon 02 Dec 1695 62 58 120 Noes 
Fri 06 Dec 1695 43 49 92 Yeas 
Sat 07 Dec 1695 38 35 73 Noes 
Tues 11 May 1697 64 45 109 Noes 
Fri 13 Aug 1697 117 84 201 Yeas 
Wed 25 Aug 1697 70 63 133 Yeas 
Tues 07 Sep 1697 34 22 56 Noes 
Thurs 09 Sep 1697 61 35 96 Yeas 
Tues 14 Sep 1697 34 42 76 Noes 
   
44 39 83 Yeas 
Wed 15 Sep 1697 70 63 133 Yeas 
Mon 20 Sep 1697 84 51 135 Yeas 
Wed 22 Sep 1697 30 43 73 Yeas 
   
56 41 97 Noes 
Tues 23 Nov 1697 92 68 160 Noes 
Wed 05 Oct 1698 35 48 83 Yeas 
Thurs 13 Oct 1698 72 101 173 Noes 
   
105 55 160 Yeas 
Sat 15 Oct 1698 94 64 158 Yeas 
Sat 22 Oct 1698 72 80 152 Yeas 
   
85 77 162 Noes 
   
66 94 160 Noes 
Mon 24 Oct 1698 85 92 177 Yeas 
Tues 15 Nov 1698 38 90 128 Noes 
Mon 21 Nov 1698 49 98 147 Noes 
Fri 25 Nov 1698 34 25 59 Noes 
Wed 30 Nov 1698 56 60 116 Noes 
   
63 80 143 Noes 
Tues 27 Dec 1698 70 40 110 Noes 
Tues 03 Jan 1698/9 74 34 108 Yeas 
Tues 17 Jan 1698/9 105 41 146 Yeas 
Wed 18 Jan 1698/9 59 40 99 Yeas 
Mon 23 Jan 1698/9 48 89 137 Yeas 
Tues 24 Jan 1698/9 61 28 89 Yeas 
                                                        
 
437
  All figures are taken from CJI, except those indicated otherwise in footnotes. A dotted line indicates a transmission 
recess, a continuous black line end of a session and a thick black line end of a parliament. 
438
  The Speaker gave his vote with yeas (ayes). 
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Date Yeas Noes Total Stayed in chamber 
Average number voting 134 % won by those staying in 
chamber (where recorded) 
55% 
Average majority 25 
Mon 27 Sep 1703 116 111 227 -
439 
Tues 28 Sep 1703 131 59 190 -
440 
Thurs 7 Oct 1703 88 141 229 -
441 
Thurs 14 Oct? 1703 123 119 242 -
442
 
Sat 16 Oct 1703 98 104 202 Not recorded in CJI 
Wed 3 Nov 1703 138 88 242 -
443
 
Fri 11 Feb 1703/4 82 125 207 Yeas 
   
108 100 208 Noes 
Tues 29 Feb 1703/4 44 39 83 Yeas 
Wed 28 Feb 1704/5 76 142 218 Not recorded in CJI 
Mon 19 Mar 1704/5 66 88 154 Not recorded in CJI 
Thurs 31 Jul 1707 73 93 166 Not recorded in CJI 
   
75 72 147 Not recorded in CJI 
Tues 21 Oct 1707 84 64 148 Yeas 
Fri 24 Oct 1707 52 64 116 Noes 
Sat 25 Oct 1707 29 39 68 Noes 
Mon 27 Oct 1707 46 40 86 Noes 
Tues 28 Oct 1707 65 53 118 Noes 
Sat 11 Jun 1709 74 68 142 Yeas 
Sat 18 Jun 1709 36 63 99 Yeas 
   
30 62 92 Noes 
Mon 20 Jun 1709 39 89 128 Yeas 
Wed 22 Jun 1709 79 52 131 Yeas 
Fri 12 Aug 1709 147 59 206 Yeas 
Thurs 08 Jun 1710 65 130 195 Yeas 
Sat 14 Jul 1711 84 39 123 Yeas 
Wed 24 Oct 1711 105 109 214 Yeas 
Mon 29 Oct 1711 116 101 217 Noes 
   
108 109 217 Yeas 
Average number voting 154 % won by those staying in 
chamber (where recorded) 
47% 
Average majority 25 
Wed 25 Nov 1713 127 131 258 -
444
 
Fri 27 Nov 1713 131 114 245 Noes 
Tues 1 Dec 1713 127 121 248
445
 Not recorded in CJI 
                                                        
 
439
  SP, 63–363, no.74(stamped 242-43) ([Chief Secretary Southwell to Secretary of State Nottingham], 2 Oct 1703); it 
is unclear why the division is not recorded in the CJI. 
440
  SP, 63–363, no.74(stamped 242-43); is unclear why the division is not recorded in the CJI. 
441
  SP, 63–363, no.85(stamped 218-19) (Southwell to Nottingham, 9 Oct 1703); Committee of Supply 
442
  BL, Add. 28,891 f.135 (Lt.-Gen. William Steuart to John Ellis, 14 Oct 1703); [committee of the whole House?] 
443
  SP, 63–363 no.117(stamped 135-38) ([Southwell to Nottingham], 4 Nov 1703); Committee of Ways and Means 
444
  Division on election of the Speaker; yeas went to right, noes to left—see p.172 above. 
445





Date Yeas Noes Total Stayed in chamber 
Tues 8 Dec 1713 95 149 244
446
 Not recorded in CJI 
Wed 9 Dec 1713 82 73 155 Not recorded in CJI 
Fri 11 Dec 1713 81 140+ 221 Not recorded in CJI 
Mon 14 Dec 1713 108 119 227 Not recorded in CJI 
   
115 118 233 Not recorded in CJI 
Wed 16 Dec 1713 120 122 242
447
 Not recorded in CJI 
Thurs 17 Dec 1713 117 109 226
448
 Not recorded in CJI 
Fri 18 Dec 1713 136 110 246
449
 Not recorded in CJI 
   
135 101 236
450
 Not recorded in CJI 
   
135 89 224 Not recorded in CJI 
Tues 22 Dec 1713 135 75 210
451
 Yeas 
Average number voting 230 
 
 
Average majority 24 
 
 
Wed 23 Nov 1715 117 57 174 -
452
 
Wed 14 Dec 1715 51 154 205 -
453 
Sat 21 Jan 1715/6 85 46 131 Ayes 
Wed 30 May 1716 124 60 182 -
454
 
Wed 6 Jun 1716 133 16 149 Ayes 
Mon 16 Sep 1717 51 46 97 Ayes 
Sat 7 Dec 1717 32 30 62 Noes 
Mon 27 Jul 1719 71 106 177 Ayes 
   81 93 173 Noes 
Mon 26 Oct 1719 19 50 69 Noes 
Tues 26 Sep 1721 73 47 120 Ayes 
Sat 14 Oct 1721 94 102 196 Not recorded in CJI 
  1721 98 91 189 Ayes 
Sat 21 Oct 1721 24 63 87 Ayes 
Tues 7 Nov 1721 76 63 139 Ayes 
Sat 11 Nov 1721 70 49 119 Ayes 
                                                        
 
446
  Division in the Committee of Privileges and Elections (Midleton Letters (1248/3/138-139) ([Alan Brodrick], to 
[Thomas Brodrick], 9 Dec 1713)) 
447
  CJI(II), p.767 (16 Dec 1713) recorded a division on whether to remove reference to lord chancellor in a motion and 
that 'on a division it passed in the negative'; figures Perceval Diaries, p.133. 
448
  CJI(II), p.768 (17 Dec 1713) recorded a division on the petition to unseat an MP for Belfast; figures Perceval 
Diaries, p.133. 
449
  CJI(II), p.769 (18 Dec 1713) recorded a division on a motion that lord chancellor had acted against his duty and 
Protestant interest; figures Perceval Diaries, p.135. 
450
  CJI(II), p.770 (Dec 1713) recorded a division on a decision to address Anne; figures Perceval Diaries, p.136. 
451
  CJI(II), p.772 (22 Dec 1713) recorded a division on a decision not to adjourn consideration of state of city of 
Dublin; figures Perceval Diaries, p.137. 
452
  SP, 63–373(stamped 256) (Lords Justices to Secretary of State Stanhope, 23 Nov 1715); 'orders of the day be 
read'; it is unclear why it is not recorded in the CJI . 
453
  SP, 63–373(stamped 304) (Lords Justices to Stanhope, 13 Dec 1715); it is unclear why it is not recorded in the 
CJI. 
454
  BL, Add. 47088 f.65 Charles Dering to Lord Perceval, 1 June 1716); a division in the committee of the whole 
House on the state of the nation 
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Date Yeas Noes Total Stayed in chamber 
Sat 9 Dec 1721 80 150 230 Ayes 
Mon 11 Dec 1721 114 94 208 Noes 
Sat 13 Jan 1721/2 52 14 66 Noes 
Tues 16 Jan 1721/2 52 18 70 Ayes 
Thurs 10 Oct 1723 92 31 123 Noes 
Sat 19 Oct 1723 89 88 177 Ayes 
Mon 21 Oct 1723 87 47 134 Noes 
Tues 5 Nov 1723 54 89 143 Noes 
Wed 6 Nov 1723 54 48 102 Noes 
Thurs 14 Nov 1723 38 80 118 Noes 
Fri 20 Dec 1723 128 12 140 Ayes 
Tues 24 Dec 1723 56 60 116 Noes 
Mon 3 Feb 1723/4 76 89 165 Ayes 
Fri 7 Feb 1723/4 55 85 140 Ayes 
Tues 26 Oct 1725 99 96 195 -
455
 
Tues 26 Oct 1725 78 98 176 Ayes 
Fri 12 Nov 1725 105 114 217 -
456
 
Mon 15 Nov 1725 93 114 207 Ayes 
   122 71 193 Ayes 
   83 111 194 Ayes 
Fri 19 Nov 1725 98 66 164 Noes 
Mon 13 Dec 1725 50 67 117 Noes 
Thurs 16 Dec 1725 38 62 100 Ayes 
Thurs 27 Jan 1725/6 8 103 111 Noes 
Average number voting 146 
% won by those staying in 
chamber 
56% 
Average majority 32 
 
 
Wed 20 Dec 1727 80 72 152 Ayes 
   79 72 151 Ayes 
   72
457
 72 144 Ayes 
   71 72 143 Ayes 
Wed 24 Jan 1727/8 92 71 163 Noes 
Thurs 1 Feb 1727/8 42 33 75 Noes 
Fri 2 Feb 1727/8 119 60 179 Ayes 
Mon 5 Feb 1727/8 74 66 140 Noes 
Fri 9 Feb 1727/8 43 38 81 Ayes 
Thurs 15 Feb 1727/8 68 68
458
 136 Ayes 
   79 53 132 Ayes 
Mon 19 Feb 1727/8 101 78 179 Ayes 
   101 78 179 Ayes 
Fri 15 Mar 1727/8 73 12 85 Ayes 
                                                        
 
455
  Coghill Letters, no.18 (To Edward Southwell, 30 Oct 1725), SP, 63–386(stamped 214-15) (Lord Chancellor West 
to [Secretary of State Newcastle], 26 Oct 1725; [a division in committee of accounts or whole House?] 
456
  Coghill Letters, no.19 (To Edward Southwell, 18 Nov 1725), this is a division in committee of the whole House. 
457
  The Speaker gave his vote with ayes. 
458





Date Yeas Noes Total Stayed in chamber 
Mon 8 Apl 1728 38 47 85 Noes 
Fri 17 Oct 1729 50 51 101 Ayes 
Fri [7 Nov?] 1729 93 90 183 -
459
 
Mon 10 Nov 1729 75 63 138 Noes 
Fri 
[11 
Nov?] 1729 97 93 190 -
460
 
Sat 29 Nov 1729 40 36 76 Ayes 
Sat 6 Dec 1729 47 93 140 Noes 
Wed 10 Dec 1729 67 52 119 Ayes 
Fri 19 Dec 1729 124 62 190 -
461
 
  1729 99 127 126 Ayes 
Sat 20 Dec 1729 75 14 89 Ayes 
   95 21 116 Ayes 
Mon 9 Mar 1729/30 46 29 75 Ayes 
Thurs 12 Mar 1729/30 75 52 127 Ayes 
Mon 16 Mar 1729/30 54 93 147 Ayes 
Mon 13 Apl 1730 65 31 96 Ayes 
Average number voting 131 
% won by those staying in 
chamber 
74% 
Average majority 24 
 
 
    
For 1695 to 1730    









                                                        
 
459
  Coghill Letters, no.61 (To Edward Southwell, 13 Nov 1729); [committee of the whole House?] 
460
  Coghill Letters, no.61; it is unclear which figures are ayes and which noes; [committee of the whole House?]. 
461
  Coghill Letters, no.63 (To Edward Southwell, 20 Dec 1729); [committee of the whole House?] 
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6.20  Comparison of Perceval diaries and Journal entries on timing 
of sittings 





Committee of the whole 
House on 'corn bill' 
(Bill no. 3923, ILD) sat 
from noon to 6pm. 
One substantial item taken (another 
committee of the whole House) 
before noon; corn or tillage bill 
taken in committee of the whole 
House was main item of business; 
House adjourned the Committee of 
Elections and Privileges due to sit 
that day; no substantive business 
after 6pm. 
Perceval dovetails with the Journal and 
shows the committee due to meet at 
4pm had to be adjourned; Journal 
entries for two committees of the 
whole House are identical but time 




Resumed debate on the 
corn bill from 1pm to 
5pm when the bill was 
rejected; followed by 
division on a motion; 
candles brought in; 
debate on the motion 
which was withdrawn 
after lengthy debate. 
Business before 1pm consisted of 
routine thanks for a sermon, a 
second reading, two petitions and a 
message from the lord lieutenant; 
after corn bill, division whether to 
proceed to orders of the day 
(negatived); no business recorded 
after that; all committees adjourned. 
The Journal and Perceval can be 
reconciled: the pre-1pm business 
appears light, though one petition 
may have taken some time; all 
committees were adjourned as the 
House sat after 4pm but no entry for 
candles; division on orders was to 
decide whether to allow the motion; 





Long debate on an 
address to lord 
lieutenant for papers 
until 6pm with two 
divisions. 
One minor item before the debate; 
then the debate on address and no 
following business; candles brought 
in. 
The Journal and Perceval are in step; 






Opening day of 
session: House sat 
from 11am; 
summoned to the 
House of Lords at 
2pm; House returned 
and divided on the 
choice of Speaker. 
House 'went up' to attend the lord 
lieutenant in the House of Lords; 
House returned and divided on 
choice of Speaker; no timings 
included. 







the House till 3pm; 
then election petitions. 
Before addresses Members took 
oaths and leave was given for 
heads of a bill; addresses agreed 
with amendments; followed by 
three election petitions 
The Journal and Perceval are in step; 
any item generating amendments 
recorded in the Journal is likely to 




Debate on the door-
keeper’s fees 
concluded with 
referral to a 
committee, then at 
noon House went to 
the Castle; at 4pm the 





No reference to a debate, referral to 
committee nor to the election of the 
chairman; items recorded were 
summons to attend, an election 
petition referred to the Committee 
of Elections and Privileges and an 
order for papers. 
A possible divergence between 
Perceval and the Journal; but in each 
case it is possible to construct a 
reconciliation—for example, the fees 
debate concluded with an intention to 
appoint a committee in the future; the 
division on the chairman may have 
taken place as a proceeding of the 
committee, not the House—Tuesday, 
4pm was its scheduled meeting time 
and there is no indication that the 




Debate until 3pm on 
taking a Jacobite into 
custody, who was 
arrested before the 
House rose. 
Before the debate on custody, 
papers brought to the bar, requests 
made for other papers, leave was 
given for heads of a bill, which 
appears to have given rise to some 
debate; after the Jacobite debate, 
appointment of committees on an 
address and heads of a bill and 
then a report from the Committee of 
Elections and Privileges and two 
election petitions, report of the 
arrest, three Members took oaths 
and other matters. 
Broad overlap between Perceval and 
the Journal, though the business 
after 3pm is substantial and looks 
likely to have run on past 4pm, there 
was no order for committees, 
including the Committee of Elections 










At 7pm on division the 
House rejected 
adjournment on the 
Dublin election 
petition; sat to 11pm. 
Before the Dublin case, the House 
heard a report from the Committee 
of Elections and Privileges on 
Randalstown election, some papers 
were presented and the House 
ordered the arrest of all Catholics in 
the gallery; during the Dublin 
debate the House ordered candles 
to be brought in. 
The Journal and Perceval are 
consistent. The Randalstown case 
was drawn-out and may have 




House sat till 9pm on 
the Dublin election. 
 
Items before the resumed debate 
included orders for papers, orders 
to attend; the Committee of 
Elections and Privileges due to 
meet that day was adjourned until 
Tuesday and the debate was 
adjourned to 9am on Monday. 
The Journal and Perceval are 
consistent. Although the committee 
due to meet at 4pm was adjourned, 





No need to mention the 
proceedings because 
the Votes show them; 
Perceval then records 
further information on 
the Dublin election 
case including 
resolutions, which are 
recorded in the 
Journal of 15 Dec. 
Journal shows resumed debate as 
second item after papers were 
delivered. The debate seems to 
have continued to late as all 
committees were adjourned and 
candles were brought in. 
Perceval endorses the Journal for 14 
Dec;  
Perceval records two divisions not in 







Decision on Belfast 
election petition taken 
in the morning; report 
from committee on 
proceedings against 
Edward Lloyd at noon, 
debate and sitting 
continued to 1am; 
division; House sat to 
after 2am. 
Records resolution that no magistrate 
can have an ordinary vote and 
casting vote—the issue in the 
Belfast case; debate on the report 
on proceedings against Edward 
Lloyd opened at noon and then 
adjourned to 4pm when it resumed. 
Hayton points out that Speaker 
Brodrick gave a different version: the 
sitting, although scheduled to begin 
at noon, in fact began late.
463
 It may 
be that Perceval is using the Votes 
when writing up his diary. An 
exceptional day that culminated in a 
decision (on a division not recorded 





Two sittings; second 
started at 3pm and 
the main item of 
business was the 
Dublin election. 
The morning session included 
several substantive items; the 
House was summoned to the Lords 
to see the lord lieutenant give royal 
assent; Journal says the House 
adjourned to 4pm when the main 
item of business was a report on 
Roscommon election. 
Perceval’s items of business are 
included but the order in the Journal 
does not fit with what he says; a day 




                                                        
 
462
  Perceval Diaries, p.132, fn 30, Hayton points out that the entry is corroborated in BL, Add. 38157, fol. 33. 
463
  Perceval Diaries, p.134, fn 39, Hayton points out that according to Speaker Brodrick the sitting on this day, 
although scheduled to begin at noon, in fact began late. Committee report to which Perceval refers was not read 
until after dinner, there having first been another debate, lasting two hours, and an adjournment (Surrey History 
Centre, 1248/3, f.142, Alan to Thomas Brodrick, 19 Dec 1713). 
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6.21  30 July 1711, items considered 'according to Order' and 
'orders of the day' 
Previous entries Monday 30 July 1711 Subsequent entries 
 Preliminary business: 
Member sworn and leaves of 
absence granted. 
Note: 30 July was two weeks 
before 'transmission' 




16 July (Mon): House ordered 
leave given for heads of a bill 
on vagabonds and vagrants 
(Bill no. 4087, ILD), Sir William 
Fownes, Cadwallader Edwards 
and John Moore to prepare and 
bring in heads [No subsequent 
entry until 30 Jul.] 
 
Heads of a bill on vagabonds 
and vagrants to reform 
Henrican statute 
According to order, Fownes 
presented the heads of a bill, 
it was committed to a 




31 July (Tues): according to Order, House 
went into committee of the whole House; 
Fownes reported progress and leave was 
given to sit again on 3 Aug; 
3 Aug (Wed): according to Order, House 
went into committee of the whole House; 
progress was reported and leave given to 
sit again on 6 Aug; 
6 Aug (Mon): no entry, covered by resolution 
'That all Orders of the Day, not proceeded 
on, be adjourned till tomorrow' 
10 Aug (Fri): House resolved to consider the 
heads in committee of the whole House on 
14 Aug [i.e. no further action before recess] 
[No further entries before recess; not 
enacted. Next attempt to legislate was in 
1717 which failed (Bill no. 2334, ILD); 
legislation enacted in the 1720s (Bills nos. 




9 Oct 1703: leave was given (to 
Sir Richard Levinge (Attorney 
General) for heads for a bill to 
prevent Nicholas Bourke, a 
Papist, from disinheriting 
Thomas Bourke, a Protestant, 
on account of his religion (Bill 
no. 2453, ILD) 
Petition from Nicholas and 
Thomasine Bourke seeking 
leave for heads of a bill to 
sell land 
Committee appointed 




examine allegations, ordered 
to meet at 5pm that day and 
to have power to send for 




Committee did not report. 
10 Oct 1717: leave given for heads for a bill 
(Henry Rose) for confirming the sales 
already made of part of [the estate of 
Nicholas Bourke and Thomasine his wife], 
and for sale of the residue thereof, for 
payment of debts, and making provision for 
[Nicholas Bourke and Thomasine his wife] 
(Bill no. 5194, ILD); [no further progress] 










Previous entries Monday 30 July 1711 Subsequent entries 
 
17 July (Tues): financial papers 
presented by the accoumptant 
general and receiver general; 
according to order, House 
considered the lord lieutenant’s 
speech, resolved to grant a 
supply and to consider in 
committee of the whole House 
on 19 Jul 
19 July (Thurs): according to 
order, House went into 
Committee of the whole House 
on supply which was ready to 
report, the House ordered it to 
report on 20 Jul; the House 
requested further papers 
20 July (Fri): Gustavus Hamilton 
reported the lord lieutenant 
would order papers to be 
supplied; according to order, 
Stephen Ludlow for committee 
reported, the House agreed 
resolutions and resolved to 
consider further on 26 July in 
committee of the whole House; 
Committee of Accounts (86 
Members) appointed and 
papers referred to it 
21 July (Sat): Clerk of Paper 
Office presented papers which 
were referred to the Committee 
of Accounts 
26 July (Thurs): the House 
resolved to go into committee of 
the whole House on 28 July to 
consider supply; surveyor 
general delivered papers which 
were referred to the Committee 
of Accounts 
27 July (Fri): clerks' and officers' 
petition for recompence referred 
to Committee of the whole 
House on Supply 
28 July (Sat): Samuel Dopping 
reported for Committee of 
Accounts, the report of which 
was referred to committee of 
the whole House; House went 
into Committee of the whole 
House on Supply and Stephen 
Ludlow reported that it was 
ready to report; the House 
ordered the report to be made 
on 30 Jul 
Committee of Supply  
According to order, Stephen 
Ludlow reported from the 
Committee of Supply that a 
supply be granted, the House 
accepted the resolutions and 
resolved that the committee 
meet again on 1 Aug at noon; 
 
1 Aug (Wed): committee of the whole House 
met and reported that it was ready to make 
a further report; report set for 2 Aug 
2 Aug (Thurs): Stephen Ludlow for committee 
reported and the House agreed supply 
resolutions and resolved to sit as 
Committee of Ways and Means on 4 Aug 
4 Aug (Sat): Committee of Ways and Means 
met and Stephen Ludlow reported that it 
had come to several resolutions and the 
House ordered the report be made on 6 
Aug 
6 Aug (Mon): Stephen Ludlow reported the 
resolutions which the House agreed with 
some amendments, nemine contradicente; 
the House gave leave given for heads to be 
drafted with Ludlow, Sir Richard Levinge 
(Attorney General), Francis Bernard 
(Solicitor General) and John Jephson to 
draft the heads 
7 Aug (Tues): Ludlow presented the heads, 
which were read and the House committed 
them to a committee of the whole house to 
meet at noon following day 
8 Aug (Wed): committee of the whole House 
considered the heads and the House 
ordered it to report on 10 Aug 
10 Aug (Fri): Ludlow reported from the 
committee and the House agreed the heads 
nemine contradicente and ordered Ludlow 
to present the heads to lord lieutenant for 
transmission  
16 Oct: bill returned from London, presented 
and subsequently proceeded through all 
stages 
9 Nov: royal assent given (Bill no. 3036, ILD; 
11 Anne c.1) 
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Previous entries Monday 30 July 1711 Subsequent entries 
 Motion that address be made 
to the lord lieutenant to have 
Dominick Langton, Friar, 
struck off the Establishment 
for malicious allegations 
against Protestant gentlemen 
of Westmeath and entering 
association against queen 
and ministry 
Committee appointed 
(chairman: John Moore with 
26 Members)
465
 to examine 
allegations, meet at 5pm that 
day and have power to send 
for papers persons and 
records; requested papers 
from lord lieutenant 
Privy Counsellors were sent to 








31 July (Tues): Chief Secretary Edward 
Southwell reported that the lord lieutenant 
had agreed to direct the production of 
papers 
6 Aug: Moore reported against Langton and 
in favour of striking him off 
6 Nov: full report from Oliver St. George on 
behalf of the committee on the whether a 
judge attending the House of Lords could 
appear before a Commons committee i.e. 
the Moore committee. Commons sought 
conference with Lords 










Previous entries Monday 30 July 1711 Subsequent entries 







16 July (Mon): the House ordered 
a committee (Attorney General 
Sir Richard Levinge, Mr 
Saunders [several in this 
parliament] plus 15 other 
Members)
466
 to consider 
methods for preventing 
mischiefs arising from the loss 
of records destroyed by fire 
17 July (Tues): House ordered 
privy counsellors to ask the lord 
lieutenant to direct officers who 
have suffered losses to give 
accounts of records and papers 
destroyed 
18 July (Wed): privy counsellors 
reported that the lord lieutenant 
agreed to give directions as 
requested 
25 July (Wed): attorney general, 
according to order, presented 
resolutions, which the House 
ordered to be considered by a 
committee of the whole House 
on 28 July at noon and it 
ordered officers whose papers 
survived the fire to present the 
papers 
27 July (Fri): surveyor general 
supplied papers surviving the 
fire which were referred to the 
committee  
28 July (Sat): no entry, covered 
by resolution 'That all Orders of 
the Day, not proceeded on, be 
adjourned till Monday next' 
[Requests for papers made and 
provided, provision not listed 
above.] 
Committee report on 
methods for preventing 
mischief arising from the 
loss of records destroyed by 
fire 
'To be taken into account by 
House on 31 July at noon and 
nothing to intervene; House 
ordered that books, maps and 
papers preserved from fire to 





31 July (Tues): House resolved to consider 
the report of the committee on 2 Aug at 
noon; papers referred to the committee 
2 Aug (Thurs): House resolved to consider 
the report of the committee the following 
day at 9am 
3 Aug (Fri): no entry, covered by resolution 
'That all Orders of the Day, not proceeded 
on, be adjourned till tomorrow' 
7 Aug (Fri): according to order, House went 
into committee of the whole House to 
consider the report and Levinge reported 
progress and sought leave to meet again 
and the House agreed and set 14 Aug [i.e. 
no further action before recess] 
[No further entries, though after the 
transmission adjournment an Irish Privy 
Council bill emerged which did not reach 
the statute book (Bill no. 5215, ILD); 
another failed in 1713 but an Irish Privy 
Council bill was enacted in the 1715–16 
session―Bill no. 1104, ILD; 2 George I c.5.] 





 edn)(III), p.830 
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Legislation originating in 
Commons had been brought 
forward in all sessions from 
1695 but had been rejected by 
London or Dublin Privy Councils 
(Bills nos. 3850-56, ILD) 
21 July (Sat): the House ordered 
leave be given for heads of a 
bill for the better securing the 
liberty of the subject and for 
preventing of imprisonment 
beyond the seas with 
Clotworthy Upton, Philip 
Savage (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), William Conolly, 
Stephen Ludlow and Sir 
Richard Levinge (Attorney 
General) to prepare and bring in 
the heads (Bill no. 3857, ILD) 
25 July (Wed): Member, 
according to order, presented 
heads of a bill and they were 
committed to a committee of the 
whole House on 28 Jul 
28 July (Sat): No entry, covered 
by the resolution 'That all 
Orders of the Day, not 
proceeded on, be adjourned till 
Monday next' 
Heads of a bill for the better 
securing the liberty of the 
subject and for preventing of 
imprisonment beyond the 
seas 
House resolved to go into 
committee of the whole House 






2 Aug (Thurs): No entry, covered by 
resolution 'That all Orders of the Day, not 
proceeded on, be adjourned till tomorrow' 
[No further entries.] 
Later legislative attempted failed in 1713 and 
1715 (Bills no. 1373, 3858, ILD) 
 
Legislation originating in 
Commons had been brought 
forward in the 1703, 1709 and 
1710 sessions  
had failed (Bills nos. 5056, 2952, 
2953, ILD) 
16 July (Mon): House ordered 
leave be given for heads of a 
bill for ease of paying quit-rents, 
etc and Stephen Ludlow, John 
Silver, Sir Richard Levinge 
(Attorney General), George 
Rochfort, John Jephson, Philip 
Savage (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), Richard Thompson 
and Edmond Echlin to prepare 
and bring in heads (Bill no. 
2954, ILD) 
26 July (Thurs): Ludlow, 
according to order, presented 
heads of a bill and they were 
committed to a committee of the 
whole House on 30 Jul; and the 
committee was empowered to 
receive clauses 
Heads of a bill for ease of 
paying quit-rents, etc 
House went into committee of 
the whole House and Ludlow 
reported progress and leave 
was given to sit again 
tomorrow morning 
 
31 July (Tues): the House resolved to 
consider in committee of the whole House 
on 2 Aug at noon 
2 Aug (Thurs): No entry, covered by 
resolution 'That all Orders of the Day, not 
proceeded on, be adjourned till tomorrow' 
6 Aug (Mon): Ludlow reported that 
Committee of the whole House met and 
ready to report; the House ordered the 
report be made on 8 Aug 
8 Aug (Wed): Ludlow reported for the 
committee and the House agreed heads 
and sent Ludlow to the lord lieutenant with 
them for transmission to Britain; [Returned 
but did not emerge from House of Lords. 
Future attempts at legislation failed in 
London Privy Council or House of Lords 





Previous entries Monday 30 July 1711 Subsequent entries 
 
 
Previous legislation originating in 
the Commons had been 
enacted in 1707 (Bill no. 1647, 
ILD). 
21 July (Sat): the House ordered 
leave be given for heads of a 
bill preventing lotteries, for 
exposing goods for sale by lot 
and St. John Brodrick, George 
Macartney, William Conolly, 
Oliver St. George and John 
Silver to prepare and bring in 
heads 
24 July (Tues): St. John Brodrick, 
according to order, presented 
heads of a bill and committed to 
committee of the whole House 
on 27 Jul 
27 July: committee of the whole 
House ready to report and the 
House ordered the report be 
made on 30 Jul 
Heads of a bill for preventing 
lotteries, for exposing goods 
for sale by lot 
St. John Brodrick reported for 
committee of the whole House 
and the House agreed the 
report agreed and the heads 
were sent to the lord 
lieutenant for transmission to 
Britain―Ludlow presented 
them to the lord lieutenant 
 
 
15 Oct: bill returned, presented and 
subsequently proceeded through all stages 
9 Nov: royal assent (Bill no. 1648, ILD; 11 
Anne c.6) 
 
[Previous bill enacted in 1709 
(Bill no. 2777, ILD; 8 Anne c.6 
(private)), failed attempt at 
amending legislation in 1710 
(Bill no. 2778, ILD).] 
19 July (Thurs): petition from Sir 
John Rawdon for leave for a 
heads presented and read; the 
House appointed a committee 
(Marmaduke Coghill and 12 
Members) to examine 
allegations and was 
empowered to send for papers 
persons and records and to 
adjourn from time to time 
20 July (Fri): Coghill reported the 
allegations proved; the House 
agreed and gave leave to same 
committee to draft heads of a 
bill and power to send for 
persons 
25 July (Wed): Coghill presented 
the heads, which were received 
and read and committed to 
committee of the whole House 
on 27 Jul 
27 July (Fri): Coghill reported the 
committee had considered the 
heads and was ready to report 
and the House ordered the 
report to be made on 30 Jul 
Heads of a bill for explaining 
an act for the relief of 
Dorothy Rawdon, spinster 
Coghill reported from the 
committee of the whole House 
and the House agreed the 
report and sent the heads 
sent to lord the lieutenant for 
transmission to 
Britain―Coghill presenting 
them to the lord lieutenant 
17 Oct: bill returned, presented and 
subsequently proceeded through all stages 
9 Nov: royal assent (Bill no. 2778, ILD; 11 
Anne c.3 (private)) 
 
27 July (Fri): the House ordered 
that the adjourned debate on an 
amendment to the heads of a 
bill for frauds committed by 
tenants be further adjourned to 
30 Jul 
[Business not considered]  
31 July (Tues): according to Order, the 
House proceeded to the adjourned debate 
on the amendment, and the amendment 
was not made; the House sent heads of a 
bill to lord lieutenant for transmission to 
Britain. [Subsequently enacted (Bill no. 
1490, ILD; 11 Anne c.2)] 
28 July (Sat): the House ordered 
that all Orders of the Day, not 
proceeded on, be adjourned till 
Monday next 
'That all Orders of the Day, not 
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6.22  Petition requirements  
a) Representations to the Commons had to be in the form of a petition, which 
addressed the House of Commons using a standard formula and the petition set out 
a request, allegation or grievance concluding with a 'prayer', that is a request for 
action by the House; it was not acceptable to write a letter to the Commons.
467
 
b) Petitions had to be on parchment.
468
 
c) The petition had to be signed.
469
 
d) Petitions had to be 'be presented by a Member of the House, or called upon to be 
read by a Member'.
470
 
e) An MP complained of in a petition had to be given notice of the petition
471
 and a 
Member making complaint about another Member had to bring the petition to the 
House of Commons, not the House of Lords.
472
  
f) The procedure was for a petition to be read to the House, the House took a 
preliminary view on whether to accept or reject;
473
 if accepted, the House began a 
process of consideration—most often, sending it to a committee—leading to an 
'answer', which was approved by order of the House, or rejected.
474
 (The committee 
stage was usual for petitions concerned with legislation; in contrast a petition seeking 
release from confinement by the serjeant-at-arms would often be dealt with 
summarily.) 




                                                        
 
467
  CJI(I), p.25  
468
  CJI(I), pp.263, 572 Not repeated after 1662. 
469
  CJI(II), p.14  
470
  CJI(I), p.206 (15 May 1641); see also (I), p.369 where the House ordered the postponement of consideration of a 
petition until an MP was present. 
471
  CJI(I), pp.206 (15 May 1641), 595 (19 Nov 1662); in the 1640s it appears that notice could take the form of an 
order of the House to consider the petition on a specified day, by the 1660s the requirement was to show the 
petition to MP. It was likely that the House would order the postponement of consideration of a petition until MP 
who was directly complained of in a petition was present—see (I), pp.429, 524. 
472
  CJI(I), p.497; see also Dennehy, Administrative History, pp.45-46. 
473
  An order that a petition should 'lie on the Table'—either to allow more time for consideration or as implicit 
rejection—does not appear, on basis of electronic search, in the 1613–66 CJI and appears be post 1692 
development.. A procedure which was used by the middle of the seventeenth century and later was that where a 
petition 'is absolutely rejected this House, and by the Clerk of this House, with the vote of the same, is torn into 
pieces and not suffered to remain' ((I), p.229). The House did order in 1662 a petitioner to amend his petition—(I), 
p.643. 
474
  CJI(I), p.326; in middle of the seventeenth century the House sometimes bypassed investigation and consideration 
in committee to take a decision immediately on acceptance of a petition—for example, (I), p.306 (15 Aug 1642). 
475
  CJI(I), p.206 (13 May 1641); the House gave permission for petitioner to amend his petition; (I), p.310 (13 Dec 




































First parliament of William III and Mary II, 1692–93; called 5 Oct 1692; dissolved 26 June 1693 
1 (1692) 25 19 0.8 2 3 (1) 0 0 
Second parliament of William III, 1695–99; called 27 Aug 1695; dissolved 14 June 1699  
1 (1695) 165 201 1.2 9 31 (3) 20 (9) 1 
2 (1698) 80 57 0.7 9 5 (2) 3 (0) 0 
First parliament of Anne, 1703–13; called 21 Sep 1703; dissolved 6 May 1713 (1699–1703) 48 
1 (1703) 80 100 1.3 3 24 (7) 9 (5) (1703–04) 4 
2 (1705) 58 55 0.9 8 11 (1) 8 (5) (1704–05) 4 
3 (1707) 68 85 1.3 1 14 (3) 7 (5) (1705–07) 13 
4 (1709) 68 65 1.0 4 19 (3) 6 (4) (1707–09) 3 
5 (1710) 51 29 0.6 0 6 (1) 6 (2) (1709–10) 6  
6 (1711) 53 21 0.4 0 5 (0) 5 (3) (1710–12) 5 
Second parliament of Anne, 1713–14; called 25 Nov 1713; dissolved 1 Aug 1714 (death of monarch) 
1 (1713) 26 22 0.8 0 0 0 2 
Parliament of George I, 1715–27; called 12 Nov 1715; dissolved 11 June 1727 (death of monarch) 
1 (1715) 93 87 0.9 0 5 (0) 7 (3) 3 
2 (1717) 69 52 0.8 0 3 (0) 2 (1)  
3 (1719) 68 51 0.8 0 9 (0) 9 (6)  
4 (1721) 73 51 0.7 0 10 (0) 0   
5 (1723) 95 69 0.7 0 13 (1) 11 (6)  
6 (1725) 76 44 0.6 4 11 (0) 7 (7)  
Parliament of George II, 1727–60; called 28 Nov 1727; dissolved 25 Oct 1760 (death of monarch) 
1 (1727) 82 106 1.3 0 3 (0) 3 (2)  
2 (1729) 97 50 0.5 5 5 (0) 5 (4)  
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  HoP(1690)(I), p.531 
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6.24  Petitions: content of selected petitions     . 
6.24.1  Petitions to House of Commons in the session 1698–99 seeking private 
legislation 
No. Requested measure Petition Initial action Member in charge Outcome
477
 
1 Petition of Geoffrey Blake 
To prevent Geoffrey Blake's father, a 
Catholic, from disinheriting him* 
Note: this was the second attempt to 
obtain legislation; an attempt in the 
previous session failed; and a third 
attempt in 1703 reached the English 
Privy Council where it was rejected 
and see pp.117ff above and 
Appendix 6.16. 








heads of a 
bill 
Col. Eyre Although 
committee 
revived Jan 





further progress;  
2 Petition of corporation of felt-makers 
To prevent the deceits and abuses in 
making hats and felts 
Note: this was the third attempt to 
obtain legislation; attempts in 1692 
and 1695 had failed as did a final 
attempt in 1703; they never got 
beyond the Commons 








John Weaver Sr. Committee 
reported in 
favour of heads, 
1 Nov; no further 
progress 
3 Petition of John Northcote and others 
For the relief of his majesty’s 
Protestant subjects, commonly 
known by the name of the 'Galway 
prisoners' 
Note: counter-petition slowed progress 










favour of heads 
of a bill, 25 Nov; 
counter-petition 
heard 30 Nov; to 
committee 3 Jan; 
reported 5 Jan; 
sent for 
transmission 9 
Jan; rejected by 
Irish Privy 
Council 
4 Petition of guardian, James Leigh 
For enabling John Baker, a minor, to 
raise money on his estate for the 
payment of his brother’s and sisters’ 
portions. 
Note: opposition of a relative may 
have stymied legislation 









heads of a 
bill 
Edward Singleton Counter-petition 




5 Petition of Henry Owen 
To enable Henry Owen to sell his 
estate for payment of debts and 
legacies 
30 Nov  Francis 
Bernard to 
bring in 
heads of a 
bill 
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6.24.2  Petitions in the 1703–04 session seeking private legislation 
No. Requested measure Petition Initial action Member in charge Outcome
481
 
1 Petition of Mary Poor alias 
Penefather, and others 
For the confirming an award 
made by the court of 
exchequer  
27 Sep  Leave given for 












Enacted: 2 Anne c.5 
(private) (Bill no. 
2766, ILD) 
2 Petition of Chichester Phillips 
To prevent George Matthews, a 
papist, and Martha, his wife, 
from barring a remainder 
limited to Chichester Phillips* 
28 Sep  Henry Tenison 
ordered to 
bring in heads 










25 Oct George and 
Martha Matthews’ 
counter-petition to be 
heard against heads 
were rejected; Coghill 
heads presented to 
lord lieutenant; 
English Privy Council 
rejected (Bill no. 
2687, ILD) 
3 Petition of Jeffrey Blake
484
 
For settling part of the estate of 
Walter Blake to prevent the 
disherison of Jeffrey Blake, on 
account of his being a 
protestant* (see pp.117ff 
above and Appendix 6.16)  
29 Sep  John Forster 
and Col. Eyre 
and named 
MPs ordered 
to bring in 
heads of a bill 
John Forster 
reported heads; 
committed to a 
select committee 
from which Sir 
Francis Blundell 
reported 
30 Oct Walter and 
Thomas Blake’s 
counter-petition to be 
heard against heads 
were rejected; heads 
presented to lord 
lieutenant but 
rejected by English 
Privy Council 
4 Petition of Redmond Morres 
To prevent the disinheriting of 
Redmond Morres, [because he 
is a Protestant]* 






bring in heads 
of a bill 
Robert Molesworth 
reported heads; 





Enacted: 2 Anne c.6 
(private) (Bill no. 
2707, ILD) 
5 Petition of Nicholas Nugent 
To prevent Nicholas Nugent 
being disinherited because he 
was a Protestant* 





bring in heads 







committed to a 
select committee  
22 Oct heads sent to 
select committee; 25 
Oct counter-petition 
by Richard Nugent, 
who was given 
permission to be 
heard at bar; no 
record of progress 
after 19 Nov when 
heads ordered to lie 
on the Table (Bill no. 
2725, ILD) 
6 Petition of Randal Acton 
To replicate English laws on felt-
making in Ireland 
7 Oct  Rejected   
7 Petition of Richard Delamer 
To allow Richard Delamer to 
mortgage or sell part of his 
estates 









bring in heads 
of a bill 
Edward Wingfield; 





18 Oct heads 
committed; 8 Nov 
counter-petition by 
Edward Delamer and 
House agrees to hear 
him at the bar; no 
further progress (Bill 
no. 2530, ILD) 
                                                        
 
481




 edn)(III), p.29 
483
  As above 
484
  See pp.117ff above. 
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No. Requested measure Petition Initial action Member in charge Outcome
481
 
8 Petition of Hollow Swordblades 
corporation 
To enable the corporation for 
making of Hollow Swordblades 
to take conveyances on lands 
in Ireland 
9 Oct  Petition to lie on 
Table 
- Does not progress 
9 Petition of Lady Hellen 
Flemming and others 
For sale of the lands of Sir Justin 
Aylmer, baronet, for payment 
of debts 







bring in heads 
of a bill 
Robert Rochfort 
committed to a 
select committee 
with instruction 
to hear all 
concerned 
21 Oct heads sent to 
select committee; 27 
Oct counter-petition 
from Sir Justin and 
House agreed he 
could be heard at bar; 
no record that 
committee reported 
(Bill no. 2415, ILD) 
11 Petition of minister and 
churchwardens of St. Mary’s 
To empower the church wardens 
of St. Mary's parish, Dublin, to 
distrain money for finishing the 
parish church of St. Mary's 





bring in heads 
of a bill 
Robert Rochfort; 
committed to a 
committee of the 
whole House 
Enacted: 2 Anne c.9 
(private) (Bill no. 
2127, ILD) 
12 Petition of mayor, etc. of Cork 
To make St. Mary Shandon a 
parish church in Cork 
21 Oct  Committee 
ordered to 
prepare a 
clause to be 
added to the 
bill 
Thomas Erle; 
committed to a 
committee of the 
whole House 
Enacted: 2 Anne c.8 
(private) (Bill no. 
1291, ILD); the Act 
also provided for 
cleansing the channel 
of Cork harbour  
13 Petition of Thomas Bell and 
others 
For the relief of the Protestant 
creditors of Walter Kennedy 
[i.e. to enable him to sell or 
mortgage land]* 
 





of a bill and to 
hear all parties 
William Conolly; 






29 Oct no record that it 
reported; 11 Nov 
counter-petition of 
Ruth Kennedy, heard; 
15 Nov heads 
rejected (Bill no. 
2641, ILD) 
15 Nov further petition 
by Bell rejected  
14 Petition of John Baker 
For heads of a bill to provide 
relief of Mr John Baker in 
recompense of his father 
Colonel Henry Baker’s service 
at the siege of Londonderry 





of a bill and to 





John Foster and 
William Conolly 
added to the 
committee on 29 
Oct 
Petition withdrawn (Bill 
no. 2418, ILD) 
[perhaps on the basis 
that an alternative 
arrangement had 
been secured] 
15 Petition of Anne-Margaret Wall 
For relieving Anne-Margaret 
Wall, spinster of debts incurred 
by her father 










of a bill and to 
hear all parties 
[Morley 
Saunders?] 
Not fully recorded in 
Journals; was 
rejected by English 
Privy Council (Bill no. 
5070, ILD) 
16 Petition of Hugh Montgomery 
and others 
To replace lost documents and 
to sell the lands of Francis de 
la Rue, deceased for payment 
of debts 







of a bill and to 
[Anderson 
Saunders?] 
No heads brought in 
(Bill no. 2698, ILD) 










No. Requested measure Petition Initial action Member in charge Outcome
481
 
hear all parties 
17 Petition of Margaret Culme 
For relief of Margaret Culme [of 
debts] 






draft heads of 
a bill, and 
ordered to 
hear all parties 
[Sir William 
Parsons?] 
No heads brought in 
(Bill no. 2521, ILD) 
18 Petition of Thomas Bourk 
To prevent Nicholas Bourk, a 
Papist, from disinheriting 
Thomas Bourk, a Protestant, 
on account of his religion* 









of a bill and to 
hear all parties  
[Sir Richard 
Levinge?] 
No record that the 
select committee 
reported (Bill no. 
2453, ILD) 
19 Petition of Sir Robert Newcomen 
and others  
For charging the estates of all 
the Irish papists restored by 
the articles of Limerick for 
rebuilding the bridge over the 
River Shannon, which was 
broke down by the Irish papists 
in the late rebellion* 










draft heads of 
a bill  
Edward Wingfield; 
committed to a 
committee of the 
whole House 
22 Nov committee 
reported and heads 
sent to the lord 
lieutenant; the heads 
were rejected by the 
Irish Privy Council 
(Bill no. 0284, ILD) 
20 Petition of Anthony Hammond 
For the relief of Anthony 
Hammond, guardian to 
Valentine Browne, commonly 
called Lord Kenmare, etc. 
against trustees 
30 Oct  Sent to a select 
committee to 
consider the 
truth of the 
petition with 
power to send 
for persons 





speak at the 
committee 
[Robert Johnson?] Representations heard 
at the bar and then 
the petition was 
rejected (Bill no. 
2465, ILD) 
21 Petition of David Power 
To enable David Power to settle 
a jointure on his present wife, 
or any after-taken wife, and to 
charge his real estate with 
portions for his younger 
children 






of a bill and to 
hear all parties 
Robert Rochfort Heads of a bill 
presented and re-
committed; no record 
of further progress 
(Bill no. 2767, ILD) 
22 Petition of Sir Hans Hamilton 
For the sale of part of the estate 
of Sir Hans Hamilton, for 
payment of debts and for other 
purposes 






draft heads of 
a bill, and 
ordered to 




but all members 
to have voice 
Enacted: 2 Anne c.3 
(private) (Bill no. 
2602, ILD) 













 edn)(III), p.95 
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No. Requested measure Petition Initial action Member in charge Outcome
481
 
23 Petition of Francis Edgeworth 
To enable trustees to sell part of 
the estate of Arthur Culme, 
esquire, deceased, for 
payment due to Francis 
Edgeworth 
8 Nov  Sent to a select 




draft heads of 
a bill, and 
ordered to 













no heads agreed by 
House (Bill no. 2522, 
ILD) 
24 Petition of John Leslie, dean of 
Dromore 
To dispose of part of [the estate 
of Reverend Dean John Leslie] 
towards satisfaction of his 
creditors 
8 Nov  Sent to a select 




draft heads of 
a bill and 
ordered to 
hear all parties 
William Conolly No heads brought in 
25 Petition of Gideon Johnson 
For selling part of Colonel John 
Browne’s estate 















Edward Wingfield Parallel heads in Lords; 
bill sent to Commons 
on 3 Mar but did not 
pass (Bills nos. 2465-
67, , ILD) 
 * Explicit sectarian dimension 
 
  





 edn)(III), p.103 
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Note on private bills enacted during the 1703–04 session of the Irish parliament
492
 
Act Long title Originating body 
2 Anne c.1 
(Bill no. 
2739, ILD) 
To confirm the sales, fee farms and leases made by James, duke of Ormond, 
and Charles, earl of Arran, and to enlarge a period for making fee farms until 
Michaelmas 1705, and to enable the earl of Arran to sell lands to the value of 
£100 per annum if need be. 
Irish Privy Council 
2 Anne c.2  
(Bill no. 
2786, ILD) 
For the relief of Richard, lord viscount Ross, and Frances Parsons his sister. Irish Privy Council 
2 Anne c.3  
(Bill no. 
2602, ILD) 
For the sale of part of the estate of Sir Hans Hamilton, baronet, for payment of 
his grandfather’s debts and for other purposes. 
Petition to Irish 
House of Commons 
2 Anne c.4  
(Bill no. 
5376, ILD) 
For vesting certain lands and hereditaments of James Stopford, esquire, lying 
in the county of Meath in trustees to be sold for payment of debts and 
portions and for other purposes. 
Irish Privy Council 
2 Anne c.5  
(Bill no. 
2766, ILD) 
For the confirming an award made by the honourable the barons of Her 
Majesty's Court of Exchequer, between Mary Poor alias Penefather, Richard, 
William, and Thomas Poor, and Walter Stephens, esquire, and for securing 
and settling the several interests as are therein designed and appointed. 
Petition to Irish 
House of Commons 
2 Anne c.6  
(Bill no. 
2707, ILD) 
To prevent the disinheriting of Redmond Morres, esquire. Petition to Irish 
House of Commons 
2 Anne c.7  
(Bill no. 
2499, ILD) 
To prevent the disinheriting of Captain Garret Coghlan, a Protestant in her 
majesty’s service. 
Irish Privy Council 
2 Anne c.8 
(Bill no. 
1291, ILD) 
For cleansing the channel of the harbour of Cork. Petition to Irish 
House of Commons 
2 Anne c.9  
(Bill no. 
2127, ILD) 
To empower the church wardens of St Mary's parish, Dublin, to distrain for 
money already applotted or hereafter to be applotted for the finishing the 
parish church of St Mary's, and the same for finishing the parish church of St 
Paul's. 
Petition to Irish 
House of Commons 
 
  
                                                        
 
492
  Kelly, Poynings's Law, pp.131-32, examines the private legislation enacted in this session. He speculates that the 
process meant that, when a private bill was contested because of the genuine commitment to provide fairly from 
all parties in family segments, opposition often meant it failed. He considers that the records are not, however, 
such as to allow for the reasons for rejection in the British/English Privy Council to be firmly established. 
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6.24.3  1711 session petitions seeking private legislation493 
Requested measure Petition Initial action Member in charge Outcome
494
 
Petition of Sir John Rawdon 
For amending an act for the 
relief of Dorothy Rawdon, 
spinster (8 Anne c.6 (private). 
19 July 
1711 
To select a committee (13 
Members)
495
 to consider 
allegations in petition 
empowered to call for 
persons, papers and 
records; same committee 
drafted and brought in 
heads on 25 July which 
were committed to a 
committee of the whole 
House that reported on 30 
July 





Petition of John Walsh 




To select a committee (12 
Members)
496
 to consider the 
truth of the allegations in the 
petition empowered to call 
for persons; same 
committee drafted and 
brought in heads on 1 Aug 
which were committed to a 
committee of the whole 
House which reported on or 









Petition of Sir Thomas Hackett 
To enable part of an act 
enabling the sale of Sir 
Thomas Hackett’s estate to be 
repealed, for the benefit of 




To lie on the Table; 23 July to 
a select committee (12 
Members)
497
 to consider the 
allegations in the petition, 
empowered to call for 









Petition of the Countess of 
Tyrone and others 
To enable the countess of 
Tyrone, to set leases of the 
estate of the earl for a term not 
exceeding 31 years 
23 July 
1711 
To a select committee (14 
Members),
498
 to consider 
allegations in the petition, 
empowered to call for 
persons, papers and 
records; same committee 
drafted and brought in 
heads on 28 July which 
were committed to a 
committee of the whole 









Petition of Nicholas and 
Thomasine Bourk  
To enable Nicholas and 
Thomasine Bourk to sell lands 
to pay debts 
30 July 
1711 
To select a committee (17 
Members),
499
 to consider 
allegations in the petition, 
empowered to call for 
persons, papers and 
records 
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  Entries based on CJI except were indicated otherwise 
494
  One bill enacted at end of session originated in Irish Privy Council: To vest the inheritance of certain lands in the 
barony of Ibaune and Barryroe in the county of Cork in Francis Bernard, esquire, and his heirs, and to vest certain 
terms for years in the said lands in Stephen and Peter Ludlow, esquires, respectively, in trust for the said Francis 
Bernard, pursuant to an agreement made between the said Francis Bernard and William Pen, senior, and William 
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Ulster Historical Foundation: http://www.ancestryireland.com 
Alumni Oxonienses 1500–1714: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/alumni-oxon/1500–1714 
British History Online: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/Default.aspx 
Cambridge Alumni Database: http://venn.lib.cam.ac.uk/Documents/acad/intro.html 
Five Colleges Archives and Manuscript Collection: 
http://asteria.fivecolleges.edu/findaids/sophiasmith/mnsss283_bioghist.html 
Gray's Inn, Register of Admissions 1521–1889: 
https://archive.org/stream/registerofadmiss00gray#page/n0/mode/2up 
History of Parliament: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/ 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers: 
http://parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk/marketing/index.jsp 
Inner Temple Admissions Database: http://www.innertemplearchives.org.uk/index.asp  
Irish Genealogy Database: https://www.irishgenealogy.ie/en/ 
Irish Legislation Database, Queen’s University Belfast: 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/ild/?func=help&section=links 
legislation.gov.uk: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/changes/chron-tables/private/intro 
Lincoln's Inn, records of: 
http://www.archive.org/stream/recordshonorabl05englgoog/recordshonorabl05engl
goog_djvu.txt 
Middle Temple, Register of Admissions to 1781: 
http://archive.middletemple.org.uk/Shared%20Documents/MTAR/MTAR%20–
1501–1781.pdf 
National Archives: http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
Peerage Database: http://www.thepeerage.com 
Registry of Deeds Index Project Ireland: http://irishdeedsindex.net/search/index.html 
Ulster Historical Foundation: http://www.ancestryireland.com/ 
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